by David Grant
Having weathered new attempts to solicit the Silver Shields’ defection, this time by Ptolemy who had anchored at Zephyrium in Cilicia (modern Mersin, and surely with an eye on the riches in Cyinda), and with Antigonus now fast on his heels and attempting to subvert the crack brigade again, Eumenes marched south with the new recruits to Phoenicia in early spring 317 BCE.122 He planned to ‘… assemble a considerable fleet, so that Polyperchon, by the addition of the Phoenician ships, might have control of the sea and be able to transport the Macedonian armies safely to Asia against Antigonus whenever he wished.’ A new fleet could, vitally, oust Cassander’s garrison from Piraeus. But the outcome was disastrous: laden with ‘great sums of money’, the ships’ captains defected to Antigonus’ approaching fleet ‘splendidy adorned’ from its recent victory over Cleitus who, along with Arrhidaeus the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, had defected in the face of Antigonus’ aggression – helped on (we suggest) by Olympias’ pleas for support. Eumenes and the ill-fated Rhodian fleet admiral, Sosigenes, watched on powerless to intervene as his working capital (whether destined for Polyperchon or use rather closer to the Hellespont) was rowed away.123
Eumenes had clearly dug deep into the reserves at Cyinda using the royal mandate, despite his earlier feigned reluctance. To rebuild and equip something like 20,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, the numbers Eumenes had under him at Orcynia and the minimum force he could expect to face Antigonus with again, would have required something approaching 2,000 talents per year, accounting for infantry basic pay (misthos) and the ration allowance (siteresion). Mercenary infantry were paid a minimum of 4 obols per day and as much as 6 (a drachma), and cavalry twice this sum, or more, when accounting for the extra provisioning of their mounts.124 Treasury coffers had to additionally cover the cost of winter billeting, the requisitioning of consumables, and the manufacture of new weapons and armour.
With the nucleus of a new land army still about him, but with his paths back to Cilicia and into Asia Minor blocked, and with an Antigonid army of 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry heading his way, Eumenes was once again left with little choice in the matter of direction. He headed east through Coele-Syria and into Mesopotamia on his way to the further eastern satrapies, for they held more promise and less prejudice against his own Greek origins. Eumenes must have already heard rumours of eastern satrapal unrest, and this was a situation he could potentially exploit.125
WAR IN THE EAST: FIGHTING FOR THE APOSKEUE
Eumenes’ army, still insufficiently large for a set piece battle, arrived in Mesopotamia, or northern Babylonia, sometime in late 317 BCE and wintered in the ‘villages of the Carians’.126 More letters had conveniently ‘appeared’ from the kings to assist his passage:
He [Polyperchon] had already sent to the commanders of the upper satrapies the letter from the kings in which it was written that they should obey Eumenes in every way; and at this time he again sent couriers bidding the satraps all to assemble in Susiane each with his own army… for it was to him alone that the kings in their letter had ordered the treasurers to give whatever sum he should ask.127
The Mespotamian governor, Amphimachus, must have joined Eumenes at this point for he is later found in the allied ranks; this is an unsurprising realignment if he can be identified as the brother of Arrhidaeus the satrap of Hellespontime Phrygia who had already turned against Antigonus.128
Eumenes narrowly avoided disaster when Seleucus diverted an old canal to inundate his camp some 300 stades (approximately 34 miles) from Babylon. Overtures to the prominent Somatophylax, the governor of Babylonia, had failed; Seleucus replied that: ‘He was willing to be of service to the kings, but that he would nevertheless never consent to carrying out the orders of Eumenes, whom the Macedonians in assembly had condemned to death.’129 Rather predictably, Seleucus, along with the now-present Peithon son of Crateuas, once more attempted to seduce the Silver Shields by reminding them Eumenes was a ‘foreigner’ responsible for the deaths of many Macedonians; he and Peithon simultaneously sent dispatch riders to Antigonus to solicit his support in the East in a combined front.
Tarn proposed that Eumenes may have initially held the citadel in Babylon with his 15,000 infantry and agema of 300 cavalry, but this seems unlikely and he was harried further east into the Persian heartland when Seleucus, under truce, conceded Eumenes a river crossing, only too glad to see him head out of his province.130 Nevertheless, with the Susa royal treasury now open to him under the ‘kings’ decree’, and guided by Alexander’s continually invoked spirit, Eumenes would soon be in command of a force to be reckoned with, and it would soon significantly include war elephants from India.131
A roman copy of a Greek bust of Seleucus found at Herculaneum and now at the Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Napoli. Photo by Massimo Finizio.
The eastern satraps and some 18,700 infantry and 4,600 cavalry with 120 elephants had already assembled at Susiane (ancient Elam, the region centred on Susa and extending to the south) under the command of Peucestas, a fortuitous gathering if Eumenes could exploit it. The alliance was precipitated by the mutual threat from Peithon, who had killed the Parthian satrap and installed his own brother, Eudamus, in his place, whereupon those fearing his further expansion combined to force him back to Media; this was the precursor to his presence with Seleucus in Babylonia.132
News of this unrest (if not its immediate outcome) would have reached Eumenes long before; the Achaemenid kings (and possibly the Assyrians before them) had established an elaborate system of lookout posts (skopai) and relay stations (stathmoi) located every 12 to 17 miles along the network of Persian Royal Roads from Sardis in Lydia to Ecbatana in Media, and onto Susa. Couriers, signal-fires and specially trained ‘criers’ made for same-day communications empire-wide; though mounted royal messengers could physically traverse the 1,600-mile Royal Road from Sardis to Susa in some seven days (conventional travel required ninety days) the Persian messaging system could avowedly send a basic voice communication from Susa to Greece in two days and nights.
Dispatch riders carried more detailed missives along the well-developed routes and there is evidence that homing pigeons were already in use; in his later sphere of influence, Antigonus would maintain the infrastructure ‘to have quick service in all his business’.133 And Peucestas, on Eumenes’ urging, put it to good use here when summoning by messenger in a single day a further 10,000 archers who were nevertheless a month’s march away.134
A map showing the most famous section of the network of Persian Royal Roads, here extending from Susa to Sardis.
Coded messages must have been used as a precaution against interception when seals alone provided insufficient protection. Plutarch first described the method of the coded message scroll, the skytale (‘stick’);135 he may have taken the explanation from Apollonius of Rhodes (3rd century BCE) in his treaty On Archilochus which would date its use as far back as the 7th century BCE (the time of Archilochus, the controversial poet-warrior).136 Thucydides, Xenophon, Aristophanes and Pindar all record the skytale’s use; it was known as a Spartan device which perhaps accounts for their laconic prose, for the message strip didn’t have room for more than the most rudimentary of text.137 No doubt something similar was employed in the Successor Wars: and a coded message was allegedly sent by Cassander to his father after Alexander’s death, so the conspiracy claims in the Pamphlet appear to have stated, and Eumenes, who had operated at the nerve centre of Alexander’s administration, would have been well placed to have developed a network of agents and informants across the troubled empire.138
Antigonus’ now even more formidable army was advancing on the treasury at Susa after successfully concluding a self-serving alliance with Seleucus and Peithon.139 He attempted to force a river crossing to establish a bridgehead close to where the 4-plethra-wide (approximately 400 feet) Coprates River flowed into the Pasitigris (the modern Karun), apparently unaware of the proximity of Eumenes, who, alone from the gathered commanders, led a repelling action that l
ed to the capture of 4,000 of Antigonus’ men.140 It was a disaster and Antigonus was forced to march north into Media after reviewing local options. He made a similarly costly decision by taking the short route (nine days) through the mountainous territory of the never-subdued Cossaeans, the unruly tribe that guarded the passes; this was the same tribe Alexander had butchered after the death of Hephaestion some seven years before. Their lingering hatred was poured down on the Macedonians in the form of rocks and arrows; Nearchus barely made it out alive with his advance brigade of lightly armed troops.141
While Antigonus retreated to Ecbatana, Eumenes and the Silver Shields commanders advocated returning to the Mediterranean coast with the eastern army, no doubt to exploit the vacuum created by Antigonus’ absence. The eastern satraps disagreed; fearing a split in the new coalition, Eumenes led the gathered forces on a twenty-four-day march to Persepolis though arid valleys, elevated plains, and finally hospitable parks in the densely populated country. When they arrived in the capital of Peucestas’ sphere of influence the army was fêted. The men were arranged in a remarkable series of concentric circles for a feast, which recalled the format of Alexander’s Susa wedding celebrations, and Peucestas was no doubt playing on just that.
But this would be no marriage. At Persepolis Peucestas prudently offered sacrifices to the memories of Alexander and his father, so perhaps more than we might suppose of the royal palace, or surrounding buildings at least, must have survived Alexander’s firing of the former Achaemenid capital some thirteen years before. Eumenes, here termed Peucestas’ former ‘friend’ (though ‘colleague’ may once again be implied), sensed the eastern satraps were attempting to beguile his men.142 Plutarch captured the scene:
Moreover, by flattering the Macedonian soldiery extravagantly and lavishing money upon them for banquets and sacrifices, in a short time they made the camp a hostelry of festal prodigality, and the army a mob to be cajoled into the election of its generals, as in a democracy.143
Uniquely popular with the Persians for his adoption of their language and customs, Peucestas controlled the wealth of Persis and Pasargadae and what remained of Persepolis itself, though much of the treasury had already been ferried to Susa, a clear target for all.144 The question of supreme command inevitably arose.
To counter the seduction, Eumenes drafted a fake letter written in Assyrian and claimed it had arrived from Orontes, the Persian satrap of Armenia, a known friend of Peucestas and one who had previously fought for Darius at Gaugamela. Its contents falsely claimed the hostile Cassander was dead, Olympias was in control of Macedonia, and Polyperchon was making good on his earlier offer to march through Asia with the royal army from Macedonia.145 If true, it would have signified a tide turned, and Eumenes’ influence as Pella’s favourite son would have been unquestioned. The gambit worked: Eumenes was voted in ‘… with the prospects that he would be able by help of the kings to promote whomever he wishes and exact punishment from those who had wronged him.’ As part of his plan to further undermine his host, and using his new authority, Eumenes brought false charges against Sibyrtius, the Greek satrap of Arachosia and another close friend of Peucestas; Eumenes seized his baggage ‘… to overawe those who did not obey him or who craved command’, and Sibyrtius may have immediately fled to join Antigonus.146
There followed a financial manipulation intended as an insurance policy; Eumenes extorted 400 talents from those whose loyalty he questioned calculating that they would prefer him alive to receive repayment in full.147 ‘The consequence was that the wealth of others was his body-guard, and that, whereas men generally preserve their lives by giving, he alone won safety by receiving.’148 The continued fragility of Eumenes’ position was evident: his Macedonian campaign veterans were now serving an outlaw while being hounded around an empire they had themselves fought to secure; furthermore, they were being hunted by strategoi and Somatophylakes they had previously served under. The cost of fealty to the new kings in Pella was beginning to take its toll, and the promised treasury silver was fading to the duller and unpredictable tincture of argent.
Eumenes’ subterfuges, by now a wholly necessary and integral part of his arsenal, could only have ever been shortlived, and, somewhat suspiciously when considered beside the central allegations of regicide in the Pamphlet, Eumenes fell seriously ill a few days after the banquet Peucestas and his friends had thrown.149 We have no idea whether he took the precautions of employing an edeatros, a court food taster to guard against poisoning, but Eumenes was so weak that he had to be carried around in a litter ‘outside the ranks where it was quiet and his sleep would not be broken’. Assassination was only ever a wine cup or bribed bodyguard away, and so each of the Diadokhoi appears to have created a personal cavalry guard unit for protection; Eumenes and Antigonus, whose repaired army was heading his way, both retained a handpicked agema of some 300 mounted men in the style of the late Argead kings.150
When Antigonus’ formation of ‘golden flashing armour and purple-towered elephants’ was spotted descending the nearby hills, the Macedonians called for Eumenes to lead them and refused to deploy without him, beating spear on shield in acknowledgement when he finally appeared. The description of him greeting his men from his litter recalls Alexander’s plight in India when he too was recovering from the near mortal wound suffered at Mallia.151 Aware of his incapacity, Antigonus prepared to attack but noting the impressive discipline and organised battle order that was unravelling on the plain below, he hesitated and laughed off Eumenes’ plight: ‘This litter, it would seem, is what is arrayed against us’, whereupon he retired his ranks and set about pitching camp.152
The two armies settled just 3 stades apart (approximately 660 yards) in the region of Paraetacene in Media (near modern Isfahan), with a river and ravines separating the two camps; the unsuitable terrain was likely the reason battle did not immediately commence. It was summer 316 BCE, and the generals pondered their next move for a further four days whilst pillaging the countryside to keep the troops fed, so skirmishing likely took place between the foraging parties vying for precious provisions.153 Once again, Antigonus sent envoys into Eumenes’ ranks to solicit desertions from the eastern satraps and to lure the Argyraspides with promises of land grants, honours, gifts and employment within his army. Eumenes deflected the temptation with Aesop’s fable of the lion and the maiden to illustrate the covert intent; it was a story that warned against succumbing to false promises.154 Here the divergence between the accounts of Diodorus and Plutarch widens in both detail and chronology, and yet each captured something of the manoeuvring ahead of the approaching need to winter their forces in the well-provisioned town of Gabiene.
Well-paid ‘deserters’ were employed on both sides to carry disinformation to the enemy camp in attempts to steal a march. Eumenes sent his baggage train ahead during the night; Antigonus countered with a cavalry push. Spies were sent out, false battle lines were exposed, and the opponents finally came to a halt and arrayed for a confrontation.155 In Diodorus’ words, ‘The two armies each outwitted the other as if they were taking part in a preliminary contest of skill and showing that each placed his hope of victory in himself.’156
Aposkeue, the ‘baggage’, is an insufficiently weighty and rather dismissive terminology for a waggon train housing ‘wives, and children, mistresses, slaves, gold, and silver’, the accumulated possessions and wealth of a decade or more of campaigning.157 When families, chattels and weapons were captured it left veterans ‘dismayed and despondent at the loss of their supplies’.158 Engels has argued that there would have been one camp follower for every two combatants in Alexander’s train from the victory of Gaugamela onwards, and in addition, each dekas of infantrymen would have had a servant in charge of a mule or a camel laden with their goods, including tents.159 ‘Baggage’ also changed the face of warfare and mobility; Philip, and Alexander too in the early campaign, had resisted using waggons (only mentioned from the actions in Iran onwards), preferring an agile army that carried it
s own panoply (helmet, shield, breastplate/cuirass, fabric-lined greaves, spear) and even hand mills for grinding grain, in backpacks possibly weighing as much as 80 lb.160 Now waggons were needed to carry pay, prizes of war and consumable provisions in the regions immediately devoid of forage and livestock. Plutarch’s description of Antigonus’ train at Orcynia included ‘many freemen, many slaves, and wealth amassed from so many wars and plunderings’.161
Baggage was booty for the victor, and it acted as hostage for the good behaviour of the vanquished, who, more often than not, were enrolled in the victor’s ranks. Craterus had motivated his men before battle with the promise of Eumenes’ possessions, just as Eumenes had coveted and exploited Neoptolemus’ waggons some ten days or so before; his securing them had been instrumental in compelling the captives to enter his service, along with his threat to harry the leaderless forces to starvation should they not.162 Clearly, the loyalty of an army of ‘detainees’ was questionable when its cause was muddied by deceits and bribes, and it helps explain the frequent turncoating we see in the Successor Wars. The lack of mobility of these heavily laden waggons explains why no mercenary squad, or private army, raided the treasuries scattered across the empire, for talents of gold and silver were not easily moved, minted, or shipped, unless huge manpower was available.
The soldiers now risking their lives in the malaria-ridden regions of Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and on the Iranian Plateau in freezing forced marches north of the Zagros Mountains, cannot by this stage have been fighting for a figurehead in Pella, despite Eumenes’ dream visions and the royal letters of empowerment.163 The promises of land grants in Asia with cultivation leases and earnable tax immunity, a philanthropon, were now more valuable weapons, as Antigonus knew.164 Satrapal tribute, which Pseudo-Aristotle’s Oikonomika (possibly written by Theophrastus) divided into six categories, was set at something like one-tenth of agricultural production (from both land and animals) and was considered state or satrapal property, whilst mining remained a royal monopoly. So exemption from excise was precious; Alexander had himself once granted tax exemption to the families of fallen cavalry officers at the Granicus River battle.165 But these early Hellenistic armies, operating far from home and fighting for a cause they must have questioned nightly before the satrapies had coalesced into any kingdoms they might call home, were volatile, disgruntled and lacked any national cohesion. But what other choices did they have? War affected everyone: those involved and those watching on, and any claims to impartiality were unlikely to have been heeded.
