UNFORTUNATELY, THE CASTE system had a serious negative aspect to it, which nullified most of its benefits—it was a singularly unjust system, and was dreadfully wasteful of human resources, for its division of labour was not based on the merit of individuals, but on their birth, so that men of low ability often had to perform high functions, while men of high ability often had to perform low functions. Moreover, the caste system kept society sedated, in a state of coma, precluding mutation and progress in Indian civilisation. Though all human societies all over the world, and all through history, had functional and hierarchic divisions, Indian society was unique in that its divisions were unalterably hereditary. An individual’s social function and status were solely dependent on his birth—not on his aptitude or ability—and they remained the same for his family from generation to generation over the centuries. Though there were a few minor deviations from this rule in history, the caste system on the whole remained virtually the same for very many centuries, well into the twentieth century.
One would have thought that this iniquitous system would weaken over time and disintegrate, and that there would be revolts against the system by the underclasses. But it was the opposite of this that happened. Instead of weakening, the caste system became more rigid over time, and the social distance between the castes widened. This was largely because India had slid into the Dark Ages in the late classical period, consequent of the decline of its urban prosperity and the general ruralisation of Indian culture. The caste system was the ideal social system for the Dark Ages.
In that setting, the social dominance of Brahmins became absolutely unassailable. But their status was not based on wealth or power, but on their birth determined ritual ranking. But ritual ranking in Hindu society meant social ranking, so very many social privileges and material benefits went with the Brahmin rank.
Some of the privileges enjoyed by Brahmins were conceded to them even by Muslim rulers. Brahmins, for instance, usually paid little or no tax, even in Muslim kingdoms. And if any king or chieftain sought to impose dues on a Brahmin, he, according to Kosambi, ‘would threaten to spill his own blood, kill a child, burn alive some old woman of his family, or fast to death, the sin of which would fall on the head of the feudal lord.’ Brahmins were exempted even from jizya by most Delhi sultans, and when Firuz Tughluq imposed it on them, the Brahmins of Delhi and its environs took to mass fasting in protest and threatened to burn themselves to death at the walls of the royal palace. They withdrew their protest only when the amount of jizya demanded from them was reduced by the sultan, and the other Hindu castes offered to pay the tax on their behalf—Brahmins evidently had no objection to jizya being imposed on them, as long as Hindus of other castes would pay the tax on their behalf!
The social status of Brahmins was based on their ritual status and function. But with the passage of time, and the growth in Brahmin population, many Brahmins spread out into other fields of activity. Many of them took to providing financial services, as bankers and tax-farmers, or served as scribes or accountants, under Hindu as well Muslim rulers. Some even served as military commanders, mostly in the Vijayanagar army.
There were similar changes in the profession of some other Hindu communities also. And, even though these changes did not lead to any significant alteration in the status hierarchy of the caste society, they did alter the material conditions of the life of some castes, with some castes gaining and some losing advantages. The main losers were Kshatriyas, the elite Hindu politico-military caste, many of whom lost their power and privileges to Turks. Though some Kshatriyas salvaged their material privileges by serving as the subordinates of sultans or their provincial governors, such service itself was considered an appalling degradation by orthodox Hindus. But what the Kshatriyas lost was power and wealth, not their social status within the caste society, which remained the same as before.
In material gains, artisans and traders were the main beneficiaries of the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate, for there was a sharp revival of urban prosperity during this period, and that led to the resuscitation of the commercial economy which had been comatose in India for several centuries. Some of the low castes in Indian society, particularly the outcastes, also benefited from the establishment of the Turko-Afghan rule, for Muslims generally ignored caste distinctions, and treated the outcastes in the same manner as they treated the other members of Indian society. Indeed, some of the outcaste communities became Muslims en-masse, thereby instantly transforming their social status from that of the underclass to that of the upper-class.
THE ETHOS AND structure of Muslim society was entirely different from that of Hindu society. Muslim society was a brotherhood, and had no caste-like hereditary social divisions in it. There were functional and status divisions in it, but these were based on an individual’s ability and accomplishments, not on his birth. Anyone could rise to any position that he merited by his abilities.
This was the Islamic ideal. The reality of Muslim society did not quite match this egalitarian, merit-oriented ideal. There were social divisions in Muslim society based on race and clan and sect, and these played a key role in determining a person’s social status. For instance, Sayyids, persons of Prophet Muhammad’s lineage, enjoyed a birth-determined, caste-like high social status everywhere in the Muslim world, irrespective of their personal merit. Further, people of foreign origin (Persians, Arabs, Turks and Afghans) generally formed the upper class of the Muslim society in India, followed by converts from the Hindu upper castes. Persians in particular enjoyed a high social status in India, and they looked down on Turks; and Turks in turn looked down on Afghans and Mongols; and all looked down on low caste Hindu converts.
Foreign Muslims ‘alone are capable of virtue, kindness, generosity, valour, good deeds, good works, truthfulness, keeping of promises … loyalty, clarity of vision, justice, equity, recognition of rights, gratitude for favours, and fear of god,’ states Barani, reflecting the stark social prejudice of upper class Muslims in medieval India. ‘They are, consequently, said to be noble, free born, virtuous, religious, of high pedigree and pure birth. These groups alone are worthy of offices and posts in the government …’
Even among the Muslims of foreign origin, the early migrants and their children were held in lower esteem than the later migrants. According to Francois Bernier, a late-seventeenth-century French physician in India, the ‘children of the third and fourth generation, who have brown complexion … are held in much less respect than newcomers, and are seldom invested with official positions: they consider themselves happy, if permitted to serve as private soldiers in the infantry or cavalry.’
Converts from Hindu low castes and outcastes formed the bottom rung of Muslim society in India. The vast majority of Indian Muslims were in fact converts from low castes, and they mostly served as common soldiers, artisans and menials. These class distinctions were particularly important in arranging marriages. But inter-dining was not a taboo among Muslims, as it was among Hindus, though low-class menials were usually segregated.
These social divisions in the Muslim society in India were, however, porous, and over time there came about some amount of social coalescing among the various Muslim communities in India. The status of Indian converts to Islam began to improve from the late thirteenth century on, and in time a number of them rose to high positions in government. The classic case of this was the career of Malik Kafur—a Gujarati eunuch-slave, he rose to be the top general under Ala-ud-din Khalji, and even became, for a few months during the last phase of the life of the ailing sultan, the virtual ruler of the empire.
In time, a number of inter-community marriages took place at all levels of the Muslim society in India, and this led to a good amount of social levelling among Muslims in India. In a parallel development, Indian Muslims in high positions now took to fabricating elaborate genealogies to claim patrician foreign family backgrounds.
In addition to the social status divisions among Muslims in India, there were also som
e functional divisions in Muslim society, such as between those of military profession and those of civilian profession. The civilian professionals in turn were divided into those of administrative vocation and those of religious vocation. Religious leaders played a major role in Muslim polity, especially in the formulation of policies and laws, to ensure that these conformed to religious prescriptions. Unlike in Christianity, there were no ordained priests in Islam, no bishops, no pope. But there were religious leaders (imams) in Islam, who led the congregational prayers in mosques and at other gatherings of Muslims. Some of these religious leaders were highly influential, and the sultans could ignore their advice or ill-treat them only at their own peril.
THE MUSLIM ARISTOCRACY in medieval India mainly consisted of men in government service, whose status depended on the post they held. And the post they held depended on the will and pleasure of the sultan. Inevitably most of the royal officers lived in a state of perpetual anxiety about their future, and this was one of the determinants of their lifestyle, which was characterised by incredible extravagance, without any thought for the future—because they could not be certain that they, or their families, had a future.
Muslim nobles lived in palatial mansions, opulently furnished with tapestries and carpets imported from Central Asia, and provided with gold and silver tableware, as well as fine chinaware. They were usually deep in debt, living far beyond even their fabulous means—it was indeed considered prestigious for one to be heavily in debt, as proof of his profligacy. There was in any case no point in they saving anything for the future, for they could not bequeath their saved wealth to their progeny. This was because their wealth was derived from the estate assigned to them by the state to meet their official and personal expenses, so whatever wealth they saved from their estate after meeting these expenses belonged to the state.
Not only did the nobles pamper themselves opulently, but they were also equally extravagant in their charity, and in the gifts they gave to those who pleased them in any way. Says Abdullah, a late medieval chronicler, about Asad Khan, a high officer of Sikandar Lodi: ‘Whenever the cloth was spread before him at meal-times, he first filled large china plates with food, on which he placed great quantities of bread and pickles of every description, and on them a betel leaf, and on that a gold mohur, all of which he gave to beggars, and [only] then he began to eat.’ Once he gave to a needy relative a heap of gold pieces amounting to 70,000 tankas. Likewise, on several occasions he filled cups and bowls with gold and gave them away to whoever pleased him at the moment.
These were laudable benevolent acts. But what characterised the lifestyle of most nobles was their extravagant self-indulgence. Thus Dilawar Khan, another noble of Sikandar Lodi, everyday purchased 500 tankas worth of roses for his harem. According to Varthema, an early sixteenth century Italian traveller in India, many of the officers of the sultan of Bijapur ‘wear on the insteps of their shoes rubies and diamonds and other jewels; so you may imagine how many are worn on the fingers of the hand and on the ears.’
MEDIEVAL INDIAN SOCIETY, like medieval societies everywhere in the world, was characterised by shocking social and economic disparities, with the nobles living in incredible luxury and the common people living in abject poverty. This was true of Hindu as well as Muslim society. ‘The land is overstocked with people, but those in the country are very miserable, whilst the nobles are extremely opulent and delight in luxury,’ observes Nikitin. ‘They are wont to be carried on their silver beds, preceded by some twenty chargers caparisoned in gold, and followed by 300 men on horseback and 500 on foot, and by horn-men, ten torchbearers and ten musicians.’
There is a good amount of information about the lifestyle of the upper classes in medieval India in the chronicles of the age, but there is hardly any information about the life of the common people. Circumstantial evidence shows that even when the common people had the means to live in comfort, they usually dared not to do so, for fear of attracting the attention of vulturous government officers and other predators. Besides, they were anxious to save for the contingency of any future adversity, which they feared was always around the corner. So they generally lived frugally, often well below their means. And what wealth they could save, they buried, usually in pits dug inside their houses. The buried treasure might not grow, but it would be at least safe, they felt, and it gave their owners a sense of security. According to Shahab-ud-din, ‘the inhabitants of India like to make money, and hoard it.’ This was their insurance against the uncertainties of life.
Nearly all the rulers of the early medieval India, rajas as well as sultans, were predators, concerned primarily with the preservation and expansion of their wealth and power, scarcely ever with the welfare of the people. They were all warlords. And if kings had no vital interest in the welfare of their people, the people had no vital interest in the welfare of their kings either. Whether their king was a Hindu or a Muslim, the common people had no sense of identity with him, and were indifferent to what happened to him, whether he rose or fell, or was killed.
This attitude of fatalism, which was pervasive in medieval India, was the reason why people’s rebellions were very rare in India, despite their inhuman oppression by the rulers. By and large people acquiesced with the conditions of their life, however harsh they might be. As Dubois, an early nineteenth century French missionary in India, would comment in another context, ‘The people of India have always been accustomed to bow their heads beneath the yoke of a cruel and oppressive despotism, and moreover, strange to say, have always displayed mere indifference towards those who have forced them to it. Little cared they whether the princes under whom they groaned were of their own country or from foreign lands. The frequent vicissitudes that befell those in power were hardly noticed by their subjects. Never did the fall of one of these despots cause the least regret; never did the elevation of another cause the least joy. Hard experience had taught Hindus to disregard not only the hope of better times but the fear of worse.’
A COMMON FEATURE OF premodern societies nearly everywhere in the world was slavery, and it was widespread in India too in medieval times. Slaves were an indispensable part of the household of affluent Indians in most parts of the subcontinent. Even some mystics kept slaves. As for nobles, most of them kept a large number of slaves, including many concubines. That was an essential part of their ostentatious lifestyle. Khan Jahan Maqbul, Firuz Tughluq’s vizier, for instance, is said to have maintained, according to Afif, as many as 2000 concubines! The largest number of slaves in medieval India was, predictably, in the service of the Delhi sultans, who employed them in various government departments and in the royal army, as well as in their personal service. The sultan’s personal attendants were all invariably slaves.
The number of slaves maintained by the Delhi sultans varied considerably from reign to reign, depending on the requirements of each sultan. The sultan who had the largest number of slaves was Firuz Tughluq, who is reported to have had as many as 180,000 slaves, and is said to have issued an order to his officers that the best of the captives they enslaved during military campaigns should be reserved for him. It was not however to pander to his personal vanity that Firuz kept so many slaves, but to give them training in crafts and to employ them in productive work, so that they became economic assets and contributed to the revenue of the state and the prosperity of the land.
Capturing people to enslave them was part of the spoils that sultans, officers and soldiers sought during military campaigns. For instance, Qutb-ud-din Aibak during his Gujarat campaign captured 20,000 people to be enslaved, and in his Kalinjar campaign he herded as many as 50,000 people into slavery. This was the usual practice of the sultans during their campaigns of conquest. They also enslaved captives during their punitive campaigns within the empire. Captured professionals too were enslaved, as Timur did during his Indian campaign, when he, according to the early fifteenth century Persian chronicler Yazdi, captured as slaves ‘several thousand artisans and professional people.
’ Like invaders, marauders too often seized men, women and children, to sell them as slaves. Sometimes children were sold into slavery by their needy parents or by hostile relatives.
Slavery was prevalent in most ancient, medieval and early modern societies all over the world. It was common in India too from ancient times, but it had never been as widespread as it was during the early medieval period, when slave trade became an important part of the Indian economy. There was even a regular export of slaves from India during this period, but Firuz Tughluq forbade it, presumably because he himself wanted to accumulate a large number of slaves. All major cities in medieval India had slave markets, where slaves were sold like cattle; in Delhi, adequate availability of slaves in the market was maintained by regular fresh supplies, as Barani indicates.
The price of slaves, as of any other commodity, depended on the prevailing demand and supply equation in the market, as well on the quality of individual slaves. According to Battuta, rustic women captured during raids fetched only very low prices, because of their large numbers and crude ways. During the reign of Ala-ud-din Khalji the prices of various categories of slaves were fixed by the sultan himself, as part of his market regulations. On the whole slaves were quite cheap in Delhi; they were even cheaper in other Indian cities. According to Shahab-ud-din, ‘the value … of a young slave girl for domestic service does not exceed eight tankas’ in Delhi. More charming girls, those fit for concubinage, fetched fifteen tankas. However, some Indian slave-girls cost as much as ‘20,000 tankas, and even more … [for they] are remarkable for their beauty, and the grace of their manners.’
THE POSITION OF slaves in Islamic society was quite different from what it was in most other societies. Muslims generally treated their slaves in the same manner as they treated their other servitors, and the position that a slave occupied, as well as the privileges he enjoyed, depended, as in the case of other servitors, on his aptitude and merit. On the whole, the life and career of a slave in Islamic society was not much different from what he could have had as a free man.
The Age of Wrath: A History of the Delhi Sultanate Page 46
