by Mark Zuehlke
The Canadian Scottish, who were having difficulty penetrating the wire, were, meanwhile, being subjected to intensifying rates of fire from their right. Sgt. Earwaker risked a glance out of his hole to investigate the cause and spotted a lone tank advancing toward them with Can Scot signaller L/Cpl. William Metcalf “walking beside it, a little to the right in front of it, pointing with his signal flags in our direction. It was still pretty early and you could hardly recognize him [in the poor light] except by the flags. The tank was coming on at an angle from the left flank. I saw Metcalf walking about thirty yards and then we decided it was our turn to help. We made a dash for the trench and made it before the Germans got their guns on us. When we captured the trench, we found a nest of machine guns on not more than a fifty-foot frontage.”
Metcalf stayed alongside the tank, using his signal flags to direct it across the trench and toward the German positions behind. Heavy fire continuously hammered against the tank’s armour, and, as it spanned the trench, German infantrymen attempted to knock it out with grenades. Pte. J. H. Riehl later recalled the thirty-seven-year-old signaller—an American from Maine—strolling calmly alongside the tank and wondered how “Metcalf escaped being shot to pieces.” Metcalf’s courage this day would be recognized with the Victoria Cross.22
The soldier’s bravery got the advance going and within minutes the battalion broke through the main D-Q Line. Making use of the opportunity the distraction Metcalf and the tank presented to escape their shell-hole, Peck and Dunlop managed to join No. 2 Company as it moved through the centre of the D-Q Line’s wire. Pushing right up to the front ranks, Peck led the men toward a wooden hut used for storing tools and wire during the defence line’s construction. Upon gaining the building the men discovered a wide lane behind it that provided a clear run through the rest of the wire to the trench that formed the heart of the D-Q Line. Moments later the barrage that had been methodically working forward struck the trench and then lifted. With Peck out front, the Canadian Scottish rushed the trench only to find most of the garrison, which outnumbered them three to one—standing on the fire-step with hands raised in surrender. As Peck stepped to the edge of the parapet a non-commissioned officer suddenly pointed a rifle at him. Peck was saved from being shot by a German soldier who knocked the rifle from the man’s hands.
Peck called a halt to reorganize. The remnants of Nos. 1 and 4 Companies were put under command of Major James Scroggie and formed up alongside what was left of Nos. 2 and 3 Companies. The battalion struck out for the D-Q Intermediate Support Line just 250 yards away on the summit of a gradual slope. Several gaps in the wire provided easy routes, and the Germans that the Canadians encountered generally surrendered without firing a shot. This also proved the case as the Canadian Scottish reached the defensive trench.23 Peck later commented that he had “never seen the enemy so cowardly; prisoners surrendered in shoals. They outnumbered us vastly and had they made a determined stand could have hindered our advance to a considerable degree.”
From the Intermediate Support Line, the Canadian Scottish could see the Support Line—their final objective and the D-Q Line’s last strongpoint. It lay down a “bare slope and across a hollow.” To the right, another height of ground dominated the line of advance. It was a little after 0800. The sky was clear and the sun bright. There was not a scrap of protective cover. The moment Peck led the men into the open, the heights to the right erupted with heavy machine-gun fire. Finally, the men could stand this storm no longer and took refuge in a series of shell holes. Peck shouted for them to throw smoke bombs ahead to create a protective screen and was about to order a renewed advance when a tank (probably the one that had worked earlier with Metcalf ) rolled down the slope. The machine gunners immediately shifted their attention to it.
Deciding he could better direct the fight from the relative safety of the Intermediate Line, Peck was readying to make a dash back up the slope when another tank growled directly down toward his position. Thirty yards from the infantry, the tank halted and then turned around.
Peck had just fifteen men close by, mostly from No. 2 Company. Peering out of his hole, Sgt. William Reith later wrote, he watched as Peck left “the shell hole where he was taking cover and, under heavy machine-gun fire, ran back to the tank. He stood directly in front of it. He forced it to turn around. But directly he returned to the shelter, the tank instead of continuing toward the Drucourt Support, turned about and proceeded to move back.… I do not know how the Colonel escaped being riddled by bullets.”
The situation was critical. Escaping up the hill was impossible, but so was going forward. Determined to break the impasse, Peck and Lt. Dunlop dashed up the hill through intense enemy fire. Gaining the Intermediate Line, Peck found the men there thoroughly disorganized. All jumbled together were a remnant of Canadian Scottish, the leading edge of the 48th Highlanders waiting to pass through once the D-Q Line was carried, and, inexplicably, a large number of Royal Munsters seeming to have no idea where they should be. Peck separated the British troops from the rest and sent them away. He then directed the Canadian machine-gun officers from each battalion to concentrate their guns on the high ground to the right and had the artillery forward observation officer target the same area. This quelled much of the enemy fire. Gathering the rest of his battalion, Peck led the men down the slope to rescue the leading wave and carry the attack into the Support Line, where the enemy again promptly surrendered. It was now about 0930 hours and the Canadian Scottish had obtained their final objective. Peck’s gallantry would be recognized with the Victoria Cross. This gave 16 th Battalion the rare distinction of having two of its own awarded the V.C. in a single day.24
Soon after, the 48th Highlanders passed through the Canadian Scottish lines. Although now in reserve, the battalion spent the next five hours clearing small pockets of resistance bypassed earlier. The Canadian Scottish paid a heavy price for the ground won this day. Five officers were dead, another ten wounded, thirty-three other ranks had been killed, and 155 suffered wounds. Peck noted ruefully that “this Battalion has lost 27 officers in the last two actions or in less than 27 days.”
He also felt an opportunity had been lost. “I never saw the enemy in a more demoralized condition, and although this was one of the most successful actions in which the Battalion or Brigade have ever been engaged, I certainly think, that, had our flank been kept up, we would have driven the enemy beyond the Canal du Nord in a short time.”
But Peck could find no fault with the performance of the Canadian Scottish. “I again find that I cannot speak too highly of the valour and discipline of the Troops under my command. It is impossible for me to describe in words the numberless acts of personal bravery that came under my observation. The Old Battalion kept up its great reputation, advancing with unfaltering courage and steadiness and sweeping away the powerful and heavily manned defences of the Drocourt-Quéant Line with the greatest ease. I may safely say of all ranks, that they without exception, did their duty.”25
As had the rest of Canadian Corps, for by day’s end the leading battalions were two miles beyond the D-Q Line. Total casualties for the day, however, were 5,622 killed or wounded. The advance continued the following day with the enemy virtually on the run before the advancing 1st British and Canadian 2nd and 3rd Divisions. By nightfall, Canadian Corps controlled all the ground west of Canal du Nord—a total advance in the offensive of five miles.
Currie wondered “whether our victory of yesterday or of August 8 is the greatest, but I am inclined to think yesterday’s was.” He singled out 1st Canadian Division’s as “one of the finest performances in all the war.”26 Indeed, such was the level of gallantry that Canadian Corps collected seven Victoria Crosses—the most Canada garnered on any single day in history.
The Canadian achievements were barely recognized at First Army headquarters, some of its staff officers snidely suggesting that better leadership and more determination on the part of the soldiers would have carried Canal du Nord and gained
the eastern bank. But a “thorough reconnaissance of our front,” Currie responded, “had shown that the frontal attack of the Canal du Nord line was impossible, the eastern bank of the Canal was strongly wired and was generally much higher than the western bank.
“The whole of our forward area was under direct observation … and any movement by day was quickly engaged by hostile artillery.” Time was needed to bring up supporting artillery. The canal, which was not dug, but created by constructing thick earth and brick walls, itself posed “a serious obstacle. It was under construction at the outbreak of the war and had not been completed.… The average width was about 100 feet and it was flooded as far south as the lock, 800 yards southwest of Sains-lez-Marquion, just north of the Corps southern boundary. South of this and to the right of the Corps front the Canal was dry, and its bottom was at the natural ground level, the sides of the Canal consisting of high earth and brick banks.
“The attack of the Canal du Nord could not, therefore, be undertaken singly by the Canadian Corps, but had to be part of a larger scheme.” Until that scheme was in place, the corps would stay put, regrouping while holding the line, and then it would carry the canal.27
While Currie began planning this offensive, to the south, the British Third Army slowly fought its way through the Hindenburg Line’s outworks. This advance was possible only because, in breaching the D-Q Line, Canadian Corps had outflanked the Germans there and caused a withdrawal to the Hindenburg’s main line. North of First Army, the reversal prompted abandonment of the Lys Salient for a line running between Ypres and Lens. “Disagreeable decisions,” the German high command called the surrendering of ground on both fronts and worried that the situation would deteriorate entirely if the Canadians crossed Canal du Nord.
The Germans were determined to hold and, while Currie and his staff worked on their plan, there were constant small clashes on the front lines. The daily Canadian casualty rate averaged one hundred. On September 16, Currie decided to stem the alarming losses by pulling the front line back to where it was out of range of the machine guns stationed on the higher ground on the opposite bank.
The day before, Field Marshal Haig had held a conference of his army commanders and outlined an Allied plan that would involve “four great hammer-strokes delivered at crucial points” between the Meuse and the English Channel. In France, the British would strike at Cambrai and St. Quentin, the French would force the Aisne River, and the newly deployed American Expeditionary Force would eliminate the St. Mihiel Salient and then join the French Fourth Army’s advance on Mézières. Meanwhile, in Belgium, a combined force under King Albert would push toward Ghent and Bruges.
Regarding the capture of Cambrai, Haig instructed General Horne to have Canadian Corps seize the Bourlon Wood, so the left flank of Third Army was covered as it moved on the city. Bourlon Wood was a dark, high mound that, on a clear day, the Canadians could see silhouetted against the sky directly east of their position. To reach it, they must cross the canal. Every bridge had been destroyed and the Germans had flooded the surrounding countryside. Intelligence officers in 2nd Canadian Division were so discouraged they told Currie the canal was “practically impassable by any force larger than a platoon without considerable preparation.” Currie agreed this was true for the northern part of the canal that the corps faced, so he sidestepped 2,600 yards southward to cross the canal at a point where it had not been flooded.
Here he would cross with a rapier thrust by 1st Canadian Division on a two-brigade front with the 4th Canadian Division on its right with one brigade forward. In this formation, the two divisions would claim the canal and then capture Bourlon Wood. After that, Currie would widen the front fanwise in a northeasterly direction by as much as 9,700 yards with 11th British Division, placed under his command, coming up on 1st Division’s left while 3rd Canadian Division advanced on 4th Division’s right flank. The four divisions would advance as one, protecting Third Army’s left during its move on Cambrai.
The First and Third armies were scheduled to begin their offensive on September 27 with Fourth Army’s drive on St. Quentin following two days later. Days before the offensive began Third Army’s commander, General Sir Julian Byng, visited Currie’s headquarters. Byng scrutinized Currie’s battle plan thoroughly and then turned to him. “Old man, do you think you can do it?” he asked. Currie assured Byng the corps would succeed.28
By 1918, the Canadian Corps was one of the most professional forces in the Allied army. Its staff officers were masters of the methodical offensive and plans for the Canal du Nord attack evidenced this. The initial assault would be supported by a rolling barrage as normal, but instead of precisely defined lifts set to a repetitive distance, they would range between 500 and 1,500 yards, depending on the estimated speed at which infantry should cross specific stretches of ground. A dense smokescreen projected by firing smoke shells and bombs ahead of the troops and wind-borne smoke issuing from drums filled with burning oil would screen the advance. Teams of engineers equipped to quickly bridge the canal would follow right behind the leading wave of infantry and tanks. By the night of September 26-27, all was in readiness and at 0520 hours, with a miserable, cold rain falling, the barrage signalling the advance began.29
The Canadian Scottish were in reserve and took no part initially beyond holding a front facing Saint-les-Marquion while the Royal Montreal Regiment forced a crossing to the right and took the village from the rear. All along the line, the Canadian attack was perfectly executed, the engineers installing bridges or ladders across the canal for the infantry crossings and ramps that enabled the tanks and vehicles to negotiate their way over. With 14th Battalion in possession of Saint-les-Marquion, after a fierce fight, the Royal Highlanders of Canada leapfrogged through to continue widening 1st Division’s front. On schedule, 3rd Brigade reached its final objective of the outskirts of Sauchy-Lestrée and the 56th British Division came up to widen the front further. Although 4th Canadian Division was exposed to brutal enfilade fire from the right flank, it managed to take Bourlon Wood.
Cambrai lay only two miles away at day’s end, seemingly within easy grasp. But September 28 proved a day of frustration. The Germans had poured in reinforcements during the night and the Canadians encountered many delays getting sufficient artillery across the canal and within range of the city. A grim slog ensued with gains being measured in yards and a rapidly rising butcher’s bill. On September 29, 2,089 men were killed or wounded for barely any ground won. Among the fallen was 1st Division’s much loved senior chaplain, Canon Frederick Scott, who was evacuated with a severe wound. Currie tried again, on the last day of September, to loosen the German front, but was forced to cancel the operation’s second phase due to heavy casualties. Canadian Corps was in possession of Tilloy, a village immediately north of Cambrai, but still lacked a toehold in the city. Prisoners reported that their commanders were stressing “the supreme importance” of Cambrai, and that it must “be held at all costs.”
Currie pondered quitting, but he knew “the enemy had suffered severely, and it was quite possible that matters had reached a stage where he no longer considered the retention of this position worth the severe losses both in men and morale consequent upon a continuation of the defence.” One more push, he decided, with four divisions in line “attacking simultaneously under a heavy barrage.”30
On 1st Division’s front, 1st and 3rd brigades would lead with 1st on the left and 3rd to the right. Flanking 1st Brigade would be the 11th British Division, while 4th Canadian Division would be to the right. On the corps’ extreme right flank, 3rd Canadian Division would hit Cambrai with a frontal assault.
The advance by 1st Division would be 5,000 yards north of Cambrai and 3rd Brigade’s first task would be completed by the Royal Highlanders advancing 1,000 yards to capture the villages of Sancourt and Blécourt. As soon as Sancourt fell, the Royal Montreal Regiment and Canadian Scottish would pass to its south and advance on a two-battalion-wide front. The target for the Montrealers was
Bantigny while the Canadian Scottish had sights on Cuvilliers. Once past these villages, the two battalions were to go hell-for-leather to a sunken road well east of Cuvilliers and dig in until reinforced.31
To the Canadian Scottish’s dismay, they would attack without the leadership of Lt.-Col. Peck, for Brig. George Tuxford had barred him from active participation in another attack due to his being physically and mentally exhausted. The brigadier “told me I must not go into action,” Peck scribbled in his diary that evening. “Very disappointed.” After briefing Major Roderick Bell-Irving, who was to command in his absence, Peck had gone to Boulogne for a rest. But he had no intention of staying there long. He would return on the evening of September 30 to monitor the fighting from Canadian Scottish headquarters. Arriving there as planned, Peck was surprised to see that the detailed plan worked out by Canadian Corps headquarters had not been disseminated down to battalion level. He considered the orders Tuxford gave Bell-Irving “ambiguous” and “sudden.”32
To position itself for the attack, the Canadian Scottish moved immediately to Haynecourt and took over the lines held by 2nd Brigade’s 10th Battalion shortly before midnight. The Canadian Corps offensive kicked off at 0500 hours and the Royal Highlanders advanced behind a creeping barrage toward Sancourt. As soon as the sounds of a fierce gunfight were audible from the village, Major Bell-Irving ordered the Canadian Scottish forward. No. 4 Company under Major Arnott Grier Mordy led with Captain George Mason’s No. 3, Captain George McCreary’s No. 2, and finally Captain Robert McIntyre’s No. 1 companies following in line. Bell-Irving’s headquarters section advanced in company with No. 1 Company. Leading from the rear was not the twenty-seven-year-old Bell-Irving’s natural inclination. His close friend, Major Hugh Urquhart, often commented that Bell-Irving “had the faults of his virtues.” One of those virtues was a fearless courage that made him seek the sharp end. But the major knew that personally breathing down Mordy’s neck would do little to instill confidence, so he hung back to give the officer room to breathe.33
