by Gwyn, Peter
If the Imperial attitude is easy to appreciate, the English one is not because, as Henry and Wolsey made clear to the emperor, they felt no immediate pressures.14 They therefore had no need, and very little intention, of being rushed into any grandiose schemes; hence their insistence on a marriage alliance first, discussion about other matters later. But did they want even a marriage alliance, and, if so, why? The essential point about the proposed marriage terms is that Charles was to be free to marry whom he liked until Mary came of age, which would not be until February 1528. Such a generous time allowance hardly suggests great eagerness on England’s part, but it might be that the marriage was merely a means of keeping in with the Imperialists so as to influence their actions in the direction of peace. On the other hand, would this require Tunstall to spend two months with the emperor involved, on the face of it, in hard bargaining? At one stage he was instructed by Henry, if things were going badly, to bypass Charles’s leading councillors, Chièvres and Sauvage’s successor as chancellor, Mercurino Gattinara, considered to be ill-disposed towards the English, and to seek a private interview with the emperor. He was, then, to press on Charles the great disadvantage of Mary’s marriage to the dauphin, especially if as a result the dauphin succeeded to the throne of England. With the sealing off of the Channel and the French possession of Milan, Charles’s lands would be effectively cut in two. This was a threat, albeit a distant one, and there seems no reason for it unless some sort of alliance with the emperor was really wanted.15
When Wolsey suggested to Henry the recall of Tunstall, he gave two main reasons. Firstly, the negotiations were being used by the Imperialists to blacken Henry’s good name with the French, thereby improving their own standing with them.16 Secondly, the Imperialist position was sufficiently weak for them sooner or later to have to come begging ‘on their hands and feet’, for, ‘if they attempt any thing by hostility, your grace not consenting thereto, they shall be utterly undone.’ Nowhere in the letter is there any reference to the need to maintain the peace of Europe as something to be worked for because good in itself. Instead, only the negative point is made, that it would be wrong for England to be dragged into a war of the emperor’s and Francis’s making.17
A policy is beginning to emerge. Throughout 1520, and indeed 1521, Wolsey posed as the honest broker trying to resolve the ever-growing conflict between the emperor and the French king. Of course, he more or less had to do this; the Treaty of London had been such a success that, whatever his motives in bringing it about, he could only lose face by abandoning it too quickly. And the role did have positive attractions. It gave England a dominating and extremely honourable position in Europe without the expense of providing an army – and if one thing is certain about Wolsey’s policy at this time it is that he did not want to fight a major campaign.18 Thus, he was quite prepared to stand by the Treaty of London, but only so long as a better alternative did not turn up. Keeping his options open was always a central article of faith, and as early as the Canterbury meeting in May 1520 he began to consider how best to do this. One option was the Imperial alliance, but only if the terms were right. In March 1521 they were not, and so for the time being Wolsey continued to act as the peacemaker of Europe. The only difficulty was that late in February Robert de La Marck, duke of Bouillon, had defied the emperor and marched into Luxemburg. If he had been an Italian, one would call La Marck a condottiere – given some additional status by the possession of an hereditary title, and in La Marck’s case the lordship of Sedan, situated on France’s border with the Holy Roman Empire. Not surprisingly, La Marck took full advantage of the Habsburg-Valois rivalry, changing sides whenever it suited him, but when he marched into Luxemburg he was undoubtedly acting on Francis’s behalf, despite the inevitable statements to the contrary. An Imperial army had little trouble in driving him out, but by May showed every indication of wishing to follow up this success by marching into French territory. Meanwhile the French had captured Navarre. The expected conflict between Habsburg and Valois had begun.
It led immediately to great diplomatic activity on Wolsey’s part. Special envoys were sent to both Francis and Charles carrying with them the same message: the disadvantages of war would far outweigh the temporary gains that either might win; they should therefore submit their disputes to England’s mediation; if they refused, she would have to intervene against the aggressor.19 Charles’s initial response was favourable,20 unlike Francis’s.21 Indeed, it was in order to persuade the latter to accept English mediation that it was first suggested that Wolsey should come to Calais so as to conduct the negotiations more easily. On about 9 June Francis accepted this, and on the 13th Charles was informed of this. So far so good: that is to say, Henry and Wolsey had behaved with the utmost correctness and in the new situation had showed every indication of standing by the Treaty of London.
It was on 16 June 1521 that John Lord Berghes, an important councillor of Charles v, and an especially close adviser of his aunt, Margaret, who was known for her pro-English sympathies, put forward an idea whose attraction was so powerful that it would eventually lead to an English invasion of France in 1523. In an after-dinner conversation with the English ambassadors at the Imperial court, Berghes stressed the need to strengthen the good relations between their two countries, ‘considering the subtle and colourable demeanour used by the French king’. He went on to suggest that Wolsey should immediately come to Calais, ‘at the which journey may be well treated and concluded such perfect intelligence and straight conjunction as the wealth of the parties requireth, without suspicion of the Frenchmen, having themselves consented and desired the same.’22 Here is the genesis of the famous plot to deceive the French. It was formally presented to Henry in a memorandum brought back from the Imperial court by Sir Richard Wingfield. On 1 July, before Wingfield had had time to return with the English reply, Philip Haneton, a special envoy from the emperor, arrived with the task of persuading Henry and Wolsey.23 As in January and February, so now a lot of pressure was being applied by the Imperialists for an English alliance. This time round it was to succeed.
It was to succeed for the reason that most negotiations succeed: both parties were now sufficiently determined to be willing to make the necessary compromises. On both occasions the Imperialists had wanted an immediate English declaration against the French. On both occasions they failed, but the second time they did not let it end the negotiations. The explanation is that, now that they were at war, they wanted the alliance more then ever – just, of course, as Wolsey had predicted. When Haneton was sent they were under the impression that a French army, having occupied Navarre, was marching into Castile, a Castile hardly yet recovered from a major rebellion. By 16 July the situation had changed for the better, with the news that Navarre had been reoccupied. This gave the Imperialists a breathing space, and also lessened the need for an immediate English declaration. Even so, faced with a war on a number of fronts – in the Pyrenees, on the north-western border of France, and also in Italy – the English alliance remained a priority.
This also explains why the Imperialists were prepared to give way on another issue. Before accepting their plan to deceive the French, Wolsey insisted on receiving from Charles a written promise that he would not negotiate with the French while talks with the English continued. At the same time, he refused to make a similar promise on Henry’s behalf.24 This insistence is a little surprising; with the outbreak of war, there hardly seems any need for it. But Wolsey had been around long enough to know that alliances changed all too quickly.25 It was apparent that in 1521 neither Charles nor Francis was in a position to deliver a major blow, least of all Charles, who was desperately short of money and needed to return to Spain before embarking upon anything too ambitious.26 It would have been a disaster for Wolsey if the peacemaker of Europe had been shown up as nothing but a wolf in sheep’s clothing, and for the emperor then to have earned good marks with the French for making the discovery. England would have been left without an ally and wit
hout a role, and it was this that Wolsey was determined to prevent.27
Wolsey secured these concessions because the Imperialists needed him, but it was just as true that he needed them. Once war had broken out between the emperor and Francis, it was virtually impossible for England to escape being drawn into it. This was not only because, under the provisions of the Treaty of London, England was bound to come to the aid of the injured party if diplomacy failed. There were also the separate treaties between Henry and the emperor which had emerged from their two meetings, at Canterbury and Gravelines, in 1520, stipulating that if either was attacked the other must come to his aid. It was to these treaties that the emperor usually appealed; they involved none of the delays allowed for by the Treaty of London, and delay was not what the emperor wanted.28 Wolsey, as we have seen, did, and that is one of the reasons why, in the spring and early summer of 1521, the Treaty of London had its uses, even if it left him with a number of problems.
How was Wolsey to turn any delay to his advantage? He could, of course, put all his efforts into attempting to end the conflict. If successful, he would avoid being drawn into a war and he would achieve another diplomatic triumph. Extremely attractive, but not very practical. It is true, as has been seen, that both Francis and Charles had to begin with tentatively accepted the English mediation, but, once the news of the French capture of Navarre had reached him, Charles on 1 June turned it down.29 This was a body blow to Wolsey. If he could not even get the contending parties to the conference table, what would become of ‘the immortal fame and renown’ that the Treaty of London had brought him?30 The Imperial offer that Haneton brought with him a month later, allowing Wolsey still to pose as peacemaker, solved the immediate, but not the long term, crisis. It was just possible that, having got to Calais, he could still have persuaded both sides to end the war, but it was not at all likely. Much more so was the possibility that the two sides would come to terms without bothering with Wolsey’s good offices – and then where would he be?
Furthermore, there had always been a major flaw lurking behind the successful facade of the Treaty of London. At some point, in order to maintain it, England might be forced to go to war, and – here was the real rub – the war would not be of England’s choosing. It was all very well coming to the aid of the aggrieved party, but almost by definition this meant coming to the aid of the losing side, for only the losing side was likely to accept English intervention. Even before Haneton’s arrival, it looks as if the English had decided that Charles would win,31 and the information Haneton brought about the Imperial military and financial position must have confirmed this view.32 Thus, even if there was a good case for saying that the French had started the war, once they began to lose and their territory was invaded, they had only to accept Wolsey’s offer to mediate for them to become the aggrieved party. England would then be dragged into the worst possible war, propping up her natural enemy against her successful friend. On the other hand, if this was too ghastly to contemplate, what sort of terms was a successful emperor likely to offer someone who had refused to help when the going was rough, and had only been a hindrance when things started to go well? What all this adds up to is: in July 1521 England was in a strong bargaining position because the Imperialists needed English support. The longer she delayed giving it, the weaker that position would become. It was this that made the role of the genuinely impartial mediator too risky to contemplate.33
It is not, in any case, at all certain how much Wolsey wanted her to play that role. Here the earlier negotiations should be recalled. It may, then, appear that in a certain sense he had merely been waiting for Haneton to arrive.34 He had very quickly seen the disadvantages of the Treaty of London and had taken steps to minimize them: the meetings with the emperor in the summer of 1520, the defensive alliance that was then signed, negotiations for a marriage between Charles and Mary, despite her prior betrothal to the dauphin, and Tunstall’s mission during the winter of 1520-1. The Imperial alliance had been kept warm, ready for use when required. In the summer of 1521 that moment had come, and the real bargaining could begin.35
One word of warning is necessary. The conclusion to be drawn is not that there was a ‘master plan’ by which in 1520 Wolsey knew that he would be allied to the emperor in 1521, and invading France in 1523. Indeed, the whole emphasis is otherwise. No one was more aware than Wolsey that plans go awry, that situations change, and that changed situations need different policies: it is really because of this that it is difficult to accept a very serious commitment on his part to universal peace. Wolsey’s skill was to be ready for any eventuality, and this held good as much after Haneton’s mission as before. Wolsey crossed the Channel with the intention of achieving an Imperial alliance, but he was not yet certain what terms he could secure. If they were not good enough, there would be no alliance.36 The great advantage of the Imperialists’ plan to use a peace conference as a cover to deceive the French was that it helped to keep Wolsey’s options open for a little longer. If the Imperialists proved intransigent, he would play the peacemaker more seriously, if only to give himself time to think what to do next.
In support of this account of Wolsey’s intentions, there has survived an interesting document listing six alternative terms for an Imperial alliance.37 Despite the fact that it appears to be a formal document, written in Latin and signed both at the beginning and end by Henry himself, it unfortunately lacks a date. In Letters and Papers it was associated with the Treaty of Windsor of 1522, but for a number of reasons it must be placed earlier, sometime between March and August 1521. It cannot be earlier than March because the terms assumed that the war between the emperor and the French king had already started. It cannot be later than the Bruges treaty of 25 August because most of the points mentioned in the alternatives were decided at that time.38 These vary in the degree to which they commit the allies to an all-out attack on France. The fifth is the least aggressive: universal peace and the restoration of the status ante bellum,39 with only a marriage treaty and defensive alliance to provide for any future French attack. The second is the most aggressive, with the recovery of Milan as a specific aim of a war with France. All the alternatives suggest a major concern of Wolsey’s throughout the negotiations: namely, the need to secure time for England to make serious military preparations; he was not going to be rushed, because England was not in a position to conduct a major campaign. He was also concerned to ensure that the annual French pension would be paid by the emperor if, as a result of any Imperial alliance, the French ceased to do so.40 Only if none of the terms was acceptable to the emperor would the English consider a radical and undoubtedly unsatisfactory alternative: an alliance with the French involving a defence of the duchy of Milan, French help in settling the affairs of Scotland, the continuance of trade between the two countries, and an increase in the pension from £16,000 to £20,000 a year. I have been able to discover no moves in the direction of such an alliance at any time during the Calais and Bruges negotiations. The assumption can only be that Wolsey got what he wanted from the Imperialists.
Wolsey arrived at Calais on 2 August, and almost immediately he was involved in some hard bargaining with the Imperial delegation;41 indeed, at one point he threatened to call off any meeting with Charles, and thus in effect all plans for an Anglo-Imperial alliance, because the Imperialists were proving too intractable.42 As it was, on 14 August he set off for Bruges – for the benefit of the French his excuse for this visit being the need to persuade the emperor not to withdraw his delegation from the Calais conference43 – and there the bargaining continued. The two matters most in dispute concerned the Imperial acceptance of the responsibility for the annual French pension – what in the negotiations was referred to as the indemnity – and the details of the marriage terms. On both of these Wolsey seems to have got his way. He certainly secured the indemnity and appears to have obtained slightly more than the going rate for Mary’s dowry.44 This left the most important matter, and one that Wolsey had stipulated
could be discussed only with the emperor himself: when would England actually have to declare war?45 As has already been mentioned, Wolsey won this argument as well. Under the terms of the Treaty of Bruges, signed on 25 August, England was not expected to do this until March 1523, unless, that is, the present war between the French and the Imperialists had not ended by the beginning of November, when England was supposed to come in on the Imperial side immediately. It was therefore embarrassing that, when the deadline arrived, the war was still in progress. However, Wolsey was able to secure an extension until the end of the the month,46 and in the end was able to delay England’s declaration of war against France until 29 May 1522.47 But the price for all these concessions by the Imperialists – including the various extensions that Wolsey had won – was that England had to provide money, ships and men for Charles’s return to Spain.48
The postponement of the declaration of war was a major victory for Wolsey,49 but its purpose must not be misunderstood. It did give him more room for manoeuvre, and one such manoeuvre might just possibly have been a break with the emperor. But its main purpose was quite different. Wolsey genuinely wanted time for English military preparations to be made, for only then could the ‘Great Enterprise’ against France become a reality. This was also why he was willing to help Charles return to Spain. Only then, once the rebellions were settled, could Charles raise sufficient money and troops to make a joint invasion of France effective. After Bruges, the ‘Great Enterprise’ was the major aim of English foreign policy, and this represents a change of emphasis. As has been shown, initially the Imperial alliance was partly a means of getting England out of a difficult situation, almost a defensive measure. On the other hand, if the emperor really could be tied down, and detailed plans for a joint invasion of France in strength be worked out, then there was a golden opportunity to win honour and glory. At Bruges, this began to happen.
