Pericles took part in running the empire with no misgivings at all. His military exploits in Euboea, Samos, and Aegina were all against rebellions that he simply crushed with a considerable degree of bloody force. If there was any specifically Periclean aspect to the situation, it lay not in imperial practices but rather in what he said about them. Pericles was probably the first to theorize the need for Athenian imperialism and publicly display the city’s domination over the league allies by organizing the construction of the Odeon and the Parthenon.
PERICLES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
The Delian League: From Summakhia to Arkhē
In 478 B.C., at the end of the Second Persian War, the Athenians, with the cooperation of a large number of the cities dotted around the Aegean, founded a league (a summakhia), the seat of which was the small and sacred island of Delos. According to Thucydides (1.95.1), membership was at that time voluntary. The cities spontaneously chose to unite their forces under the leadership of Athens, in order to prevent the Persians returning to the Aegean. To this end, members had to contribute to the war effort in proportion to their resources, either directly, with ships and soldiers, or indirectly, by paying tribute (phoros) representing the monetary equivalent of the ships to be supplied (Thucydides, 1.98.3). The overwhelming majority of the cities chose the second option: as far as we can tell from the stēlē on which the contributions of the league’s member cities were recorded in 454, only thirteen or fourteen of the contributing cities were still paying tribute in the form of triremes or military contingents. In short, Athens did the fighting, while the allies paid.
Also according to Thucydides, the total sum of tribute was fixed at 460 talents in 478 by the Athenian Aristides. In order to calculate the contributions of each of the cities, Aristides no doubt took over the framework of the Achaemenid system of taxation that was set in place after the revolt of Ionia in 493: to a certain extent, the allies had simply switched masters. However, at this juncture, the members of the alliance were still deciding on its general policies all together, with each contributor possessing a vote in the league’s council (sunedrion).
A number of crucial dates mark out the Delian League’s development and its slide into imperialism. First there was the battle of Eurymedon, fought between 469 and 466 B.C. by the Athenian fleet, commanded by the stratēgos Cimon. This great victory de facto sealed the end of the Persian threat in the Aegean. Next came the peace negotiated by Callias between the Athenians and the Persians in 449 B.C. Following the failure of the Athenian expedition to Egypt, the Athenians sent Callias as an ambassador to Susa, where a peace treaty was signed, with the Persians agreeing to leave the Aegean and the cities of Asia Minor under the control of the Athenians, while the Athenians, for their part, undertook not to launch any more expeditions against the royal territories. The peace of Callias thus, de facto, if not de iure, put an end to the Persian threat.1
After the peace had been signed, the Delian League no longer had as much raison d’être, and that is perhaps why the levying of tribute was suspended in 448 B.C.2 However, that respite was short-lived, and the Athenians then continued to receive a phoros even though the Persian threat had disappeared. These taxes were resented all the more because in the late 450s the league’s treasury had been transferred to Athens. The sum to be paid as tribute was fixed every four years by the Athenian ekklēsia, which summoned all the allies at the time of the great Panathenaea, in order to reveal to them the sum that they were to pay annually. All of this is attested by Cleinias’s decree.3
It was therefore certainly not by chance that several major revolts broke out within this league that now had no purpose. In 447/6 Euboea revolted against Athens, which, after putting down the uprising, imposed democratic systems on the island and installed cleruchies, garrisons of Athenian soldiers, who settled there.4 It was at this point that the city of Histiaea became the cleruchy of Oreos. In 440/39, the island of Samos was pacified after a long siege, as was then the city of Byzantium. The vocabulary used to speak of the league and its members now changed: the Athenians spoke no longer of their hēgemonia but of their arkhē—their domination—and they now referred to the league members as hupēkooi, dependents, not allies.5 During the Peloponnesian War, the revolts multiplied, prompting the Athenians to exact heavy reprisals. In 427, Mytilene was forced back into the league and the island of Lesbos was subjected to heavy repression. In 425, tribute was almost tripled in order to cope with the heavy expenses of warfare. Athenian imperialism had now reached its peak. It was not until the disastrous result of the Sicilian expedition (415–413 B.C.) and, above all, the last years of the war that Athens’s grip loosened; the league was finally dissolved at the end of the conflict, in 404 B.C.
Did Pericles play a role in the imperial metamorphosis of the Delian League? Did he, as leader of the people, act as a catalyst in the aggressive tendencies of the Athenians or did he, on the contrary, try to keep them in check? In order to resolve that alternative, we must first determine a crucial question: exactly when was the league transformed into an empire (figure 2)?
The Slide into Imperialism: A Periclean Turning Point?
Precisely when did Athens increase its power over the members of the Delian League to the point of turning them into mere subjects, or even “slaves”? Among historians, this tricky question eludes a consensus. Specialists on the Athenian Empire disagree on the dating of the complex epigraphical evidence. A number of decrees testifying to the growing imperialism of Athens have been found, but it has not been possible to date them precisely, on account of their lamentable state of preservation. While most epigraphists place the date of their engraving between 450 and 440, some specialists defend a later dating, around 430/420.6 One might remain unmoved by this erudite battle were it not for the fact that what is at stake here is crucial for an understanding of the nature of the Periclean empire and the role that Pericles himself played in its development. There are two possibilities: if these inscriptions go back to the mid-fifth century, the hardening of Athenian imperialism must have taken place under Pericles and probably at his instigation; if, on the contrary, they were not engraved until the time of the Peloponnesian War, “only the war forced the Athenians to tighten their grip on the Aegean world,”7 so Pericles, who died at the beginning of the conflict, was in no way implicated in the process.8
To be quite frank, the second alternative does not seem credible. Whatever the date of the decrees in question, there is plenty of other evidence of the Athenian descent into imperialism as early as the middle of the fifth century. On this basis, it might seem logical to detect signs of specifically Periclean policies, particularly since some authors who were contemporaries of the stratēgos make this their justification for taking a hard line in this matter. One such is Stesimbrotus of Thasos, a native of an island placed under Athenian control, who certainly criticizes Pericles for his cruel behavior toward the people of Thasos and contrasts this to the supposed moderation of Cimon.9 In reality, that contrast does not withstand scrutiny. What strikes one upon reading the sources that are available is above all how quickly the Delian League was transformed into an empire placed at the service of Athens. In fact, this happened as early as the time when Cimon dominated the political life of the city. So it was probably under his leadership that the first of the allies’ revolts was repressed. As early as 475, the city of Carystus, in Euboea, was forced, against its will, to join the league. In 470 or 468, Naxos revolted, and, as Thucydides declares, “this was the first allied city to be enslaved [edoulōthē] in violation of the established rule” (1.98.4). However, the first rebellion of any magnitude was that of Thasos, between 465 and 463. It took the Athenians two years to overcome this city that possessed, on the continent, mineral resources and forests that were eminently desirable.10 When the conflict was over, the city precinct was razed to the ground and its navy was confiscated. The people of Thasos became tribute-payers to Athens and lost their liberty. Very soon, the Athenians
also insisted that the cities that had revolted, once they rejoined the alliance, should solemnly swear never again to secede, as we know from an inscription in Erythrae, a city in Asia Minor that rejoined the league some time between 465 and 450 B.C.11
FIGURE 2. Map of the Athenian Empire ca. 431 B.C.
An aggressive imperialist thrust was thus initiated as early as the second third of the fifth century. No Athenian leader could afford to resist it if he wished for the support of the people. In this context, Cimon repressed the revolts of the allies as regularly as did Pericles after him. It was Cimon who was in charge of the lengthy siege of Thasos in 465–463 and also he who decisively promoted the development of cleruchies, the Athenian garrisons that were installed in allied territories.12 Apart from a few minor disagreements, the political leaders clearly shared in common the conviction that the empire constituted the guarantee of Athenian sociopolitical stability. There may have been disagreement about the methods to be adopted, but there was none where the principle was concerned: the empire was vital for Athens, so, if necessary, the allies had to be repressed by force. Moreover, the transfer of the Delian League’s treasury, often interpreted as the ultimate symbol of the hardening attitude of imperialism, may quite possibly have taken place before 454—the date when it is actually mentioned—indeed, it may have been carried out even prior to the victory of Eurymedon, at the beginning of the 460s.13
All the same, it would be exaggerated to detect no change at all in Athenian politics during the years between 440 and 430. However, such developments probably owed nothing to Pericles himself but everything to the transformation of the geopolitical context and, in particular, the establishment of peace, de facto if not de iure, with Persia. With the signing of the peace of Callias in 449, Athenian domination in effect became radically illegitimate in the eyes of the allies/subjects: the league was now subject to a whole spate of revolts, which were countered by increasing repression.
Faced with mounting challenges, Pericles unhesitatingly resorted to force and was, as a result, sometimes accused of cruelty. This practical experience of his, marked by a series of bloody incidents, now led him, at the theoretical level, to develop his lucid thinking about the empire and the need to maintain it.
PERICLES FACED BY THE ALLIES: IMPERIAL PRACTICES AND REPRESENTATIONS
The Recourse to Force: Periclean Cruelty
Still today, certain historians seek to palliate the image of Pericles’ actions in the face of the allies. Donald Kagan, in his biography, emphasizes the relative moderation of the stratēgos’s behavior in this episode.14 “Save Private Pericles!”: the stratēgos cannot possibly have been cruel and risk besmirching the Greek miracle with an indelible stain! That is an eminently ideological attitude and it should be analyzed in relation to the biographer’s own political background. In this respect, his political trajectory is instructive: having started out as a liberal—in the American sense of the term—Kagan became a Republican in the 1970s and then, in the 1990s, was one of the founders of a neo-conservative “think tank” (“Project for the New American Century”). Meanwhile, one of his sons became John McCain’s advisor on foreign policy. So it is perfectly logical that, as an apostle of American interventionism abroad, Kagan should present us with a Pericles who is both firm yet temperate and is the epitome of moderation when faced with undisciplined and recalcitrant allies.15
However, that supposed moderation is a fiction. During the years in which he played a leading role, Pericles made sure that the allies’ revolts were shamelessly repressed, sometimes even with cruelty. In truth, the stratēgos was intimately associated with the repressive policies of Athens. Significantly enough, Thucydides, who only mentions Pericles three times in his long account of the pentēkontaetia (the period of almost fifty years [478–431] that separated the end of the Persian Wars from the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War) twice mentions his direct involvement in forcing the allies to toe the line.
The Euboean Revolt
First, the historian describes his participation in the punishment of Euboea, in 446 B.C.: “The Athenians again crossed over into Euboea under the command of Pericles and subdued the whole of it; the rest of the island they settled by agreement, but expelled the Histiaeans from their homes and themselves occupied their territory.”16 That was how Pericles wreaked his revenge on those who, having captured an Athenian vessel, massacred the entire crew.17 The city was turned into a cleruchy and the rest of the Euboean cities were placed under strict supervision, as is attested epigraphically by two decrees concerning Eretria and Chalcis.18
The comic poets dwelt upon this bloody episode—in particular, in Aristophanes’ Clouds, a play that was staged for the first time in 423 B.C. Referring to Euboea, the poet has one of the characters say: “We have stretched it enough, we and Pericles!”19 The treatment meted out to the rebels was so traumatic that it was still haunting the Athenian conscience nearly forty years later. When the Peloponnesian War ended, at the news of the defeat at Aigos Potamoi, in 405, the Athenians were gripped by terror, fearing now to see the allies, so long tyrannized, seeking revenge for the exactions that they had suffered. And in the long list of outrages, the crushing of the Euboean revolt figured prominently: “That night, no one slept, all mourning, not for the lost alone, but far more for their own selves, thinking that they would suffer such treatment as they had visited upon the Melians, colonists of the Lacedaemonians, after reducing them by siege, and upon the Histiaeans and Scionaeans and Toronaeans and Aeginetans and many other Greek peoples” (Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.2.3). The repression of Euboea in 446, led by Pericles, thus symbolized all the harshness of Athenian imperialism, to the point of leaving an indelible mark on the civic conscience.
The Samos Affair
Pericles’ second intervention left just as deep a scar. In 440–439 B.C.,20 taking advantage of an altercation between Samos and Miletus over the possession of Priene, in Asia Minor, the Athenians embarked on a long war against the Samians, who had defected and left the Delian League. We need not dwell on the ins-and-outs of the conflict but should note that this war turned out to be extremely costly for Athens, both in men and in money. In money, first: an inscription records the total sum of the expenses for the war. The final sum was as high as 1,400 talents, more than three years’ accumulated tribute, which was later paid back solely by the Samians!21 But the war was also costly in men and was marked by an extreme violence that struck the imagination of ancient authors. Two stories focus on the cruelty of the conflict; it was a violence that was initially reciprocal but for which, later on, the Athenians alone were held responsible.
The first episode was recorded in the fourth century by Douris of Samos, who was well placed to know of the affair since he was a native of the rebel island.22 In the course of the conflict, some Athenian prisoners were captured by the Samian rebels, who tattooed their faces with an owl. Gratuitous cruelty? Not at all. The rebels were simply paying back the Athenians who, earlier, had marked the faces of enemy prisoners with the prow of a Samian ship, the Samaina.23 By recording this incident, Douris clearly intended to underline the Athenians’ initial responsibility in this unleashing of violence. However, the episode took on another, less immediate significance. By tattooing their prisoners in this way, both groups of belligerents turned them into monetary symbols and consequently into interchangeable merchandise—for, just as the owl was the monetary symbol of Athens, the Samaina was that of Samos (figure 3).24
Furthermore, this story may reveal the true cause of this bloody conflict. Over and above the reasons alleged by the ancient sources, the main objective of the repression led by Pericles may have been to impose upon Samos the use of Athenian coins. The Samians appear to have refused to apply Clearchus’s decree, which was probably passed in the early 440s and imposed upon all the allies the use of Athenian weights and measures and silver currency.
FIGURE 3. A coin war: (a) Athenian silver tetradrachm, minted 449 B.C. 17.07 grams. Owl facing right. SNG Cop
enhagen 31. Photo © Marie-Lan Nguyen. (b) Silver tetradrachm, minted in Zancle (Messana) by the Samians between 493 and 489 B.C., showing, on the reverse, the prow of a Samian ship (Samaina). Image © Hirmer Fotoarchiv.
However that may be, the Samos affair shows us a Pericles who resorted to unbridled violence, as the outcome of the conflict testifies. After the Athenians’ victory, the Samians “were reduced by siege and agreed to a capitulation, pulling down their walls, giving hostages and consenting to pay back by instalments the money spent upon the siege” (Thucydides 1.117.3). All this was altogether normal; Athens applied victors’ rights and deprived the Samians of all attributes of sovereign power: its ramparts, its fleet, and its currency. What was less normal though was the cruelty that, again according to Douris of Samos, Pericles inflicted upon the Samian elite: “To these details, Douris the Samian adds stuff for tragedy, accusing the Athenians and Pericles of great cruelty. But he appears not to speak the truth when he says that Pericles had the Samian trierarchs and marines brought into the marketplace of Miletus and crucified there, and that then, when they had already suffered grievously for ten days, he gave orders to break their heads in with clubs and make an end of them, and then cast their bodies forth without funeral rites.”25 In Douris’s version, the horror of the tortures—inflicted in Miletus, not in Athens—had been intended to serve as a lesson addressed to the entire empire. But this account aimed above all to emphasize not only the cruelty of Pericles, but his impiety: to deprive bodies of the funeral rites was a grave transgression, the full implications of which are revealed in Sophocles’ Antigone. It may be that Douris is overdramatizing (epitragoidein) the events, as Plutarch, being concerned to protect the reputation of the Athenian stratēgos, claims; but in any case, Douris’s testimony underlines the existence of a tradition hostile to Pericles that deliberately emphasizes his intolerable cruelty.26
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