Afterword
From the death of General Walter Krivitsky to the firing of Angleton, riddle had piled upon riddle. Could the KGB really manipulate events with so callous yet hidden a hand, or were the fates that had befallen Krivitsky and Angleton merely the breaks of the game? Either way, the game was a vicious one, but it was important to know whether or not the wounds were self-inflicted.
Was there a mole? If there was, he must surely be gone by now, forced into retirement by advancing years and recurring personnel cuts. But the question still demands an answer. The KGB penetrated the intelligence services of other Western countries. Why not the CIA? Surely, sometime, somewhere, whether through ideological empathy or simple blackmail, the KGB succeeded in recruiting a CIA officer. But did the mole ever attain a position from which he could do real harm? The answer to that lies buried somewhere in the maze of counterintelligence cases surrounding the defections of Nosenko and Golitsin.
After both Angleton and Petty had withdrawn from the field, the CIA tried again to find the answer, this time with separate panels under the direction of two retired officers who had spent their working lives outside the double-cross world of counterintelligence. The panels—the one on Nosenko headed by John Hart and the one on Golitsin by Bronson Tweedy—concluded that both defectors were genuine. The CIA has adopted the findings as the final word, but they carry no more weight than all the other analyses that went before and do nothing to allay the fear of penetration, since to believe in Golitsin is to believe in the mole. It is possible, of course, that even a genuine Golitsin could simply have been mistaken. But what about Goleniewski, “the best defector the U.S. ever had,” who was so certain that the KGB had found out about him through a leak in the CIA? Was he wrong too? And how did the Russians discover the CIA’s plan to recruit the Polish intelligence officer in Switzerland, and where did they get a transcript of the CIA’s debriefing of the defector Deriabin?
The mists of suspicion can never be burned away, no matter how intense the light. The resulting uncertainty is profoundly dissatisfying. It frustrates the longing for clear-cut solutions and leaves hanging questions about the existence of a high-level penetration agent. But if no amount of scrutiny can pierce the veil, it can at least reveal the mole hunt for what it was—the single most corrosive episode in the CIA’s history, more so by far than the blatant yet easily eliminated excesses for which the Agency has been publicly pilloried. Assassination was contemplated by such a handful of men and kept so isolated from the rest of the CIA that it did not corrupt the mainstream of intelligence collection and analysis. The mole hunt, with its attendant fear that all the Agency’s clandestine sources on the Soviet Union were compromised and transmitting nothing but bogus data, went to the heart of the CIA’s business—the production of reliable intelligence about the motives and methods of the Kremlin. At the beginning, in 1947, Clark Clifford had warned Harry Truman that without reliable intelligence on the Soviet Union the United States would be “at the mercy of rumors and half-truths,” and that is precisely what happened during the hunt for the mole. Whether by KGB design or CIA misadventure, that was the ultimate corruption.
While such tactics as assassination and mail opening can be summarily banned, the dilemmas inherent in counterintelligence are not so easily resolved. The CIA has made a fresh start, but the secret war remains as devious and deceptive as ever, and no amount of well-intentioned “reform,” whether dictated by Congress or generated from within the executive branch, is going to change that. The KGB would have it no other way. And if the CIA had such trouble holding its own against the KGB when there were virtually no constraints on the tactics it could employ, how will it fare in this new era?
The CIA’s war against the KGB is undeniably just, but the reality is absurd. The careers of Angleton and Harvey were mired in absurdities, not the least of which was that they habitually violated the democratic freedoms they were sworn to defend. The futility of the first thirty years, the expense of spirit and the burden of shame, was staggering. The wonder was that Angleton and Harvey stuck with it for so long, stuck with it for too long, stuck with it until absurdity became the only logic they knew. Immersed in duplicity and insulated by secrecy, they developed survival mechanisms and behavior patterns that by any rational standard were bizarre. The forced inbreeding of secrecy spawned mutant deeds and thoughts. Loyalty demanded dishonesty, and duty was a thieves’ game. The game attracted strange men and slowly twisted them until something snapped. There were no winners or losers in this game, only victims.
Author’s Note
Although I accept full responsibility for the accuracy of the facts and the validity of the opinions contained in this book, there are several people who were absolutely indispensable to me in transferring the complexities of espionage from my reporter’s notebooks to the printed page.
My father, Joseph W. Martin, was a tremendous source of encouragement and a very tough copy editor who could somehow display as much enthusiasm for the latest rewrite as for the first rough draft. Since my father worked for the CIA for twenty-three years, I need to make one specific disclaimer about his role in my work. For his entire career he was an intelligence analyst far removed from clandestine operations and had no involvement in or knowledge of the events portrayed in this book. He was not a source of information, and with one minor exception, neither were his friends. Mike Sniffen of the Associated Press spent days of his time reading my various drafts, going over them with me line by line, sharpening the language, warning against pitfalls, and suggesting avenues of inquiry that had never occurred to me. His reward invariably was another draft to read. Irving Wechsler, a man I respect and admire above all others, and his wife, Marion, read the final drafts of the manuscript and besides making numerous improvements in the text were able to articulate themes I had been wrestling with for the better part of two years but could never express.
Then there was Mel Elfin, my boss at Newsweek and one of the class acts in Washington. To paraphrase another prominent Washingtonian, Mel gave me unlimited time off to work on this book, and I exceeded it. Mark Lynch of the American Civil Liberties Union and Jack Landau of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press were both extremely helpful in pursuing requests under the Freedom of Information Act. Elizabeth Jones at Carrolton Press assisted me in using that firm’s unique catalogue of declassified government documents. At Harper & Row, Buz Wyeth bought the book on the basis of a five-minute conversation and from then on treated it as though it were his life’s work. Burton Beals put this manuscript in its final form, which given my penchant for last-minute changes, must have felt like a life’s work. My agent, Theron Raines, friend to English bulldogs and unpublished authors, led me by the hand through the publishing jungles without a false step.
Finally there is my family, beginning with my wife and children, to whom this book is dedicated, and extending to a network of relatives, my parents and hers especially, who have given so much of themselves to my obsession. I visited all the torments of authorship on them without sharing any of the satisfactions. My wife, E.D., was pursuing her own studies in medicine at the time, yet she always pretended that my work was more important and pressing. Truth is, the most important thing is the life we have together with Cate and Zach.
Index
Abel, Colonel Rudolf, 98, 180
Abwehr code, 15
Acheson, Dean, 23
Albee, Edward, 70
Allen, George, 52
Allende, Salvador, 221
Alsop, Joseph, 53, 216
AM/LASH, 151–153
American Embassy, Moscow, 111
Soviet bugging of, 154, 166
American Friends Service Committee, 70
AN/APR9, antenna, 79
Anderson, Dillon, 89
Anderson, Jack, 219
ANDREY (Soviet agent), 112, 159, 166
Angleton, Cicely d’Autremont, 12, 215
Angleton, Hugh, 11
Angleton, James Jesus, 1
0–12, 47, 48, 118, 119, 210, 211, 213–216, 224, 226
counterintelligence assignment, 62–63
and Goleniewski case, 95, 98, 103, 104
and Golitsin case, 108–114, 148–178, 191–209
and HT/LINGUAL, 68–72, 211
and OSS, 12–13
and Philby case, 55–58
and SSU (Italy), 17–21, 34
transfer to CIA, 34–35
Anglo-German Fellowship, 14
Armed Forces Courier Center, Paris, 168
Armed Forces Security Agency, 39, 40, 43, 45, 60
Army Signal Corps, 79
Ashmead, Hugh, 206
Atomic bomb, 41
Atomic bomb project, Los Alamos, 41, 42
Atomic energy, 39, 49
Atomic Energy Commission, 41, 49
Atomic weapons, 9, 101
Australia, 61, 198
intelligence, 109
Austria, intelligence, 109, 198
Avedon, Richard, 216
Bagley, Pete, 191, 199, 200, 201
and Nosenko case, 111–113, 153–177
Balkans, 75
Baltic states, 60
Barmine, Alexander, 7
Barnes, Tracy, 67, 68
Barron, John, 168
Bassof, Sergei, 2
Bay of Pigs invasion, 117–122, 126, 133, 184
Beard, Dita, 221
Belgian Congo, 123, 124
Bell System, 74
Bennett, Leslie “Jim,” 208–210
Bentley, Elizabeth, 23–31, 42
Berle, Adolf, 6–7
Berlin, 62–67, 75
Bishop Service, 218
Bissell, Richard, 118, 119, 120, 121, 124, 126, 140
Blake, George, 99–104, 108, 109, 149, 161, 198
escape from prison, 180–181
Blunt, Sir Anthony, 109–110
BND (West German Federal Intelligence Agency), 103, 104, 105, 213
Bobbs-Merrill, 219, 221, 222
Bond, James (Agent 007), 128
BOUNTY (operation), 130
BOURBON (Soviet agent), 111, 114, 148
Bourke, Sean, 179–181
Bradlee, Ben, 215
British Admiralty, 97, 98, 111
Soviet penetration of, 149
British-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, 49
British Embassy (Wash., D.C.), 8, 41, 44, 47
British Foreign Office, 5, 7, 15, 21, 47, 50
British Labour Party, 151
British Security Service, 61
BRONZE (operation), 89
Brothman, Abraham, 25, 42
Bugging operations, 154, 166, 188
Bundy, McGeorge, 119, 125, 134, 137, 140
Burgess, Guy, 47–48, 50–51, 53, 54, 57, 59, 60, 61, 109, 110
Burke, Mike, 55, 67
Burst transmitter, 209–210
Cabell, Charles, 118
Cambridge University, 47, 48, 61, 200
Socialist Society, 13
Campbell, Judith, 122
Canada, 107
Soviet penetration of, 23, 29, 109, 166–167, 198, 208
Capitalism, 9, 13, 48
Carter, Jimmy (James Earl), 218
Carter, Marshall, 118, 140
Castro, Fidel, 117, 120, 133, 137, 138
assassination plots against, 121–124, 138–141, 145, 146, 151–153, 219–221, 225
Castro, Raul, 139
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA):
Bay of Pigs invasion, 117–122
Berlin Operations Base, 159
Board of National Estimates, 140, 141, 144, 193
Castro assassination plots, 121–124, 138–141, 145, 146, 151–153, 219–221, 225
Central Registry (RG), 123
Counterintelligence Division, 62, 70, 153, 172, 174, 177, 201, 206, 212
domestic spying, 213, 214, 216, 218
Doolittle report, 61–62, 68
Far East Division, 145
FBI rivalry with, 36–37, 52
founded, 9–10, 36
French operations, 167–170, 199
Goleniewski case, 98–99, 103–106
HT/LINGUAL, 68–72, 211
Italian operations, 182–187
JM/WAVE (Florida base), 131, 132, 139
KGB penetration of (suspected), 105–117, 148–179, 190–211, 223, 225
Manhattan Field Office, 69
Office of Communications, 72
Office of Security, 175
Office of Special Operations, 34
Operation GOLD, 76–90
Operation MONGOOSE, 126–129, 133, 140, 143
Operations Directorate, 67, 68, 118, 187, 205, 206, 211
Philby case, 44–56
Sniper case, 95–99
Soviet Bloc Division, 60, 92, 107–110, 128, 153, 157, 172, 177
Special Affairs Staff, 152
Special Services Unit, 188
Staff A, 121
Staff B, 121
Staff C, 121, 138
Staff D, 121, 127–128
Tairova/Popov case, 92–95
Task Force W, 128–135, 145, 152, 186
Technical Services Division, 122
Western Europe Division, 182, 184, 196, 199
Western Hemisphere Division, 153, 214
ZR/RIFLE program, 120–124, 138, 140
Chambers, Whittaker, 6–7, 8, 23
Cherapanov case, 160–161
Chief Military Intelligence of the Ministry of Armed Forces. See GRU
Chile, 221
China, 39
relations with Soviet Union, 150, 203, 217
relations with United States, 217
Chisholm, Janet, 115
Church, Frank, 222
Churchill, Sir Winston, 39, 40, 41, 48, 49
CIFAR, 185–186
Cipher machine (SIGTOT), 74
Ciphers. See Codes
Clandestine Service, 119
Clemens, Hans, 103–104
Clifford, Clark, 9, 225
Cline, Ray, 144
Codes, 39–13, 45, 48, 55, 74
Cohen, Morris and Lona, 98–99
Colby, William, 145, 183, 184, 211–217, 223
Cold War, 10, 125
Collier, Robert, 9, 25, 28
Collins, Henry, 28
Commissariat of State Security. See KGB
Communism, 9
Communist Party, 14
Corvo, Max, 18
Counterintelligence, 13, 15–16
Cox, Dave, 219
Coyne, Pat, 32
Crimea Conference, 43
Cryptanalysis, 39–43, 45, 55
Cryptonyms, 42, 43, 45, 55, 60, 92, 109, 126
“Crypt ops,” 43
Cuba, 117–144
Bay of Pigs invasion, 117–122, 126, 133, 184
Cuban missile crisis, 141–144
Cubella, Rolando, 151–153
Curiel, Henri, 100
Currie, Lauchlin, 24
Czechoslovakia, 9, 28, 203, 204
Dasher, Major General Charles, 88
Davis, Brigadier General Kermit, 66
Davison, Alexis, 115, 116
Defectors, 203
De Gaulle, Charles, 109
DELANDA (CIA agent), 183
Depression of 1929, 25
Deriabin, Peter, 103, 105, 106, 200, 201, 203, 225
DETECTOR (CIA agent), 183
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 4, 5
DINOSAUR (Project), 202
Disarmament talks, Geneva, 153, 154
Disinformation agents, 153, 156, 158, 161, 164, 167, 170, 178, 200, 201, 203
Distinguished Intelligence Medal, 90
Dobert, Eitel Wolf, 3, 5
Donovan, General William “Wild Bill,” 13, 36
Doolittle, Lieutenant General James, 61, 62, 68, 72
Double agents, 16
DROWZY (operation), 103, 104
Dubček, Alexander, 203
Dulles, Allen, 27, 35, 62, 67, 77, 90, 92–93, 118, 119, 120
; East Germany, 66, 159–160
Edwards, Colonel Sheffield, 121, 139, 140
Egyptian Communist Party, 100
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 51, 52, 61, 62, 89
Elder, Walter, 143
Electronic surveillance, 154, 166, 188
Elliott, Nicholas, 109–110
Evang, Colonel Wilhelm, 196
Facism, 9, 13, 17
Fair Play for Cuba Committee, 151
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 200, 208, 209
Bentley case, 23–31
Chambers case, 6–8
CIA rivalry and, 36–37, 52
Krivitsky case, 3–4
Philby case, 36–56, 59, 60
Popov/Tairova case, 92–95, 102, 103, 112, 161
Security Division, 38, 44
South American operations, 36–37
Soviet espionage division, 9
Federation of American Scientists, 70
Federov (Soviet agent), 195
Felfe, Heinz, 103–105, 108, 149, 205, 213
FitzGerald, Desmond, 145, 152, 187, 188
Fleming, Ian, 128
Follich, Carol Grace, 64, 222
Ford, Gerald, 218
Foreign Office (British), 5, 7, 15, 21, 47, 50
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