Politically, the never-ending story of the Party’s suppression of its opponents naturally merits great attention. But even here, the system has become more sophisticated in ways that are not obvious from the day-to-day headlines. Post-1989, the Party not only strengthened paramilitary riot police across the country and equipped them with modern armouries; they were also trained to use force as sparingly as possible, so as not to inflame already disgruntled protesters. In just about every place I visited in China over many years, I witnessed protests of some kind. For the most part, in my experience, they were settled relatively peacefully, often by paying money to get people off the streets. If protesters persist and, worst of all, try to organize themselves into larger anti-government groups, the local authorities have no compunction in crushing them, by whatever means. But the centre frowns on such confrontations. The best local officials are the ones who anticipate trouble, and nip it in the bud.
Propaganda has also become more street-wise. Instead of allowing the foreign media and local internet activists to scoop the state media when reporting on disasters and protests, the authorities now encourage local media to report some negative news, to ensure the official version dominates public debate. Anne-Marie Brady, who has written extensively on the propaganda system, says the authorities were burnt badly by the SARS crisis in 2003, when government secrecy was responsible for the spread of the virus in the region. They started working on a new system of managing public opinion, taking the Blair government’s handling of popular opinion during the mad-cow disease crisis in 2000–2001 as a model. ‘The leadership’s awareness of the risk of popular protests threatening the regime is not a sign of weakness,’ writes Ms Brady. ‘Rather it is an indication of [the Party’s] determination to survive and its ability to absorb new methods and technologies to enable it to do so.’
When the fine-tuning doesn’t work, the Party maintains a big stick in reserve. The central authorities in Beijing, and even in provincial capitals, struggle to keep up with what is happening on the ground in such a vast country. The multitude of astounding stories about graft, wasteful government spending, local profiteering and environmental degradation are testament to that. But much like a large magnet that makes iron filings suddenly cling together as it moves into position above them, the Party can still force the system and all its ne’er-do-wells to stand to attention when it focuses its attention on them.
The Party’s power is obvious in the political arena. When Jiang Zemin ordered that the Falun Gong movement be wiped out inside China, by and large it was. The Party has a harder time making the economy do its bidding, but it can still mobilize the system in an emergency. At the end of 2008, when the economy dropped into a hole with the rest of the world in the financial crisis, the Party ordered banks to lend, which they did with gusto. In the opening months of 2010, the Party reversed course, and told the banks to slow down, a diktat followed with much greater reluctance, but followed nonetheless. The Party’s power is also being felt on the environment. After decades of largely ignoring the issue, the central authorities have now attempted to take hold of a national environment policy. They have done this not by suppressing development but by turning the environment into an economic opportunity, by giving huge incentives to business to invest in alternative energies. In a few short years, as a result, China emerged as the largest producer of wind turbines and solar panels and the biggest investor in so-called clean coal technologies.
In large part, the Party’s legitimacy still depends on the economy. Economic growth is the single most important pillar supporting the Party at home and the force behind the power that China now projects around the world. Growth sustains living standards, policy flexibility, the internal patronage network and global leverage. The Chinese growth model has well-documented flaws and is unsustainable in its present form. Martin Wolf, the Financial Times economics commentator, summed up in late 2009 the deep distortions of a system that has suppressed personal consumption in favour of investment and exports with a devastatingly simple calculation. ‘In 2007, personal consumption was just 35 per cent of GDP. Meanwhile, China was investing 11 per cent of GDP in low-yielding foreign assets, via its current account surplus,’ he wrote. ‘Remember how poor hundreds of millions of Chinese still are. Then consider that the net transfer of resources abroad was equal to a third of personal consumption.’
The irony of this calculation is not that it shows how China’s economic miracle is unravelling. It is how much of an upside there is for ordinary Chinese once the Party has the courage to take on the vested interests now profiting from the distortions. The next stage of economic reform brings with it further political risk. How do you unpick the powerful financial interests within the Party that benefit from the state’s privileged position in the economy? Does unravelling the state’s economic interests irreparably damage the Party’s political clout? There is no easy way to chart a course through this thicket but the Party’s adaptive abilities should not be underestimated.
There is more to economic growth than just incomes. The success of the economy also buttresses the pride that many Chinese feel about the revival of a great civilization humiliated by the west. That pride, in turn, has become a powerful tool in the hands of party leaders, preordained as the natural and energetic defenders of the Chinese nation. Chinese pride in the country’s revival and the cultural confidence that comes with being part of a longstanding, highly developed and once pioneering civilization is an entirely natural thing. Look at the US. From the outside, the richer it has got, the more patriotic it has become. There is no reason China will be any different. Under the Party’s tutelage, however, patriotism and nationalism in China have mutated into much nastier phenomena in recent years.
China often feels like the USA in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, full of anger at outsiders and insistent on dividing the world down the middle into friends and enemies. Otherwise worldly and intelligent officials and friendly citizens become red with rage when topics such as Tibet and the Dalai Lama, Japan’s wartime record, the Xinjiang riots and Taiwan enter the conversation. In democracies like the USA, debates evolve and governments change. In all my time in China, it was very difficult to have even a civil exchange of views on these topics with anyone in an official position. Differences of opinion on issues such as Tibet and the anti-Japanese war can be transformed in a flash into deep slights against the nation. In the words of Joseph Fewsmith, the US Sinologist, speaking about a different issue: ‘If one part of “civil society” is civility, China has not yet reached it.’
But even here, the political system has adjusted. I once believed that nationalism had become so out of control as to be a threat to the Party itself. Whereas the people learn to fear the Party in China, the opposite seemed the case when patriotism came into play. The Party seemed to fear the people. The anti-Japanese protests of early 2005 were another lesson not to underestimate the Party’s adaptive powers. When riots broke out against the Japanese in cities across China, the police let them run long enough to send a message of anger and retribution to Tokyo, but not so long that they spilled out of control and turned into a forum for anti-Party grievances at home.
On the day of the largest demonstrations, the reach of the all-powerful state was on full display. In Beijing and elsewhere, the police commandeered the state-owned telecommunications network to flood the city’s mobile system with messages, to ensure the situation did not get out of control. In the words of Geremie Barmé, of the Australian National University, the messages provided ‘a glimpse of the fascinating yet unsettling face of China’s contemporary cheery authoritarianism’.
The Beijing Public Security Bureau would like to remind you of the following: don’t believe rumours, don’t spread rumours, express your patriotic fervour in rational ways. Don’t participate in illegal demonstrations.–Wangtong Telecommunications wishes you a happy Labour Day!
Don’t create trouble when all you want to do is help! Be patriotic, but don’t break the la
w. Be a solid, law-abiding citizen.
Usually you’re busy and exhausted, so let this be a happy Labour Day holiday week. We can only build a harmonious society if we are disciplined and respect the law.
At the end of the largest demonstration, outside the Japanese embassy in Beijing, the police wished the crowd well, complimented them on their restraint and patriotism–even after they had thrown bricks at the embassy–and asked them to go home, which by and large they did.
The handling of the anti-Japanese demonstrations was a reminder of how the Party doesn’t so much control public opinion on these hot-button issues as harness and channel it, in line with its prevailing political priorities. The moment that Japan changed prime ministers in September 2006, more than a year after the riots, Chinese policy-makers were able to switch stride. When Junichiro Koizumi was replaced by Shinzo Abe, a man Beijing considered more friendly than his predecessor, Hu Jintao instantly agreed to meet him. The state press immediately changed its tone, to focus on the ‘positive’ aspects of the relationship. The police quietly visited the leaders of the anti-Japanese protests, telling them to hold fire while Beijing tested out Tokyo’s new leader. The masses, intoxicated with rage at Japan only the year before, fell silent.
Much western commentary has long harped on about the coming collapse of China as though such an event would go on to destabilize the world around it. This misses the point. China will destabilize the world not only if it fails but if it succeeds as well. Any country of China’s size growing as quickly as it is is bound to unsettle the existing order. The rest of the world will have to adjust and compete, be it for dominance of the sea lanes in Asia, the search for oil in Africa, the writing of new norms for the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund or over the latest mobile phone standards. Name any global debate and China will inevitably be positioned at the heart of it.
China’s focus on economic development, however, is tying Beijing to global institutions in confronting these issues. China has become an increasingly active member of everything from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization to the Nuclear Suppliers Group. China has an interest in pressing its claims in these institutions but no desire to up-end the bodies altogether, since any ensuing instability could blow back on China itself. Equally, for all its rising global interests, the scale of China’s domestic problems, in their depth, multiplicity and variety, means that central government leaders will remain preoccupied at home. It is often hard to explain to outsiders that Hu Jintao does not wake up in the morning worried about what is happening in the US Senate, but by peasant riots in Henan, the choice of the new party secretary in Shandong, a corruption case in Shanghai, coal-mine disasters in Shanxi and so on. China has an ever-increasing outward focus but local problems have priority when they land on Hu’s desk in the morning.
Within China, the country’s distinctive system is not a source of concern. Rather, it is played up as a point of pride. The Global Times, the nationalistic tabloid owned by the People’s Daily, the Party’s mouthpiece, trumpets how China’s rise has ended the post-Cold-War ‘unilateral’ world lorded over by the USA. ‘The biggest contribution that China has made to world politics is that through revolution, reform and development China has shown the world that the Western model is not the only way to modernize,’ it said in an opinion piece in October 2009. ‘China has also demonstrated that the non-Western world does not necessarily follow the West’s footsteps.’
The editorial captured a longtime article of faith in China that is only now becoming evident in a western world still recuperating from the financial crisis. The end of the Cold War did not mean the end of history after all. The Chinese communist system is, in many ways, rotten, costly, corrupt and often dysfunctional. The financial crisis has added a dangerous dash of hubris to the mix. But the system has also proved to be flexible and protean enough to absorb everything that has been thrown at it, to the surprise and horror of many in the west.
In the absence of democratic elections and open debate, it is impossible to judge popular support for the Party with any degree of accuracy. But is is indisputable since Mao’s death that the twin foundations of the Party’s power–economic growth and resurgent nationalism–have been strengthened. China has long known something that many in developed countries are only now beginning to grasp, that the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders have never wanted to be the west when they grow up. For the foreseeable future, it looks as though their wish, to bestride the world as a colossus on their own implacable terms, will come true.
Notes
PROLOGUE
Barely two years after…: Among the western banks which had invested in China’s big state lenders, the Royal Bank of Scotland was effectively nationalized; a near-bankrupt Merrill Lynch was swallowed by Bank of America, which needed a federal bailout to absorb the losses; Goldman Sachs was forced to convert into a mere bank to access federal aid and UBS in Zurich was rescued from insolvency by a capital injection from the Swiss government. Of the foreign companies which put money into their Chinese counterparts, only HSBC survived unscathed. But then, many Chinese thought of HSBC as a Chinese bank anyway.
The banner headline…: Renmin Ribao, People’s Daily, 13 April 2009. Hereafter, I will just refer to the paper as the People’s Daily.
But alongside…: According to Jim O’Neill, the chief economist for Goldman Sachs, at the end of 2008, the US dollar value of China’s GDP was about $4.3 trillion. As recently as 2001, it was around $1.3 trillion–in other words, China’s GDP has increased by about $3 trillion in just seven years. Evening Standard, 17 November 2009.
In the words of…: China Digital Times, 29 July 2009. Dai was speaking at the annual US–China high-level dialogue. (The Chinese Foreign Minister–at the time of writing, it is Yang Jiechi–is not a powerful political player. Not only is he outranked by Dai, Yang is not a member of the Politburo. Since he is outside the Politburo, Yang, in terms of seniority, does not rank among the top thirty-five party members in the country.)
Like communism in its heyday…: Robert Service, Comrades. Communism: A World History, Macmillan, 2007, p. 9.
More than that…: From Poor Areas to Poor People: China’s evolving poverty reduction agenda. An assessment of poverty and inequality in China. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Department, East Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank, March 2009. The bank’s definition of poverty is anyone living on less than $1.00 a day, a benchmark which admittedly many of the bank’s economists agree is out of date, and undercounts the number of poor people.
CHAPTER 1 THE RED MACHINE
Ahead of the congress…: The information about the restrictions on petitioners refers to orders covering the cities of Nanjing and Shenzhen. See Zuzhi gongzuo yanjiu wenxuan, 2005 [Selection of Studies on Organizational Work from 2005]; Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu yanjiushi [Compiled by the Research Department of the CCP Central Organization Department]. Contained in Zhiding tixian kexue fazhanguan he zhengque zhengjiguan yaoqiu de ganbu shiqi kaohe pingjia biaozhun yanjiu [Studies on Cadres’ Actual Performance Evaluation Criteria in Order to Reflect the Theory of Scientific Development and the Correct Concept of Political Performance]. The documents say officials in the two cities will be benchmarked according to the number of local petitioners who lodge their complaints to ‘authorities higher than the municipal government’.
The tools to enforce…: See The Times, 15 November 2002; Financial Times, 6–7 October 2007.
Hu had been careful…: Hu did answer questions from Russian reporters before two visits to Moscow, but they were submitted, and replied to, in writing.
In the coming years…: The Standing Committee did appear for a photo-op when China stopped for three minutes’ silence after the Sichuan earthquake in May 2008, as well as at a handful of other functions, including one to host overseas Chinese in July 2009, and to oversee the celebrations for the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the republic on 1 October 2009.
Party me
mbership is a…: I am grateful to the late Jim Brock for the phrasing of this observation.
For the centre to…: From A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks, V.I. Lenin. September 1902.
The Politburo’s overriding priorities…: The Politburo selected in 2007 consists of the nine-member ‘Standing Committee’, the inner circle, and twenty-four other individuals, with broad portfolio responsibilities, such as agriculture, finance and trade, and the party secretaries of various large and important provinces and cities. The Standing Committee meets separately, and also together with the full Politburo. The Standing Committee’s individual members’ responsibilities are, in order, party affairs and the military (Hu Jintao); oversight of China’s managed parliament (Wu Bangguo); the economy (Wen Jiabao); relations with non-party members, Taiwan and civil organizations (Jia Qinglin); media and propaganda, which in China are one and the same thing (Li Changchun); the day-to-day running of party affairs and some diplomatic responsibilities (Xi Jinping): a back-up on the economy and budget, environment, health and central–regional issues (Li Keqiang); anti-corruption (He Guoqiang); and the police and state security (Zhou Yongkang.)
The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers Page 36