Since my arrival in Cairo . . . I have striven ceaselessly to find a common basis upon which peace negotiations between the two parties might be undertaken. I have tried to bring them together in my presence or without it. I have studied carefully their respective positions, claims, and contentions, and . . . have devised compromises . . . put to them either orally or in writing. I have employed abundantly both reason and persuasion, but to date neither agreement between the parties nor a basis for agreement has been found.1
His assassination in Jerusalem the following day confirmed his point.
In mid-October fighting resumed, and the Israeli army launched Operation Yoav (Ten Plagues), a massive thrust in the south that broke the Egyptian lines. Within a week, the Israelis captured the Negev desert and southern Palestine except for the Gaza Strip, and surrounded an entire Egyptian division at al-Faluja, while a simultaneous Israeli drive in the north captured the Galilee. The UN Security Council halted the fighting again with resolutions in November and called on both sides to begin negotiation on an armistice. But the Arabs and Israelis were not done. On December 10, Egypt launched an attack hoping to rescue the al-Faluja division and recapture the Negev, a six-thousand-seven-hundred-square-mile desert extending from the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel’s counteroffensive shattered the poorly equipped Egyptian army and threw it back into the Sinai Peninsula. Finally, on January 6, 1949, after the loss of more than ten thousand lives and creating over a half million refugees, under decisive pressure from the UN and the British and American governments, the parties consented to UN-sponsored armistice negotiation.
Israel’s decisive battlefield victories smashed the opposing forces beyond repair, and it dictated events on the ground and controlled a much larger area than originally envisioned. As a new state founded largely under UN auspices, it hoped to consolidate its military triumphs into a diplomatic agreement. Israel also had a great deal to lose. It was vulnerable politically. Its new borders, acquired during UN-mandated cease-fires, were seen as illegitimate. If the United Nations withheld recognition or imposed sanctions and the great powers followed suit, Israel risked international isolation, a fatal prospect for the small, poor, and fragile young nation.
Egypt felt tremendous pressures as well. The defeats had taken their toll, the united Arab front had crumbled into suspicion and rivalry, and the United States leaned heavily on Cairo for a formal peace. Britain grew increasingly nervous that the violence would jeopardize the security of the Suez Canal, and rattled the Egyptian government with talk of bringing troops in to safeguard the area. Egypt also knew that the only hope of separating Israel from its newly won territories lay with a negotiated settlement or UN Security Council resolution accompanied by sanctions. But Egypt’s greatest incentive to come to the negotiating table lay with the fate of two thousand seven hundred Egyptian soldiers (nearly a third of the total Egyptian forces) trapped by the Israeli military at al-Faluja, completely encircled, without hope of rescue or resupply and in danger of running out of food. Whatever the Egyptians’ distaste for meeting with the Israelis, the al-Faluja issue simply had to be addressed, and this could only be done as part of a larger armistice negotiation with Israel. Still, the prospect of an armistice with Israel was a bitter pill to swallow. Egypt refused to recognize Israel or acknowledge its right to exist. Cairo insisted on UN involvement for fear that one-on-one negotiation would imply recognition of what it referred to as “the so-called State of Israel.”2 Egyptian leaders swore often and publicly that they would rather die than strike a bargain with Israel, and there was no shortage of assassins willing to keep them to their word.3
For the United Nations, established three years before, this was a defining moment. The armistice negotiation was its first major test in matters of war and peace, and the world waited to see if it could produce results or if it would fall prey to the same inaction and lack of resolve that doomed the League of Nations.
As a formal end to hostilities, the negotiation would address both the military issues concerning withdrawal and balance of forces and larger political questions of territorial boundaries and steps toward a permanent peace. The Egyptian delegation’s ten members included Colonel Seif El Dine, the head of the delegation; Dr. Abdul Mustafa, the chief political adviser; Colonel El Rahmany; and Colonel Ismail Sherine, a cousin and brother-in-law of King Farouk. Israel’s delegation, headed by Walter Eytan, the 39-year-old founder of the Israeli Foreign Service, included Reuven Shiloah, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s foreign policy adviser; Elias Sasson, the Syrian-born director of the Middle East Division; and Shabtai Rosenne, the Foreign Ministry’s legal adviser. Colonel Yigael Yadin, chief of staff of the Israeli army, led the small group of military advisers.
The negotiation was supervised by Ralph Bunche, a man uniquely suited for the challenge. Orphaned as a young child, Bunche was raised in the tough Watts section of Los Angeles by his maternal grandmother, “Nana” Johnson, who had been born into slavery. He could remember no time in his childhood when his family lived in conditions other than those of extreme poverty,4 which imbued him with a toughness tempered by tolerance. “Life was no idyll,” he remembered. “I was learning what it meant to be a Negro, even in an enlightened northern city. But I wasn’t embittered by such experiences, for Nana had taught me to fight without rancor. She taught all of us to stand up for our rights, to suffer no indignity, but to harbor no bitterness toward anyone, as this would only warp our personalities. She instilled in us a sense of personal pride strong enough to sustain all external shocks, but she also taught us understanding and tolerance. Be honest and frank with yourself and the world at all times, she said. Never compromise what you know to be the right. Never pick a fight, but never run from one if your principles are at stake.”5
Bunche earned his way through high school laying carpets, and worked as a janitor to put himself through the University of California at Los Angeles, where he excelled as a star athlete and class valedictorian. On his graduation, the black community of Los Angeles raised one thousand dollars for him to pursue graduate studies at Harvard University, where in 1934 he became the first black American to receive a PhD in political science in the United States. With the advent of World War II, Bunche joined the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the CIA, where he headed the Africa section and played an important role in the Allied landings in North Africa. When the war ended, Bunche joined the State Department as its first black official and head of the Colonial Affairs Division. In April 1945, the State Department sent him to San Francisco, where he helped organize the founding of the United Nations and contributed in the writing of its charter. Bunche joined the United Nations as a specialist on colonialism, decolonialism, and trusteeship, and quickly became one of the UN’s leading experts on Palestine. When his close friend and colleague Count Bernadotte was assassinated, Bunche was appointed in his place as UN mediator. UN officials made it clear to Bunche before he left for the negotiation that the outcome would determine not only prospects for the Middle East, but also the future of the United Nations.
The delegations arrived at Rhodes on January 12. An ancient Greek island off the Turkish coast, Rhodes was neutral, secluded, and conveniently close to Cairo and Tel Aviv. While architecturally beautiful, the majestic Hotel des Roses, which housed the delegations, had uncomfortable rooms, little or no heat, and inedible food. “Dr. Bunche and his staff,” Eytan wrote, “had set up their headquarters and living accommodations in one wing of the spacious Hotel des Roses and had reserved the other for the Egyptian and Israeli delegations. Israel occupied the larger part of one floor, and Egypt the floor immediately above. It was an excellent arrangement. All the parties concerned in the negotiations were under the same roof, yet each enjoyed almost perfect privacy.”6
They met the following day in Bunche’s sitting room. “I can readily think,” Bunche told them, “of a million ways to stall, delay, obstruct and stalemate these discussions should anyone care to do so. I trust there wi
ll be no tendency to be rigidly legalistic, picayunish about detail, or recriminatory. There are many eyes here, and motes can be readily found in them. The lives of many people and indeed the peace of the Near East hang in the balance while you meet. You cannot afford to fail. You must succeed. I have faith that you will succeed.”7 Bunche drafted a statement of basic principles to frame the discussion, which the two sides agreed to the next day. It called for “scrupulous respect for the injunction of the Security Council against the use of military force; no aggressive actions to be planned or executed by either party; respect for the right of each party to its security and to freedom from fear of attack; and the acceptance of the armistice as an indispensable step toward peace in Palestine.” He also laid out the agenda: al-Faluja, then delineation of armistice lines, withdrawal of forces, and finally reduction of forces.8
Eytan reported to Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett:
We have been here for just over twenty-four hours, and I think the time has come to give you some first impressions. . . . Bunche himself is dead keen on achieving success, and, if the Egyptians are at all susceptible to a mélange of charm and high-pressure diplomacy, he may pull it off. . . . The formal opening meeting went off smoothly. Bunche told me afterwards that the Egyptians were pleasantly surprised at our appearance; they had apparently expected fierce, warlike persons to come exultantly to the table, with grim expressions on their faces. The Egyptians were visibly nervous, never quite sure whether they were doing the right thing. [The Israeli representatives] agree that the thing to do is to try to wear down their initial suspicion and caution.9
The first week was filled with challenges. When the negotiators passed each other in the narrow hallways they would avert their eyes and turn away. The two sides refused to meet, forcing Bunche to tell them, “It was my understanding that we had come here to negotiate, and to do this, gentlemen, one side must talk to the other.”10 The Egyptians and Israelis would not sit down at working meetings with each other, forcing Bunche to work separately with each side. He shuttled between the two delegations, discussing the proposals and delivering the written responses. After five days, Bunche had had enough. He told the delegations that he was not there in the capacity of a high-class messenger boy and asked them, “Can you give a single example in history of a peace that has been concluded without the two parties meeting?”11
They also confronted more fundamental obstacles. Along with the normal pressures to bring home a respectable compromise able to withstand domestic opposition were unique constraints. To minimize political tensions with the Arab world, the Egyptian government maintained the public fiction that the negotiation at Rhodes did not involve direct talks with Israelis and did not address the broader issue of peace. The Egyptian leadership also placed itself in the awkward position of having concealed the army’s defeat from the Egyptian public. Outside of the military and high-level politicians, Egyptians were under the illusion that their army lay within striking distance of Tel Aviv and hailed their returning soldiers as triumphant victors. Thus any concession by Egyptian negotiators, even of territory they no longer held, would be seen as treason.12 Israeli interests were more direct. In exchange for the release of the al-Faluja division and concessions on territory still held by Egypt in the Gaza Strip, they hoped to gain legitimacy for their control over the Negev and greater political stability.
Eytan wrote to Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett on January 16:
Reuven and I wish to place the following considerations before you and [Prime Minister] Ben-Gurion, though we are sure you are both well aware of them. The fact of signing this armistice with Egypt is in itself of far-reaching importance irrespective of the terms of the agreement. As we now know, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan are willing to sign an armistice if the negotiations with Egypt succeed. . . . A series of such armistice agreements would transform the political situation in the Middle East. They are possible only if the talks with Egypt lead to results. If we here fail, it sets back indefinitely the chances of armistice with all these countries. We consider, therefore, that the signing of an armistice agreement with Egypt in itself transcends in importance this detail or that. We have no hint yet as to what the Egyptians have in mind regarding armistice lines, withdrawal and reduction of forces, etc.13
Eytan worried that time was not on Israel’s side. “In the changeable Middle East, with Egyptian Prime Ministers liable to be assassinated any day, we should in our interest clinch the matter as soon as we can.”14 He described the Egyptian delegation as “skillful, tenacious and well-briefed.”15
The first item on the agenda was al-Faluja. Anxiety over the fate of the besieged division there was the principal reason for Egypt’s presence at the talks, and the Israelis were well aware of its bargaining value. Bunche wanted the issue resolved early in the discussions in the hope of building momentum by removing this source of tension before moving on to the thornier question of demarcation lines. Bunche composed a plan that allowed the Egyptian division to evacuate under UN supervision, with its heavy equipment held in UN custody until a settlement was in place. The Israelis agreed at once to the unconditional evacuation of the sick and wounded, but they tried to hold half of the rest until the conclusion of an armistice. After prodding from Bunche, who reminded them of their obligations under UN resolutions, and a hope that the talks would proceed quickly, the Israelis relented and agreed to an evacuation to take place on January 24, one week later. Both sides approved the plan at a formal joint meeting on the evening of January 17.
The quick agreement on al-Faluja generated a sense of optimism, and Bunche and the Israeli and Egyptian delegations predicted the talks would be finished within a week. With the al-Faluja issue ostensibly settled, the negotiators moved on to the meatier issue of boundary lines. “Armistice demarcation lines next—the crucial issue by which we succeed or fail,”16 Bunche wrote in his diary. Here the negotiators ran aground. Eytan wanted the Egyptians all the way out of Palestine, arguing that armistice lines should be based on the fighting lines as they stood, while the Egyptians demanded the October lines, before UN cease-fire violations. Bunche cabled UN Secretary General Trygve Lie on January 20:
Egyptians pressing for 4 November resolution and Memorandum of 13 November as basis for lines which would require Israeli withdrawal from Rafah–Bir Asluj area and Egyptian advance. I have informed Egyptians privately that miracles seldom happen. Israelis desire Egyptian-Palestine frontier as basis for lines with special arrangement for Gaza–Rafah coastal strip not involving Israeli occupation. Situation is toughest I have ever faced but no reason for discouragement yet since spirit remains good on both sides and there is no take it or leave it attitude. Israeli delegation becoming sensitive to time factor in view of imminence of election day and criticism in opposition Hebrew press. Egyptians in no hurry.17
While “neither side appears aggressive in its position,” Bunche wrote, he found little room to maneuver as they stuck “stubbornly but not adamantly to their original positions.”18 Bunche believed he could reconcile Israel’s security concerns with Egypt’s desire to minimize its loss of territory. He worked to devise compromise formulas, drafting and meeting with the delegations until early each morning. But as the days wore on without movement, hopes began to fade.
Bunche rode both delegations hard. On January 23, he gave Eytan a stern lecture, telling him that in his view the Israelis were making no concessions of consequence while asking the Egyptians to sign a blank check. In his reply, Eytan dropped a bombshell. The evacuation of the al-Faluja division, scheduled to take place the following day, would not be allowed to occur. When they agreed to permit the evacuation on January 24, the Israelis had assumed the talks would be concluded by then. When it was clear that they were nowhere close to agreement, the Israelis began to suspect that Egypt was indifferent to an armistice and was concerned only with the release of its division. Once that happened, they feared, the Egyptians would renew fighting. Eytan blamed Bunche, claiming he had “s
educed” them with the prospect of a quick settlement, but the results were disastrous.19
Bunche informed the Egyptians, who were “dumbfounded,”20 while Eytan sent a cable to Tel Aviv warning that “we have more or less succeeded in antagonizing Bunche by what he considers our ungenerous attitude.”21 Bunche reported to Secretary General Lie that the Israeli cancellation of the evacuation had created a “sudden crisis which threatens the complete disruption of the negotiations on the question of good faith.”22
That night, Bunche told the Egyptians to sleep on it, and sat down to try to salvage the talks. The lynchpin of his strategy having worked itself free, he needed a stopgap to keep the negotiation alive and buy time to find another way to move the two sides forward. The next morning he presented a three-point plan, consisting of (1) a strong and signed cease-fire of indefinite duration, (2) an undertaking by the Israelis to permit food and medical convoys through to al-Faluja exclusively under UN supervision, and (3) adjournment of the discussions for three days until Thursday, January 27, to allow some of the delegates to go home and consult with their governments. With minor changes, the proposal was accepted. 23
The talks were saved, but barely. After two weeks of nonstop negotiating, the only tangible results were a reiteration of the cease-fire already in effect and a convoy of twenty-five tons of food and medical supplies for al-Faluja. Both sides remained as far apart as ever. While the parties adjourned to confer with their governments and reconsider their positions, Bunche continued working. “Spent the evening working on a draft agreement,” he recorded, “but I doubt it will ever come near being signed.”24
Great Negotiations Page 14
