The French battle plan was relatively simple. They would soften the English position with a barrage of bolts from the contingent of Genovese mercenary crossbowmen. The French would then follow with a decisive charge with the heavy cavalry to close with and destroy the line of English men-at-arms. However, this simple concept was beyond the abilities of the French to execute.
After some delay, the Genovese, one of the few well-commanded French units, managed to get into position and move forward. These men were professionals and, unlike the French cavalry, operated in distinct units and under firm command of their officers. But the situation they marched into was not one suited for success. Because of the haste in organizing the attack, they moved forward without their protective pavise shields. These shields were a critical piece of equipment as they were used to protect the crossbowmen during the reloading process. They also moved forward with no supply of quarrels, other than those carried on their person. Nonetheless, the Genovese advanced in good order and managed, in a series of short marches, to position themselves about 150 yards from the Prince of Wales. The two sides opened fire simultaneously.53
If each army fired at the maximum rate for the first minute of combat, the 2,000 English archers in the English battle would have released 20,000 to 24,000 arrows (at a rate of fire of 10 to 12 shots per minute) while the 6,000 Genovese would have fired approximately 12,000 bolts (at a rate of fire of 2 shots per minute). Sometime shortly after the volleys began, the Genovese, having taken severe casualties, broke contact with the English. The English vollies likely caused twice the number of casualties as the Genovese. In addition, shortly before the battle began, a short but severe rain-storm had swept the battlefield. The English archers removed their bow strings to keep them dry. This was impossible with the crossbow. It’s likely that a significant number of French bolts fell well short of their target because the wet strings of the crossbows had lost some of their power. At least one Medieval source indicates that this was the case. Given the volume of fire coming from the English, the Genovese must have realized the futility of continuing the failed assault. The retreat of the Genovese professionals under these adverse conditions was a reasonable command decision.54
The Genovese withdrawal ended the French infantry’s contribution to the battle. The 12,000 mounted French men-at-arms would carry out the remainder of the fight. The last act of the retreating Genovese was to become entangled in the mounted battle of Charles II Count of Alençon. The French cavalry were positioned closely behind the crossbowmen and were anxious to execute a charge. The two units had never worked with each other, and the French cavalry refused to open ranks for the retreating Genovese. The result was a stalemate in which the French cavalry were unable to advance with any speed or cohesion. This collision took place within range of the English archers who continued to rain arrows on both groups. The chain mail armor of the men-at-arms provided only limited protection against the arrows, although their shields proved somewhat more effective. The unarmored horses suffered much more than the riders. Count Alençon gave the order to ride down the Genovese crying, “Away with these faint-hearted rabble!” But his order did little to prevent the hopeless entangling of the two forces. The initial cavalry charge against the English started in a disrupted state and never recovered.55 Alençon’s charge dissolved into a mass of confused and dying infantry, rearing wounded horses, unhorsed and wounded men-at-arms, and general chaos—before it ever reached the English battle line. Any men-at-arms that extracted themselves from the confusion became solitary targets for the forward ranks of archers. Those who did reach the English battle line were easily dispatched.
As Alençon’s charge failed, the second battle of the French army moved forward. The blind Bohemian king, John of Luxembourg, commanded the second battle. John’s reputation as a warrior was respected on both sides, and his followers were veterans known for their loyalty to their king. In addition to the inherent difficulties all Medieval armies had executing a coherent charge against a line of infantry, King John’s battle had to negotiate a battlefield strewn with the debris of two previous failed attacks. At this relatively early point in the battle the field across which King John was to charge would have been littered with thousands of dead and wounded Genovese, men-at-arms, and horses. In addition, the sun was setting behind the English battle line, casting long shadows and making it difficult to see the English lines. Horses have particularly poor night vision, and they have difficulty distinguishing shadows from holes or solid objects. Under these conditions, the horses would have been hypersensitive and much more prone to shying, bolting, or refusing to go forward. The French cavalry horses were already fatigued before they charged; they had been on the move since early morning, and the leading elements had had an 18-mile march en route to the battlefield. The French cavalry may also have been plagued with many foundered horses because of several days of hard riding. Foundered horses would have been challenged just to keep up on the march and would have been totally incapable of charging. 56
The blind King John led the charge with his reins tied to those of his escort. His directive to his escort was simple: “Sirs, ye are my men, my companions and friends in this journey: I require you bring me so far forward, that I may strike one stroke with my sword.” The Bohemian contingent likely advanced at the trot, moving between 8 and 10 miles an hour, trying for cohesion and control rather than great speed. Still, given the clutter of the battlefield they could not have maintained a tight stirrup-to-stirrup formation. At about 250 yards the missile attack from the English archers began. Using both direct fire from the first rank and high-angle fire from the rear ranks, the 2,000 English bowmen would have released another 24,000 arrows in the one minute it took King John’s force to cross the deadly ground in front of the English battle line.57 Casualties were significant on the flanks of the charge, and the effect of the archery attack naturally compressed the center of the formation as the horses and riders on the flanks shied away.
Just before hitting the English battle line the cavalry encountered the trip holes. The holes surprised the French, and a few horses must have fallen. This would have slowed the charge even further. When the charge closed on the English it would not have had the momentum to crash through the battle line. Instead, the men-at-arms, mounted and dismounted, would have immediately become engulfed in a melee as the mounted force tried to penetrate the line. The dismounted men-at-arms, horsemen themselves, would have had little psychological fear of the horses, but the size, strength, and quickness of the horses still gave the mounted force an advantage. Offsetting this French advantage were the English longbowmen, who continued to pour fire into the flanks and rear of the French force.
The struggle between the forces of the English right flank under the Prince of Wales and King John of Luxembourg’s battle was the hardest fought of the evening and the closest the French came to achieving success. At one point the French penetrated to the young prince’s standard and knocked the prince off his feet. His advisers sent a messenger to King Edward requesting reinforcements. Edward, positioned in the windmill to the rear of the right flank, was undoubtedly aware that what little success the French were having was temporary and local. The left flank English battle had hardly been engaged, and the English reserve was uncommitted. The king’s response to the request for reinforcements was to let the prince “win his spurs; for if God be pleased, I will this journey be his and the honour thereof, and to them that be about him.” Though fighting valiantly, the second French charge was eventually destroyed and the English battle line remained firm. The bodies of King John and his escort were found the next day in a group, their dead horses still harnessed together.58
Though the French would launch as many as 13 separate cavalry charges at the English battle line, none came as close to achieving a penetration as the second charge. The records of the battle do not indicate any orders or actions taken by King Philip to organize or control his army after the attack began, although toward the end o
f the evening, he personally led several attacks and reportedly had as many as three horses killed from under him. As French units arrived on the battlefield, their tactical commanders, with little or no guidance, launched them in an uncoordinated manner on the closest English force. Because the Prince of Wale’s position was closest, most of the French attacks fell on the English right flank. Each French charge was more difficult to assemble and execute as darkness fell, and horse and human casualties turned the field in front of the English position into a huge obstacle. The French cavalry had to coax their mounts forward at a walk to avoid tripping over the bodies that littered the field. Walking forward increased the exposure time of the French to the rain of arrows. When the advancing French cavalry arrived before the English men-at-arms they did so in small groups that were relatively easy to deal with: the English men-at-arms swarmed around the outnumbered French horsemen, pulled them from their mounts, and quickly put them to the sword. Any small groups of French cavalry that did reach the English line were not supported; the English could quickly re-form and close any gaps created.
Some reports have the battle continuing until well after sunset. If so, action was very limited. Large-scale cavalry operations would have been increasingly difficult as daylight faded—and totally impossible after darkness. All reports indicate that the French cavalry at Crécy did not retreat but rather dissolved. Individual men-at-arms and small contingents just drifted off the battlefield in the darkness. At some point, King Philip and his retinue left the field. The English army slept in its battle positions. No pursuit was attempted.
In the morning a heavy fog covered the field. When it lifted the English were able to identify more than 1,500 French nobles lying in the field before them. Some short skirmishes occurred that day as French levied infantry, unaware of the previous day’s results, wandered into the battle area, and were routed by mounted English men-at-arms. Total French casualties may have numbered as high as 10,000. English casualties were few—probably in the range of 100 to 300 killed.
The battle of Crécy is often heralded as the demonstration of the tactical superiority of the longbow and the supremacy of firepower over heavy cavalry. In future engagements, the French dismounted their cavalry for battle and added more archers to their armies. However, the charge of the French cavalry at Crécy could not have been more mismanaged. Though the French cavalry charged in absolutely the worst conditions the battlefield losses were still not as significant as one might suppose. Assuming that the total number of men-at-arms killed was twice that of the nobles identified by the English, one can infer that the total losses amounted to 3,000 men-at-arms. That would mean that about 25 percent of the cavalry force died. That was not an unusually high number, especially among an elite component of the army. If one assumes horse casualties were twice rider casualties, the French may have had a force of 6,000 cavalry available even at the end of the day. This force could have threatened Edward the next day. But the cavalry was not available because of the haphazard organization of the French army and King Philip’s total lack of leadership.
The original French plan to delay the battle for a day would undoubtedly have greatly effected its course. Even attacking when they did, had the French focused concerted cavalry attacks against the English archers, they would have drastically changed the tactical situation. Eliminating the archers would have removed the source of the devastating fire, increased the cohesion and shock effect of the French cavalry charges, and might have opened a vulnerable flank to attack. Such an attack had a high probability for success. At Crécy, the ground conditions and terrain supported a cavalry attack. The English archers, though protected by trip holes, were not surrounded by stakes (as they would be at Agincourt) and were in exposed positions. The trip holes would have been a nuisance but not an insurmountable obstacle to the French cavalry. At Bannockburn in 1314, when English archers opened flank fire against the Scottish infantry, the reserve cavalry of Robert the Bruce, “who well knew that archers were dangerous and their shot hard and right grievous,” ordered forward his cavalry reserve. The reserve of 500 men-at-arms successfully charged and rode down the English archers of King Edward II, turning the tide of battle in favor of the Scots. One French knight who was in the midst of the English archer formation at Crécy easily cut his way completely through the formation unscathed; he was not brought down until he rode back to the French lines. The French failure to attack the archers is attributable to a chivalric focus on the English men-at-arms, cultural disdain for common infantry, and a lack of appreciation for the effects of the longbow.59
The English use of trip holes at Crécy was not innovative. For centuries infantry had attempted to protect itself from cavalry by the use of obstacles. These obstacles included trip holes, ditches, caltrops, and stakes. Caltrops, small pointed iron objects shaped symmetrically so that no matter how it was thrown one small spike always pointed straight up, were one of the first antihorse obstacles. One of earliest reported uses of caltrops was at Guagamela in 331 BC. They were part of the Greek as well as Roman army equipment. The Scottish army under Robert the Bruce used caltrops as well as trip holes at Bannockburn to attempt to canalize the English cavalry in 1314. At Agincourt the English archers pounded sharpened stakes into ground around their positions to protect against mounted attack. Numerous disadvantages are associated with these antihorse obstacles. First, they are only useful if a commander determines that he will fight a purely defensive battle. Then, they require exact positioning in order to block the attack. In the case of caltrops, though usually only the size of a fist, the defender had to use an immense number of them to achieve an effective size and density. Creating an antihorse obstacle was extremely time-consuming and labor intensive. Finally, the effects of the obstacle were at best temporary. All obstacles could be by passed or breached. They could slow or canalize, but not stop the enemy. Cavalry, encountering the rare effective obstacle, simply rode around it or retreated. For these reasons, obstacles such as caltrops, stakes, ditches, or holes had only limited tactical effects on cavalry, and no impact on the role of the war horse in battle. Commanders only considered obstacles in special circumstances. Later, in the modern era, industrialization permitted the use of immense obstacles which did have a major impact on the employment of cavalry.
The other important aspect of Crécy was the effectiveness of the English dismounted men-at-arms. Though outnumbered, they held their position with relative ease against repeated cavalry attacks. Disciplined infantry stopped the French cavalry. More than the rise of the longbow, Crécy marks the return of disciplined infantry to the battlefield.
The Medieval period was a time of fundamental change. Europe began this period with a military system that had regressed in the years since the fall of the Roman Empire. At the end of the Middle Ages, Europe was poised to begin a series of social and military revolutions that would continue for 500 years. A close study of the military issues and events of the Middle Ages reveals that cavalry was not the dominant force on the battlefield that popular history claims. Warfare in the Medieval period was dominated by fortifications. Open battle was rare, and large bodies of disciplined infantry were even more uncommon. Though cavalry had a role to play it was chiefly in the execution of the chevauchée—the raid. In those highly mobile operations cavalry were integral to success.
In the occassional open-field battle, cavalry had a significant but overrated role. The lack of disciplined infantry artificially inflated the role of cavalry. The veteran professionals of the period probably did not understand the reason cavalry appeared to be so dominant. The English armies of the Hundred Years War demonstrated that dismounted men-at-arms were one solution to the deficit of disciplined infantry and were one of the main reasons that the mounted heavy cavalry lost its dominant role in battle. The longbow, too, was effective in a role supporting infantry or cavalry against enemy mounted forces.
The English victories in the Hundred Years War were more the result of generalship and tactic
s than of technology. English leaders knew the key to victory was the careful use of terrain and the integration of infantry, missile weapons, and cavalry. French ineptitude was the major cause of the defeat at Crécy, and later at Poitiers (1356), and Agincourt (1415). Defeats such as that of the French cavalry by Flemish pikemen at Courtrai (1302) represent the triumph of French folly rather than the superiority of Flemish infantry.60
The Crusades represented a fascinating clash of cultures and military systems. These wars demonstrated the superiority of the Middle Eastern military system over the European system. This was primarily because of the superiority of Middle Eastern cavalry, who were far better organized and better horsemen. As Ann Hyland observed, “horsemanship in Europe did not make significant advancement until after the close of the Medieval period and the rise of the sixteenth-century Italian masters.”61 That being said, it is interesting to ponder how the multipurpose cavalry of Saladin, ably led and featuring the composite bow, might have matched up with the English combined men-at-arms and longbow army of Edward III and Henry V.
The battles of the Medieval period represent early and imperfect experiments in combined arms warfare. This type of warfare would eventually evolve to consist of three elements: missile weapons to provide standoff and wear down the enemy at long range; infantry to hold or take ground; and cavalry to provide rapid maneuver and shock. The perfection of these experiments would require greater military professionalism, which would develop in the early modern era that followed the Middle Ages.
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