War Horse

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War Horse Page 30

by Louis A. DiMarco


  Horsemanship

  Military horsemanship took a definite turn for the worse during the Napoleonic period due to the large size of the armies, the high number of casualties, and the constant warfare. These conditions created a huge demand for cavalry troopers, which placed a great stress on training programs. In most countries abbreviated riding programs taught the trooper the basics before he joined his unit. In some cases, particularly in France in the last few years of Napoleon’s reign, cavalrymen often went to their regiments, and even into combat, almost unable to ride.

  A French cavalry expert opined that it took three or four years to properly train a cavalryman for combat whereas an infantryman could be trained in six weeks. This amount of time to train cavalry riders was never available to the French during the entire period from the revolution to Waterloo. Instead, troops got a very quick introduction to the basics. French cavalry training was limited to teaching the trooper to stop, turn by pulling on the reins, drive the horse forward by kicking, and once the horse was going in the right general direction to let the reins “float.”53 During short times of peace, the French were able to put recruits through more horsemanship courses. but he quality of horsemanship declined steadily. A French cavalry commander reported to the army chief of staff in 1813, “I must inform Your Highness that my division of light cavalry and cuirassiers are greatly reduced through horses having to be sent to the rear, or dying of fatigue. . . . One reason for the grave number of horses’ injuries is the exhausting marches which we have been making for some time, but mostly it is the fault of soldiers in the newly joined detachments, the majority of whom are first put on horseback at the moment when they set out from France.” General Delort reported the status of his new cuirassier division: “No-one but a madman would expect me to charge with such cavalry.”54 There is little doubt that the abysmal horsemanship of the French cavalry in the last years of the Empire were a factor in the defeats suffered in 1814 and 1815.

  Britain had very good horses, but the general state of horsemanship was not impressive. The best-known British horseman of the late eighteenth century was Henry, the earl of Pembroke, colonel of the Royal Horse Guards, and his evaluation of the equitation skills of British cavalry was that they were “a disgrace to themselves and the animals they ride.” The earl was an accomplished classical rider but believed that high school riding skills had no role to play in training cavalry troopers except possibly selected remount trainers. He insisted that units teach soldiers and horses to jump. In his work Military Equitation (1778) the earl gave the first instructions on how to jump a horse over an obstacle. Though the British military seat was very classical, the light cavalry were encouraged to ride in a shorter stirrup than heavy cavalry were.55 Light cavalry adopted a seat that was closer to the hunt seat of the period than the classic seat.

  Horsemanship had a major impact on how cavalry preformed in battle. The level of horsemanship forced commanders to make a decision between speed and good order. Ideally, commanders wanted both, but this was only possible with exceptionally well-trained horsemen and well-conditioned horses such as those possessed by Seydlitz at Rossbach. Lacking either or both, commanders adjusted their tactics. The French rarely galloped anywhere. France’s senior cavalry commander, Marshal Murat, was perfectly satisfied if his cavalry could walk on the march and trot in the presence of the enemy.56

  In contrast, British cavalry were eager to gallop into combat—much to Wellington’s disgust. The discrepancy between the mediocre performance of British cavalry in battle and the quality of their horses was explained by the French cavalry commander General Excelmann who told a British officer, “Your horses are the finest in the world and your men ride better than any continental soldier. With such material the English cavalry ought to have done more . . . . The great deficiency is in your officers who seem to be impressed by the conviction that they can dash or ride over everything, as if the art of war were precisely the same as the art of fox-hunting.”57

  Perhaps the finest horsemen of the Napoleonic period were the Russian Cossacks who consistently frustrated the French cavalry. French cavalry commander General Morand commented

  These rude horsemen keep their horses close between their legs; their feet rest in broad stirrups, which support them when they use their arms. They spring from a state of rest to the full gallop, and at that gallop they make a dead halt: their horses second their skill and seem only part of themselves; these men are always on the alert, they move with extraordinary rapidity, have few wants and are full of warlike ardour.”58

  The French were never able to solve the problem of Cossack cavalry. The failure of the French 1812 campaign is in many ways attributable to the French cavalry’s inability to match the Cossacks ability to operate effectively in severe winter conditions. This capability was no accident, but rather a characteristic of the Cossacks inherited from the Mongol horsemen of the Golden Horde from whom they were descendant.

  Horse Management

  Recruits were not only trained in horsemanship, but also horse management. Horse management was the routine management of all aspects of the horse’s care to ensure that he was fit and healthy. Grooming and stable cleaning were important aspects of horse management. By British regulations, troopers were supposed to groom horses and cleaned stables three times a day. Watering, with clean and cool water, also occurred three times a day. British cavalry horses were nag-tailed, or docked. This made British cavalry readily distinguishable on the battlefield but was not sound horse mastership; without its tail, the horse was more vulnerable to flies and other insects and therefore to disease.59

  Despite extensive regulations on the subject, and officers and NCOs who should have known better, the management of horses in both the British and French armies was far from adequate. Historian Sir Charles Oman’s evaluation of British horse mastership could apply equally well to either army: “In countless places, in diaries no less than dispatches, we find the complaint that the trooper of 1810 was, when not well looked after by his officers, a bad horse-master—careless as to feeding his mount and still more so as to saddle-galls and such like.” Oman notes that the only exception was the German hussars of the king’s German legion who were “far more conscientious and considerate to their beasts.”60

  The French cavalry was notorious for neglecting their mounts. After the 1806 campaign, when the French cavalry were at their highest state of training and competence, a surprise inspection of 40 men from the 26th Dragoons revealed that half the horses had sore backs. To make matters worse, the regimental veterinarian accompanied this detachment. Men would attempt to shirk duty by intentionally injuring their horse. A favorite trick was to put stones or even tacks under the saddle to cause back sores and thus eliminate horse and rider from duty. In the last campaigns, the French may have lost more horses before battle than in battle. Probably one of the most graphic condemnations of the French cavalry was the saying that one could notice the approach of a French mounted unit by the smell of the infected sores of its neglected horses.61

  Overloading horses was a constant concern. Both troops and commanders were guilty of this infraction. Commanders wanted to add equipment, arms, and ammunition. Troopers wanted to add personal comfort items as well as booty. The average weight of a troop horse was about 1,000 pounds. A horse can carry 25 percent of its own weight for extended periods without any problems. This meant the average troop horse could carry about 250 pounds of rider and equipment. One experiment done by British light dragoons in 1775 indicated that the basic load of equipment and soldier came to a total of 316 pounds—a full 66 pounds more than a horse should have to carry. Overloading horses eventually resulted in leg injuries and lameness. Some equipment, mostly tentage and blankets, could be carried on baggage carts, but there were only two carts authorized per squadron.

  Wellington described the Spanish theater as “the grave of Horses.” Most of the horse casualties were due to nonbattle injuries and disease. To help reduce horse losse
s every regiment was assigned a veterinarian. In the British cavalry, the regimental veterinary surgeon was the officer primarily tasked with all things related to the health and well-being of the horses. He supervised the regimental farrier major as well as the company farriers. His duties included a daily horse sick call where all sick horses paraded for him, and after which he visited all the horses that were too sick to attend parade. On Sundays, he held another parade that included all sick and lame horses as well as all horses shod by the farriers during the previous week. The veterinarian was responsible for inspecting all pastures considered for use by the regiment, and also for the stockage of shoes in the farrier’s stores.62

  To some cavalrymen, and to many noncavalrymen, the horse was a piece of war equipment. The army cared for and used horses like any other weapon, and discarded them when they were no longer useful. However, to the best soldiers and leaders, the horse was more than a weapon, it was a partner and comrade that, when well trained and treated, responded with faithful service that could save lives and win battles. Horses were not just a piece of army equipment, and even the military bureaucracy recognized this fact, which is why through the long history of the war horse, armies always gave them individual names.

  The Napoleonic period is the first period where a large portion of the riders were literate. Because of this, it is the first period where the personal relationship between the military horse and the soldier was recorded. In almost all armies of the period, horses were individually assigned to riders, and the two would often remain a team until they were separated by death or wounds. The shared experiences of hardship, danger, and often wounds over a long period of time created strong bonds between war horses and their riders. Private Melet of the dragoons of the French Imperial Guard rode the same horse, Cadet, from 1806 to 1815. They parted only when Melet was wounded and Cadet killed at Waterloo. British dragoon Captain William Tomkinson’s personal mount, Bob, took him through four years of campaigning in Spain. Bob was wounded once by a French bayonet, and was much neglected when Tomkinson was wounded and absent, but recovered and was shipped with Tomkinson back to England in 1813. Bob was returned to Tomkinson’s family home and did not join him on the Waterloo campaign. He lived for many years and became his master’s favorite hunt horse.63

  The memory of their wartime companions stayed with both the horse and rider even after the fighting ended. French sergeant Reynier ended his career with the 4th Chasseurs and managed to start another career with the gendarmerie. Months after leaving the army, he heard a horse whinny as he passed through the city of Fontenay and he immediately recognized his older charger, Hants. Tears ran down the veteran’s face as he stroked the muzzle of his comrade. Reynier and Hants had together sustained 36 wounds at Waterloo alone.64

  NAPOLEONIC CAVALRY IN BATTLE

  An examination of Napoleonic cavalry in battle demonstrates how important horsemen were to victory. Cavalry was a battle-winning arm. The psychological aspects surrounding the all-important timing of cavalry action was absolutely critical. Practical issues of horses and horsemanship were also important to the performance of cavalry in battle and on campaign. Waterloo, the decisive battle of the Napoleonic wars, demonstrated all the capabilities and limitations of cavalry. The outcome of the battle was determined by the opponents skill at employing their cavalry.

  Waterloo, 1815

  Napoleon returned from exile on March 1, 1815 and quickly regained the loyalty of the French army. The French king Louis XVIII fled to Belgium. The allies mobilized armies to move against France as quickly as possible. Napoleon’s plan was to inflict a quick and decisive defeat on an allied army, and then use the fact of that defeat as an advantage in negotiations with the other European powers. There were several allied armies in the field, but the two most dangerous were the Anglo-Dutch army under the duke of Wellington and the Prussian army under Gebhard Blücher. Individually, Napoleon’s main French army of over 100,000 outnumbered either of the two allied armies by themselves. However, if the allies combined they would have the numerical advantage. Thus, it was critical to Napoleon’s plan to keep the two armies separated.65

  Napoleon marched north and divided his army into three components. Marshal Michel Ney commanded the left wing while Marshal Emmanuel Grouchy commanded the right wing. The largest component of the army was the reserve which Napoleon commanded himself. The campaign began on June 15, when Napoleon’s troops crossed the Sambre River and attacked the forward positions of the Prussians.

  On June 16 two battles were fought which set up the final confrontation of the armies at Waterloo two days later. The first battle was fought a Quatre Bras where Napoleon’s left wing under Marshal Ney collided with the advance elements of Wellington’s army. The French initially outnumbered the British, but Ney failed to attack aggressively. This allowed the British time to reinforce so that when Ney attacked in the afternoon, the two sides were evenly matched and he failed to make any progress. Meanwhile, the reserve and the right wing of the French army met the Prussians to the east of Quatre Bras at Ligny. Napoleon decisively defeated the Prussians, who lost more than 20,000 men and retreated. Blücher, commanding the Prussians, had his horse killed and was trapped under him. During his absence, with the battle lost, his chief of staff General August von Gneisenau ordered the army to retreat. However, instead of retreating east as expected, the Prussians retreated north to Wavre. This kept the Prussians within supporting distance of Wellington. This serendipitous move would ultimately decide the outcome of the battle of Waterloo.

  As the Prussians retreated north on June 17, Napoleon dispatched Marshal Grouchy with the 30,000 men of the right wing to pursue them, and, most importantly, prevent them from marching to join Wellington. The Prussian retreat exposed Wellington’s left flank, and so he too retreated north, moving to a defensive position he had previously reconnoitered fixed upon the ridgeline known as Mont St. Jean. Napoleon, with the reserve and the left wing under Ney, marched in pursuit of Wellington and encamped across the valley from Mont St. Jean on the evening of June 17. The Prussians were located 8 miles to the east at Wavre. A heavy rain drenched all three armies and thoroughly soaked the ground on the night of June 17.

  When the French army reformed under Napoleon in March 1815, it only had 16,000 horses on the cavalry rolls. The army acquired horses quickly to bring the cavalry back up to a fighting strength. The regiments received 4,000 horses from the French gendarmerie to equip the heavy cavalry, farms using borrowed cavalry mounts provided another 5,000, and the army purchased 5,700. Though the men who made up the French cavalry in 1815 were almost exclusively veterans, most the horses upon which they were mounted were of marginal quality. British cavalry, in contact with French lancers after Quatre Bras, commented on the small size of the French horses. Napoleon found it much easier to rally experienced soldiers to his flag than acquire experienced remounts.

  The French reconstituted the Cavalry Reserve for the Waterloo campaign, and it consisted of four corps: one light cavalry corps, one dragoon corps, and two heavy cavalry corps. The heavy cavalry corps were the IV Cavalry Corps consisting of eight regiments of cuirassiers, about 2,800 horsemen, and the III Cavalry Corps consisting of two regiments of dragoons, four regiments of cuirassiers, and the two elite regiments of the Carabinier brigade, numbering more than 3,500 troopers. Two batteries of horse artillery supported each of the corps.

  Though veterans, the ranks of the French cavalry were riddled with distrust between those who returned to the colors to fight for Napoleon and those who had continued service under the king and then returned to Napoleon. This caused considerable indiscipline among the ranks. Many officers who had stayed in service for the king after Napoleon’s initial abdication could not be sure their orders would be followed.

  Leadership problems extended to key positions in the cavalry formations. Marshal Grouchy was initially to command the Cavalry Reserve but subsequently was assigned to command one of the army wings and was not replaced. Therefore,
there was no overall Cavalry Reserve commander during the Waterloo campaign. Compounding the problem, General Kellermann took command of the III Cavalry Corps only 10 days before the battle.

  Wellington’s army consisted of approximately 60,000 troops of which about 20,000 were British. The remaining were a mixture of Dutch, Belgium, and Hanoverians. The cavalry component was approximately 14,000 of which approximately 6,000 were British.66 Of the British cavalry, the light dragoons were mostly veterans of Spain, while most of the heavy cavalry had little or no previous experience. The British heavy cavalry formed two brigades. General Lord Edward Somerset commanded the Guards Cavalry Brigade consisting of the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the Life Guards, the Royal Horse Guards (the Blues), and the 1st (King’s) Dragoon Guards, numbering 1,090 troopers. General Sir William Ponsonby led the Union Brigade with the 1st (Royal) Dragoons, 2nd (Scots Greys) Dragoons, and 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, totaling 1,181 men and horses.

  Wellington was an expert at the defensive battle and deployed his forces using techniques that he had perfected during his operations in Spain. His defensive line was anchored on three strong points along a line running west to east: the Hougoumont complex of buildings and orchards on his right, western, flank; the center of the line included the farm of La Haye Sainte; and the left, eastern, flank was anchored on the village of Papelotte. The allies fortified all of these building complexes and occupied them with infantry. These three positions were all on the forward slopes of the Mont St. Jean ridge. The main Brussels road ran south to north through the center of the position just to the east of La Haye Sainte. At the top of the ridge was a hedge-lined road than ran its entire length from east to west. Wellington positioned the bulk of his artillery forward of these hedges. Most of the infantry and all of the allied cavalry were positioned to the rear of the road and hedges and on the northern, reverse slope, of the Mont St. Jean ridge. The allied cavalry deployed in reserve to the rear of the allied infantry. On the left flank north of Papelotte were four cavalry brigades: two British light brigades and two Hanoverian brigades. In the center were the two British heavy brigades backed up by three Dutch-Belgium heavy brigades. On the right flank behind Hougoumont were three light brigades made up of British and King’s German Legion (KGL) hussars and light dragoons.

 

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