The most numerous and popular of the Civil War carbines was the Spencer seven-shot repeater. General James H. Wilson, a successful of Union cavalry leader and advocate of repeating arms, said that with the Spencer carbine “Green regiments, that you couldn’t have driven into a fight with the old arms, became invincible.” The basis of the Spencer design was a spring tension seven-round tube magazine. This magazine inserted into the butt of the weapon. When the trigger guard of the weapon was levered, it ejected the spent round in the chamber and opened the breech, allowing the spring to push a fresh round into the chamber. Closing the lever sealed the chamber. After cocking the hammer manually, the carbine was ready to fire. The Spencer fired a .52-caliber metallic cartridge and did not require percussion caps. A Spencer carbine-armed trooper could maintain a sustained rate of fire of 14 or 15 aimed shots per minute. In an emergency, a trooper could fire the seven rounds in the magazine in 10 seconds or less, but at that rate of fire the barrel would get too hot to hold. It was a heavier weapon than the Sharps, weighing 8 1/4 pounds empty and was the standard carbine length of 39 inches. The government purchased 95,181 Spencers, and it became the most popular weapon of the Union cavalry by the end of the war.13
Carbines of any sort were rare among Southern cavalry throughout the war. Many Southern leaders felt that the double-barrel shotgun was a suitable solution to the problem of insufficient carbines for the cavalry. Cavalry leader Nathan Bedford Forrest believed the shotgun was the “best gun” for cavalry. The Southern Secretary of War, J.P. Benjamin, stated the double-barreled shotgun was an acceptable cavalry weapon and that sabers were not necessary: “after a month or two sabers are universally discarded as useless, men not being thoroughly trained to the use of that arm.”14
Both the North and the South experimented with lances. The 6th Pennsylvania cavalry equipped with the weapon in the spring of 1862 and were known as “Rush’s Lancers.” However, the weapon required too much skill, was unsuited to carrying through wooded terrain, and was too specialized for great utility. By May 1863, the lances were retired. The Southern cavalry also experimented with lances. The attraction of the lance to the South was the ease and lack of expense associated with its manufacture. The 5th Virginia Cavalry received lances as a trial but quickly found the weapon to be unmanageable.15
Tactics
American cavalry contributed to operations in three ways. The first was through the traditional role of reconnaissance and security duties. The second way was through contributions to the main battle both in a mounted and dismounted role. The final contribution of cavalry was through independent cavalry operations—cavalry raids— that caused disruption in the enemy’s rear areas.
The Cavalry Charge
The general view of the charge in the American Civil War is that both sides rarely used the tactic. However, most analysis of the Civil War overstates the dearth of cavalry charges and misunderstands the reasons why the charge was not a more common tactic on Civil War battlefields. In the early years of the war, many leaders, including cavalry officers, reached the conclusion that the cavalry charge was an impractical tactic. An article in the Scientific American magazine in January 1862 criticized the expense and uselessness of the cavalry and called on the army to “get rid of this arm of service.”16 The basis of this analysis was the theoretical capability of the rifle musket and ignored both the actual capability of the rifle and the real-world dynamics of the cavalry charge.
As discussed in previous chapters, the cavalry charge was largely a psychological event. Under actual combat conditions the rifle musket’s performance, though much better than the smooth bore musket, was not sufficient to stop a well-conducted cavalry charge. The immense psychological effect of a cavalry attack, plus the normal stresses of combat, effected the concentration necessary to aim the rifle musket for long-range accuracy. Even more detrimental to accurate fire was the speed of the cavalry charge. The speed of the cavalry once the charge began caused the range to the target to change rapidly and made accurate range estimation almost impossible. Accurate range estimation was essential for the rifle musket to hit the target. Thus, musket fire at anything but short range was problematic. At short range, 300 to 400 yards, cavalry at the gallop would be into the infantry line in less than a minute. Under these conditions, most infantry officers, faced with a cavalry attack, would choose to hold their fire for one effective volley once the cavalry got within extremely short range, probably less than 200 yards, when the trajectory of the round was not significant. Thus, despite its more effective long-range capability, infantry formations would likely only get to fire one, at most two, good volleys at charging cavalry. Thus, the dynamics of the cavalry charge were essentially unchanged between the Napoleonic period and the American Civil War.17
The fact remains, however, that American cavalry in the Civil War charged less often as part of the main battle than European cavalry did in previous conflicts. The reasons for this lie in circumstances other than the effectiveness of the rifle musket. Cavalry early in the war could not execute cavalry charges because of heavily wooded and fenced terrain, because of how it was organized, and because of its training. Later in the war, terrain was still a major inhibitor, but as training and organization improved, infantry developed the tactic of hasty fortification, which became an obstacle to cavalry attack.
The horsemanship of Civil War cavalry made executing the charge a risky venture regardless of the battlefield conditions. Trooper Henry R. Payne, of the 1st New Jersey Cavalry, described a saber charge he witnessed which ended in disaster.
Pressing upon one another, strained to the utmost of their speed, the horses catch an infection of fear which rouses them to frenzy. The men, losing their places in the ranks, and all power of formation or hope of combined resistance, rush madly for some point of safety upon which it may be possible to rally. Each check in front makes the mass behind more dense and desperate, until horses and men are overthrown and ridden over, trampled on by others as helpless as themselves to rescue or to spare. The speed grows momentarily greater. Splashing through the pools of mud, breaking down fences, darting under trees, with clang of sabers and din of hoofs, officers wild with shame and rage, shouting themselves hoarse with unavailing curses, and the bullets of the enemy whistling shrilly overhead, the mingled mass sweeps on, until utter exhaustion stops them.18
The Union cavalrymen of the Civil War focused on mastering the basics of drill and were unable and uninterested in learning the advanced intricacies of the various tactics manuals available.19 By the end of the war as horsemanship and drill improved, small-scale cavalry charges became more common, but the massed cavalry charge—a maneuver that challenged the best European professionals—was still not possible.
Southern individual horsemanship was superior to that found in the Union cavalry, at least in the first years of the war, but Confederate cavalry were even worse at drill than Union cavalry. Southern cavalry, though it operated in brigade and division strength, rarely trained or drilled at any level higher than regiment. This lack of training reduced the cavalry’s ability to execute massed mounted operations effectively, especially charges. Austrian Cavalry officer Fitzgerald Ross observed Southern cavalry and stated that there was no time to train the cavalry in drill and use of the saber. He felt the terrain, forested and with many fences, precluded large-scale cavalry battle maneuver. He also believed that since Southern cavalrymen provided their own horse, they were overly protective of their mounts.20
Dismounted Cavalry
An unanticipated change in warfare was the importance of dismounted cavalry action. During the war, though not designated as dragoons, the American dragoon tradition was very much in evidence. Dismounted action by cavalry occurred on a scale never before seen in the history of mounted forces. Union cavalry, because of their training and weapons, were far superior to Southern cavalry once on the ground. Typically, three of every four cavalrymen would dismount and go into action with their carbines, while the fourth
soldier held the horses. If the action needed more dismounts, tying the horses together in groups of 15 to 20 released additional men for the fight. A Union cavalryman, Frederick Whittaker, estimated that a unit could dismount and be in action in less than two minutes.21 After 1863, the Union cavalry’s ability to operate equally well, mounted or dismounted, made it an impressive highly mobile multifunctional combat force. Union cavalry were willing to dismount and storm fortified positions with their carbines. Southern cavalry, due to their lack of emphasis on dismounted drill and inferior weapons, were not very effective in a dismounted role.
The Cavalry Raid
Throughout the Civil War, bought sides used cavalry forces to attack deep into enemy rear areas. These raids served numerous operational and strategic purposes. They destroyed logistics capability and diverted resources away from the main battle areas. Raids provided a diversion that covered the movement of the main body of the army. At the strategic level, bold cavalry raids attracted public attention and were effective at raising friendly military and civilian morale while depressing the morale of the enemy. Raids were, however, risky operations, and more raids resulted in marginal gains or significant losses than noteworthy successes.
Horses and Horsemanship
At the time of the Civil War, scientific and controlled horse breeding did not exist on a large scale in the United States. Horses were judged in terms of very broad types. Neither army of the war had a particular type preference. Formal horsemanship also did not exist to any appreciable extent in the United States. Though the lack of a breeding program did not greatly inhibit the quality of horses or operations during the war, the general ignorance of the science and art of horse management and riding did—especially in the North.
Horses
In 1860, the horse population of the United States was the largest in the world. The census of 1860 counted 4,504,852 horses in the country and significantly most of them were concentrated in states and territories that remained under Union control. The United States was also rich in acreage for forage. Three-fourths to four-fifths of the cultivated acreage in New England and upper New York grew hay. The challenge was tapping into these abundant resources in an efficient manner. Late in 1861, the government set up a network of purchasing stations across the country, to which large and small horse dealers brought their horses for inspection by army officers and civilian employees. The horses were purchased for a set price that fluctuated between $150 and $185. The horse was the most expensive piece of cavalry equipment—pay for a Union cavalry private was $13 a month., while a new Spencer repeating carbine cost $25.22
In the first two years of the war, 1861 and 1862, the Army remount purchase system provided 284,000 remounts for a cavalry force of 60,000 troopers. The Army horse standards were clear: six years old, no less than 950 pounds, and no less than 15 hands tall. However, purchase agents often ignored these standards to the detriment of the mounted units. Corruption riddled the remount system. In one lot of 400 horses sold to the quartermaster in St. Louis in late 1861, five died within hours of the sale, and 300 others were smaller than the standard, lame, blind, or sick. A 1st New York Cavalry veteran observed, “in no other branch of the service has there been so much fraud, so much corruption, so much utter worthlessness.” The establishment of the Cavalry Bureau in the fall of 1863, which among other duties oversaw the remount purchasing system, finally gained control of the problem of corruption.23
Horse Equipment
The horse equipment issued to the Union cavalry was generally of good quality and very functional. The bit used to control the horse was a curb bit. American cavalry would not adopt the double bridle, common in Europe, until the end of the century. The use of curb bits on horses not used to the bit, and with inexperienced riders, made the training of horses and riders difficult as most of the horses reacted adversely to the severe bit.24 However, the requirements of military riding permitted no alternative.
Union cavalry used a saddle that was different from anything used in Europe. Its design was developed by Captain George B. McClellan (later to be Commander of the Army of the Potomac), and he claimed that it combined features of the Hungarian saddle he observed during his travels in Europe and features of a Mexican saddletree. Randy Steffen, an expert on American cavalry equipment, opined that McClellan’s inspiration was really of domestic origin. Regardless of its inspiration, the unique “McClellan saddle,” in different model forms, adopted in 1859 remained the standard U.S. cavalry saddle, and a unique characteristic of American cavalry, until the end of the horse era.
The saddle consisted of two wood sideboards connected by high wooden pommel and cantle arches. Rawhide covered the wood to strengthen it. Although generally considered a good saddle, the saddle’s rawhide seat cracked after repeatedly getting wet and then drying. These cracks formed sharp hard raised edges on the seat that made the saddle extremely uncomfortable and often unserviceable. The Civil War model saddle also included side skirts riveted to the sidebars. Subsequent models, beginning in 1874, covered the tree with leather eliminating the cracking issue, and removed the side skirts based on recommendations from the field. The most distinguishing feature of the American McClellan saddle was that it did not have a covered seat between the sidebars. Instead, the sidebars were wide to support the weight of the trooper, and an open slot ran the length of the saddle between the cantle and pommel. Though the initial impression was that this would cause discomfort to the rider, in fact, no weight was born directly down the center of the saddle and the saddle with the slot in the center was not uncomfortable. Another uniquely American feature of the saddle was the use of leather hooded wooden stirrups, designed to protect the legs in thick underbrush, instead of the open iron stirrups common among European saddle designs.25
American Horsemanship
American cavalry prior to the American Civil War rode in a deep military seat as outlined in a manual titled A System of Tactics, Adapted to the Organization of Dragoon Regiments, published in 1841. This manual was almost a direct translation of the French Regulations of 1829. The emphasis of this manual was on the free movement of the horse and basic equitation. Collection of the horse and classical high school equitation was not a part of American cavalry training. The American military seat was similar to that practiced by European cavalry of the period. Unlike most European cavalry, however, American cavalry did not post to the trot.26
Southern cavalry did not have as large a training challenge because each trooper had to provide his own horse and therefore knew the basics of riding. A British observer, Lord Wolsley, commented that the Southern cavalrymen he observed “rode well, in which particular they present a striking contrast to the Northern cavalry, who can scarcely sit their horses, even when trotting. . . . Every man in the South rides from childhood.”27
The Union army built “Camps of Instruction” to organize, train, and equip recruits. At these camps the army issued uniforms, weapons, and horses. Officers formed individual recruits and companies of recruits into regiments. Noncommissioned officers taught the recruit how to care for the horse and tack, dismounted drill, how to ride, and finally mounted drill. Trained instructors were always in short supply and the NCOs who supervised the training were often only a day ahead of the recruit learning the task.28 The collective low level of training of both horses and riders was demonstrated by a mounted review by the 7th Indiana Cavalry for the state governor in the fall of 1861. What occurred, as related by the unit historian, happened numerous times in many regiments throughout the Union cavalry in the first years of the war:
The horses having been but recently drawn, had never been exercised in drill. Some of them had never been backed. . . . The men were as green as the horses. Some of them never having been on a horse’s back, did not know how to mount. Those who had wild steeds, had great difficulty in maintaining their positions in the saddle, and some in attempting to mount suddenly found themselves on the ground. However, after great effort, the horses were suffi
ciently quieted, so as to stand in reasonable proximity to each other. The hour having arrived for the review, the companies were marched to the parade ground, and the regiment, after long and patient effort, formed in a reasonably straight line. Governor Morton and his Staff, accompanied by Colonel Shanks, took their positions in front of the regiment. Colonel Shanks, in genuine military style, gave the command “Draw Sabres.” The men obeyed the order. The sabres in being drawn made a great rattling and clatter, and waved over the horse’s heads, the sight and sound of which greatly frightened them. This was more than they could bear. Some of them reared and plunged, depositing their riders on the ground; others darted over the commons, their riders hatless, holding on with both hands to the horses’ manes, or the pommels of their saddles, presenting pictures not in keeping with accomplished equestrianism. . . . So ended the first grand review of the regiment.29
President Lincoln witnessed the sorry state of the cavalry himself at a presentation of colors to the 2nd New York Cavalry when an infantry unit set off the regiment’s horses, which went “kicking, plunging and falling over the field, to the great amusement of the crowd.”30 It took two years before the Union cavalry developed even a general mediocre level of horsemanship.
Good horse management was just as important if not more, as good riding skills. Effective horse management was the exception among Union forces rather than the rule. The best units were the six experienced regular cavalry regiments, and the 3rd Indiana Cavalry—the only volunteer unit in which the troopers supplied their own horses. In the early years of the war, ignorance at all levels of command led to the negligent if not cruel treatment of Union army horses. Plentiful remounts contributed to the general lack of emphasis on horse care. Horses were overworked, poorly shod, ungroomed, and often underfed and unwatered. Throughout the war hundreds of thousands of horses were lost due to neglect or mistreatment.31
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