After the invasion of Poland in September 1939, the 1st Cavalry Brigade expanded to division size. The new 1st Cavalry Division had 3 heavy regiments (reiters), of 6 squadrons each, and a light (kavallerie) regiment of 3 squadrons. In addition, the division had a bicycle battalion, a light artillery regiment, an engineer battalion, an antitank company, and a signal battalion. The 1st Cavalry Division participated in the invasion of France in 1940 and in the initial stages of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. The division had about 4,500 cavalry troops and included 17,000 horses in its various units. It was converted into the 24th Panzer Division in Russia during the winter of 1941–42.42
The German infantry organization had a significant number of horsemen. The reconnaissance battalion of each infantry division divided into 3 squadrons: a horse squadron, a bicycle squadron, and a heavy motorized squadron that included armored cars and antitank guns. In addition, each German infantry regiment had a horse platoon in the regimental headquarters that carried out a variety of duties including reconnaissance and security. Thirty-one riders manned this unit.43 These infantry horsemen were the only army mounted forces from the end of 1941 until early 1943. At that point a young German captain, Rittmeister Georg von Boeselager, with the aid of the Army Group Center commander, Generalfieldmarschall Günther von Kluge, began the process of reestablishing large army cavalry units.
Boeselager was a highly decorated veteran of the 1940 campaign in France. He had commanded the horse squadron of the 6th Reconnaissance Battalion and was a winner of the Knight’s Cross. He proposed forming a regimental-size mounted unit to operate behind German lines against enemy partisans. Replacement soldiers, some with riding experience, some not, volunteer Cossacks, cavalry officers, and an assort-ed mixture of horses assembled to form the unit. In February 1943, Reiterverband (Mounted Unit) Boeselager was operational. Its capabilities were quickly recognized and its organization and missions expanded. By the end of March 1943, success caused the Germans to expand the unit and give it new and more difficult missions. By April 1943, the unit organized into a regiment of 5,000 troopers and mounts. Meanwhile, army groups North and South copied the concept and also created independent mounted regiments. In 1944, Boeselager’s unit expanded again and reorganized as the 3rd Cavalry Brigade with 2 regiments. In the summer of 1944, together with the 4th Cavalry Brigade (formed from the North and South army groups regiments), and the 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division, the unit joined the 1st Cavalry Corps, known as the Harteneck Cavalry Corps. The Germans expanded both brigades into the 3rd and 4th cavalry divisions in early 1945. The corps probably averaged a total strength of about 15,000 to 20,000 horses and riders. The 3rd Cavalry Division alone had a reported strength of 11,333 men in February 1945. The corps fought together for the balance of the war in East Prussia and Hungary, and surrendered to the British and Americans in 1945.44
In addition to the army cavalry units, the German military organized two special cavalry forces that are worth mentioning. The first of these were the cavalry units of the Waffen SS. Waffen SS cavalry began as a mounted component of the SS Totenkopf security forces—SS Totenkopf Reiterstandarte (SS Deaths-Head horse regiment) specifically for operations in Poland. The SS cavalry units organized and equipped like those of the army. By the time of the invasion of the Russia, the regiment reorganized and expanded into an SS cavalry brigade with two SS cavalry regiments. By March 1942, the brigade’s casualties were so high that the command withdrew it from the front and reorganized it with a third regiment added. In August 1943, the brigade added a fourth regiment and in October 1943 it became the 8th SS Cavalry Division. At its greatest strength, it numbered about 15,000 men. In March 1944, the division received the honorary title “Florien Geyer,” after a sixteenth-century German hero. In the spring of 1944, the Germans raised a second SS Cavalry Division from ethnic German volunteers. The unit was designated the 22nd SS Cavalry Division and eventually reached a strength of three regiments built around a cadre of Florien Geyer veterans. The Soviets destroyed both cavalry divisions in the siege of Budapest in early 1945.45
The other special German cavalry force worth noting were the Cossacks in German service. After World War I, most of the Cossack hosts participated in the Russian Revolution on the White Russian side. As a result, after the victory of the communists, the Cossack communities were persecuted and their leaders executed or imprisoned. The communists destroyed the traditional special autonomy that the Cossacks had enjoyed in Russian society. Thus, as the German army invaded Russia, many Cossacks viewed the arrival of the Germans as liberation from communist rule. Though most Russians in the lands invaded by the Germans were anti-communists, German racial prejudice and ill-conceived policies prevented the Germans from tapping into this large potential resource. The Cossacks were an exception because the German army was familiar with their fighting abilities and anticommunism. The Cossacks had retained enough community identity, leadership, and internal organization that they were able to use the German presence to pursue their own agenda against the Soviets.
The Cossack movement was spontaneous and always ahead of the sometimes grudging German support. In the winter of 1942, as the Soviet counterattack burst around Stalingrad, it did so into the midst of the newly liberated Cossack lands around the Don River and in the Caucasus Mountains. The Germans, in their desperation, turned to the Cossacks, who were waiting for the opportunity to fight the communists again. German cavalry Colonel Helmuth von Pannwitz formed a cavalry group from Don Cossacks in November 1942, known as the Pannwitz Mounted Force. In August 1943, two other large Cossack contingents joined Pannwitz’s command to form a three regiment Cossack division. The Division eventually expanded to six regiments in two brigades, and then the second brigade became the basis of a second Cossack division. In the last months of 1944, the two Cossack divisions came under von Pannwitz’s control in the new XV Cossack Cavalry Corps. The unit’s main area of operations was in Yugoslavia, where they fought Tito’s partisans and then Soviet forces. The Cossack Cavalry Corps surrendered to British forces in Austria in May 1945. At the time of the surrender the total strength of the Corps was between 12,000 and 15,000 men. The British, betraying promises made to the German and Cossack officers of the corps, forcibly turned the Cossacks, their German officers, and their families who had followed the soldiers out of Russia over to the Soviet Army. Most of the Cossack men were sent to slave labor camps in Siberia. The officers were executed.46 Numerous other small detachments of Cossacks served with German units as auxiliaries. Many of these escaped repatriation to the Soviet Union.
Soviet Cavalry
The German army, at its height in the last year of the war, fielded three active cavalry corps with a total of six divisions. The likely strength of the German cavalry at its height in the final months of the war was probably about 45,000. In contrast, Soviet cavalry on the eastern front numbered at least 200,000 men after mobilization in 1941, and well over 100,000 at war’s end. The Red Army cavalry, though probably not as able horsemen as their Czarist predecessors, accrued a very commendable record over the course of World War II, and represented the last great employment of large mounted military forces.
The Red Army began the war with a large cavalry force. The cavalry at the beginning of the war consisted of four cavalry corps, and 13 cavalry divisions, totaling 80,000 men. The standard cavalry corps consisted of two divisions and a signal squadron. Each division contained four cavalry regiments each with five cavalry and one machine-gun squadron. The division also included a light tank regiment, artillery, antiaircraft, antitank, and reconnaissance battalions, engineer and signal squadrons, and chemical, supply and transport units.47
In the opening month of the attack into Russia, the Germans destroyed one complete cavalry corps and severely damaged another. The Russians lost more than 50 percent of the cavalry strength opposing the Germans. However, this did not discourage the Soviets regarding the importance of horse cavalry, because during the same period, the Germans destroyed over
10,000 of the Soviet’s 23,000 tanks. Thus, the cavalry losses were not unique. Throughout 1942 the strength of the cavalry corps increased as equipment and units became available. The average corps structure increased to three cavalry divisions. In February 1943, the army again added tanks to the cavalry division structure, this time in form of the powerful T-34 tank. In 1943, the cavalry corps structure achieved its largest and most powerful form. Each corps included three divisions. By late 1943, a typical Soviet cavalry corps had more than 21,000 men and 18,000 horses.48
Soviet cavalry was heavily engaged in combat against front-line German forces throughout the war. Casualties among the cavalry from German aircraft and artillery were particularly high among the horses. In order to keep the cavalry corps as capable as possible, the Soviets, beginning in 1942, steadily reduced the number of cavalry units while maintaining the strength of the remaining units. In July 1942, the forces consisted of 12 corps and 42 divisions; in February 1943 it was 10 corps and 30 divisions; and in December 1943 it was 8 corps and 26 divisions. The importance of mounted cavalry operations did not decrease with the decreasing size of the force.49
Equipment
German cavalry in World War II gave up all pretense of being a shock weapon. They discarded sabers in all mounted units by the time of the invasion of Russia in 1941. German cavalry relied on dismounted action and the rifle and light machine gun for its firepower. The only exceptions to this were the Cossack forces which retained their traditional shashka sabers and did not hesitate to employ them at every opportunity. At the beginning of the war cavalry troopers were equipped with the latest version of the bolt-action Mauser—the Kar98k. By 1941, most cavalry units added the 9-mm MP-40 machine pistol (submachine gun). In the last year of the war, many cavalrymen had the 7.92mm MP-44, one of the first modern assault rifles. Armed with automatic weapons, cavalry’s dismounted firepower increased significantly. Soviet cavalry arms, like German cavalry, included the rifle, submachine gun, and assault rifle by the end of the war. Soviet cavalry, however, retained the saber as an important piece of equipment throughout the war.
Tactics
The growth of German Cavalry during World War II was inversely proportional to Germany’s war fortunes. The Germans had early on made a decision that motorization was a more effective means of battlefield mobility. However, the German industrial base could not meet the motorized requirements of the army. The Germans brought cavalry back into their force structure in order to compensate for a lack of automotive capability as the war progressed. American army intelligence concluded at the end of the war that: “The marked growth of independent cavalry toward the end of the war is not to be interpreted as signifying a basic change in German military theory. The new units were required primarily to protect communication lines in the Balkans, where they operated in small independent groups, or to cover the flanks of armies during large-scale withdrawals on the eastern front. In both cases, the use of cavalry was largely dictated by lack of motor transport. In late 1943 and early 1944 German military requirements began seriously to exceed production capacities.”50
Terrain and weather were also important reasons why the Germans brought back cavalry formations. After a year of operating in Russia, many German commanders realized that the German assumptions regarding the utility of cavalry were based largely on conditions in Western Europe. In Russia, the lack of roads, terrible extremes of weather, dense forests and marshes, and the vast distances all stressed the numbers, mechanical reliability, and the cross-country capability of German motorized and mechanized forces. These conditions of the theater had much less effect on horse cavalry.
After 1942, antipartisan activities became the major focus of German mounted forces. Cavalry’s mobility gave it the speed required to have an advantage, or against mounted partisans, match the enemy, as the partisans sought to retreat after attacking. Soviet partisans used deep forests, marshes, and mountains as sanctuaries from which to raid the extended German supply lines. Cavalry had two missions in regards to this threat. Mobile cavalry patrols escorted convoys and patrolled rail lines. More effective were cavalry strike forces, pursuing the partisans into their sanctuaries, destroying the bases, and keeping the partisans focused on survival rather than attack. In these missions, the German cavalry operated in a similar manner as U.S. cavalry pursuing Indian bands, or the British tracking Boer commandos.
In 1944, as the Soviet forces began to press against the frontiers of Germany and her allies, the role of German cavalry began to change again. Germany used the cavalry forces as fire brigades, moving as a mobile reserve to blunt Soviet penetrations of the line. In addition, they had the very difficult task of screening and covering the retreat of German forces. Cavalry, with their superior mobility, fought dismounted, as the infantry behind them marched to new defensive positions. The horsemen then quickly mounted and retreated, usually as Soviet tanks crushed the positions that they had just held. Using forests and rough terrain impassible to motorized forces, the cavalry raced ahead of the advancing tanks, so as to pass behind the new friendly infantry lines before the next battle began.
In their role as a quick reaction and covering force, the German cavalry fought hundreds of short sharp nameless engagements, usually against desperate odds. Polish historian Janusz Piekalkiewicz, described the 4th Kuban Cossack Regiment executing this type of small unit action in March 1945, fighting as a rear guard for German forces retreating through Yugoslavia:
A green flare gave the signal for the cavalry to mount and ride off. On the road ahead, the first mines exploded. The hollow thunder of hundreds of horses’ hoofs drowned even the shots which were crackling through the night air. The Cossacks galloped off into the darkness. “Za parva-za Kuban!” resounded the Cossack’s battle cry. One squadron got caught up in an entanglement of barbed wire, but the other squadron, yelling “Hurrah!” as it forged ahead, reached a Soviet gun emplacement without hindrance. The Cossacks turned the captured guns around and fired on the enemy.51
These types of limited counterattacks allowed German infantry units to retreat with fewer casualties and caused the Soviet advance to slow and proceed more cautiously.
The German view of cavalry, for the most part, was that it was an important supplementary force that had some utility for reconnaissance, security, and antipartisan activities, which helped enable the decisive main action of tanks and infantry. As the war progressed, the Germans grudgingly formed large cavalry units to compensate for the lack of motorized equipment but without changing their basic view that cavalry was an auxiliary arm.
The Soviets had a completely different operational view of the role of cavalry. Based on the successes and failures of operations in 1941 and 1942, the Soviets determined that the most important role for cavalry was as a deep strike force. Cavalry, working with mechanized and tank formations, was organized and employed to exploit the penetration of the enemy’s defense. Unlike every other modern army in World War II, when faced with the question of “horse or motor” the Soviet answer was “horse and motor.”52 Over the course of the war, the tactical details of cavalry employment changed, but the basic concept for the use of cavalry did not.
The Soviet tactic was to obliterate a narrow section of the front with an intensive artillery barrage followed by a massive integrated tank and infantry attack. The tank and infantry attack then penetrated the German first-, second-, and third-tier defenses. Once they achieved the penetration, and only then, were the mobile forces committed. The mobile forces, tank corps and cavalry-mechanized corps, then streamed through the gap. Supported closely by the air force, the cavalry and armor attacked to operational depth destroying command and control capability, overrunning logistics facilities, and isolating large sections of the front, preventing the enemy’s retreat.53
Cavalry had several roles when fighting together with armor. First, cavalry provided a mobile mounted infantry capability that could quickly dismount to support the tanks. The tanks protected the cavalry from enem
y armor while the cavalry protected the armor from enemy infantry attack, especially those soldiers armed with the effective Panzerfaust antitank weapon. Second, cavalry ensured that terrain conditions did not provide sanctuaries from tanks in which the enemy could organize a retreat. Finally, unlike motorized infantry, cavalry armed with sabers contributed to the shock value of the mobile troops. Tanks moving in mass through the rear areas terrorized German troops. Saber-wielding cavalry had a similar psychological effect as German rear area troops and facilities were ridden down by charging horsemen. The mounted cavalry forces also had an all weather, all terrain, advantage over armor units which allowed breakthrough operations to be conducted or to continue in terrain and weather conditions which would have stopped a purely armored spear-head. The different logistics requirements of horses and tanks also gave the penetration forces flexibility: when fuel was low the advance continued with cavalry; and when the horses were tired the advance continued with tanks.54 In the Soviet doctrine for mobile warfare horse cavalry was an integral and important capability in the prosecution of decisive offensive operations.
The Soviets demonstrated the deep penetration capability of Soviet cavalry early in the war with General P. I. Belov’s cavalry corps, which participated in the Soviet counterattack around Moscow in the winter of 1941–42. After playing an instrumental role in halting the German offensive just 14 miles short of Moscow, Belov’s 1st Corps of Cavalry Guards counterattacked with other Soviet forces on January 9, 1942. The cavalry corps penetrated through the German lines with the mission of cutting the German road to Smolensk. The entire corps stayed isolated in the German rear, attacking German columns and facilities, and using deep forests for cover until May 1942. Paratroop battalions reinforced the cavalry, and supplies were brought in and wounded evacuated by air. The German 4th Army, whose communications and logistics was paralyzed by these troops, did not have enough mobile armored forces to pursue them through forests, deep snow, and subzero arctic winter conditions. The Germans had no horse units. At one time, in the spring of 1942, the German army in Russia faced a total of six Soviet cavalry divisions operating in its rear. The effort required to minimize the impact of these forces had serious detrimental effects on the German’s ability to defend at the front, and to prepare to renew offensive operations in the spring.55
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