Remarkably, in early 2011 it was reported that the Gulf monarchies had some of the highest alcohol consumption growth rates in the world. Dubai’s growth rate was believed to be between 26 and 28 per cent during the boom years of 2006–2008, while since then Abu Dhabi has taken the lead with an estimated growth rate of 28 per cent. Indeed, regional distributors point to the emirate’s rapidly expanding tourism and entertainment industry and expect the demand for alcohol to grow even faster. At present, the region’s beer industry is dominated by Dubai, with a joint venture between the state-backed Emirates airline and Heineken International enjoying a two-thirds market share in the UAE and with its products also being the market leaders in Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar.3 Meanwhile, the spirits industry is dominated by imports, with Scotch whisky being the preferred liquor and described as the ‘mainstay choice of the region’. According to research conducted in 2010, Euromonitor International concluded that the UAE is now the world’s biggest consumer of Scotch, with its volume sales having grown by 9 per cent in 2010 to reach a total of 10.2 million litres, enough to push France into second place. One of the main distributors also claimed that the ‘increased investment from global drinks giants [in the UAE] would lead to the country retaining its importance in the future’ and ‘[with] the persistently lacklustre figures coming from developed core markets, the UAE should stop raising eyebrows and become the focal point of rising [alcohol consumption] expectations in the region’.4 With regard to officially dry Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, alcohol consumption growth has also been very high, but has been harder to measure. Industry insiders believe that margins are getting higher, with the average black market bottle of whisky now selling for about $150. Much of the smuggled liquor is believed to originate from alcohol stores that operate in the UAE’s poorer northern emirates. These undercut the licensed outlets in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, and it is estimated that more than half of the alcohol sold to traders in these emirates ends up being smuggled into Saudi Arabia.5
Also seen as eroding the status of Islam, and in particular Islamic holidays, has been the shopping mall-backed rise of the commercial and secular Christmas. In the 1990s Christmas trees were rarely seen in public places in the Gulf monarchies, but are now featured prominently in many retail outlets, hotels, bars, and restaurants, especially in the UAE. While in the past government-sponsored Eid and national day street lights and decorations were always dismantled shortly before Christmas, so as to avoid any confusion, they now often remain in place throughout the Christmas period, especially if Ramadan is late and finishes in December. On occasion, the UAE’s high spending on Christmas has caught out the establishment. In late 2010, having spent approximately $10 million assembling a giant 43 foot tall Christmas tree festooned with diamonds, Abu Dhabi’s most prestigious hotel, the Emirates Palace, was forced to admit that it had ‘taken the holiday spirit a bit too far’ and removed the tree following a large number of complaints. In its defence, the hotel—which is regularly used for high level government conferences—explained that it was simply an effort to ‘…boost the holiday mood for its guests, based on the UAE’s values of openness and tolerance’.6 Further to the changing status of holidays, even the Muslim Sabbath day is now considered to be under threat, given that in late 2006 the UAE’s official public sector weekend changed from Thursday and Friday—as it had been for thirty-five years—to Friday and Saturday. Ostensibly to bring the UAE more in line with other Middle Eastern states7 (including Kuwait, which had already switched), the real reason was to provide government departments and state-backed companies in the UAE with an extra day of contact and trade with their internationally based counterparts and colleagues. There is now a fear among some UAE nationals that the country will soon fully follow the western weekend, especially given that many private sector employees are already following such a schedule.
While gambling remains a fragile taboo, with no lawful casinos in operation, some Gulf monarchies have nevertheless legitimised such thrills by allowing lottery-style tickets at horse-racing events and, in the UAE’s case, by recently introducing prize-carrying ‘national bonds’ which offer savers the ‘chance to win 41,750 rewards [per annum]’.8 Perhaps most controversially, as part of the aforementioned overseas investments strategy, some of the Gulf monarchies have been investing in Western companies that focus on gambling. In 2007, for example, the state-backed Dubai Holdings acquired a $5 billion, 9.5 per cent stake in the Nevadaheadquartered MGM Mirage Corporation—the world’s second largest gaming group and the proprietor of the Monte Carlo, the Bellagio, Caesar’s Palace, the Luxor, the Mirage, and several other extravagant casinos on the Las Vegas strip. At the same time it was also reported that Dubai Holdings had bought a 50 per cent stake in MGM Mirage’s $7 billion residential and leisure CityCenter project.9 And in 2008 it was reported that Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala Development Company was setting up a joint venture with MGM Mirage.10 This has resulted in the building of a $3 billion MGM resort in Abu Dhabi, including a 600 bedroom MGM Grand hotel.11
Prostitution is also on the rise in the Gulf monarchies, with Dubai and Bahrain having long stood out as major centres in the region’s sex tourism industry, and with the authorities in Abu Dhabi and Qatar increasingly turning a blind eye to the activity. Almost all demands appear to be catered for, with many hotels in these cities—including luxury establishments—being awash with high class escorts in the evenings, while in Dubai there are also many streetwalkers in certain areas. Although there are occasional crackdowns, usually preceding Ramadan, in practice the police rarely intervene and soliciting and kerb crawling is usually left unchecked. Most prostitutes arrive in the Gulf monarchies on tourist visas, or are initially employed as hostesses or waitresses in hotels and restaurants. In many cases they are separated from their passports by their sponsors or employers, and often end up trapped in a debt cycle, where they have to find ways to pay off the cost of their visas and accommodation. While some originate from other parts of the Arab world and Iran, a large number come from much further afield, including Central Asia, East Asia, and Eastern Europe.
The exact routes into prostitution in the Gulf monarchies tend to differ, varying from country to country, but in general it is either a story of entrapment or human trafficking. Entire books have now been devoted to the subject, especially regarding the women who end up in Dubai.12 In most cases it is a story of economic deprivation, misery, human rights abuses, and a disregard of the values and traditions that the indigenous populations of the Gulf monarchies are supposed to uphold. Commenting on the situation from the perspective of a major supplier country, an Iranian military officer has explained that ‘…notorious women used to identify young women and girls from [Iranian] families with financial difficulties, then under the pretext of happiness for these girls in Persian Gulf countries, they offered a ransom to the families and in a matter of three weeks they transferred these girls to Dubai. After arrival in Dubai, through their network, they introduced these girls to Arab businessmen. Each girl was sold for $5000 profit for their families and ten times the amount for the traffickers. The buyers used these girls for their sinister business’. Providing another example, he explained how men masquerading as taxi drivers would drive around Tehran identifying runaway girls, and then report them to traffickers who would then arrange for their visa and passport to go to the Gulf monarchies. The travel details were described as ‘…taking no more than a month, and were arranged under the pretext of tourism. While waiting for passport and visa, these girls were promised a better and prosperous life and marriage to Arab Sheikhs. However, after entering UAE, the ring members handed these girls over to brothels and prostitution networks’.13
Criticism of these many problems and issues is, as would be expected, becoming increasingly loud. A few years ago, for example, a prominent UAE national claimed to a major US newspaper that the city he lives in—Dubai—is now unrecognisable and is not even Arab anymore. Moreover, he complained that when he visits one
of the many malls, the vast majority of patrons are foreigners, and that he rarely hears Arabic. Most damningly the article recorded the man’s concern that despite religious prohibitions ‘…drinking is unabashed, and [he fears] public wine-tasting parties are on the way, with the beaches of his youth having been taken over by hotels and their occasionally topless sunbathers and other westerners whose dress is deemed inappropriate… he grimaces at women jogging in the streets, sometimes with their dogs, considered unclean under Islamic law, and the celebration of Islamic holidays and the country’s national day pale before the more commercialised commemoration of Christmas’. He concluded his interview by stating that he and his family felt they were in ‘internal exile’ and in an effort to maintain their Arab and Muslim identities they had had to move away from the central area of Dubai to an outlying suburb.14 This is far from being an isolated case, with there being many other examples of UAE national families relocating from Dubai completely, or at least building a new family home in another emirate so that their children could still feel they were growing up in an Arab city. Most recently, in 2012 there has been an extensive, grass roots social media campaign to uphold modest dress codes. Launched by two women and now centred on a Twitter subject entitled #UAE-DressCode, the campaign has seen large numbers of UAE nationals criticise the inaction of their government to enforce basic standards.15
Famously outspoken, even Dubai’s chief of police16 has publicly discussed the situation, arguing that expatriates and tourists pose a serious threat to national identity and societal norms in the Gulf monarchies. Speaking on a popular call-in show on Qatar Television, he was debating ‘Whether the rising numbers of foreign workers posed a serious threat to the Gulf’s identity and culture, and if so, what steps the governments in the region could take to reduce the danger?’ Among other statements, he argued that ‘…if the Gulf governments do not take bold steps to check the inflow of foreign workforce, a day could come when locals would be marginalised in their own countries and become like Red Indians [sic] in the US’.17 Interestingly, since the credit crunch and the slowdown of Dubai’s economy, there have been some small signs that the government has begun to take the matter more seriously—perhaps because it has been concerned that many UAE nationals were becoming increasingly frustrated with the authorities due to poor-performing investments or substantial losses. Notably, in 2009 fresh ‘decency regulations’ were introduced in Dubai, leading to posters appearing in shopping malls and other public places that instructed what women could and could not wear, and warned about public displays of affection. Moreover, in summer 2011 standalone bars and restaurants that were not connected to hotels were banned from displaying alcohol in full view, while bars inside hotels were ordered to tint the glass on display cases. To some extent these mirrored similar regulations introduced in neighbouring Sharjah in 2001.18 Perhaps most dramatically, especially given their aforementioned attempts to build up a tourist industry and host international sporting events, in 2009 alcohol was completely banned in Bahrain’s three star hotels, following criticism from pressure groups, and in early 2012 Qatar announced that alcohol would be banned on the Pearl—one of its major tourism and real estate developments.19
Most vulnerable to criticism with regard to these trends in the region has been Saudi Arabia, given the ruling family’s closeness to the religious establishment and its greater reliance on religious legitimacy. While most nationals are aware of the quantities of alcohol, drugs, and prostitutes in their country, the authorities have nonetheless managed to keep these vices out of the immediate public gaze. Nevertheless several recent developments have sparked anger and outrage amongst Saudi nationals, especially the various construction projects in the two holy cities and the sense that the regime is trying to ‘cash in’ on the pilgrimage industry. In late 2010 it was reported by the New York Times that several new buildings were nearing completion in Mecca. Among these was the Royal Mecca Clock Tower, also known as the Abraj al-Bait Tower, which in 2011 became the second tallest building in the world.20 Covered in neon lights and topped with a crescent-shaped spire, it has been described as a ‘kitsch rendition of London’s Big Ben’ while being a ‘cynical nod to Islam’s architectural past’. In order to make way for it, the authorities had to demolish an eighteenth-century Ottoman castle—a practice which is usually justified on the grounds that buildings prior to the founding of the Saudi state were built during a ‘corrupt era’. Unsurprisingly, many have been appalled by the clock tower and the slew of new luxury hotels and high rises that have sprung up in Mecca in recent years. One Saudi architect explained that it as ‘the commercialisation of the house of God’ and that ‘the closer [one gets] to the Grand Mosque, the more expensive the apartments… in the most expensive towers, you can pay millions…. If you can see the mosque, you pay triple’. On this point, it has been claimed that the new buildings will effectively divide Mecca along ‘highly visible class lines, with the rich sealed inside exclusive air-conditioned high-rises encircling the Grand Mosque and the poor pushed increasingly to the periphery… like the luxury boxes that encircle most sports stadiums, the apartments will allow the wealthy to peer directly down at the main event from the comfort of their suites without having to mix with the ordinary rabble below’. According to another Saudi critic ‘…The irony is that developers argue that the more towers you build the more views you have… but only rich people go inside these towers. They have the views… We don’t want to bring New York to Mecca’.21
Western bases and armaments
Still viewed as a necessity by the governments of the Gulf monarchies—most of which remain fearful of foreign aggression or in some cases even each other—the Western security guarantees they have sought and maintained are nevertheless becoming increasingly problematic, not least because of the significant expansion of the physical Western military footprint in their territories, often described as ‘boots on the ground’. Despite receiving encouragement from the ruling families that serve as their hosts, the existence of substantial non-Arab, non-Muslim bases on the Arabian Peninsula has always been controversial and potentially delegitimising for the Gulf monarchies. And as more details emerge of their size and scope it is likely the bases will draw further criticism, perhaps serving as another flashpoint for opposition movements while of course undermining the ability of these states to keep positioning themselves as peaceful neutrals.
Among the most entrenched Western bases in the Gulf monarchies is Qatar’s Al-Udeid Airbase. In 1999 Qatar’s ruler told the US that he would like to see ‘up to 10,000 American servicemen permanently based in the emirate’ and over the next few years the US duly began shifting personnel from a camp at Saudi Arabia’s Prince Sultan Airbase.22 Although Al-Udeid has only ever housed a few thousand American servicemen at a time, it has nevertheless been used as a forward headquarters of the US Central Command—CENTCOM—along with housing a US Air Force expeditionary air wing, a CIA base, and an array of US Special Forces living in compounds. Similarly, nearby Bahrain continues to host a US Naval Support Activity Base that houses the US Naval Forces Central Command and the entire US Fifth Fleet. Although the American role in Kuwait has recently been downsized, there still exist at least four infantry bases, including Camp Patriot, which is believed to house about 3000 American soldiers, and two air bases: Camp Ali Salem and Camp Al-Jabar.
Although there are no US infantry bases in the UAE, the country’s ports are heavily used by the US. Dubai’s Jebel Ali is now the US Navy’s most highly visited ‘liberty port’, with warships such as the USS John Kennedy regularly being refuelled or serviced in Dubai’s dry docks,23 which remains one of only two ship repair yards in the Persian Gulf.24 It was recently estimated that around 4,000 American sailors come ashore at Jebel Ali each year, with many claiming in anonymous US Navy surveys that Dubai is their favourite stop-off location due to the availability of alcohol and nightclubs.25 Moreover, Jebel Ali together with Port Rashid also serve as major transit hubs for US military
goods, with most such freight being delivered by three inconspicuous European shipping companies.26 Meanwhile Abu Dhabi’s Port Zayed is the US Navy’s second most used port in the Persian Gulf27 and, on a lesser but still significant scale, Fujairah’s deep water port is also used by the US Navy, with the emirate’s major hotels having a longstanding arrangement to bloclet many of their rooms for Navy personnel. Similarly, following the 2003 invasion of Iraq some of Abu Dhabi’s hotels began to billet US soldiers on leave from Iraq. In mid-2006 the US president stated that ‘…the UAE is a key partner for our navy in a critical region, and outside of our own country Dubai services more of our own ships than any other country in the world’. Moreover, commenting on the aforementioned Dubai Ports scandal in the US, a US rear admiral declared that ‘…in a sense Dubai Ports has already been responsible for American security because we dock here in Dubai, and from personal experience I can confirm they are wonderfully efficient’.28
After the Sheikhs Page 22
