As with Saudi Arabia and some of the other Gulf monarchies, the UAE was also reportedly alarmed that Mubarak would have to face the indignity of a trial. As claimed by Egypt’s Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper ‘…certain princes offered to pay the hospital bill of deposed President Hosni Mubarak, when they heard that the Egyptian government would not meet the costs of his [private] medical treatment’.46 More recently, even after the success of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Muhammad Morsi in Egypt’s May 2012 elections, senior UAE officials have gone on record with inflammatory statements. Dubai’s veteran chief of police,47 for example, claimed in July 2012 that members of the Brotherhood had ‘been meeting people from the Gulf and discussing toppling Gulf regimes’ and warned the Egypt-based group that ‘they would lose a lot if they challenged the Gulf states’.48 Beyond Egypt, the UAE’s diplomatic stance has been much the same on other Arab Spring revolutions, or at least when they began. In April 2011, nearly two months after the beginning of the Bahrain revolution and a month after the deployment of UAE and Saudi troops in the kingdom—as discussed below—the crown prince of Abu Dhabi received a delegation from the Bahraini government which had come to ‘express its gratitude… for the supportive stance that had contributed to establishing security and stability in the kingdom’. Despite the crown prince having no formal foreign policy role in the UAE’s federal government, he reportedly welcomed the delegates by ‘stressing the deep fraternal bond between the UAE and Bahrain as well as all other Gulf countries’ and stated that ‘these relations are based on strong historical ties, shared interests, and mutual destiny’. Despite the brutal crackdown that was taking place in Bahrain that very week, the crown prince also expressed his ‘support for Bahrain and its people as well as the measures adopted by Bahrain’s wise leadership for establishing peace and security’. He also ‘hailed the efforts of the king and the crown prince [of Bahrain] for reforms and development as well as for protecting the values of national unity, tolerance, and peaceful coexistence among sects’.49
On a broader level, there are indications that the Gulf monarchies are now working harder than ever to portray themselves collectively as being inherently different from the Arab authoritarian republics. A concerted effort has been made to convince both their own populations and the international community that there are somehow enough structural differences between their style of authoritarianism and that of their neighbours such as to exempt them from Arab Spring-type revolutions. Most notably, there have been recent attempts to broaden the Gulf Co-operation Council to include the fellow Arab monarchies of Jordan and Morocco. Despite these states being geographically separated from the Gulf monarchies and having few economic or social commonalities it has nonetheless been reasoned that their survival now matters to the Gulf monarchies. Jordan and Morocco have faced serious protests since early 2011, but the regimes remain in place for the time being, and thus provide some temporary evidence for the ‘monarchy is different’ theory. In May 2011 a GCC consultative summit was held during which it was decided to offer both Jordan and Morocco GCC membership. The summit’s main topic of discussion was likely to have been the Arab Spring and how the Gulf monarchies could best find ways of delivering financial aid to the region’s two other monarchies. Moreover, given that the usefulness of foreign mercenaries has become increasingly apparent since the beginning of the Arab Spring, it is likely that Jordan and Morocco—both of which are manpower rich—were viewed as possible suppliers in the event that the Gulf monarchies have to rapidly expand their security services.
Shortly after the summit the Moroccan minister for foreign affairs50 visited Abu Dhabi to convey the ‘…gratitude of King Muhammad to the UAE under the leadership of Sheikh Khalifa for the sincere and fraternal call stated in the final statement of the recent GCC consultative summit for the accession of Morocco to the GCC’. Adding that ‘such a move would further strengthen bilateral ties’, the minister also referred to the ‘…fraternal coordination and co-operation that bind us with these countries since a long time at all levels’, despite Morocco having never had any previous formal engagements with the GCC.51 Unsurprisingly, within a few months of this and similar meetings between Jordanian officials and GCC representatives, an announcement was made in September 2011 that the GCC would be funding a five year development programme in Jordan and Morocco. Finalised in December 2011 with $2.5 billion being allocated to each state, the deal was viewed by some analysts as being a ‘…consolidation of monarchies that are solidly Sunni’ and with the ‘…attraction [for the Gulf monarchies] being assistance… from [Jordan’s] well-trained military’.52 Similarly Reuters reported that the deal reflected the Gulf monarchies’ need for ‘…closer ties with Arab kingdoms outside the Gulf as part of efforts to contain the pro-democracy unrest that is buffeting autocratic ruling elites throughout the Arab world’.53
Bahrain: rage and revolution
Bahrain, unsurprisingly, has been the biggest flashpoint in the Persian Gulf since the onset of the Arab Spring. As one of the poorest of the monarchies and, beset by a long history of sectarianism, its ruling family has had to contend with almost all of the mounting pressures discussed in this book. On the back of the Egyptian revolution, the Bahraini protests saw an estimated 150,000 nationals streaming onto the streets of Manama following an initial ‘day of rage’, on 14 February 2011.54 Organised by various youth groups, rather than established political societies, the size and strength of this movement took many by surprise. Although the majority of the protestors were Shia—understandable given the long-running discrimination they have faced and their reduced economic opportunities—there were also many Sunni participants,55 with slogans of ‘No Sunni, No Shia, Just Bahraini’ being chanted.56 Calling for the fulfilment of the 2001 National Action Charter, these early demonstrations were not specifically aiming to topple the ruling Al-Khalifa family, but were more modestly focused on getting the government to deliver on earlier promises of political reform and the release of political prisoners. With surprising vigour, however, the Bahraini security services clamped down heavily on the protests, deploying teargas, water cannons, and even live ammunition. The Pearl Roundabout monument—a focal point for the first wave of protests—was even bulldozed in March 2011, despite it representing a key period of Bahrain’s history. Clearly fearing a revolutionary landmark such as Cairo’s Tahrir Square, the rubble around the roundabout was cordoned off, and at least thirty well-established Shia mosques and other religious structures in the kingdom were similarly destroyed—officially on the grounds that they were operating without licences.57
At about this time the protests had begun to reach Manama’s financial district and were being predicted to soon reach palaces and government buildings. The Bahrain Formula One Grand Prix—a central pillar in Bahrain’s economic strategy—even had to be called off,58 much to the consternation of the ruling family. Clearly concerned that the king was due to be ousted in the same manner as the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes, the Bahraini security forces unleashed a massive series of reprisals on the suburbs and villages believed to be home to most of the protestors. Moreover, in order to bolster the defences of their key government and security installations a deployment of about 1500 Saudi soldiers and over 500 UAE security personnel were invited to cross the King Fahd Causeway that links Bahrain to mainland Saudi Arabia. An unprecedented move for these Gulf monarchies,59 the deployment was justified on the grounds that it was an official response of the GCC’s aforementioned Peninsula Shield Force, despite there being no threat of foreign invasion and despite there being no significant contingents from the other Gulf monarchies.60 Although the Bahraini authorities communicated to their citizens that ‘…the foreign [Saudi and UAE] troops have started arriving to Bahrain in light of the regretful situation the kingdom is currently witnessing’ and called upon ‘…all citizens and residents to co-operate fully with the GCC forces and welcome them warmly’61 within days there were reports that Saudi and UAE forces had been engaging with protestors
and taking part in arrest squads.62
Unable to quell the protests, several hundred more political prisoners were taken, including academics, journalists, human rights activists, and even doctors and nurses—the latter groups having witnessed the injuries and deaths sustained by the protestors. Further delegitimising the regime, reports also began to circulate that the Bahraini government was trying to bolster its security services with fresh mercenaries from Pakistan and elsewhere. Having always had a substantial contingent of Pakistani nationals serving in its security sector, along with many Jordanian and Yemeni soldiers, it was believed that the authorities were trying rapidly to increase rapidly the number of non-Arabs in their employment, presumably on the grounds that such foreigners would be more willing to open fire on Bahraini nationals. A Pakistani conglomerate with close links to the Pakistani military was understood to have been recruiting and airlifting thousands of soldiers to Bahrain, while adverts for the ‘Urgent Need of the Bahraini National Guard’ had begun to appear in Pakistani newspapers soon after the first protests in Bahrain.63 Later in 2011 reports also began circulating that Bahrain was trying to recruit from Indonesia and Malaysia, with a noted Saudi scholar claiming that the ‘Bahraini monarchy was at the end of its rope’ and that ‘they [the monarchy] do not trust even the loyalists in Bahrain so they need to seek mercenaries from elsewhere—and these mercenaries will one day be captured and tried in public’.64
Unsurprisingly, the protestors’ key demands soon evolved from simple demands for political reform to full blown regime change, with chants of ‘Down with Hamad’—referring to the king65—becoming commonplace. Moreover, Bahrain’s aforementioned long-serving prime minister66—a member of the ruling family and an uncle of the king—was being publicly accused of leading the crackdown and inviting the Saudi, UAE, and other foreign troops into the kingdom. Over the summer of 2011 the protests continued unabated with frequent reports of killings, arson, and the seizing of activists. Many of these crackdowns were recorded by onlookers on their smart phones and uploaded onto You-Tube or other video-sharing websites. These have been viewed by thousands of other Gulf nationals and heavily discussed on social media platforms. Facing criticism that Al-Jazeera was not covering the various Arab Spring revolutions in a uniform manner, the Qatar-based network even produced a documentary on the Bahraini protests. Entitled Shouting in the Dark it was watched by more than 200,000 YouTube users in the first week that it was broadcast. Depicting police brutality and various other human rights violations, it led to a diplomatic rift between Qatar and Bahrain, with the latter’s minister for foreign affairs67 tweeting ‘It’s clear that in Qatar there are those who don’t want anything good for Bahrain. And this film on Al-Jazeera English is the best example of this inexplicable hostility’.68
Since then the government has hastily tried to create more public sector jobs and raise salaries—following a $10 billion emergency package from the GCC—and has sought to convene a ‘National Consensus Dialogue’ with the various opposition groups and political parties in order to ‘re-launch the political reform processes’ and ‘write a new chapter in the country’s history’.69 But the leading Shia political society—Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society—boycotted the discussions and in many ways the other societies involved in the dialogue now no longer really represent the substantial popular protests on Bahrain’s streets. The king also initiated the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate and report on the crackdown. By appointing several world renowned human rights lawyers above reproach, including former UN lawyer Cherif Bassiouni, the king’s intention was likely to buy some breathing space when dealing with the international community. Indeed, the commission was described by some Bahraini opposition members as being the ‘king’s perfect defence shield’ as it allowed him to continue suppressing protests for several months while appeasing concerned western diplomats and other observers by convincing them that something was being done.
Although the commission’s findings, published in November 2011 and broadcast to the nation, were suitably damning, describing how prisoners were tortured to death, threatened with rape, and often hooded, whipped, beaten, and subjected to electric-shock treatment,70 little significant action has since been taken by the authorities. Most individuals and departments blamed by the commission have not been punished, with only ten junior police officers having stood trial,71 and only a few of the hundreds of political prisoners have been released. Moreover, crackdowns on protests have continued and appear to be no less brutal than before with reports of deaths and torture remaining frequent. These accelerated after the lengthy hunger strike of a key opposition figure72 and the reinstatement of the Bahrain Formula One Grand Prix in March 2012—deemed by The Independent newspaper to be the ‘most controversial race’ in F1 history.73 With F1’s governing body seemingly oblivious to the situation, over 100,000 protestors reportedly took to the streets, with security forces firing teargas and stun grenades into the crowds.74 One demonstrator was even found ‘peppered with birdshot… after having been beaten and partially burned’.75 Opposition sources now claim that over eighty Bahrainis have died since the uprisings began,76 with nearly 5000 Shia having been fired from their jobs,77 with hundreds of homes having recently been raided, and with over $10 million having been looted by security personnel from Shia communities.78
Oman: protests and promises
As another relatively poor Gulf monarchy, Oman also faced serious protests and riots in 2011. Much like in Bahrain, the protestors were not initially calling for the overthrow of the regime, but were rather expressing their grievances over poor economic opportunities, the lack of political reform, and widespread corruption in the government. Unsurprisingly the most serious protests occurred in Oman’s more indigent areas, notably the northern city of Sohar where a number of protestors—most of whom had congregated around the Globe Roundabout as part of the ‘Green March’—died in clashes with the police in February 2011. But several hundred protestors were also reported to have rallied in the capital city of Muscat where they had translated their banner slogans into English and French for the benefit of the international media. Following swift promises of increased subsidies, pay rises for the public sector, social security benefits for the unemployed, and other benefits estimated to have cost the government $2.6 billion,79 Oman’s ruler80 went on to dismiss twelve ministers in a further effort to appease the opposition.81 But in early April 2011 Omani newspapers ran headlines that makeshift weapons had been discovered in the houses of protestors, including members of a group called ‘Gang of the Dragon’. Photographs were displayed indicating that knives and swords were being manufactured.82 And by the end of the month fresh protests had erupted elsewhere in the country, with hundreds spilling onto the streets of Oman’s southern city of Salalah and with smaller protests taking place in Haima, a key oil-producing region, and in Ibri. The demands again focused on economic concerns and greater government accountability, but this time the authorities found it harder to disperse the protestors, many of whom remained encamped in Salalah’s central square for weeks.83
Although several hundred protestors were imprisoned during this period, only a small handful was kept in custody.84 Nevertheless, with fresh demonstrations in May 2011 there were reports of much greater heavy-handedness from the security forces—including armoured vehicles being deployed to evict protestors from their tents and dismantle roadblocks, and with shots being fired into the air. Hundreds more prisoners were taken and two protestors were reported to have been shot. Protestors in Salalah claimed that the government was ‘trying to crush [their] movement’85 and dozens of activists were given one year prison sentences for ‘damaging public property’ and ‘attacking public employees’.86 Seven were even sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, having been charged with ‘shutting down work at a government organisation’.87 In turn the wave of arrests led to further protests in summer 2011 when demonstrators in Sohar called for the release of these prisoners in addit
ion to the meeting of their other, earlier demands. Although the ‘young protesters’ were reported to have decided to end their demonstration and return home so as to ‘avoid confrontation with security forces that could have bad consequences’, security forces were nonetheless described as having been ‘present in big numbers’ and teargas and baton charges were used to disperse the remaining crowds.88
In parallel to the security clampdown, the Omani authorities also began encouraging loyalist rallies, which often involved motorcades of several hundred cars driving around Muscat. Although the state-backed media claimed these were spontaneous displays of affection for the ruler, opposition activists claim that the state-owned telecommunications company89 had been sending out multiple SMS messages during the nights preceding the rallies, urging Omani nationals to join in. Since the beginning of the protests the authorities have also sought to limit further the actions of existing civil society organisations, especially those relating to human rights. As with most of the other Gulf monarchies a state-backed human rights organisation was set up, and although it did offer support and advice to protestors and political prisoners, its lack of independence and neutrality has been criticised by many observers. Moreover, in 2011 there was a noticeable rise in media censorship, with journalists and bloggers having been arrested. Most significantly, in August 2011 one of Oman’s few independent newspapers—Al-Zaman—was threatened with closure following the publication of an article alleging corruption in the Ministry for Interior. The newspaper’s editor-in-chief was interrogated while the article’s author90—a prominent Omani journalist and filmmaker, and a participant in some of the protests—was arrested and brought in for questioning. Without access to a lawyer he was charged with ‘insulting the minister for justice and his deputy’, ‘attempting to create a division in society’, ‘abusing the judiciary in Oman’, ‘violating the publications and publishing law’, and ‘practising a profession without a permit from the Ministry for Information’. Representatives for the Committee to Project Journalists explained the writer’s subsequent trial was due to ‘the Omani authorities engaging in retaliatory tactics against [the accused] for his critical writing’ and that ‘the steps taken by the Omani judiciary suggest that this is a political vendetta rather than an effort to apply justice’. Similarly a group of Omani intellectuals, journalists, and activists issued a statement condemning the closure of Al-Zaman, stating that it would ‘… take us back to a world of repression and restriction of freedoms’.91
After the Sheikhs Page 28
