by Gary Murphy
An Ireland that had sought to define its identity since independence principally in terms of social patterns rooted in the country’s past was to seek to adapt itself to the prevailing capitalist values of the developed world.64
Tadhg Ó Cearbhaill – assistant secretary in the Department of the Taoiseach at the time and intimately involved in the EFTA negotiations – noted:
In the end we were not that enthusiastic as there was a feeling within Government at the time that the whole concept of Europe would come right in the end and it was within a larger unified EEC that we wanted to be associated. Lemass was very much of that view. Policy was directed with that in mind.65
Thus, the Government suspended deliberations on EFTA and explored new avenues in its quest for economic development. Its immediate aim was to seek membership of the EEC. Within a month of Lemass’ speech on rejecting the EFTA option, the Government published a White Paper on membership of the EEC, to prepare public opinion for the official application the following month. There were still many in the administrative framework who doubted the wisdom of fully entering a European trading bloc. Con Cremin – by this time secretary of External Affairs – outlined in June 1960 Ireland’s relationship with both European trading groups when suggesting a Dáil reply to the deputy secretary of Industry and Commerce regarding Ireland’s refusal to join EFTA:
It is probable that in our circumstances association would be the most appropriate formula having regard particularly to the fact that we could not accept the full obligations of either instrument nor accord that degree of reciprocity which would be required for full membership. The terms of association on our part with either group would have to safeguard the special trading relationship between this country and Britain which is provided for in the Anglo-Irish trade agreements. Such association would be considered primarily as a means of enabling us to share in the benefits of a general European settlement of trade and economic relations on terms which would take account of our own economic circumstances.66
The premise that Ireland seek initially association rather than full membership of an economic group suggested that the EEC negotiations would also be tortuous.
Ireland is ready to assume all obligations
The prospect of Irish involvement in European economic integration was not an explicit feature of either Economic Development or the First Programme for Economic Expansion. Yet both documents did recognise that the country would have to engage substantially more with Western Europe, at least in trade terms, if it was to prosper economically. Most policy-makers – though somewhat committed to change – continued to believe that, for the immediate future, the country’s economic prospects rested on access to British markets. Nor did the accession of Lemass to Taoiseach in 1959 precipitate a completely radical departure in this respect. A distinction was drawn between the movement to free trade and a decision to join any multilateral organisation. The former policy was adopted towards the end of the 1950s, but the latter was avoided until July 1961. Throughout 1960 and into 1961, Lemass reiterated the view that it was not to Ireland’s advantage to join either the EEC or EFTA. While examining the options, the conclusion drawn was that Ireland’s economic development would not be significantly improved by membership of any multilateral group.67In essence, the Government’s – and, indeed, the civil service’s – reluctance to embark on the European option can be traced to the belief that international organisations such as GATT and the OEEC ‘were not likely to succeed in liberalising agricultural trade’.68Yet there was a growing belief in some sections of the policy community that there was a wider perspective to policy-making in the 1950s, and that wider events in Western Europe could not simply be ignored by the Irish body politic.69As Whitaker pointed out:
It was painfully obvious there was a lack of any meaningful future in our over-reliance on the British market. Thus there was no complacency within the civil service. How could there be? Our independence was threatened. There was a restless discontent as we tried to get out of the dark night of the soul.70
There can be little doubt, however, that there was many industrialists – including some in the FII – who would have been quite content to carry on trading in the rather stultifying atmosphere of the protectionist shelter.71
In theory, the more interventionist-minded but free trade-led Department of Finance was all in favour of joining a trading bloc, but would only do so on terms favourable to Ireland. Thus, prior to July 1961, policy development had continued to move in a bilateral direction on the grounds that this would provide the greatest advantage for Ireland. Many within the policy community were deeply worried by the prospect of Irish entry into the EEC without a simultaneous British entry. For Industry and Commerce, entry into the EEC would result in:
[The] withdrawal of preferential treatment given by Ireland to United Kingdom goods, but by requiring Ireland to adopt a common external tariff which would have to be applied to British goods, would put Britain at a disadvantage in the Irish market as compared with EEC countries. It would be foolhardy to expect the United Kingdom would continue to give trade advantages, agricultural or industrial, to this country in those circumstances.72
Industry and Commerce further argued that all measures of industrial protection would have to be eliminated, with wages and conditions of competition equated with those obtaining in the highly developed countries of the EEC: ‘it should be noted that the principle of adequate protection for Irish industry, including special consideration for industries not fully established, is enshrined in the existing trade agreement with the United Kingdom’.73This attitude reflects and reasserts the traditional gloomy outlook of Industry and Commerce towards economic development within Ireland. It was unwilling to look beyond habitual arrangements with Britain to expand either Irish industry or agriculture. The position of the British was crucial to Irish attitudes towards membership of the EEC, as Ireland was clearly in no position to join unless Britain did so as well.
An informal Irish delegation to the European Commission in April 1961 was informed of the difficulties an Irish application would meet, and told that association rather than full membership could well be the best method for developing Ireland’s relationship with the Community, with full membership following in due course.74The reason given was that Ireland was considered to be an underdeveloped economy and would require special consideration prior to full membership. This could best be described as an ‘unfortunate’ outcome of the EFTA negotiations, where it was well known throughout the Community that the Irish Government had considered entry on the basis that the country was underdeveloped economically. The delegation drew up a memorandum for the Government, within which it made two observations: the first was that it believed the official position of the Commission was that Ireland should apply for associate membership rather than full membership at this stage, and that the Government should be careful before it decided to apply for full membership; the second was that Ireland might pursue a high-risk strategy of applying for full membership in the hope that the Commission would offer concessions to make association more attractive. It concluded that full membership carried considerable disadvantages for Ireland, especially for its industrial economy and the special relationship with Britain, but that association also carried the risk that Ireland would neither benefit from Commission programmes nor be in a position to influence the future development of the EEC itself.75
A White Paper on membership of the EEC was published in June 1961 prior to the official application. This flurry of activity can be attributed to the decision of Britain to apply. Once the Government became aware of the British decision, it quickly prepared its own application and forwarded it to Brussels to anticipate the British application. As Dermot Keogh has shown, this was for public consumption in order to claim that the Irish decision was not a consequence of British pressure or example.76While such behaviour might be considered somewhat bizarre, the application itself made sense because Ireland could not afford to be outside t
he Community if Britain was in it. Lemass admitted that the application was inevitable once Britain had decided to apply. He told the Economist in February 1962:
It was Britain’s decision to apply for membership that opened the way for our own application. The predominant position of British trade on our economy, as a market for our exports, and the special character of the trading arrangements between the two countries, made it difficult to contemplate membership unless Britain were also to become a member.77
The decision to apply for membership was quickly seen as historic. It was described by William Tyler, the US assistant secretary of state for European affairs, as the first move by the Irish Government towards participation in international affairs, and particularly in the economic affairs of Western Europe. Maintaining that Ireland was shedding its ‘narrow provincialism’, Tyler proclaimed:
The decision to apply for membership of the EEC is most significant. Though obviously motivated to a large extent by a feeling that Ireland would be excluded from the British market the decision is not merely a reaction to this prospect. There is evidence that Irish leaders weighed their decision carefully and concluded that Ireland must become a member of the Common Market. This is further borne out by the Prime Minister’s declaration that Ireland is ready to assume all obligations, political as well as economic, of membership of the EEC.78
The EEC suggested to the Irish Government in October 1961 that it should present its case in Brussels the following January. While Lemass was primarily concerned about the economic implications of membership, he realised there were political ramifications, too. He told the secretary of his department that he considered it ‘essential to the success of Ireland’s application to include in the draft statement a declaration of Ireland’s attitude to the political aims of the Community’.79This related to the setting-up of an inter-Governmental working party to reconcile the continued refusal to join NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Alliance) with Irish support for the ideal of European unity. Con Cremin, departmental secretary at External Affairs, had initially procrastinated only to be bluntly told by Lemass to come up with a formula.80The formula reached within two days in the week coming up to Christmas ingeniously stated that the reason Ireland was not a member of NATO was not because of any lack of sympathy with its basic objectives but due to the fact that membership would place the state under an obligation to not only respect but defend the territorial integration of the countries party to the treaty, including of course Britain, whereas it was a fundamental aspiration of the Irish people to see the unity of the country restored: ‘Our non-participation in NATO is thus not an expression of any principle of neutrality, nor does it weaken in any way our positive attitude towards the ideal of European unity’.81While Lemass noted correctly that membership of NATO was not a prerequisite for membership of the EEC, he voiced reasonable fears:
Some countries or interests … may be opposed, or at least indifferent, to our entry to the EEC, it would be prudent not to imply, by anything said prior to being accepted as a member that joining NATO (even with a reservation) is something we could not face in any circumstances. To do so might merely supply them with a test of membership which, as they might hope, would transfer from them to ourselves the responsibility of negativing our application.82
This, in turn, related to the Government’s discovery in November 1961 that a very senior member of the Kennedy administration – the under-secretary for economic affairs, George Ball – was hostile to the idea of Ireland’s full membership of the EEC. Ireland’s refusal to join NATO and its policy of neutrality at the UN did not sit well with Ball for one, who was arguing in Washington that no neutrals should be allowed join the EEC.83
‘We fully realise what the Community is’
Lemass’ reasoning on NATO was further reinforced by a memorandum written the previous day by Ireland’s ambassador to the Community, Frank Biggar. He reported that the British approach – as outlined by Edward Heath to the Community – had been received positively, and while the British would encounter serious technical problems in pursuing their application, Ireland could not expect to have any lesser difficulty in this process; indeed, Ireland – because it was a small, neutral state – could expect more serious problems compared to Britain. Biggar added that the draft memorandum for the January meeting could well be seen as suspect by the existing EEC members in that Ireland might be viewed as indifferent in its application, and that the Government would have to demonstrate it was applying without reservations of any kind if it were to make its application convincing. He urged the Government to redraft in a positive vein, warning that the existing draft suffered:
From a failure to emphasise sufficiently at the outset our appreciation of the fact that the EEC despite its title, is first and foremost a political concept and not merely an economic organisation with a few political ideas as an afterthought.84
This was something Industry and Commerce had also warned about – though with its traditional gloomy economic mindset – when it argued:
It must be remembered that the final objective of the six is political integration. What we need in this country is a combination of reasonable long term price stability in agriculture, together with a very substantial expansion in activity.85
Implicit in this statement was that Industry and Commerce saw the political developments of the EEC impinging on Ireland’s economic development and its capacity to make independent policy – namely, sustaining protectionism.
Biggar’s memorandum stressed the means by which the official application should proceed:
We fully realise what the community is and what it is seeking to achieve. This would involve a general expression of our belief in the vital and unique importance of Western Europe for the future of humanity and the conviction that it can only play its proper role if politically strong and economically prosperous, conditions for which political and economic unity are the essential prerequisites.86
Biggar’s memorandum did not find favour with all in the civil service. Nicholas Ó Nuailláin, secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach, wrote to Whitaker a number of days later:
We do not agree with all of his comment. In particular we here do not agree that it is essential that we ‘inflate’ the sections concerning our acceptance of the political objectives. Any judgement on this point is, of course, largely subjective but it is our feeling that the sincerity of our professions in this regard will not be assessed by the six by reference to the length of what we say but rather by our making it clear that we know what we are talking about and do so in a direct and unambiguous fashion. Above all, we here would be somewhat nervous about appearing to ‘protest too much’. I don’t think that the six generally and, in particular some of them (such as the French), would be impressed by what they might describe as ‘literature’.87
In between Biggar’s memorandum and Ó Nuailláin’s rebuttal, a revised draft of the application statement was circulated on 1 January 1962, and it contained a brief reference to political aspects. The statement was careful to place Ireland’s application in the context of its Christian heritage and its commitment to Christian values in a European context:
Indeed for some centuries after the break up of the Roman Empire, Ireland was a haven of spiritual and intellectual life in which the essence of the European tradition was preserved and from which it was brought back again to many continental lands.
The statement insisted that Ireland had favourably viewed the various movements towards European union, but noted that while Ireland had actively participated in the OEEC and the Council of Europe, it had not been able to join NATO:
The fact that we did not accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, despite our agreement with its aims, was due to special circumstances and is not an expression of any principle of neutrality nor does it qualify in any way our positive attitude towards the ideal of European unity.88
Cremin – not withstanding his Christmas 1961 formula explaining the NATO/European-unity conund
rum – still had doubts over the whole question, and suggested two lines could still be taken: the first involved withdrawing the application if NATO membership proved to be a prerequisite for entry, the second was to insist that special circumstances were involved, and that Ireland would join the organisation if partition was ended.89Moreover, Hugh McCann – ambassador in London – had reported to Cremin that ‘Britain is not keen that EEC membership should be coterminous with NATO’, which might explain External Affairs’ attitude of attempting to avoid the NATO question entirely.90According to External Affairs, the Taoiseach was in favour of the second approach; this led Finance to take a vigorous line on the application, with the result that Cremin and External Affairs were in the main ignored. External Affairs had, to an extent, been fudging on the application since late December 1961, with the result that Finance grabbed the initiative and moved the application forward. Thus, Finance took the lead in promoting the Irish application, with Whitaker playing a central role in the background discussions in Dublin and subsequently in Brussels. As Whitaker stated:
What was at stake was the economic independence of the country, thus we, in Finance, felt that we had to give the lead and take the strongest line possible in arguing for entry to the community. I felt really that it was the only way we could advance in an economic sense.91
Finance, then, was insisting that joining the Community was imperative if Ireland was to survive economically. It had shrugged off its previous reticence regarding the economic benefits of entry. With the British committed to entry, Finance now saw the EEC as the only place to be. It was not open to Ireland to pick or choose the circumstances under which it would join. Once the country had decided on full membership, it would be incumbent on the Government to proceed with the application without any reservations. Whitaker insisted that it would be ‘extremely unfortunate’ if the application was to be withdrawn on the issue of NATO membership. Early in January, he wrote a long memorandum to his minister, James Ryan, outlining the NATO problem in relation to the EEC:
