When Miners March

by William C. Blizzard

  During late August the miners drove toward Marmet in wagons, in old Fords and Reo Speed Wagons; some came on foot, others on the family horse or mule. If they had guns they brought them, if not they came without, evidently believing that they would be supplied by arms from coal company caches. By August 23, the whole valley below Marmet was teeming with armed miners and their varied vehicles. Their District 17 leaders and others, including Mother Jones, were obviously in contact with the miners, and made frequent speeches. At this point the story becomes even cloudier and more contradictory than is usual at a time of social crisis. We shall not attempt to assess the role of Keeney, Blizzard and Mooney as regards their attitude and action in the 1921 march. All were later tried on murder charges and acquitted of same. Blizzard had the additional honor of being tried for treason against the State of West Virginia at the scene of the John Brown trials in Charles Town, West Virginia. He was acquitted and is at present president of District 17 of the UMW. From his office window on a clear day he can almost see the old encampment site near Marmet.

  Intentions Not Clear

  If the District 17 and sub-district UMW officials were actively supporting the armed gathering of miners it is not clear as to whether they had in mind only a public demonstration which would draw national attention to the plight of the miners or whether they expected to win their fight by the last resort of armed force. This writer inclines toward the latter opinion.

  It seems, however, that Mother Jones had different ideas. The fighting old champion of the miners had been a leader in West Virginia coal fields since before the turn of the century. By this time she was 91 years old, but definitely with a mind of her own and a tongue to back it up. It is almost certain that Mother was in touch with federal officials in Washington, and was using the gathering of the miners near Marmet as a lever in order to get strong governmental action to aid the miners in feudal West Virginia. At a speech at Lens Creek on August 23 Mother intimated that she would soon have good news for “her boys.” This could only mean that she anticipated friendly treatment from President Warren G. Harding or his associates.

  The young District 17 leadership had been to a man something like the pupils of Mother Jones. They had grown to manhood under her tutelage, but now believed her to be an old woman who was not as alert-minded as in former years. They put no faith in President Harding or any other political office-holder, for they had been too many times promised everything and given nothing. They evidently trusted only their own strength. In this it must be said that the students had outstripped the master, and this led to an interesting conflict between Mother Jones and the young UMW leaders.

  Chapter Nine: Mother Makes Mistake

  1/27/1953 (Forty-eighth)

  The extent of the involvement of the District 17 officials in the organization of the Armed March of 1921, if there was such involvement, will never be known. And the initial part played by Mother Jones will also remain dark, for even today men do not chatter freely about what was literally a life-and-death matter. This writer is also the author of a short work on the life of Mother Jones and is as a result rather familiar with her methods of work over a number of years. Considering the hostile press of her time (which is certainly no less hostile today), Mother was a fine agitator, who knew how to use events for maximum publicity effect.

  Whatever her part in the organization of the march, it is clear that she was intent on using it in late August as a means of focusing attention on West Virginia and procuring federal intervention in the miners’ behalf. It is also clear that she was horrified by her discovery that the miners had every intent of actually going across the hills by foot, car, horse and even commandeered freight train, and that their attitude toward Don Chafin and the Baldwin-Felts guards was just this: An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.

  Knowing Mother’s history and her real devotion to the miners, this writer can not think that Mother, in her whole life, ever sold them out. She simply felt that the Armed March was a mistake, that it would accomplish no good end, and would play into the hands of the coal operators by giving them grounds for wholesale legal reprisals. There is evidence that some operators in the unionized fields felt the same way and gave money and arms and encouraged the marchers in their armed protest. For in this way they could hurt their competitors a little, and, much more important, have a weapon with which to fight the hated UMW.

  It is also true, however, that Mother Jones was 91 years old, and in all those years was entitled to a few mistakes. In seeking federal intervention in 1921, as she had gotten it in 1912, she was pursuing a policy which had worked before. But it is not easy to see just what she hoped to accomplish in this case. In 1912 her work procured an investigation committee which did much to help the miners win their later contractual victory. But in late 1921 another federal investigating committee was already in West Virginia, and had been for months. Aid from the Harding administration was possible of course, but not likely. The men who helped to make an American historical landmark of the Teapot Dome scandals were not apt to be overflowing with ardor to help coal miners.

  And it is a fact that Mother Jones thought a great deal more of Governor Ephraim Morgan of West Virginia than an active partisan of the coal miners should, a circumstance which the District 17 leadership pointed out with much acerbity. Mother, herself, in her autobiography, says this:

  “For myself I always found Governor Morgan most approachable. The human appeal always reached him. I remember a poor woman coming to see me one day. Her husband had been blacklisted in the mines and he dared not return to his home. The woman was weak from lack of food, too weak to work. I took her to the Governor. He gave her 20 dollars. He arranged for her husband to return, promised his executive protection.

  “I was with the Governor’s secretary one day when a committee called to see the Governor. The committee was composed of lickspittles of the mine owners. They requested that the Governor put The Federationist, a labor weekly, out of business. The Governor said, ‘Gentlemen, the Constitution guarantees the right of free speech and free press. I shall not go on record as interfering with either as long as the Constitution lives.’

  “The committee slunk out of the office.

  “I think that Governor Morgan is the only governor in the 23 years I was in West Virginia who refused to comply with the requests of the dominant money interests. To a man of that type I wish to pay my respect.”

  Mother and Keeney Clash

  The young leadership of District 17 did not at all agree with this estimate of Governor Morgan, and this writer must side with them as opposed to Mother Jones. This is written in no carping, or “debunking” manner. Mother Jones was great and selfless champion of the miners, with few peers. But even the great may err, as we feel that in this case she did. Morgan was as much on the side of the coal companies as any other governor of West Virginia, as we think we have already shown. And we will have more to say.

  In any case the District 17 leadership and Mother Jones disagreed on a number of points. People who know the labor movement will not have to be told that those who lead labor generally possess positive opinions. It is not an unusual thing for equally positive opinions to clash in internecine labor battle. The men who led the UMW in West Virginia were perhaps a little jealous of Mother’s great prestige, and this may have been a complicating factor, plus the undoubted fact that Mother Jones was a rugged individualist who took no orders from anyone and frequently did not advise other UMW organizers or the District organization of her plans until they were confronted with a fait accompli.

  On the night of Aug. 23, 1921, Mother made a speech before the assembled miners on Lens Creek in which she promised that she should soon have good news from Washington in the form of a telegram or communication from President Harding. According to District 17 Secretary-Treasurer Fred Mooney, some Union committeemen visited him the following morning in Charleston and wanted to know what Mother meant. They wanted to know why President Harding would wire Mother
Jones instead of the District organization.

  Mooney and Keeney were just as curious as the men were, and they went to Lens Creek to see what Mother was going to say. They arrived as the old woman was concluding her talk, the main burden of which was that the men should go home and give up the idea of an Armed March to Logan. She held in the air what was purportedly a telegram from President Harding advising them to do the same. C. Frank Keeney, District 17 head, asked Mother if he might look at the telegram – there is some testimony that he tried to snatch it from her hand – but she refused the request. Mooney also asked Mother for a look and was likewise refused.

  1/28/1953 (Forty-ninth)

  It is almost certain that both Mooney and Keeney then told the assembled miners that the telegram did not exist, that the piece of paper in Mother’s hand was a fake. It is absolutely certain that they said this later, for Mooney went back to Charleston and telephoned George B. Christian, Secretary to President Harding. Christian advised that the President had sent no such telegram. The miners were immediately notified of this fact. Mooney explained later that he released this information because Mother Jones had told the Charleston Daily Mail that he and Keeney urged the miners to go right on to Logan and pay no attention to Mother. Mooney said this was not so, that he and Keeney had on the contrary told the miners to return to their homes. Who is here bending the truth a bit is not known. It is known that the coal operators later used this story in the Charleston Daily Mail in their attempt to convict of murder and hang Mooney, Keeney, and Blizzard.

  There is a nice lesson here for Labor: If you are going to have family fights don’t publicize them in anti-union newspapers, for this can lead to a severe pain in the neck.

  The coal operators in later court battles tried to prove that the majority of the miners on the march were coerced into going by a minority “radical” element. That there were leaders in the affair, and that leaders are by the nature of things in a minority can not be denied. But it is obvious that the majority of miners were boiling mad and ready for anything. Individual coercion of the fainthearted exists in any struggle involving personal danger. That it existed on a large scale in the “Armed March” of 1921 is not borne out by the records.

  The Miners March

  Secretary-Treasurer Mooney testified later that Mother made her speech before only about 600 of the miners on Lens Creek and that “the main column had gone on up the creek, further over the creek toward Racine.” Attempting to determine exactly what happened by consulting files of Charleston newspapers is a hopeless task. As Mooney pointed out: “I have written an article myself and sent it in and they have twisted it so you would not recognize it – both papers.”

  This speech of Mother Jones’ and the consequent argument occurred August 24, and that day and night the armed miners left their encampment near Marmet in great numbers, pouring up Lens Creek and over the hills toward Boone County. Through the town of Racine they traveled, up Drawdy and Rock Creek into Danville and Madison. A few reports aver that they were sometimes accompanied by miners’ wives and daughters wearing nurses’ caps with the letters “U.M.W. of A.” sewn neatly to the brims.

  The “uniform” of the angry miners, for those who observed such regulations, were blue denim overalls and red handkerchiefs around the neck, in accordance with their traditions. Some sang as they went. Reliable sources allege that one of the tunes was “John Brown’s Body” and that the improvised words announced that “they would hang Don Chafin to a sour apple tree.” Don Chafin, it will be recalled was the autocratic sheriff who ruled Logan County for the coal operators.

  As has been told before, the miners had a sort of military organization for the march, with sentries posted, patrols organized, and passwords for the identification of enemies and friends. At first it seems that the password in reply to a challenge was “I come creeping.” It was later changed so that the challenge was “Where to” and the reply from a Union man was “Mingo” or “to Mingo.” If you challenged a party of men by waving your hat up and down they were supposed to reply, if friendly, with the word “Selma,” according to some evidence.

  The Army Lands

  Miners were supposed to have commandeered freight cars which bore numbers of men and such titles as “Blue Steel Special” and “Smith & Wesson Special.”

  The general movement of the miners was toward Blair Mountain, a high ridge over near the town of Logan, where centered the demesne of Sheriff Don Chafin. A fiction writer might well use Blair Mountain in some symbolic manner, as it was the dividing line between the Union forces and the nonunion fields. A small portion of Logan County on one side of Blair Mountain was unionized. On the other side, to the south, was a howling wilderness, so far as Union men were concerned.

  This concerted march of thousands of armed miners, needless to say, was brought to the attention of the state and federal governments. Governor Morgan, through Major Tom Davis, dispatched Capt. James R. Brockus from martial-law-ruled Mingo County to the aid of Don Chafin. With him Brockus took 71 regular state police and about 15 of the “volunteers” before mentioned in this history. This turned out to be an important action, historically, as we shall show later, but these police did not arrive in Logan until about 6 a.m. on the morning of August 27. The Federal Government had meanwhile intervened.

  This was at the request of Governor Morgan, who evidently had men reporting to him who were in close touch with the situation. Gen. Harry H. Bandholtz of the United States Army arrived in Charleston at 3:05 a.m., August 26th, and proceeded to the temporary “pasteboard” capitol which had been erected to replace the stone building destroyed by fire on Jan. 3, 1921. Here he met Governor Morgan and they summoned Keeney, Mooney, and UMW Attorney Harold Houston. The sleepy-eyed Union officials found Morgan and Bandholtz in a room crowded with policemen, state officials of varied ranks, and the military staff of Bandholtz. They were ordered to proceed at once to turn back the marching miners.

  District 17 President Keeney explained that he might well get shot if he attempted such a thing without something to show that the United States Government had given him orders. Keeney asked General Bandholtz for a letter, signed by the General, ordering him to turn back the marchers. Bandholtz at first refused, but later consented to this arrangement, according to Keeney himself when interviewed recently.

  1/29/1953 (Fiftieth)

  Keeney and Mooney then took off toward Boone County, where most of the miners had by this time congregated, in order to talk with the marchers. The Union leaders telephoned later in the day (August 26) telling General Bandholtz that they were having success in inducing the men to withdraw.

  On August 27 General Bandholtz, with two other military officials, got in an automobile at Charleston at 11:15 a.m. with William Blizzard, then President of UMW Sub-district No. 2, and followed in the path of the marching miners over a “very difficult road” to the Boone County town of Racine. In view of later events, part of the courtroom testimony of Bandholtz should be given verbatim:

  “Q. Why did you make that trip that morning, General?

  “A. To satisfy myself that the miners were returning as reported. In addition to that, I had sent Major Thompson further up the river for a like purpose.

  “Q. Did you satisfy yourself that they were returning home?

  “A. I did.

  “Q. Did you receive any report from Major Thompson on that occasion, as to what he found?

  “A. I did – confirmatory of my own.”

  After satisfying himself, as he relates above, that the march of the miners had ended, General Bandholtz returned to Charleston and took the 6:40 train back to Washington, D.C. This was on the 27th day of August, 1921. It is clear that the General was correct in his estimate – the miners were returning to their homes, although none too willingly. But a very little match can cause a mighty conflagration in such an explosive situation.

  The Sharples Incident

  And on the same night that General Bandholtz and his retinue left
West Virginia the coal operators through Don Chafin and a contingent of state police which Governor Morgan and Major Tom Davis had sent from Mingo to Logan County, furnished that match. This was the Sharples incident.

  There is reason to infer, both from this action near Sharples, Logan County, and the seeming fact that some of the operators in the Union fields aided the marchers with arms and food and encouragement, that in the Armed March the coal operators saw an excellent club with which to break the back of the United Mine Workers of America; with the coal operators superior firepower, if not numerical superiority, and the backing of the United States and West Virginia governments, they had nothing to lose by provoking the armed miners into revolt. They had, in fact, much to gain, for with the Government of West Virginia their docile tool they would not themselves be subject to prosecution in the courts. And they stood an excellent chance of obtaining severe legal penalties against the UMW.

  But this would not have been easy if the miners had merely returned peacefully to their homes after having been warned by representatives of the Federal Government. So, if the inference is correct, something had to be done by the coal operators to again rouse the miners to hot-blooded anger; an incident had to be manufactured which would again set the miner on the march. Such an incident was manufactured, if the theory of this writer coincides with the facts.

  It will be recalled that Mingo County was still under martial law, with Major Tom Davis, a veteran of such labor-quelling measures, in charge. About 2:30 a.m., Aug. 27, Davis ordered State Police Captain James R. Brockus, of Lick Creek fame, to proceed to the aid of Don Chafin in Logan County. Brockus, with about 85 or 86 other regular state police and “volunteers” did as he was told. The Captain did not go into Logan just to help Chafin in a general way, but for a specific purpose. This was to lead a group of men across Blair Mountain and serve warrants on Union coal miners. This Brockus proceeded to do, augmenting his armed force by adding a number of Chafin’s deputies thereto.