by Rudolf Hoess
On Pohl’s orders I made three visits to Budapest in order to obtain an estimate of the number of able-bodied Jews that might be expected. This gave me the opportunity of observing Eichmann’s methods of negotiating with the Hungarian government departments and the army. His manner of approach was extremely firm and matter-of-fact, but nevertheless amiable and courteous, and he was liked and made welcome wherever he went. This was confirmed by the innumerable private invitations he received from the chiefs of these departments. Only the Hungarian army showed no pleasure in Eichmann’s visits. The army sabotaged the surrender of the Jews whenever they could, but they did it in such a manner that the Hungarian government was unable to intervene. The majority of the Hungarian population, particularly in eastern Hungary, were unfavorably disposed toward the Jews and there cannot have been many Jews in that part, in 1943, who escaped being rounded up. If they did, it was only because they were lucky enough to make their way across the Carpathians to Romania.
Eichmann was absolutely convinced that if he could succeed in destroying the biological basis of Jewry in the East by complete extermination, then Jewry as a whole would never recover from the blow. The assimilated Jews of the West, including America, would, in his opinion, be in no position (and would have no desire) to make up this enormous loss of blood and there would therefore be no future generation worth mentioning. He was strengthened in these views by the continual efforts of the leader of the Hungarian Jews, a fanatical Zionist, to persuade Eichmann to exclude from the transports Jews with large families. Eichmann repeatedly had long discussions with this Zionist leader on all questions relating to the Jews. Moreover it was interesting to hear that this man had up-to-date knowledge concerning Auschwitz and the number of transports, and of the process of selection and extermination. Eichmann’s journeys and his dealings with the authorities of the various countries were also kept under continuous observation. The leader of the Jews in Budapest was able to tell Eichmann exactly where he had been in recent weeks and with whom he had been negotiating.
Eichmann was completely obsessed with his mission and also convinced that this extermination action was necessary in order to preserve the German people in the future from the destructive intentions of the Jews. This was the way in which he regarded his task, and he employed all his energy in fulfilling the plans for extermination which the Reichsführer SS had made.
Eichmann was also a determined opponent of the idea of selecting from the transports Jews who were fit for work. He regarded it as a constant danger to his scheme for a “final solution,” because of the possibility of mass escapes or some other event occurring which would enable the Jews to survive. In his view action should be taken against every Jew that could be got hold of, and such actions ought to be pursued to their conclusion as quickly as possible, since it was impossible to anticipate the final result of the war. Already in 1943 he had doubts in a complete German victory and believed that the end would be inconclusive.
APPENDIX 4
Müller
SS Gruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the Police, Müller was head of Department IV in the Reich Security Head Office and Deputy Chief of the Security Police and SD
Müller served as an officer in the First World War and later joined the Bavarian police. After Hitler had assumed power, he was transferred to the Bavarian political police under Best, who installed him in the office of the State Secret Police in Berlin.
He quickly assumed a prominent position in this office under Heydrich, and finally became head of the Gestapo himself.
Müller was a police official by choice. It was only after the assumption of power that he became a member of the Party, and it was comparatively late before he was enrolled in the SS.
His specialist knowledge of police methods (he always was an active executive) and his aptitude for the job were particularly useful in the development of the Gestapo. He also played a decisive part in its organization.
It was Müller’s principle to remain in the background, for he did not care to be associated with any kind of operations or actions. Yet it was he who organized all the larger and more important actions taken by the security police, and it was he who planned their execution.
After Heydrich’s departure he became the leading personality of the Reich Security Head Office, Kaltenbrunner was only the chief and concerned himself principally with the SD.
Müller was always well informed about the major political events in the Reich. He had many trusted friends in every kind of official position, especially in the economic sphere, with whom he kept in contact through third parties. He was adept at working behind the scenes.
Müller had only visited a concentration camp on a few occasions and had never inspected them all. Nevertheless he was always kept up to date on matters concerning them, and it was not for nothing that the head of the political department in each camp was a member of the police.
Eicke and Müller had got on very well with each other ever since the time when Eiche was commandant of Dachau and Müller was working with the Bavarian political police.
It was impossible to find out what Müller’s personal opinions were on matters concerning concentration camp prisoners. All his pronouncements on such questions began with: “the Reichsführer SS wishes that,” or “the Reichsführer SS orders.” His own point of view could never be discovered.
As adjutant at Sachsenhausen, and camp commandant at Auschwitz, and later more especially as head of department DI, I very often had dealings with him. But I never knew of a single occasion on which he said: “I decide this—I order that—I want this.” He always hid himself behind the Reichsführer SS or the chief of the security police and the SD, although the initiated knew that his was the deciding voice and that the Reichsführer SS or Kaltenbrunner completely depended on him in all questions concerning the prisoners. It was he who decided what appointments should be made and who should be dismissed, and he also had the final word in the executions, so far as they were determined by the Reich Security Head Office: that is to say that in important cases he submitted the orders for execution to the Reichsführer SS for signature.
He had an accurate knowledge of the far-reaching and delicate question of the special prisoners. He knew the exact details of each of these numerous prisoners and where they were accommodated and their particular weaknesses.
Müller was a tremendously versatile and tenacious worker. He was seldom away on duty and could always be contacted by day or by night, on Sundays and holidays as well, either in his office or at his home.
He had two adjutants and two clerks, whom he kept busy alternately day and night.
He answered every inquiry promptly, mostly through the Reichsführer SS, “since he must always first obtain the decision of the Reichsführer SS!”
I knew from Eichmann and Günther, who had much more to do with him than I had, that he controlled the actions against the Jews in their more important respects, even though he gave Eichmann a fairly free hand in the matter.
As I have already said, he was well informed about all the concentration camps and always possessed an accurate knowledge about Auschwitz, which he had personally never seen. He knew every detail, whether it concerned Birkenau or the crematoriums, or the numbers of prisoners or the mortality figures, with an exactitude that often astonished me.
My personal requests that he should slow down the actions so that the defects in the camps could be remedied were of no avail, for he always sheltered behind the strict order of the Reichsführer SS that “the actions which I have ordered are to be ruthlessly carried out.” I tried everything I could to move him in this matter, but in vain, although in other respects I managed to achieve a great deal with him where others never succeeded, especially later on when as DI he placed much reliance on my judgment. I now believe that they did not want to remedy the conditions in Auschwitz, so that the effects of the actions could be increased by their indifference.
Müller might have had the power to st
op the actions, or to slow them down, and he might have been able to convince the Reichsführer SS of the need for this. But he failed to do so, although he knew exactly what the results would be, because it was contrary to their intentions. That is how I see it today, although at the time I could not appreciate the attitude of the Reich Security Head Office.
Müller repeatedly said to me: “The Reichsführer SS is of the opinion that the release of political prisoners during the war must be refused for security reasons. Requests for release must therefore be reduced to a minimum and only submitted in exceptional cases.” “The Reichsführer SS has ordered that, on principle, all prisoners of foreign nationality are not to be released for the duration of the war.” “The Reichsführer SS desires that even in the case of negligible acts of sabotage by prisoners of foreign nationality, the death penalty shall be demanded, as a deterrent to others.”
After what I have said above, it is not difficult to guess who was behind these orders and wishes.
Altogether one can say that the Reich Security Head Office, or at least the executive, and all that it achieved was Müller.
As a person, Müller was very correct in his attitude, obliging and friendly. He never stood on his seniority or rank, but it was impossible to have any close, personal contact with him. This was confirmed to me time and again by those of his colleagues who had worked with him for several years.
Müller was the ice-cold executive or organizer of all the measures which the Reichsführer SS deemed necessary for the security of the Reich.
APPENDIX 5
Pohl
The Chief of the Economic Administration Head Office, SS Obergruppenführer Oswald Pohl, has been known to me since my appointment to Dachau on December 1, 1934
Pohl was a native of Kiel and a paymaster in the navy. He was a veteran member of the Party and belonged to the naval SA. The Reichsführer SS removed him from there in 1934 and installed him as administrative chief of the SS.
Although this office played only a small part in affairs under the guidance of his predecessors, Pohl managed in a very short time to make himself indispensable to the Reichsführer SS and to make his office feared and all-powerful. For example his auditors, who were selected by himself and received his support and were responsible only to him, were held in terror by the administrative heads of every department. PohPs methods did, however, instill order and accuracy into the administration of the SS and resulted in the dismissal of any administrative official whom he found careless or unreliable.
Under Pohl’s predecessors, the more senior officers were fairly independent in money matters and did much as they pleased. Pohl got the Reichsführer SS to issue instructions that permission had to be obtained for all payments made by the General SS and that such payments would be audited by him. This caused a lot of ill-feeling and irritation, but with characteristic energy Pohl succeeded in getting his way and, as a result, obtained for himself an enormous influence over the affairs of every SS unit. Even the most obstinate cranks among the senior SS officers, such as Sepp Dietrich and Eicke, had to draw in their horns and ask Pohl when they wanted money for some extrabudgetary expenditure.
Each SS unit had an exactly calculated annual budget, which had to be observed with the most scrupulous accuracy. Pohl’s bloodhounds, the auditors, would unearth every penny that had been over- or underspent.
Pohl’s main objective from the beginning, however, was gradually to make the SS financially Independent of the state and the Party, by means of its own business undertakings and thus to guarantee the Reichsführer SS the necessary freedom of action in his planning. It was a task with a far-reaching objective, which Pohl was convinced could be accomplished and for which he labored unremittingly. He was the guiding spirit behind almost all of the business undertakings of the SS. To start with there were the German Armaments Works (DAW), the porcelain factory (Allach), the quarries, slag-works, brickyards, and cement factories forming the German Mineral and Stone Works (Dest), and the clothing factories. There was the WIII German Provisions Combine, incorporating bakeries, butchers, retail grocers, and canteens, the numerous spas, the agricultural and forestry undertakings, the printing works and publishing companies, all of which already represented a considerable economic strength. Yet this was only a beginning.
Pohl had already made plans for industrial undertakings of great magnitude, which would put even the IG Farben Industrie in the shade. Pohl also had the necessary energy to bring these schemes to completion.
The Reichsführer SS needed an enormous amount of money for his research and experimental establishments alone, and Pohl had always produced it. The Reichsführer SS was very liberal in allowing money to be spent for exceptional purposes, and Pohl financed everything. He was easily able to do this, since the business undertakings of the SS, in spite of the large capital investment they required, produced an immense amount of money.
The Waffen SS, the concentration camps, the Reich Security Head Office, the police, and later some other service departments, were financed by the state. Budgetary discussions were conducted on Pohl’s behalf by Gruppenführer Frank, his ad latus and general factotum.
The negotiations with the Treasury over the budget were veritable trials of strength, for without money provided by the state, not one new company of the Waffen SS could be formed. Frank was clever and tenacious and managed to get all that he wanted, often after negotiations lasting for weeks on end. He had been trained by Pohl, and Pohl stood behind his shoulder. Later on Frank reorganized the administration of the entire police force, which had become completely fossilized. After the attempt on the Führer’s life, Frank became administrative chief of the army. Pohl stood in the background and directed.
The headquarters and administration of the SS were situated in Munich during the first few years after the assumption of power. During the same period, Pohl lived in Dachau in the immediate neighborhood of the camp. He therefore came into contact with the concentration camp and the prisoners from the start, and was able to acquire a thorough knowledge of their needs. Because of his intense interest in the construction of industrial undertakings in Dachau concentration camp, he spent much time in the camp and on Sundays enjoyed making a tour of inspection of the entire camp area. He deliberately avoided entering the actual protective custody camp, so as not to give the Inspector of Concentration Camps, Eicke, any possible ground for complaining to the Reichsführer SS. Pohl and Eicke were both powerful personalities, and there was constant friction between them which often developed into violent quarrels. They held contrary opinions on almost every question that came within their competence. This was the case in questions concerning the treatment of prisoners, so far as they affected Pohl, on matters such as their accommodation, provisioning and clothing, and their employment in the industrial undertakings. During the whole time that I knew Pohl, up to the final collapse, he always showed the same approach to all questions concerning the prisoners. It was his opinion that a prisoner who was given good and warm living quarters and was sufficiently well fed and clothed, would work industriously on his own account, and that punishment was only necessary as a last resort.
On Pohl’s initiative a garden of medicinal herbs was started in Dachau. Pohl was an enthusiastic believer in diet reform. Spices and medicinal herbs of all kinds were bred and cultivated in this garden, with the object of weaning the German people from the foreign spices that were a danger to health, and from the synthetic medicines, and of accustoming them instead to the use of unharmful, pleasant-tasting German spices and natural, medicinal herbs for all kinds of bodily infirmities. The use of these spices was made obligatory for all SS and police formations. Later on, during the war, almost the entire army received these spices from Dachau. Pohl found many opportunities in this herb garden of discussing with the prisoners the reasons for their arrest, and of hearing about their life in the carnp. In this way he was always in the know about what was going on in Dachau concentration camp. Even in later years he visit
ed the herb garden almost every month, and always lived there when he was in Munich or when he had some business to transact in the neighborhood.
Pohl persistently supported requests for the release of prisoners who were known to him, when he believed that they had been wrongly imprisoned, or when he considered that the length of their sentences was unjustifiable. This brought him into irreconcilable hostility with Eicke and the Reich Security Head Office, and later on with Kaltenbrunner. Pohl was never afraid to make a complaint, and in especially bad cases he would go to the Reichsführer SS himself, which he otherwise avoided doing. But he met with little success, for in matters relating to releases the Reichsführer SS deferred on principle to the opinions of the Reich Security Head Office.
In 1941 the concentration camps were incorporated in Department D of the Economic Administration Head Office, and placed under Pohl’s authority.
Through his contacts with the industrial undertakings which were concerned with all the camps, and through the heads of those undertakings and their temporary inspector Maurer, and also through the chiefs of the department groups and of departments A, B, C, and W, Pohl was kept well informed about all the camps.
After he had taken over the concentration camps, Pohl immediately started to reform them in accordance with his ideas. First of all, some of the camp commandants had to go, either because they failed to comply with Pohl’s new instructions, or because, like Loritz, they were (in Pohl’s opinion) no longer tolerable for service in a concentration camp.
Pohl’s main demands were: decent treatment of the prisoners, elimination of all arbitrary handling of the prisoners by subordinate members of the SS, improvements in the system of provisioning, the supply of warmer clothing for the winter, sufficient accommodation, and improvement of the sanitary arrangements. All of these improvements were proposed with the object of keeping the prisoners sufficiently fit to do the work demanded of them!
