by Michael Cox
In truth, United were battered by Bayern in the final. Ferguson’s tactics were questionable; without Scholes and Keane, he used Beckham centrally, where he performed well in terms of dictating the tempo of the game, but United desperately missed his crossing quality. Bayern had been particularly scared of United’s width, persuading UEFA to reduce the width of the large Camp Nou pitch by four yards. But Giggs was fielded on the right where he struggled against Bayern’s Michael Tarnat, while Blomqvist couldn’t influence the game on the left. Bayern went quickly 1–0 up, hit the woodwork twice and should have had the game wrapped up long before United’s extraordinary late comeback. United made inroads when Beckham returned to the right, his combinations with Neville pushing them up the pitch. But it was somehow fitting that the goals came from two substitutes: Sheringham, turning home Giggs’s scuffed shot, and Solskjær, converting Sheringham’s flick-on from Beckham’s in-swinging corner. Ferguson’s revolutionary approach of assembling four genuinely top-class centre-forwards had paid off, and this was classic Manchester United 1998/99, those deemed not good enough for the first-choice XI providing the crucial contributions.
Solskjær had become renowned as a supersub rather than a starter, and earlier that season had, amazingly, scored four goals in a single game as a substitute against Nottingham Forest. Solskjær actually disliked his supersub reputation but, as an intelligent, studious player, analysed the opposition from the sidelines before exploiting weaknesses in the second half. In fact, almost all of United’s crucial victories that season involved the introduction of a supersub or rotation. In the famous 2–1 FA Cup semi-final replay victory over Arsenal, Ferguson made the shock decision to rest Yorke and Cole, fielding Sheringham and Solskjær up front instead. Giggs was also left out, before being introduced as a substitute when Ferguson saw Arsenal’s ageing defence was fatiguing. His extra energy proved crucial and he scored the best goal of his career.
In the final Premier League victory over Tottenham, Ferguson used Sheringham from the outset, but then introduced Cole at half-time, asking him to target John Scales, recently returned after injury and not moving comfortably, with his speed. United went 1–0 down, but after Beckham whipped in a brilliant equaliser, Cole scored the winner.
In the FA Cup Final, United’s plans took an early blow when Keane departed through injury. Surprisingly, Ferguson opted to introduce Teddy Sheringham in his place, but his logic was sound. He knew both Keane and Scholes were suspended from the Champions League Final four days later, so didn’t want to use Butt – now a certain starter against Bayern – for an extended period at Wembley. Instead he introduced Sheringham, with Solskaer dropping back from his centre-forward position to the right of midfield and Beckham tucking inside. Sheringham scored with his first touch, then created the second for Scholes. Another key substitution.
Incredibly, Ferguson also rested Stam and Yorke – his best defender and best attacker – at Wembley in preparation for the Champions League Final, merely giving them a quick second-half runout to stay sharp. ‘Some of the directors have given up trying to understand some of my selections,’ Ferguson admitted. ‘It’s written on their faces – “What on earth is he doing now?”’ The idea that a manager could rest two key players for the most important match of the domestic football calendar was incredible, but then Ferguson was always one step ahead. A few years earlier he was the first manager to consider the League Cup as an opportunity to rest key players and blood youngsters, which would later become established practice for big sides.
Squad rotation was generally linked to foreign managers like Chelsea’s Claudio Ranieri and later Rafael Benítez at Liverpool. There remained a belief within English football that managers should ‘keep a settled side’ and, in particular, ‘never change a winning side’ – Aston Villa famously won the title in 1980/81 by using only 14 players, including seven ever-presents. But in 1998/99 Ferguson was the only Premier League manager who didn’t name an unchanged side all season, eternally freshening up things to allow first-teamers a breather and to keep reserves involved. While other title challengers often faded in the last month of the season, United’s 1998/99 side kept on going. This was largely attributed to ‘bottle’, typically the most revered attribute in English football, but it was also simply about fitness. United’s players shared the workload, and Ferguson possessed substitutes of comparable ability to his first-choices. ‘You can’t expect the same players to play in so many games,’ said Ferguson. ‘At least, you can’t if you want them to keep winning.’
The emphasis upon rotation represented an enormous transformation from United’s first Premier League title six years earlier. In 1992/93 eight players started at least 40 of United’s 42 Premier League games. By 1998/99, in a 38-game season, no one started more than 34. Ferguson’s use of the squad was fantastic: Phil Neville, Butt and Blomqvist weren’t considered regulars, but all three started more than half of United’s Premier League matches. Centre-back David May, who made just seven starts all season, is often mocked for taking an unreasonably prominent role in the Champions League celebrations. But that was United’s treble-winning squad all over, the back-ups always heavily involved.
Slowly, other top Premier League clubs started to embrace rotation. It was particularly evident up front, with title rivals looking to emulate United’s four-man strike options. When winning the double in 1997/98, Arsenal’s back-ups were the relatively unknown Nicolas Anelka and Christopher Wreh, but immediately after United’s treble success they found themselves with experienced internationals Nwankwo Kanu and Davor Šuker in reserve to Thierry Henry and Dennis Bergkamp. The next time they won the league, at Old Trafford in 2001/02, Wenger started his two back-up strikers, two-time African Footballer of the Year Kanu playing alongside Euro 2000 final goalscorer Sylvain Wiltord, who netted the winner. Big clubs started to stockpile top-class players, which increased the gap between them and the also-rans. Established first-teamers, however, generally didn’t like rotation – Bergkamp described the concept as ‘bullshit’.
Crucially, Ferguson wasn’t simply rotating for the sake of it; this wasn’t a revolving door policy, as critical pundits often implied. He was often introducing specific players for specific roles against specific opponents, and United’s strategic improvement and European progress convinced his players. The fact Ferguson successfully introduced rotation was, in part, because he had successfully embraced tactics.
8
The Foreign Revolution
‘Ninety-nine per cent of the innovations you see in the Premier League come from abroad.’
Michael Owen
On the Premier League’s first-ever weekend, 15 August 1992, only 11 foreign players started in the entire division. Just over seven years later, on Boxing Day 1999, 11 foreign players started for a single team.
With Chris Sutton and Dennis Wise both injured, Chelsea’s starting XI for their 2–1 victory over Southampton consisted of Ed de Goey (Netherlands), Albert Ferrer (Spain), Frank Leboeuf (France), Emerson Thome (Brazil), Celestine Babayaro (Nigeria), Dan Petrescu (Romania), Didier Deschamps (France), Roberto Di Matteo (Italy), Gabriele Ambrosetti (Italy), Gus Poyet (Uruguay) and Tore André Flo (Norway), who scored both goals. Chelsea’s manager, meanwhile, was Italian Gianluca Vialli – there had been no foreign managers back in 1992/93.
To Vialli and his players, it felt entirely natural. None of them had noticed anything unusual about the team selection, but when they emerged from the dressing room to be confronted with an unusual number of photographers, the story became obvious. ‘I never thought about it,’ said Vialli afterwards. ‘It makes no difference as long as we talk the same language on the pitch. We had a few players out – and unfortunately a few of them were English – but nationality is not important.’
For the British press, though, it was a momentous occasion, and the story was deemed significant enough to graduate from the sports pages to the main sections of newspapers. The Guardian published a leader article discussing the
cultural significance of this development, inevitably attempting to find a wider meaning. ‘It is not very many years since Chelsea was one of the most xenophobic of football clubs, with supporters booing foreign players when they came onto the field – even on occasion their own players,’ it read. ‘It is curious how Britain, so reluctant to share a single currency with the rest of Europe, has welcomed continental and non-European players to its bosom.’
When Chelsea again fielded no British players for a 2–1 defeat to Lazio three months later, the Independent described a photo of the starting XI as ‘a picture that humiliates English football’. If that sounds extreme, it’s worth remembering that just a few years earlier, fielding just four foreign players wouldn’t simply have been frowned upon – it would have been against the rules.
English football’s deep-rooted suspicion of foreign football tactics is notorious, although the extent it ignored foreigners themselves throughout the 20th century is often overlooked. After Herbert Chapman’s Arsenal signed Dutch goalkeeper Gerrit Keizer in 1930, the Football Association reacted by introducing a two-year ‘residency rule’ on foreign players, effectively preventing English clubs from signing footballers from abroad. This rule, amazingly, remained in place until the 1970s, when Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community meant such a ban was impossible. This was accepted by the FA in 1976, although the Football League attempted to stand its ground – ‘I cannot stop a manager signing an overseas player, but I can stop him playing in our competition,’ said league secretary Alan Hardaker. The European Economic Community specifically ruled on the issue two years later, clarifying that discrimination against the employment of other EEC citizens was in breach of the Treaty of Rome, although leagues were surprisingly able to maintain restrictions on the number of players fielded in a starting XI, a situation that lasted the best part of two decades. For the opening years of the Premier League, teams could employ as many foreigners as they liked, but could only field three together at any time.
There was a further complication, however, owing to England and Britain’s somewhat complex political and footballing status. In the Premier League, Welsh, Scottish and Northern Irish players were not considered foreign by the FA, because they were all British citizens, while Ireland’s long-standing agreement with Britain concerning freedom of movement meant they were not considered foreign either (which is why, in a British footballing context, ‘foreign’ generally referred to players from outside the UK and Ireland, even though the Republic of Ireland is a separate country).
UEFA’s rules were different. In their eyes, England was a separate country to Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Ireland because they competed separately at international level and had separate leagues that all provided teams for UEFA competitions. In Europe, therefore, clubs were only allowed to name three ‘foreign’ players plus two ‘assimilated’ players (who had earned residency in a country) in their matchday squad, which caused Manchester United particular problems during their formative Champions League adventures. Peter Schmeichel was once omitted from a 1994 trip to Barcelona because Alex Ferguson felt he needed to use his foreign quota on Welsh and Irish outfielders, and reserve goalkeeper Gary Walsh conceded four goals.
Surprisingly, at this stage the FA were giving serious consideration to falling in line with UEFA by maintaining English football’s three-foreigner rule, but classifying anyone other than Englishmen as foreigners, as FA chief executive Graham Kelly confirmed. ‘We believe there is a need to examine current regulations to determine if it would be advantageous to the English game, and the production and progress of our own players, to apply a similar classification to Europe,’ he said. Ferguson, predictably, was fuming. ‘It would effectively close the door to some great talents. Where would the game have been without people like George Best, Danny Blanchflower and Denis Law?’
He didn’t need to worry, however, because restrictions upon foreign players in both domestic and European competition were scrapped in 1995, when a journeyman Belgian player named Jean-Marc Bosman blew the system wide open. Bosman was a midfielder for RFC Liège in the Belgian First Division, and upon the expiry of his contract in 1990, he wanted to move to French side Dunkerque. But at this stage, players didn’t have freedom of movement at the end of their contract. Dunkerque refused to pay the inflated transfer fee Liège demanded, so Liège refused to let him go. Rules differed across Europe at this stage, and had Bosman been attempting to transfer between two English clubs, for example, he would have moved, with the fee being decided by a tribunal. But Belgian clubs could prevent their players moving abroad if a fee wasn’t agreed, so Bosman was essentially trapped and his wages at Liege reduced because he was no longer a first-teamer.
Unsurprisingly, the European Court of Justice ruled that this was against the free movement of workers across European Union countries. It was a landmark case and had two major impacts. First, players could move on a free transfer when their contract expired. Second, leagues were no longer able to enforce any quotas on foreign players from other EU countries (although they could maintain quotas for non-EU players). English football’s top brass were not impressed, and talk inevitably turned to the possibility of what Chelsea eventually did four years later. ‘Whether the day will come where we see 11 non-British players in a single team, we’ll have to wait and see,’ said a rueful Kelly. Bosman’s legal team, incidentally, had downplayed suggestions this could ever happen, claiming teams would need to field local players to retain supporters’ affections. How wrong they were.
In hindsight it’s astonishing it took so long before such an obviously unfair system was overhauled; football associations were claiming to be above the law, but couldn’t explain precisely why. The changes to football were profound and the entire transfer market was seemingly at risk. Headlines uniformly described football as being ‘plunged into crisis’, and there were particular concerns about lower-league clubs’ ability to survive, as they depended upon selling key players higher up the leagues. Would players ever transfer before the end of their contract, or simply let their deals run down and move for free, in the knowledge their new club would save money on transfer fees, and have more to spend on wages? The power had shifted dramatically from clubs to players.
The greatest impact, though, wasn’t on contracts but on freedom of movement – teams could now field an unlimited number of foreigners. The ECJ ruling was made in December and took effect immediately, which meant leagues were forced to change their rules midway through the season, inevitably causing controversy. In Germany Bundesliga clubs formulated a gentleman’s agreement not to exceed the previous three-foreigner limit for the rest of the campaign, but in England things changed immediately.
Less than a fortnight after the ruling Manchester City became the first English side to field four foreigners in the same team, using midfielders Georgi Kinkladze and Ronnie Ekelund from Georgia and Denmark respectively, plus two Germans – goalkeeper Eike Immel and striker Uwe Rösler – in a 2–0 defeat at champions Blackburn Rovers on 26 December. Indeed, Boxing Day proved a significant day in the history of foreign players in the Premier League, as it was exactly four years between the first time a Premier League team fielded four foreigners, in 1995, and the first time a Premier League team fielded 11 foreigners, in 1999, as if British players’ tendency to overload on turkey and stuffing meant they were more likely to miss the following day’s action.
Not everyone fully adjusted. Former Nottingham Forest manager Frank Clark recalls a scene ahead of a UEFA Cup tie against Lyon, when captain Stuart Pearce was delivering a pre-match rallying cry. Psycho was inevitably punching the air while roaring at his teammates, ‘We’re going to win, because we’re English!’ ‘The factual inaccuracy of the statement didn’t seem to occur to Stuart,’ Clark said. ‘I’m not sure if it occurred to his Norwegian, Dutch, Italian, Scottish, Welsh and Irish teammates, but if it did, none of them seemed in much of a hurry to point out his mistake.’
The sudden
introduction of foreign players, more than any other single factor, changed English football. The introduction of Italian, French and Dutch players, in particular, throughout the 1990s enabled English football to embrace different roles, positions and styles, encouraging managers to think outside boxy 4–4–2 formations. The introduction of continental number 10s had provided more attacking flair, but now teams were evolving stylistically all over the pitch.
Certain countries simply produced an entirely different type of player in particular positions. Brazil, for example, was renowned for its attack-minded full-backs, and there was a dramatic change when the tough-tackling, old-school Arsenal left-back Nigel Winterburn was replaced by the dynamic, overlapping Silvinho, who was briefly fantastic and voted into the PFA Team of the Year before departing under a cloud following speculation about an illegitimate passport. He proved his quality in Spain, however, enjoying a successful spell with Barcelona.
The best examples of elegant centre-backs in the 1990s, too, were foreign. There was Belgian Philippe Albert, who starred in Newcastle’s 1995/96 title challenge and famously rounded off the 5–0 victory over Manchester United in 1996 with a stupendous chip over Schmeichel. There was also Gheorghe Popescu, who enjoyed a sole season at Tottenham. He was a centre-back but also capable of playing in midfield, and stormed forward into attack when required, scoring the winner in a north London derby against Arsenal when popping up as a centre-forward. He also scored a fine goal against Newcastle, showing tremendous composure in possession, shuffling past a challenge and playing a one-two before firing home. He spent only a year in England, but was another who left for Barcelona.
One of the first genuine deep-lying playmakers was Emerson, the Brazilian who played for Middlesbrough at the same time as Juninho. Emerson was hugely talented, boasting great authority in possession, and was capable of spreading play to the flanks with long diagonal balls. He had a troubled time in England, mainly because his wife flew back to Brazil and refused to return to the north-east, which led to a bizarre stand-off when Emerson remained in Rio de Janeiro mid-season, saying he would happily quit football to remain with his wife. He eventually returned and was yet another who interested Barcelona – their coach, Bobby Robson, had worked with him at Porto – although he went on to join Tenerife and then La Liga champions Deportivo La Coruña. He played just 41 times and offered little lasting legacy, but his passing range was unlike anything else in English football at the time.
