by Michael Cox
The deepest midfield role had changed, particularly as managers increasingly used three central midfielders in an attempt to dominate that zone, leaving only one player up front. It meant responsibilities were different, and managers wanted a holding midfielder who never advanced from in front of the defence. ‘I would never have been the classic sitting midfielder like Claude Makélélé – he wouldn’t budge,’ Keane wrote in his autobiography, while Vieira said his teammate Gilberto was ‘a holding midfielder like Makélélé … that enabled me push forward more’. Neither Vieira nor Keane was quite as defensive as Makélélé.
In fact the simple term ‘defensive midfielder’ didn’t do Makélélé’s role justice; he was described as a ‘holding midfielder’, a ‘sitting midfielder’, a ‘screening player’, all of which implied his role was based around positioning and protecting rather than simply tackling. And then, eventually, it just became the ‘Makélélé role’ – a position in itself – an extremely rare honour. The surprising aspect of Makélélé’s position, however, is that he started playing the Makélélé role – the sole holding midfielder at the base of a trio or a diamond – very late in his career. Far from it being his natural position, Makélélé essentially dropped deeper and sacrificed himself for the team in the autumn of his career, precisely what Vieira and Keane were unable to do.
Makélélé started at Nantes, winning Ligue 1 in 1995. He was a winger notable for regularly slaloming past opposition challenges, and later become an industrious midfielder on the right of a diamond, somewhat reminiscent of future Chelsea midfielder Ramires, being about energy rather than positional discipline. Although not prolific, registering nine goals in 169 games, those strikes were often excellent, slamming the ball home from tight angles. However, future World Cup-winning winger Christian Karembeu played at right-back and pushed forward regularly, so Makélélé would drop back and cover.
After a sole season with Marseille, where he played a similar role, Makélélé moved to Spanish side Celta Vigo in 1998. Here he was deployed in a central role alongside disciplined Brazilian World Cup winner Mazinho. His solid positioning meant Makélélé could break forward more, but he also trained the Frenchman in the art of the holding midfield position. ‘It’s Mazinho who opened up the spirit of this new role,’ Makélélé recalled. ‘I spent hours working with Mazinho, him explaining the correct positions to take up, when to play one touch and two touches.’ The Brazilian was on his last legs, however, and in Makélélé’s second season he generally played alongside Albert Celades. Celta produced some incredible performances in the UEFA Cup that year, recording a staggering 7–0 win over Benfica and thrashing Juventus 4–0, particularly impressive considering both victories were against European Cup-winning managers, Jupp Heynckes and Marcello Lippi. Makélélé scored in both, including after just 27 seconds against Juve; he was clearly not yet a pure holding midfielder.
In 2000 Real Madrid surprisingly sold Fernando Redondo, the outstanding defensive midfielder of his era, to AC Milan and replaced him with Celta’s midfield partnership – both Makélélé and Celades – plus Deportivo’s defensive midfielder Flávio Conceição. During his three years at Real Makélélé would become renowned as the club’s most important player; behind Real’s expensively assembled galácticos – Zinedine Zidane, Luís Figo, Ronaldo, Raúl – Makélélé was the responsible midfielder who sat deep. Real’s manager Vicente del Bosque told Makélélé he had the perfect skill set to be both the ‘first defender and the first attacking midfielder’, a neat summary of his dual role.
Contrary to popular belief, however, Makélélé wasn’t on his own. A false picture has developed of Real attacking with seven players, leaving Makélélé to protect the centre-backs by himself. Realistically, that wasn’t remotely true. In Makélélé’s 95 league starts for Real Madrid, on 76 occasions he was deployed alongside another disciplined defensive midfielder – Ivan Helguera (36 times), Conceição (19), Esteban Cambiasso (12), Celades (7) or Fernando Hierro (2). Only 17 times was Makélélé the only defensive midfielder, and even then it was often in home matches against inferior opposition where it was natural to play a more creative midfielder, such as Guti or Steve McManaman, alongside him.
It’s significant that Makélélé later named Helguera, such a defensive-minded midfielder that he was sometimes deployed at centre-back, as his favourite teammate. ‘He knew where I’d move on the pitch, I’d know when he was going to push up and try to score,’ Makélélé said. ‘We didn’t even need to talk, just a look was enough to know what the other was going to do.’ Makélélé appreciated playing alongside a similarly minded partner, but was gradually deployed more on his own in front of the defence. Sometimes he was paired with Santi Solari, naturally a left-sided player who would drift wide to cover for Roberto Carlos’s forward runs, leaving Makélélé alone in the centre. But Makélélé had not yet defined his eponymous role.
His 2003 transfer to Chelsea was the point at which Real’s obsession with superstars spiralled out of control. Makélélé complained he was paid considerably less than his more illustrious teammates, but President Florentino Pérez had little interest in keeping him at the club, and upon the Frenchman’s departure, memorably told the press, ‘We will not miss Makélélé. His technique is average; he lacks the speed and skill to take the ball past opponents, and ninety per cent of his distribution either goes backwards or sideways. He wasn’t a header of the ball and he rarely passed the ball more than three metres.’ Unknowingly, Pérez was describing the Makélélé role, rather than his skill set – those who recalled his Nantes days remembered his all-round ability. His former teammates were bemused at his departure and the arrival of David Beckham. ‘Why put another layer of gold paint on the Bentley,’ Zidane asked, ‘when you are losing the entire engine?’
Real had won La Liga in Makélélé’s final campaign, but slumped to fourth without him. Their problem, as much as his departure in itself, was that the club essentially went from playing two holding midfielders, Makélélé alongside Flavio Conceição or Cambiasso in 2002/03, to frequently fielding none in 2003/04, with Beckham deployed alongside the creative Guti. It wouldn’t have been so problematic had Real realised Cambiasso’s qualities, and it’s interesting that Real later tried to sign both Vieira in 2004 and Keane in 2005. Real clearly wanted a combative but energetic midfielder in that mould, and later, bizarrely, ended up signing Everton’s Thomas Gravesen. This was peculiar for two reasons: first, Gravesen was well below the standard required for Real Madrid and, second, he wasn’t a holding midfielder either, being accustomed to a more advanced role. ‘It is totally different to my Everton role,’ Gravesen admitted after joining Real and being played in the deepest midfield position. ‘Lee Carsley was playing where I do here.’ It seemed Real had mixed up their bald Everton central midfielders.
Real’s loss was Chelsea’s gain, but it’s worth reiterating that by this stage Makélélé was already 30 and had played 11 full seasons of top-level football, often as an energetic midfielder forced to get through lots of running. He was now ready to play a more defined, solid, defensive midfield role, which worked particularly well considering the nature of Chelsea’s squad. In his first summer Abramovich had already signed attacking midfielders Damien Duff, Joe Cole and Juan Sebastian Verón, plus strikers Adrian Mutu and Hernán Crespo. There were some more functional, defensive players too: Glen Johnson, Geremi and Wayne Bridge, but no proper holding midfielder. Brian Clough summarised the situation neatly. ‘I’d love to know who’s going to do all the fetching and carrying for all these glamorous, over-priced internationals who love to bomb forward yet can’t tackle their dinner, never mind a ball,’ he said. ‘Verón, Cole and Duff won’t get their hands dirty doing the donkey work.’
That, of course, was before the arrival of Makélélé, who effectively solved the problem overnight. ‘I have a fantastic watch and Claude is my battery,’ said his new manager Claudio Ranieri, before, significantly, referring to him as ‘one of the bes
t, if not the best, playmakers in the world’. Ranieri never considered him a purely defensive player.
Makélélé made his first Premier League start in a 5–0 away victory at Wolves, playing in a 4–4–2 system alongside Frank Lampard, with Jesper Grønkjær and Damien Duff out wide. His defensive-minded positioning in this system was obvious, to the extent that, after Chelsea’s narrow 2–1 victory over Middlesbrough with the same midfield quartet, one newspaper described it as a 4–1–1–2–2 formation: Makélélé sitting in front of the defence and allowing Lampard to break forward. But this left Lampard overrun, and Makélélé wasn’t suited to playing in a flat four-man midfield. The Frenchman looked more comfortable when Ranieri played a diamond, which allowed him to remain in front of the defence but also afforded Lampard a proper midfield partner. When combative central midfielder Scott Parker arrived from Charlton in January 2004, he was often deployed on the right of a notional four-man midfield, but tucked inside to create a midfield trio with Makélélé and Lampard, leaving the right flank bare. This lopsided system worked much better, as Makélélé was allowed to sit deep.
When José Mourinho replaced Ranieri in the summer, he interrupted Makélélé’s holiday by phoning him to emphasise his importance to his Chelsea side. Mourinho used the two systems he’d developed at Porto: a midfield diamond and a 4–3–3, which both necessitated a strict holding midfielder in Makélélé’s mould. Opposition midfielders struggled to cope with Makélélé’s positioning – they couldn’t close him down without leaving a more advanced Chelsea midfielder free – and it was the positioning rather than Makélélé’s individual brilliance that proved crucial.
Makélélé managed just two goals in 144 Premier League games – one a rebound from his own saved penalty – and only four assists. But he unquestionably played a crucial role in starting Chelsea’s attacks. While his Real Madrid role was purely defensive – all about covering for midfield runs and protecting the defence – that was less obvious at Chelsea, a defensive side who got numbers behind the ball quickly and remained compact. Instead he was crucial in possession, which is strange because he was an entirely unfussy, reserved distributor – there were no sudden dribbles into attack, and few diagonal balls or killer passes. He simply held his position, mopped up and then passed the ball sideways. But this was vital, as Mourinho outlined.
‘Look, if I have a triangle in midfield – Claude Makélélé behind and two others just in front – I will always have an advantage against a pure 4–4–2 where the central midfielders are side by side,’ he explained. ‘That’s because I will always have an extra man. It starts with Makélélé, who is between the lines. If nobody comes to him he can see the whole pitch and has time. If he gets closed down it means one of the two other central midfielders is open. If they are closed down and the other team’s wingers come inside to help, it means there is space now for us on the flank, either for our own wingers or for our full-backs. There is nothing a pure 4–4–2 can do to stop things.’ It was as simple as that, and literally about the Makélélé role, rather than Makélélé himself.
Makélélé, though, insists his technical skill set and history as an attacking midfielder ensured he was a different type of deep-lying midfielder. ‘As a former winger I know how to make attackers feel confident,’ he said, and he also believed the major difference between him and previous holding midfielders was simply that he was better in possession. ‘People spoke of the “Makélélé role” to describe the modern, ball-recovering midfielder. But in fact, I didn’t invent anything. I am perhaps better technically and tactically than the old defensive midfielders of the 80s and 90s, like Luis Fernández, Franck Sauzée or Didier Deschamps, but I don’t do anything radically different to what they did, I am simply a more complete footballer,’ Makélélé insisted. ‘I think rather that the game has changed and that, to be a top-level player in any position, you now have to know how to keep the ball, give precise passes and contribute to each phase of a move. It is no longer enough to be good in the air or tough in the tackle to carve out a place for yourself as a midfielder. You have to be a multifaceted footballer.’
This is a fascinating analysis, because many would claim Makélélé was, in fact, the complete antithesis of a universal player. Legendary Milan coach Arrigo Sacchi, for example, the great champion of universality, specifically highlighted Makélélé as an anti-universal player. ‘In my football, the playmaker is whoever had the ball,’ he said. ‘But if you have Makélélé, he can’t do that. He doesn’t have the ideas to do it, although of course he’s great at winning the ball. It’s become all about specialists.’ That underestimated his role. Although Makélélé wasn’t launching pinpoint diagonal passes like Andrea Pirlo or Xabi Alonso, he played between the opposition lines of midfield and attack, found space to pull the strings and delivered crisp, effective passes into attacking players.
Because Makélélé was essentially playing between the opposition lines there’s a similarity to the way his compatriot Eric Cantona redefined centre-forward play – even if their level of artistry is significantly different – and teams needed to cope with Makélélé in a similar manner. Conventional wisdom suggested the natural order of things was simple – the defensive midfielder marked the opposition’s attacking midfielder. But Makélélé became so influential that a literal role reversal occurred, and managers realised they needed their attacking midfielder to man-mark Chelsea’s defensive midfielder. The best example came in March 2006, when Fulham manager Chris Coleman masterminded a 1–0 victory over Chelsea by deploying playmaker Steed Malbranque at the top of a diamond to stop Makélélé. ‘Every time we play against Chelsea and every time we’ve watched them play, everything goes through Makélélé and he starts the attacks,’ Coleman said. ‘Malbranque loves playing in that position. We told him to go where he liked when he had the ball but, as soon as he didn’t have it, Makélélé was his man. We wanted Petr Čech to kick it rather than pass it out, and it worked very well.’
Fulham went ahead early through Luís Boa Morte, and their dominance was so complete that Mourinho made two substitutions, purely for tactical reasons, after just 25 minutes – the Premier League’s earliest-ever double change. Wingers Joe Cole and Shaun Wright-Phillips were sacrificed in favour of Damien Duff and Didier Drogba as Chelsea matched Fulham’s system. ‘José started with 4–3–3 and changed very early,’ Coleman continued. ‘He gave Crespo a bit of support with Drogba, brought Duff on and matched us up in midfield, which was a compliment. It was going well for us so we didn’t need to change.’ Chelsea subsequently used a 3–5–2 system in the second half in an attempt to launch a fightback – so it was two dramatic changes of system, almost exclusively because Fulham had successfully stopped Makélélé. Post-match discussion focused on ugly scenes at Craven Cottage, with rival supporters fighting on the pitch after full-time, but Fulham’s first win against their local rivals since 1979 was hugely significant. Because it owed so much to a naturally attacking player performing such a strict defensive role, it emphasised the need for footballers to increasingly become all-rounders.
Just as Cantona had prompted a wave of copycats, other top-level Premier League teams started searching for their Makélélé. But it was notable that, having realised how much time in possession the Frenchman enjoyed, they turned to naturally more attack-minded midfielders. A curious phenomenon in the mid-2000s was the so-called Big Four all buying promising young attacking midfielders, but converting them into defensive midfielders.
The classic example was Liverpool’s purchase of Lucas Leiva. The Brazilian was signed from Grêmio in 2007 and was renowned as an exciting all-round midfielder with an eye for goal. He was the youngest-ever winner of the Bola de Ouro, for the best player in the Brazilian championship, and helped Brazil to glory at the South American U20 Championships that year, scoring four goals in nine appearances. ‘He can play as a holding midfielder but he can also get from box to box,’ said Liverpool manager Rafael Benítez upon his arrival. ‘So
I am looking forward to seeing him score goals for Liverpool in the future.’ One goal in over 200 Premier League games underlines the fact he was deployed exclusively in a defensive role.
South American football is played at a slow pace, and it was felt that Lucas lacked the requisite speed to thrive as an attacking midfielder in the Premier League. ‘This choice to play more defensively was a way for me to feel more comfortable,’ he explained. ‘It suits my characteristics and also those of the Premier League. Of course, it’s cooler to play closer to the attack, but in a defensive role I believe I can offer more to the team.’ Lucas was heavily criticised for his lack of ambition in possession, however, and while there was evidence of his experience as a more attacking player in the way he worked tirelessly finding space to receive the ball, his transformation into a holding midfielder robbed him of his creativity.
Arsenal and Manchester United experienced something extremely similar with the midfield pairing who took Brazil to South American U17 Championships glory in 2005 and reached the World U17 Championships Final later that year. Arsenal signed the captain, Denilson, who was considered ‘somewhere between Gilberto and Tomáš Rosický’ by Arsène Wenger upon his arrival. Yet after being introduced to the side in an all-round midfield role, Denilson was eventually played in a pure defensive midfield position by Wenger, again frustrating supporters with his unambitious distribution but also receiving criticism for his lack of defensive skills.
