by Michael Cox
In midfield, Matić and Oscar rarely advanced and instead moved to slightly wider positions, protecting the space the full-backs would generally defend, while Kanté sometimes dropped deep between the two centre-backs. At the start of the season, therefore, Conte’s system was peculiarly like Guardiola’s in possession: effectively a front five, supported by two players in unusual, wide-ish midfield roles, a holding player shuttling between defence and midfield, and two centre-backs spreading wide. Conte and Guardiola were trying to form the same system, a 2–3–5/3–2–5, in two entirely different ways.
Chelsea started 2016/17 slowly, however, with unconvincing victories over West Ham, Watford and Burnley, a draw at Swansea and then defeats in their first major tests against Liverpool and Arsenal, when they were completely outplayed. Against Liverpool they sat extraordinarily deep without possession, another classic Chelsea tactic, and the following weekend at the Emirates Conte attempted to use a more advanced defensive line, but his centre-backs and Kanté were completely destroyed by the counter-attacking speed of Alexis Sánchez and Mesut Özil, with Chelsea 3–0 down by half-time.
Ten minutes into second half, with the game already lost, Conte decided to experiment. He substituted Fàbregas, making his first league start of the campaign after a fine midweek performance in the League Cup, and introduced debutant Marcos Alonso, a surprising signing considering he’d previously performed at left-back in the Premier League with little distinction for Bolton and Sunderland. But Alonso had played left-wing-back for Fiorentina and was signed precisely for that purpose by Chelsea. This substitution meant Conte’s side switched from 4–3–3 to 3–4–3.
It was difficult to decide whether Chelsea performed better after the switch, with Arsenal out of sight and concentrating on killing the game, but that substitution proved the most crucial moment in Chelsea’s season. From that point on Chelsea played 3–4–3, with the most consistent starting XI in the Premier League, and embarked on a truly extraordinary run of results. It seemed that the best recipe for a title challenge was an early-season three-goal defeat to Arsenal: a 5–2 loss for Leicester on 26 September 2015 had encouraged Claudio Ranieri to change system, and now Chelsea’s 3–0 defeat at Arsenal on 24 September 2016 forced Conte to do exactly the same.
It wasn’t entirely surprising that Conte turned to a three-man defence, as he’d previously been associated with that system at Juventus and with the Italian national team. Although he started his spell at Juve playing a 4–4–2 – with such attack-minded wingers that Italians often considered it a 4–2–4 – the fact that he could depend upon three top-class centre-backs in Giorgio Chiellini, Leonardo Bonucci and Andrea Barzagli meant that he switched to 3–5–2; when he took the Italy job after three years in Turin he was counting upon the same defensive trio, and so he used the same system.
It’s also worth considering, meanwhile, that Conte adopted his three-man defence in Serie A having witnessed outsiders Udinese and Napoli breaking into the Champions League places with extremely impressive three-man defences. Those clubs’ managers during that period – Francesco Guidolin and Walter Mazzarri – also took charge of Premier League clubs in 2016, Guidolin at Swansea and Mazzarri at Watford. Guidolin seldom played a three-man defence, but Mazzarri usually did.
‘We started the season with another system, but I noticed in some circumstances we didn’t have the right balance,’ Conte said. ‘For this reason we switched to the new system of 3–4–3, and I think this is a good fit for our squad because we have the forwards adapted for this system. I thought it would improve us offensively as well as defensively … I always knew the squad could play with this 3–4–3 system. In my mind there was always this possibility; I knew the characteristic of the players and for this reason when I spoke to the club and we planned the season, this system was an alternative.’
Chelsea won their next 13 games using the 3–4–3 system – the first six without conceding – narrowly failing to break Arsenal’s 2002 record of 14 consecutive wins in the Premier League. Chelsea were excellently drilled in their new system thanks to unusually long periods in training working on team shape. Indeed, Conte had the advantage, like Brendan Rodgers’ Liverpool in 2013/14 and Claudio Ranieri’s Leicester in 2015/16 (and Conte himself in his debut season at the helm at Juventus in 2011/12), of having no European football to contend with, which meant more coaching time on the training ground. ‘Defensively we all work as a unit in training,’ said right-wing-back Victor Moses. ‘Every day in training, the manager is on top of us to make sure we are solid at the back.’
The new system suited Conte’s players much better. There were crucial changes in personnel: David Luiz, surprisingly re-signed from Paris Saint-Germain, played the free role at the heart of the defence impeccably, transforming from laughing stock to among the division’s most impressive centre-backs and Chelsea’s defensive leader. ‘The central defender must be more tactical, reflect more, find the right position and call the defensive line up and down,’ explained Conte. The Brazilian did that excellently, and was perfectly suited to the three-man defence.
On the right, Moses finally became a Chelsea regular, having spent the previous three seasons out on loan. He adapted impressively to the wing-back role, which meant Azpilicueta dropped deeper to become one of the three defenders. It was notable that the two major victims were Chelsea’s two most immobile defenders, John Terry and Bransilav Ivanović, as this new shape depended heavily upon covering ground quickly. Oscar also found himself jettisoned and departed for China, while Fàbregas had even less chance of breaking into the two-man midfield. Kanté increasingly showcased his incredible energy, but he and Matić rarely advanced into attack.
The funny thing about the change in system, however, was that in possession it wasn’t entirely different to Chelsea’s previous shape. There was still the front five, with Alonso and Moses pushing forward either side of Eden Hazard, Diego Costa and Pedro Rodríguez, with two solid midfielders, two centre-backs and another player, David Luiz, playing in between defence and midfield. But Chelsea achieved that shape more naturally, were less vulnerable to counter-attacks and had players with much greater mobility in defensive positions. Hazard, Chelsea’s key attacker, was allowed almost complete freedom from defensive responsibilities, and having a naturally overlapping player in Alonso granted him licence to drift inside into his favoured central positions. Pedro, meanwhile, played higher up the pitch and ran in behind the opposition more frequently, as he did so menacingly in his Barcelona days. Costa was the only player who found his role unchanged.
It was also notable that Conte found the right balance in the ‘in-between’ positions that English teams struggled with when switching from a four-man defence to a three-man defence. Should the wide defenders be natural centre-backs or natural full-backs? In Cahill and Azpilicueta, Conte had one of each. Should the wing-backs be natural full-backs or natural wingers? Again, in Alonso and Moses, he had one of each. In that sense Chelsea’s system was slightly unbalanced in terms of style, but the structure of the side was impeccable.
Opponents struggled to cope with Chelsea’s system, particularly when they formed a front five. It was notable how frequently either of Chelsea’s wing-backs would find themselves entirely unmarked at the far post when the opposition full-back had been sucked inside – the five-against-four situation was constantly obvious, and Alonso and Moses contributed a surprising number of open-play goals.
To guard against that five-against-four situation, many managers started matching Chelsea’s system. In early November Everton manager Ronald Koeman was the first to attempt it, although it backfired dramatically as Chelsea’s wide forwards counter-attacked in behind Everton’s wing-backs. Koeman was forced to revert to a back four before half-time, and Chelsea eventually ran out 5–0 winners.
Chelsea’s most memorable victory of the season was the crucial 3–1 victory at Manchester City in early December. This was perhaps the most complex tactical battle the Premier Le
ague has ever witnessed, with Guardiola deploying a bizarre 3–2–4–1 system to dominate midfield and press Chelsea’s wing-backs, but leaving his three defenders exposed to Chelsea’s front three.
In truth, Chelsea could have easily lost this game. Gary Cahill clumsily diverted Jesús Navas’s right-wing cross into his own net, and the outstanding Kevin De Bruyne should have doubled City’s lead against his former club, somehow hitting the bar when presented with an open goal. But Chelsea stormed back and scored three goals that took advantage of City’s lack of defensive numbers. Costa brought down a long ball, outmuscled Nicolas Otamendi and smashed home, and shortly afterwards turned Otamendi and played in the onrushing Willian for goal number two. In stoppage time Hazard streaked away from Aleksandar Kolarov and finished coolly. On each occasion Chelsea needed only one attacker to beat his direct opponent to get in on goal, which was why matching Chelsea’s back three was such a gamble.
Nevertheless, City should have won that contest, and the first team to overcome Chelsea’s 3–4–3 – indeed, the first to avoid defeat – were Mauricio Pochettino’s Tottenham in January. Spurs also played 3–4–3, and excellently exploited the weaknesses in Chelsea’s three-man defence with two identical goals. Christian Eriksen took advantage of Cahill’s lack of mobility to find a pocket of space just outside him (Cahill had previously been booked for fouling the Dane and was reluctant to come out from his defensive position), and twice crossed to the far post where Dele Alli took advantage of his height advantage over Azpilicueta to head home both goals.
3–4–3 seemed the best way to contain Chelsea’s 3–4–3, and the more that teams that switched to 3–4–3, the more their opponents felt compelled to respond. On the weekend of 14–15 January, no fewer than eight sides played a three-man defence. Chelsea, Tottenham, Hull, West Ham and Everton all won, Watford and Middlesbrough drew with each other, while only Leicester, up against Conte’s rampant Chelsea, lost.
Considering that five years earlier only one side in the Premier League – Roberto Martinez’s Wigan – regularly played a three-man defence, this was a dramatic turnaround. In the intervening period Brendan Rodgers, Louis van Gaal and Mauricio Pochettino, among others, had all experimented with a back three, but no one made it work as effectively as Conte. Of course, there had been a brief craze of 3–5–2 systems in the mid-1990s, but not since Harry Catterick’s Everton in 1952/53 had a team won the English top flight with a three-man defence. Therefore, Conte ended half a century of flat-back-four dominance.
‘I think in England something is changing because there are different coaches from different countries and they are bringing new, different ideas, and new methods and new philosophies of football,’ said Conte. This had been the case for a quarter of a century, however. From Cantona to Conte, the Premier League’s evolution has depended almost entirely upon foreign influence.
Postscript
The Premier League’s 25th season took place alongside the most significant political event in Britain for decades.
In June 2016 the British electorate surprisingly voted to leave the European Union. This was more than simply a background development, and it threatened serious ramifications for English football. The explosion in the number of foreign players in the late 1990s was prompted by the Bosman case, which ruled that football’s restrictions were in breach of EU laws and forced immediate and significant change. Once Britain was outside the EU, however, English football could reintroduce quotas.
It took only three months for Labour MP Andy Burnham to raise the issue. ‘Could Brexit mean that English football takes a step away from the European directives with relation to free movement in sport?’ he asked. ‘Could we look at introducing a quota for our homegrown players, so that the Premier League doesn’t become a playground for the world’s best talent but, actually, we make sure that we bring through more English and homegrown players in our domestic league? I think that’s a debate that is worth having … the question is: can you have both, can you have the best league in the world and the most successful international team?’
Implicit in Burnham’s question was the acknowledgement that the presence of so many foreign imports had improved the Premier League. ‘A playground for the world’s best talent’ was used in a negative sense, but is exactly the type of phrase that could feature in a pre-season Sky advertisement, complete with a ‘back to school’ theme.
Of the various figures charted throughout this story of the Premier League’s tactical evolution, perhaps there are only two genuine British revolutionaries: Rio Ferdinand and Brendan Rodgers. Ferdinand changed centre-back play and Rodgers championed possession football at Swansea. Yet Ferdinand was told by Kevin Keegan he’d have a better chance of international caps ‘if he was French, Brazilian or Dutch’, and Rodgers consistently underlined his love for Spanish and Dutch football. The Premier League’s evolution has almost solely been about foreign influence.
The other significant event of summer 2016 was purely footballing: the European Championships. This tournament, held in France, was widely considered underwhelming, with few intriguing matches and barely any memorable moments. The lack of tactical variety was particularly problematic, and it’s significant that the tournament’s two overachievers were arguably the only sides who played unusual systems – winners Portugal deployed a midfield diamond and no true centre-forward, while semi-finalists Wales used a 3–4–2–1. Otherwise it was disappointingly homogeneous. In a post-tournament survey of its readers by When Saturday Comes magazine, two-thirds of respondents agreed that ‘many games were samey.’ This is a damning indictment of an international tournament intended to be a multicultural jamboree of contrasting football styles. It’s supposed to be about the technique of Spain, the discipline of Italy, the efficiency of Germany, the tactical inadequacy of England. Instead, everyone played in roughly the same way.
But the 2016/17 edition of the Premier League was its most stylistically diverse campaign ever. At one stage, in early February, the top nine in the Premier League were, incredibly, led by managers from nine different nations: Italy, Argentina, Spain, France, Germany, Portugal, Holland, Wales and Croatia. To varying extents, these managers represented their country’s traditional playing styles. The Premier League was as stylistically diverse as, or perhaps even more than, the European Championships. The obvious absence from that list, of course, was England.
But the Premier League retains a distinct English identity. Pep Guardiola was shocked by the emphasis upon ‘second balls’ in the Premier League. This is a distinctly English phenomenon, but with so few English players and managers, why has it remained? The players don’t naturally play in that style, the managers don’t encourage it.
It’s about the environment, rather than the footballing personnel. We’re approaching 10,000 Premier League matches, and all have been played in England or Wales. This is significant, because Britain provides certain crucial characteristics that influence football. Most obviously, there’s the climate – this is decidedly colder than in the majority of other top-class European countries, which allows for a faster style of play. And although there’s been a great improvement over the last couple of decades, England and Wales’s wetter weather also means pitches are boggier, which encourages more balls to be played in the air.
English officials are more lenient than any in Europe – to the extent that, in Italy, a referee who allows strong tackles without punishment is literally referred to as a ‘very English’ referee. This, of course, means that flair players find it more difficult to work their magic in England, and rudimentary defenders can intimidate through physicality.
Most importantly there are the supporters, who continue to represent English football identity by celebrating things their European counterparts don’t. No one else cheers the winning of a corner like English fans, because it’s an opportunity to launch the ball into the penalty box. There’s a load roar for a thundering tackle and an enthusiastic round of applause whenever a team switch
es play from one flank to the other. You never hear that for a straight, penetrative pass – despite the fact they are, in the modern age, much more valuable. There’s still a good helping of ‘traditional’ English grounds, which foreign imports often remark upon as being intimidating and creating a particularly fiery atmosphere.
But many of these factors may become less relevant, because at some point in its second 25 years, the Premier League will surely play matches abroad. Since 1992 the division has evolved from battling against other sports for a British sporting audience, to battling other football leagues for a global football audience, to battling against other sports for a global sporting audience. The world’s two major sports leagues are now the Premier League and the NFL, with both experiencing a recent surge of popularity from the ‘wrong’ side of the Atlantic.
While the NFL has played a succession of matches in London, mainly at Wembley, the Premier League hasn’t yet ventured abroad, but sports bars in New York and other major cities are packed with fans watching ‘EPL’ action. There’s a huge market in the US – and across the world – for the Premier League to take advantage of. The idea for a ‘game 39’ – an extra Premier League fixture for every side, played abroad – entirely undermines the simple structure of playing each league opponent twice. Every club playing one ‘home’ game abroad, however, seems inevitable, and could increase dramatically over time. Playing matches abroad would compromise many of the Premier League’s ‘English’ ingredients. The climate would inevitably be variable. The stadiums would be different, probably with fans further from the pitch. The level of support would be hugely impressive in numbers, but almost certainly not as cohesive and vocal as traditional home matches.
