CHAPTER XVIII. HOW A FREE GOVERNMENT CAN BE MAINTAINED IN CORRUPT CITIES IF IT EXISTS THERE ALREADY; OR, HOW TO ESTABLISH IT THERE IF IT DOES NOT ALREADY EXIST
I believe that it is not outside my subject, nor would it be contrary to the above discourse, to consider whether or not one can maintain a free government in a corrupt city if it already exists there, or whether or not one can be established there in the event that it does not already exist. Concerning this, let me say that it is very difficult to do either the one or the other, and although it is quite impossible to set up rules on the matter, for one would have to proceed according to the gradations of the corruption, nevertheless, since it is always good to discuss everything thoroughly, I shall not ignore this problem. And I shall assume that the city in question is totally corrupt, which will further increase the difficulty: for neither laws nor institutions are to be found which suffice to check a universal state of corruption. For just as good customs require laws in order to be maintained, so laws require good customs in order for them to be observed. Besides this, institutions and laws established in a republic at the time of its foundation, when men were good, are no longer acceptable later on when men have become evil; furthermore, if the laws in a city vary according to circumstances, then its institutions never or rarely ever change: because of this, new laws are not enough, for the institutions which remain intact corrupt them. And in order to make this point clearer, let me say that in Rome there was an established government, or rather an established form of the state, and then came laws which, along with the magistrates, kept the citizens in check. The state was based upon the authority of the people, the senate, the tribunes, and the consuls, and upon the means of selecting and creating the magistrates and of making the laws. These institutions changed very little or not at all, according to the course of events. The laws restraining the citizens began to change; for example, the law against adultery, the law against luxuries, the one against ambition, and many others, all of which were instituted as the citizens gradually grew more corrupt. But since the institutions of the state remained fixed and were no longer good because of corruption, the laws that were changed did not suffice to keep men good; but they would have helped very much if the institutions had been changed along with the change in the laws.
And that it is true that such institutions in a corrupt city were not good is most evident in two important instances: in the appointment of the magistrates and in the creation of the laws. The Roman people gave the consulate or the other main offices of the city only to those citizens who asked for them. This institution was good at the beginning, for only those citizens who felt themselves worthy asked to have the offices, since being refused was considered a disgrace; thus, in order to be judged worthy every citizen behaved in an honorable fashion. This system subsequently became most pernicious in the corrupt city: for those who had the most power, not those who had the most ability, sought the magistracies; and although they were capable, the powerless refrained from asking for them out of fear. Rome did not come to this situation all at once, but rather by degrees, just as she came into all her other difficulties: for after the Romans had conquered Africa and Asia and had brought almost all of Greece under their control, they became secure in their freedom and felt that they had no more enemies capable of frightening them. This security, as well as the weakness of their enemies, caused the Roman people to consider favor rather than ability in choosing their consuls, and in so doing all those who knew best how to please men were attracted to that office, instead of those who knew best how to conquer the enemy; then, from those who enjoyed the most favor they descended to giving the office to those who had more power; and so, in this way, the good citizens, because of the faults of this institution, remained completely excluded from such offices. At one time a tribune or any other citizen could propose a law to the people and everyone was able to speak either for or against it before it was finally adopted. This institution was a good one so long as the citizens were good: for it was always beneficial for a citizen to be able to propose something he felt was for the public good; it was equally beneficial for everyone to be able to express his opinion on the proposal so that the people, after hearing them all, could then select the best one. But when the citizens became wicked, such an institution became most harmful: for only the powerful were proposing laws, not in the name of common liberty but rather for their own power, and no one spoke against these men because they feared them. In such a way, the people were deceived or forced into decreeing their own ruin.
It was therefore necessary, if Rome wished to maintain her liberty amidst her corruption, that just as she had passed new laws in the course of her existence, she should have then created new institutions: for different institutions and ways of living must be instituted for a bad subject than for a good one, nor can a similar form exist in material which is completely different. But since these institutions must either be reformed all at once the moment they are recognized as being bad or reformed little by little before they are generally recognized as such, let me say that both of these two approaches are almost impossible; for it takes a prudent man who can see defects from far off and in their initial stages in order to reform them gradually, and it is not common to find a man like this in a city; and when one is found, he may never be able to persuade others to follow what he himself understands; for men are accustomed to living in one way, and they do not want to change; and this is even more true when they cannot see the evil for themselves but have to have it explained to them by abstract arguments. As for reforming these institutions all at once, when everyone realizes that they are not good, let me say that this uselessness which is easily recognized is corrected only with difficulty; for to do this it is not enough to employ lawful means, for lawful methods are now useless; it is necessary to have recourse to extraordinary measures, such as violence or arms, and to become, before all else, prince of that city in order to be able to deal with it in one’s own way. But since the reforming of a city into a body politic presupposes a good man, and becoming prince of a republic through the use of violence presupposes an evil man—because of this fact we discover that it happens only very rarely that a good man wishes to become prince through evil means, even though his goal may be a good one; while, on the other hand, we discover that it is equally rare for an evil man who has become prince to act correctly, for it would never ever enter his mind to employ that authority for a good which he has acquired by evil means.
From all the above-mentioned things comes the difficulty or the impossibility of maintaining a government in a corrupt city or of establishing a new one there; if, nevertheless, one has to be set up or maintained in such a city, it must necessarily incline toward a monarchy rather than a popular government since those men who cannot be controlled by laws because of their insolence may be checked in some manner by a kind of regal power. And to try to make them become good by any other means would be either a most cruel undertaking or completely impossible, as I have said earlier when talking about Cleomenes. If he murdered the Ephors in order to rule alone, and if Romulus killed his brother and Titus Tatius, the Sabine, for the same reasons, and afterward they used this authority of theirs well, nevertheless one should remember that neither of them had a subject stained by that corruption which we have been discussing in this chapter, and therefore they had reason to hope and, in hoping, to justify their plan.
CHAPTER XIX. A WEAK PRINCE CAN MAINTAIN HIMSELF WHEN HE SUCCEEDS AN EXCELLENT PRINCE; BUT AFTER A WEAK PRINCE ONE CANNOT MAINTAIN ANY RULE WITH ANOTHER WEAK PRINCE
[Rome was fortunate in that the first three kings of the city—Romulus, Numa, and Tullus—were all excellent rulers and thus established a tradition of strong leadership ; in contrast, the virtues of David and Solomon were not enough to guarantee Rehoboam’s rule of Israel since he did not possess the qualities of his father and grandfather and therefore lost much of the kingdom they had acquired. As long as Rome was governed by kings, she ran the risk of being rui
ned by the succession of a weak or evil king.]
CHAPTER XX. TWO CONTINUOUS SUCCESSIONS OF ABLE PRINCES PRODUCE GREAT RESULTS; AND SINCE WELL-ORGANIZED REPUBLICS HAVE, OF NECESSITY, A SUCCESSION OF ABLE RULERS, THEIR GAINS AND GROWTH ARE ALSO GREAT
[If two successive able princes were sufficient to conquer the world, as occurred with Philip of Macedonia and his son, Alexander the Great, a republic has even greater potential, for it has the same power that Rome possessed when she vested her sovereign authority in the consuls, rather than in hereditary kings, to elect an infinite number of most able rulers, one after the other.]
CHAPTER XXI. WHAT GREAT BLAME A PRINCE OR A REPUBLIC WHICH LACKS ITS OWN ARMED FORCES DESERVES
[Princes and republics of modem times should be ashamed not to have their own troops. This is the result not of a lack of suitable men but rather of their own inability to train them. The proof of this can be found in a recent example of the King of England. He dared to attack the Kingdom of France, defended by the experienced, professional soldiers from the wars in Italy, with men he had trained himself because he had not neglected the arts of war in his well-organized kingdom, even after living for over thirty years in peacetime. Similar examples may be found in Tullus of Rome or in Pelopidas and Epaminondas of Thebes.]
CHAPTER XXII. WHAT IS NOTABLE IN THE CASE OF THE THREE ROMAN HORATII AND THE THREE ALBAN CURIATII
[With the survival of one of the Horatii and the victory of Rome over Alba, the victorious Horatius returned home to see his sister weeping over her dead husband (one of the Curiatii) and killed her in anger; for this crime he was tried and eventually set free. Three things should be noted here: (1) one should never risk everything on only a portion of one’s forces; (2) a man’s merits should never be used to balance his faults in a well-ordered city; (3) it is unwise to make agreements whose observance is doubtful. The first two points will be covered in successive chapters.]
CHAPTER XXIII. HOW ONE SHOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE ALL OF ONE’S FORTUNE OR ALL OF ONE’S FORCES; AND, FOR THIS REASON, GUARDING PASSES IS OFTEN DANGEROUS
[Risking their kingdoms on the combat of three men, as did Tullus, King of Rome, and Mettius, King of Alba, was the height of stupidity, since they lost the years of preparations former kings had made for their defense. This procedure is, in some respects, similar to the guarding of passes, for you may, at best, only prohibit the enemy from crossing the pass. But you cannot win a clear victory without the use of all your forces, since such locations lack sufficient space for an entire army and a loss at a defended pass may frighten your remaining troops. The Romans awaited Hannibal not at the passes but in the plains. Recently, in 1515, Francis, King of France, invaded Lombardy and captured Milan by coming into Italy not by those passes guarded by Swiss troops but by a different way.]
CHAPTER XXIV. WELL-ORDERED REPUBLICS ESTABLISH REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS FOR THEIR CITIZENS BUT NEVER BALANCE ONE WITH THE OTHER
[Although the merits of Horatius were great and served Rome well, his crime was atrocious; the Romans would have been wrong to balance his crime with his good deeds. A well-organized republic will reward good deeds and punish crimes without consideration of previous service ; such a city will enjoy its liberty for a long time, but if it acts otherwise it will lose its liberty.]
CHAPTER XXV. ONE SEEKING TO REFORM AN ESTABLISHED STATE IN A FREE CITY SHOULD RETAIN AT LEAST A SHADOW OF THE ANCIENT CUSTOMS
If one desires or intends to reform the government of a city so that the reform will be acceptable and will be able to maintain itself to everyone’s satisfaction, he should retain at least the shadow of ancient customs so that it will not seem to the people that they have changed institutions, whereas in actual fact the new institutions may be completely different from those of the past; for the majority of men delude themselves with what seems to be rather than with what actually is; indeed, they are more often moved by things that seem to be rather than by things that are. For this reason the Romans, recognizing this necessity at the foundation of their self-governing state, when they created two consuls instead of one king decided to have no more than twelve lictors so as not to exceed the number of those who served the king. Besides this, when an annual sacrifice was made in Rome it could only be offered by the king in person, and since they did not want the people to miss anything from their past customs because of the absence of the kings, the Romans created a leader for the said sacrifice, whom they called the King of the Sacrifice, and placed him under the command of the high priests. Thus, by this means the people grew satisfied with this sacrifice and never had reason to desire the return of the kings because of its absence. And this should be observed by all those who wish to abolish an ancient regime in a city and establish a new and free one: for, since new things disturb the minds of men, you should strive to see that these disturbing changes retain as much of the ancient regime as possible; and if the number, authority, and length of office of the magistrates change, they should at least retain their title. And, as I have said, anyone who wishes to institute a political regime, whether it be by way of a republic or a kingdom, should observe this; but anyone who wishes to create an absolute rule (called a tyranny by ancient historians) ought to make everything anew, as will be explained in the next chapter.
CHAPTER XXVI. A NEW PRINCE, IN A CITY OR PROVINCE HE HAS TAKEN, SHOULD MAKE EVERYTHING OVER ANEW
For anyone becoming a prince either of a city or a state, especially if his foundations are weak and he does not choose either a republican or a monarchical form of government, the best means he can use to hold that principality—if he is a new prince—is to begin everything in that state anew; that is, to establish new rulers with new names, new authority, and new men; to make the rich poor and the poor rich, as David did when he became king, who “hath filled the hungry with good things; and the rich he hath sent empty away.”31 Besides this, he should build new cities, destroy existing ones, move the inhabitants from one place to another, in short, leave nothing intact in that province, nor permit either rank, institution, form of government, or wealth in your city which is not recognized as coming from you; and he should choose as his example Philip of Macedonia, the father of Alexander the Great, who by such means rose from being a petty king to become the ruler of Greece. Those who write of him say that he transferred men from province to province just as shepherds move their flocks about. These methods are most cruel and are inimical to any body politic, not only to a Christian one but to any human one, and every man should avoid them and should prefer to live as a private citizen rather than as a king who does so much damage to mankind; nevertheless, anyone who does not wish to choose this first humane course of action must, if he wishes to maintain himself, enter into this evil one. But men choose certain middle ways which are very damaging and, in so doing, are unable to be entirely good or entirely bad, as the following chapter will demonstrate by example.
CHAPTER XXVII. MEN VERY RARELY KNOW HOW TO BE ENTIRELY GOOD OR ENTIRELY BAD
Pope Julius, upon going to Bologna in 1505 to expel from that state the Bentivogli family, which had held the city’s government for one hundred years, also wanted to remove from Perugia Giovampagolo Baglioni, who was the tyrant there (for the Pope had conspired against all tyrants who held lands belonging to the Church). And having almost reached Perugia with this intention and purpose in mind, known to everyone, he did not wait but entered that city unarmed, notwithstanding the fact that Giovampagolo was inside with many of the men he had gathered around him for his defense. And thus, with the usual furor with which he governed all his affairs, Julius placed himself in the hands of his enemy with only a small bodyguard; nevertheless, he carried Giovampagolo off with him, leaving a governor in that city to act in the name of the Church. The impetuosity of Julius and the cowardice of Giovampagolo were noted by the prudent men who were with the Pope; and they could not understand why Giovampagolo had not, with a single blow, rid himself of his enemy, whereby he would have gained for himself perpetual fame and rich spoils,
for the Pope was accompanied by all the cardinals and their valuable possessions. Nor could they believe that he had refrained through goodness or scruples of conscience, for in the heart of a vicious man who took his sister as his mistress and murdered his cousins and nephews in order to rule, no compassionate sentiment could be aroused; but they concluded that his behavior must be due to the fact that men do not know how to be honorably evil or perfectly good, and when an evil deed has in itself some grandeur or magnanimity, they will not know how to perform it.
Thus, Giovampagolo, who did not mind incest or public parricide, did not know how, or, to put it better, did not dare (when he had the perfect opportunity to do so) to perform an act for which everyone would have admired his courage, and which would have gained for him eternal fame as the first man to show these prelates how little esteem is merited by those who live and govern as they do; he would have done something the greatness of which would have surpassed all infamy and all danger that could have resulted from it.
CHAPTER XXVIII. WHY THE ROMANS WERE LESS UNGRATEFUL TO THEIR CITIZENS THAN THE ATHENIANS WERE
[Rome was less ungrateful to her citizens than Athens was because she had less reason to mistrust them; from the expulsion of the kings to the times of Sulla and Marius, Rome never lost her liberty through the actions of any of her citizens. The contrary was true in Athens, and suspicion of her citizens led to the institutions of banishment and ostracism. Rome would have acted in a similar manner if, in her early days, she had, like Athens, grounds for this ingratitude.]
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