CHAPTER XLVI. MEN RISE FROM ONE AMBITION TO ANOTHER; FIRST THEY SEEK TO AVOID SUFFERING INJURY THEMSELVES, THEN THEY INJURE OTHERS
When the Roman people had recovered their liberty and had returned to their former level of power—this being even greater now that many new laws had been passed confirming their strength—it seemed reasonable to expect that Rome would be quiet for a time; nevertheless, experience shows the contrary, for every day new riots and disputes arose. And since Livy very prudently explains why this happened, it does not seem beside the point to refer to his exact words where he states that the people or the nobility always acted arrogantly when one or the other group was humiliated; when the people were calm and in their place, then the young noblemen began to wrong them, and the tribunes could provide few remedies since they, too, were being attacked. The nobility, on the other hand, realizing that their younger members were too insolent, nevertheless preferred that if excesses were to be committed, their own members and not the people should commit them. Thus, in desiring to defend its liberty each side tried to become strong enough to oppress the other. And the cause of all this is that in trying to escape fear men begin to make others fearful, and the injury they themselves seek to avoid they inflict on others, as if it were absolutely necessary either to harm or to be harmed.
From this can be seen one of several ways that republics fall apart, how men rise from one ambition to another, and the truth of the remark Sallust puts in the mouth of Caesar: “All examples of evil doings arise from good beginnings.”43 As was mentioned above, the citizens of a republic who act out of ambition seek, first of all, not to be harmed, not only by private citizens but also by the magistrates; to this end, they seek out friendships, acquiring them by means which appear outwardly honest—either by assisting people with money or by defending them from the more powerful—and because this action appears to be honorable, everyone is easily deceived and so no one provides any remedy against it. The result is that such a man, persevering without obstacles, attains so much power that private citizens fear him and the magistrates show him deference. And when he has risen to such a position as this, and there has, up until now, been no opposition to his greatness, then he has attained such a position that to attack him would be most dangerous, for the reasons I stated above, where I talk about the danger that exists in attacking a problem that has already grown too serious in a city. The matter comes precisely to this: either you try to do away with the problem altogether, risking the danger of an immediate disaster, or you allow the problem to continue and so enter into a clear state of servitude unless, of course, death or some accident frees you. For when matters reach the stage described above and the citizens and magistrates are afraid to harm such an ambitious man and his friends, then not much effort is required to make them pass judgments in his favor and at his will. Therefore, a republic ought to have among its laws a law which sees to it that citizens are prevented from doing evil under the pretense of doing good and ensures that citizens acquire the kind of popularity which benefits and in no way harms liberty—as will be discussed in the appropriate section.
CHAPTER XLVII. HOW MEN DECEIVE THEMSELVES IN GENERAL TERMS BUT NOT IN PARTICULAR DETAILS
As was stated above, when the Roman people became annoyed with the title of consul and wanted plebeians made eligible to become consuls—either that or curtail consular authority—the nobility, in order not to blemish the consular authority with either one reform or the other, chose a middle course, agreeing to the creation of four tribunes, with consular power, to be chosen either from among the people or the nobles. This satisfied the people, for they felt they had abolished the consulate and were getting their own share of this high office. A noteworthy event arose from this: when the Roman people came to electing these tribunes, although they could have chosen all of them from the plebeians they chose all nobles. Livy says, concerning this matter: “The result of these elections demonstrated that during the struggle for liberty and honor their spirits differed from their attitude when their judgment was less impassioned after the struggles had ceased.”44 And in analyzing how this might have come about, I believe it happened because men deceive themselves greatly in general terms but not so much in particular details. The Roman people believed, in general, that they deserved the consulate, for they represented a larger portion of the city, they incurred greater risk in wartime, and they kept Rome free and made her powerful with their brawn. And since, as was said, they felt this desire of theirs was a reasonable one, they determined to get this authority at any cost. But when it came to judging individually the men of their own faction, they recognized their weakness and decided that not one of them deserved what all of them taken together seemed to merit as a group. And so, ashamed of their own, they turned to those who did merit the high office. Justifiably amazed at this decision, Livy writes: “Where today would you find in one man alone such modesty, fairness, and high-mindedness which, at that time, characterized an entire people?”45
In confirmation of this, one may cite another noteworthy example which occurred in Capua after Hannibal defeated the Romans at Cannae. Although all of Italy was aroused by this defeat, Capua still continued to be embroiled in her internal struggles as a result of the hatred that existed between the people and the senate. Pacuvius Calanus was the supreme magistrate at that time; realizing the danger the city risked with her quarrels, he planned to use his high office to reconcile the plebeians with the nobility; having made this decision, he convened the senate and told the senators of the hatred the people felt toward them and the dangers they faced of being murdered by the populace and of having the city surrendered to Hannibal now that the Romans were in difficulty. Then he added that if they were to leave him in charge of the problem he would act in such a way that the city’s factions would be united: he would lock all the senators inside the palace and then save them by giving the people the power to punish them. The senators agreed to his idea, and, after locking the senators in the palace, he called the people together and told them that the time had come for them to tame the pride of the nobles and take revenge for the injustices they had received from them, since all of them had been locked up under his custody. But, he added, since he believed that they did not want their city to be left without any government, they must choose new senators if they wished to kill the old ones. In the meantime, he would put all the names of the senators in a bag and draw them out one at a time in their presence; then, in the order in which they were drawn, he would put them to death as soon as the people had found a successor. When he drew out the first name, there was a great commotion at the sound of the man’s name—they called him proud, cruel, and arrogant; but when Pacuvius asked whom they would select to take his place, the entire assembly fell silent. Then, after a while, one of the plebeians was nominated, but at the sound of his name some began to whistle, others to laugh, still others to speak ill of him in one way or another: and so they passed from one name to another until, finally, all those who had been nominated were judged unworthy of the senatorial rank. At this point, seizing the opportunity, Pacuvius remarked: “Since you believe that this city cannot function without the senate and you cannot agree on replacements for the old senators, I think it would be best if you reconciled yourselves with them, for the fear which the senators have just experienced will have humbled them to such an extent that you will certainly find in them the kindness you seek elsewhere.” Once they agreed to this, union with that institution followed, and the mistaken idea which had deceived them was now uncovered as soon as they were forced to deal with particulars. This example aside, the people are deceived when they judge matters and events connected with them in a general way, but when particulars about things are known error is corrected.
After 1494, when the rulers of Florence had been driven from the city, there was no organized government there, but rather a kind of ambitious anarchy, and public affairs had gone from bad to worse. Many of the popular party, seeing the ruin of the city and
finding no explanation for it, blamed it on the ambition of some powerful individuals who were encouraging disorder in order to create a government more to their own liking and thus take away liberty. And such accusers stood around the loggias and the piazzas speaking ill of many citizens, threatening that if they ever became part of the Signoria they would uncover this plot of theirs and punish them. It often happens that just such a man does rise to the highest magistracy; and when he arrives at the position he sees things more closely: he realizes where disorders come from and he recognizes the dangers they involve and the difficulty of remedying them; and once he sees that the times, not men, create disorder, he suddenly becomes a man of different character and kind, for the knowledge of particulars removes the misconception which he had taken for granted when he considered matters in general terms. Thus, those who heard him speak earlier, when he was a private citizen, and now see him silent as he occupies the highest office are convinced that this fact arose not from a truer knowledge of affairs of state but rather, from some trick or bribe by the powerful. And since this has happened to many men at many times, a proverb about the matter has grown up among the people which states: “They have one mind in the piazza and another in the palace.”
Considering everything that has been said in this section, we see that although the people can be deceived in general terms, their eyes can be opened quickly if only a means is found to show them the particulars, as Pacuvius succeeded in doing in Capua and as the senate did in Rome. I also believe it may be concluded that, regarding the distribution of offices and honors, a prudent man should never avoid the popular judgment in particulars, for here alone do the people not deceive themselves; and if they are sometimes deceived, the number of times is few when compared to the many times that a few men are deceived when they have to make such appointments. Nor does it seem superfluous for me to show, in the next chapter, the means the senate employed to deceive the people in making its appointments.
CHAPTER XLVIII. ANYONE DESIRING TO PREVENT A MAGIS-TRACY FROM BEING GRANTED TO A MAN OF LOW RANK OR TO A WICKED MAN SHOULD HAVE IT REQUESTED EITHER BY A MAN OF VERY LOW RANK OR BY A VERY WICKED MAN OR BY ONE OF TOO HIGH RANK, OR BY ONE WHO IS TOO GOOD
[The senate, fearing that the tribunes would be chosen from among the plebeians, had the most distinguished citizens present themselves or bribed the worst citizens to present themselves. In either case, the plebeians were shamed into giving the offices to the most honorable citizens. This demonstrates the truth of the preceding argument, namely, that the people may be deceived in general terms but are not so deceived in specific matters.]
CHAPTER XLIX. IF CITIES WHICH HAD THEIR BEGINNINGS IN LIBERTY, SUCH AS ROME, EXPERIENCE DIFFICULTY IN FINDING LAWS TO PRESERVE THEIR FREEDOMS, THEN THOSE CITIES WHOSE BEGINNINGS WERE SERVILE WILL FIND IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DO SO
How difficult it is in organizing a republic to foresee all the laws required to keep it free is evident in the development of the Roman republic: for, notwithstanding the many laws that were instituted first by Romulus, then Numa, Tullus Hostilius, Servius, and finally by the decemvirs created for this task, new difficulties were nevertheless always appearing in the management of that city. It became necessary to establish new laws—as was the case when the Romans created the censors, a provision which helped keep Rome free for as long as she enjoyed her independence; for, since the censors became the arbiters of Roman morals, they served an important role in postponing Rome’s corruption for a long time. The Romans made one error in the establishment of such an office: they created the office for a five-year term; but after a short time this was rectified through the prudence of the dictator, Mamercus, who, by means of a new law, reduced the term of office in the said magistracy to eighteen months. The censors who were then serving their term took this so badly that they deprived Mamercus of his place in the senate—an act which both the plebeians and the patricians strongly criticized. And if history does not show that Mamercus could have defended himself, either the historian is inadequate or Roman laws were not good enough in this respect, because it is not right for a republic to be organized in such a way that one citizen, without any recourse, can be harmed for promulgating a law conforming to free government. But, returning to the beginning of this discussion, let me say that in the creation of this new office one ought to bear in mind that if it is true that cities such as Rome, which have had their beginnings in liberty and already have self-government, experience great difficulty in finding laws to preserve their freedoms, then it is no wonder that those cities which have had servile beginnings find it not difficult but rather impossible ever to organize themselves in a way that will allow them to live in a civil manner and in peace.
This is evident in the case of Florence: because in her beginnings she was subject to Roman rule and had always lived under the control of others, she remained humble for a time and had no plans of her own; then, when the opportunity arose for her to breathe a bit, she began to establish her own laws, and these laws, since they were combined with old ones that were bad, could not possibly be good. And so, she had gone along managing her affairs for two hundred years (for which there are reliable documents) without ever having a government which could truly entitle her to be called a republic. And difficulties like hers have always existed in all those cities whose beginnings were similar to hers; while sufficient authority to reform her has been granted many times to a few citizens by means of public and free elections, nevertheless such citizens have organized her not for the common welfare but rather for the favor of their own faction—a fact which has caused not order but greater disorder in the city.
Now, to come to some specific examples, let me say that among other things that have to be considered by the founder of a republic is the necessity of scrutinizing carefully the men into whose hands he puts the power of life and death over his citizens. This was well done in Rome, for one could normally make an appeal to the people, and if something important did happen in which deferring action through an appeal was dangerous, the Romans found a remedy in the dictator, who acted immediately, a remedy they employed only in times of necessity. But Florence and the other cities which were founded as she was—as a slave—had this power vested in a foreigner who fulfilled this office as a prince’s envoy; then, later on, when such cities as these gained their liberty, they continued to support this power vested in a foreigner and called him captain. Since he could easily be corrupted by powerful citizens, this was a very harmful practice, but later on, when this institution was modified by a change in governments, the Florentines set up eight citizens to fulfill the office of this captain; the result was that this institution went from bad to worse (for the reasons mentioned elsewhere), for these few men were always the servants of those few who were most powerful.
The city of Venice has protected herself from this danger by having ten citizens who possess the authority to punish any citizen without the right of appeal; since the ten might not be sufficient to punish the powerful, even though they have the authority to do so, the Venetians set up the Council of Forty; furthermore, they decided that their Council of the Pregadi, which is their greatest council, should have the power, in turn, to punish all of them—thus, if an accuser is not lacking, there is no lack of a judge to keep powerful men in check. And so, we see that if in Rome, organized by her own citizens and by so many prudent men, there sprang up every day new reasons for new laws to be passed in support of free government, then it is no wonder that in other cities with more disorderly beginnings so many problems appear that they can never be reordered properly.
CHAPTER L. NO SINGLE COUNCIL OR MAGISTRATE SHOULD BE ABLE TO HALT THE BUSINESS OF A CITY
[Examples from Roman history and from recent events in the Republic of Venice prove that no single council or magistrate should be able to hinder the smooth operation of a city’s affairs; such councils or magistrates should be required to fulfill their offices until successors are chosen so that the republic remains safe.]
CHAPTER U. A REPUBLIC OR A PRINCE SHOULD PRETEND TO DO OUT OF GENEROSITY WHAT MUST BE DONE OUT OF NECESSITY
[Prudent men make a virtue of necessity, as the Roman senate did when it pretended to pay the army from the public treasury out of generosity, while it actually did so in order to wage war more effectively. The people rejoiced at this in spite of the fact that the subsequent taxes levied to pay for this decision made the burden upon them even heavier.]
CHAPTER LII. THERE IS NO MORE SECURE AND LESS DANGEROUS MEANS OF PUTTING DOWN THE INSOLENCE OF A MAN WHO RISES TO POWER IN A REPUBLIC THAN TO BLOCK THOSE ROADS BY WHICH HE IS COMING INTO POWER
[If the enemies of Cosimo de’ Medici had followed this rule, turning Cosimo’s means to power against him by favoring the people as he did, they would have been more successful than they were in driving him out of the city. Piero Soderini might also have been successfully opposed in Florence if his adversaries had like Soderini, tried to gain the favor of the people.]
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