The Portable Machiavelli

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by Niccolo Machiavelli


  But Rome, an example of the second method, rose to great power by doing both one and the other; and because she was the only city to operate in this way, she was the only one to become so powerful. She made many allies all over Italy who, in many ways, lived under laws similar to her own; on the other hand, as was mentioned above, since she always reserved for herself the seat of the empire and the glory of its undertakings, these allies of hers, without realizing it, found that they had subjugated themselves to her with their own labors and their own blood. For these allies marched with the Roman armies and reduced kingdoms to provinces outside of Italy, and they made subjects of those peoples who did not mind being subjects because they were accustomed to living under kings; these conquered peoples, having Roman governors and having been conquered by armies with the Roman name, recognized no other superior than Rome. As a result, the allies of Rome who were in Italy found themselves suddenly surrounded by Roman subjects and oppressed by such a very great city as Rome; and when they became aware of the deception under which they were living, it was too late to remedy it, for Rome had acquired so much authority with her overseas provinces and so much strength inside her own city, which was very large and very well armed. And although these allies of hers banded together against her to avenge themselves for their injuries, they lost the war in a short time, thereby making their conditions worse, for instead of allies they had now become subjects. This method of proceeding, as was mentioned, has been followed only by the Romans, yet a republic that wishes to expand can use no other method, for experience has shown us no other way that is more certain or more true.

  The previously mentioned system of confederations, under which the Tuscans, the Achaeans, and the Aetolians operated, and under which the Swiss operate today, is the next best method after the one followed by the Romans. Although with this method it is not possible to grow very much, two good things result from it: first, you do not easily draw wars down on your back; second, all that you seize you can easily keep. The reason why it is not possible to grow greater is that you are a federated republic with various seats of power, which makes it difficult for them to consult one another and arrive at decisions. Moreover, it also means that the various parts of the republic are not so eager to make conquests, since the many communities participating in this dominion do not regard such acquisitions as highly as a republic does, which has hopes of enjoying them all alone. Besides this, federated republics govern themselves through councils and are bound to be slower in making every decision than those who live within one and the same circle.

  It is also clear from experience that this method of proceeding has a fixed limit, and there is no example demonstrating that this limit may be exceeded: the limit is a confederation of between twelve and fourteen communities—after that they do not try to expand any further, for when they arrive at the point where they believe they are able to defend themselves from anyone, they seek no greater dominion, both because necessity does not force them to acquire more power and because they do not see any usefulness in such acquisitions, for the reasons stated above. The members of the confederation would have to do one of two things: either continue to make allies for themselves—the great number of which would cause confusion—or make subjects for themselves, which they do not value for they judge it too difficult and not profitable enough. Thus, when they have arrived at such a number that they think may live in security, they turn to two procedures: first, they receive those who ask for their assistance and establish protectorates; by this means they obtain money from those around them which they can easily distribute among themselves; second, they wage war for others and get paid for this by the prince or whoever hires them for his undertakings, which is what the Swiss do today and what we read about the states mentioned above. Livy bears witness to this, saying that when Philip, King of Macedonia, came to parley with Titus Quintius Flaminius, speaking in the presence of a praetor of the Aetolians about an agreement, and the said praetor began talking with Philip, the king rebuked the Aetolians for their avarice and lack of faith, saying that they were not ashamed to fight with one man and later to send their men out into the service of his enemy, so that the banners of Aetolia were frequently seen flying in two opposing armies.

  It is clear, then, that the system of confederations has always been the same and has always produced the same results. It is also clear that this method of acquiring subjects has always been weak and has resulted in little profit; when these confederations go beyond their limitations, they immediately come to ruin. And if this method of acquiring subjects is useless to armed republics, it is totally without value for republics that are unarmed, as the republics of Italy have been in our own times. Evidently, then, the true method is the one the Romans employed, and it is even more remarkable because there is no instance of it before Rome, and after Rome there has been no one who has imitated it. As for confederations, they are only found among the Swiss and the Swabian League which imitates them. As will be discussed at the conclusion of this subject, a great number of methods followed in Rome, as pertinent to domestic matters as to foreign affairs, are not only not imitated in our present times but are not even taken into account, for some people judge them as being untrue, others as impossible, and still others as inappropriate or unprofitable; as a result, while we stand here in this ignorance of ours we are the prey of anyone who wishes to overrun this country.

  But, if the imitation of the Romans should seem difficult, the imitation of the ancient Tuscans should not appear so, especially to the Tuscans today; for if they were unable, for the reasons suggested, to establish an empire similar to that of Rome, they were still able to acquire in Italy the power that their method of proceeding allowed them. This power was secure for a long time, resulting in the utmost glory of empire and arms and the highest praises for their customs and religion. Their power and glory were first diminished by the Gauls and later destroyed by the Romans; and it was so totally destroyed that there is hardly any memory of it—in spite of the fact that two thousand years ago the power of the Tuscans was immense. This has made me think about why things are forgotten this way, and this will be discussed in the following chapter.

  CHAPTER V. HOW THE CHANGES IN RELIGIOUS SECTS AND LANGUAGES, TOGETHER WITH THE OCCURRENCE OF FLOODS AND PLAGUES, ERASE THE MEMORY OF THINGS

  [Historical records may be destroyed either by acts of Heaven or by man. Those committed by man involve changes of religion or language; whenever a new sect springs up, its first impulse is to destroy all vestiges of the sect that preceded it. Thus, the Christians attempted to erase the historical record of their pagan predecessors by burning their books and destroying their works of art. Acts of Heaven, such as floods, plagues, and famines, work upon the human race much as spontaneous purgation takes place in the human body; when nations become too populous and human wickedness becomes too great, such occurrences reduce the numbers of men, allowing the survivors to live more easily.]

  CHAPTER VI. HOW THE ROMANS PROCEEDED IN WAGING WAR

  [Since war is waged for the purpose of acquiring something at the least possible expense, the Romans always waged short and conclusive wars. Upon their victory, they forced the defeated enemy to cede some of his land, which they converted into private property or a colony; this land was on the enemy’s frontier and the colonists protected Rome with no expense to the republic. Even when the Romans began to pay their soldiers to wage wars of longer duration farther away from Rome, they never stopped trying to limit their duration as much as possible, nor did they ever stop establishing colonies. By dividing the spoils of war and sending out colonies Rome was able to enrich herself and at the same time impoverish others.]

  CHAPTER VII. HOW MUCH LAND THE ROMANS GAVE TO THEIR COLONISTS

  [The precise amount is difficult to determine, but it seems to have been small, so that there would be more land to distribute to more colonists. Furthermore, since the Romans were poor at home, small quantities of land granted to colonists abroad would no
t allow them to be corrupted by wealth there.]

  CHAPTER VIII. THE REASONS WHY PEOPLES LEAVE THEIR HOMELANDS AND OVERRUN THE LANDS OF OTHERS

  [Two types of wars exist. The first, illustrated by the wars of Alexander the Great or the Romans against hostile powers, results from the ambition of a republic or a ruler to extend an empire abroad. The second type of war involves a whole people leaving its homeland, driven by war, plague, or famine, to seek a new homeland not merely for an extension of an empire but for the purpose of dispossessing another population. This kind of war is much more serious since each side fights for its very existence rather than for its freedom. The Romans experienced three of these wars and were victorious in all of them, but when their armies lost their ancient valor under the empire the Romans were defeated by invasions of Goths, Vandals, and other foreign tribes.]

  CHAPTER IX. WHAT CAUSES COMMONLY PROVOKE WARS BETWEEN POWERS

  The cause that provoked war between the Romans and the Samnites, who had been allies for a long time, is a common cause among great powers. War either breaks out by chance or it is provoked by the power wishing to start the war. The war between the Samnites started by chance, for the intention of the Samnites was not to wage war against the Romans when they began fighting the Sidicines and the Campanians; but when the Campanians were conquered, against the expectation of both the Romans and the Samnites, they ran for aid to Rome, and once the Campanians had entrusted themselves to the Romans, the Romans were obliged to defend them as if they were defending themselves and to wage a war which they felt they could not honorably avoid. The Romans thought it was reasonable not to defend their friends the Campanians against their friends the Samnites, but they also felt it would be shameful not to defend these peoples, who were their subjects and under their protection, believing that if they did not undertake their defense they would be closing the road to all those who might wish to seek their protection in the future. And since Rome set empire and glory, and not tranquillity, as her goal, this undertaking could not be denied.

  The same cause gave rise to the war against the Carthaginians: the Romans undertook the defense of the Messinians in Sicily—again by chance. But later it was not by chance that the Second Punic War broke out, for the Carthaginian general, Hannibal, attacked the Saguntines, the allies of Rome in Spain, not in order to harm the Saguntines but rather to provoke the Roman armies and to have the opportunity to engage them in battle and cross over into Italy. This method of starting war has always been common among the powerful and among those who still have respect for both their own word and that of others. For if I wish to wage war upon a prince with whom I have long-respected treaties, I can attack one of his friends with more justification and excuse than I can attack the prince, knowing for a certainty that if I attack his friend he will either resent it (and I shall fulfill my intention of waging war upon him) or not resent it, in which case he will reveal his weakness or lack of faith by not defending one of his dependents. Either one of these two alternatives suffices to lessen his reputation and to facilitate my plans.

  Concerning the provocation of wars, then, one should bear in mind what was said above concerning the surrender of the Campanians; furthermore, one should remember the remedy a city has when it cannot defend itself alone yet wishes to defend itself at any cost from anyone who attacks it: that remedy is for the city to give itself freely to the one it can count on to defend it, as the Capuans did with the Romans and the Florentines did with King Robert of Naples, who, although he did not want to defend them as his allies, subsequently did defend them as his subjects against the forces of Castruccio of Lucca, who was oppressing them.

  CHAPTER X. WEALTH DOES NOT REPRESENT THE SINEWS OF WAR AS POPULAR OPINION WOULD HAVE IT

  Since anyone can begin but cannot end a war whenever he pleases, before he undertakes such action a prince should take stock of his forces and govern himself accordingly. But he should have enough prudence not to deceive himself about his forces; and he will deceive himself every time he measures them by wealth, by their location, or by their goodwill if he lacks troops of his own. For the aforementioned things surely increase your forces, but they certainly do not provide you with them, and by themselves they are nothing and are of no good whatsoever without faithful troops. For without them a great deal of money does you no good, the strength of the country does you no good, and the word and goodwill of men do not last, as they cannot be faithful to you if you cannot defend them. Every mountain, every lake, every inaccessible place becomes a plain when strong defenders are lacking. Wealth not only will not defend you, it will cause you to be plundered all the sooner.

  Nothing can be more false than the popular conception that riches are the sinews of war. This maxim was uttered by Quintus Curtius in connection with the war between Antipater of Macedonia and the King of Sparta, where he described how the King of Sparta was forced to engage in battle and was defeated for lack of money; if he had postponed the battle for a few days, the news of the death of Alexander would have reached Greece, and as a result he would have been the victor without fighting; but since he lacked money and was afraid that his army might abandon him because of this, he was forced to tempt the fortunes of battle; thus, for this reason Quintus Curtius affirms that riches are the sinews of war. This maxim is cited every day and is practiced by princes who are not quite prudent enough to make use of it; because they base their actions upon it, they believe that possessing great riches is sufficient for their defense, and they do not realize that if riches were sufficient for victory Darius would have defeated Alexander; the Greeks would have vanquished the Romans; Duke Carlo would have beaten the Swiss in our times; and the Pope and the Florentines together would not have had any difficulty a few days ago in defeating Francesco Maria, the nephew of Pope Julius II, in the war over Urbino. Nevertheless, all the aforementioned were conquered by those who thought good soldiers, and not wealth, were the sinews of war.

  Among the things that Croesus, King of the Lydians, showed to Solon, the Athenian, was an immeasurable treasure: when he asked Solon what he thought of his power, Solon answered that he did not consider him more powerful because of it, for war was waged with steel and not with gold, and someone who had more steel than he had could take his treasure away from him. Another example: after the death of Alexander the Great a number of Gauls crossed Greece into Asia; when they sent envoys to the King of Macedonia to draw up certain accords, that king showed them a great amount of gold and silver in order to demonstrate his power and to frighten them; as a result, the Gauls—who, until that moment, had been set on peace—broke the agreement because of the strong desire they now had to get the gold; and so, the king was despoiled of the very thing he had amassed for his defense. A few years ago, the Venetians lost their entire state while their treasury was still full of money, for they were unable to defend themselves with it.

  Hence, let me say that good soldiers, not gold, as common opinion proclaims, are the sinews of war, for gold is not sufficient to find good soldiers but good soldiers are more than sufficient to find gold. If the Romans had wanted to wage war with wealth rather than with steel, all the world’s treasure would not have been sufficient, considering the greatness of the tasks they undertook and the difficulties they encountered in them; but since they waged their wars with steel, they never suffered a scarcity of gold, for those who feared them carried it to them even into their camps. And if that Spartan king had to tempt the fortunes of war through a scarcity of money, what happened to him because of money has often happened for other reasons: for when an army lacks provisions and must either die of hunger or fight in battle, it always chooses to fight as the most honorable course and the one in which Fortune can favor you in some way. It has also happened many times that when a general sees aid coming to the opposing army, he finds that he must engage in battle and tempt the fortunes of war immediately, for if he waits for his enemy to grow stronger, he will have to fight in any case, and with a thousand disadvantages. It has
also been observed (as happened to Hasdrubal when he was attacked in the Marches by Claudius Nero together with the other Roman consul) that when a general is forced either to flee or to fight, he always chooses to fight, for he feels that this decision, while it may be most dangerous, can lead to victory, while the other one must in any event lead to defeat. There are, then, many necessities that force a general, contrary to his intention, to make the decision to fight; among them, sometimes, is a lack of money, but wealth should not, on this account, be judged the sinews of war any more than the other things that bring men to such straits.

  I repeat again: not gold but good soldiers are the sinews of war. Money is certainly necessary as a secondary consideration, but it is a necessity that good soldiers supply by themselves; for it is as impossible for good soldiers to lack riches as it is for wealth to find good soldiers by itself. History demonstrates in a thousand places that what we are saying is true, notwithstanding the fact that Pericles advised the Athenians to wage war on the entire Peloponnesus, arguing that they would win the war because of their ingenuity and the power of their money. And although the Athenians sometimes succeeded in that war, they ultimately lost it, for the prudence and the good soldiers of Sparta were worth more than the ingenuity and wealth of Athens. But Livy is a better witness to the truth of this opinion than anyone else. In discussing the question of whether Alexander would have defeated the Romans if he had invaded Italy, he shows that three things are necessary in war: many good soldiers, prudent generals, and good fortune. In considering whether the Romans or Alexander would have prevailed in these matters, he then gives his conclusion without ever discussing riches. The Capuans, when they were requested by the Sidicines to take up arms with them against the Samnites, must have measured their strength by their wealth and not by their soldiers; for when they had taken the decision to assist them, they were forced after two defeats to become tributaries of the Romans in order to save themselves.

 

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