Because of this, it came about that as a result of the victories of the common people the city of Rome became more distinguished; for since the common people could participate in the administration of the magistrates, the army, and the provinces along with the nobility, they acquired the same skill as the nobility. And the city grew in power because ability increased there. But in Florence, when the common people triumphed the nobles were deprived of offices; and if they wished to acquire them again, it was necessary for them not only to pretend that they were like the common people but also actually to become like them in their policies, their spirit, and their manner of living. From this arose the variations in the family coats of arms and the alterations in the family titles that the nobles effected in order to appear more like the people; they did this in such a way that the military skill and generosity of spirit in them were extinguished; such qualities could not be rekindled in the common people, since they had never existed. Florence thus became more and more humble and abject. And where Rome had seen the virtue of her citizens reduced to pride, and had come to such a pass that she could not be governed without a prince, Florence reached a condition where she could easily be reformed by some wise lawgiver and could be given any sort of government. This becomes quite clear if one reads the preceding book, which treated the birth of Florence and the origins of her liberty, the causes of her factions, and how the division between noble and commoner ended with the tyranny of the Duke of Athens and the ruin of the nobility. Now there still remains to be described the struggles between the masses and the middle classes and the various circumstances that produced them.
BOOK V
CHAPTER I [MACHIAVELLI’S CYCLE OF HISTORY]
In most instances, in the course of the variations states undergo, they usually move from order to chaos and then back again from chaos to order. Since Nature has not allowed earthly affairs to remain stationary, as soon as they reach their final state of perfection they must go down, possessing no further potential for rising; likewise, when they have descended and have reached the lowest possible level (because of their disorders), they must rise since they cannot possibly go lower. Thus, they always descend from good to bad and rise from bad to good. For ability brings about tranquillity, and tranquillity laziness, and laziness chaos, and chaos ruin; and, in like manner, from ruin is born order, from order ability, and from this quality glory and good fortune. And so, prudent men have observed that literature develops after arms, and that in nations and city-states generals are born before philosophers. For after an effective and well-organized militia has produced victories, and these victories have ensured tranquillity, the strength of such brave minds cannot be corrupted with a more honorable laziness than that of literature, nor can this laziness enter into well-organized cities with a greater and more dangerous deception. than with that of literature. Cato was well aware of this when Diogenes and Carneades, both philosophers, came to Rome as ambassadors to the senate; when he saw that the Roman youth began to admire these men, aware of the evil that could enter his native city as a result of this honorable laziness, he made it a law that no philosopher could be received in Rome. Nations have come to ruin because of this; and when this has happened and men have become wiser through their trials, they return to order, as I said before, if they do not remain weakened by some extraordinary force.
These causes sometimes created happiness and sometimes misery in Italy, first through the ancient Tuscans and later through the Romans. And nothing has been built upon the Roman ruins that would in some way revive Italy, so that under the rule of a skillful prince she might be able to advance gloriously. Nevertheless, in some of the new cities and territories of Rome there arose among the ruins such great ability that although one of them could not dominate the others, there was nevertheless such unity and organization among them that they defended Italy and freed her from the barbarians. Among these territories, the Florentines were not the least significant in authority or power, even though they possessed a smaller territory; on the contrary, because of their central position in Italy, their wealth, and their readiness for war, they either successfully sustained any war waged against them or they were victorious together with their allies.
If, therefore, peacetime of long duration did not come about as a result of the vigor of these new principalities, neither were there dangerous times characterized by the harshness of war. For a period during which principalities often attack each other with troops cannot be termed a time of peace; nor can there be wars wherein men do not kill, cities are not sacked, and principalities are not destroyed, for these wars arose from such a weakness that they were begun without fear, carried on without danger, and terminated without damage. As a result, that spirit which is usually extinguished in other provinces because of a lengthy peace was destroyed in Italy by the vileness of these wars, as one can clearly recognize from that which we shall describe as having occurred from 1434 until 1494. There the reader will see how a new road was finally opened to the barbarians and how Italy put herself back into slavery under such peoples. And if the deeds accomplished by our princes at home and abroad will not be read with admiration for these princes’ ability and greatness, as is done with those of the ancients, perhaps they will be considered for their other qualities with no less astonishment, when the reader sees how many most noble peoples were held back by such weak and badly administered armies. And if, in describing the events that occurred in this wasted world, the bravery of the soldier, the courage of the captain, or the patriotism of the citizen are not recorded, one will be able to see with what artifice, deceit, and cunning the princes, soldiers, and leaders of republics conducted themselves in order to maintain reputations that they did not deserve. This, perhaps, will not be less useful than an acquaintance with ancient history, for if the latter incites the noble mind to imitation, the former will demonstrate what to avoid or to suppress.
BOOK VII [COSIMO DE’ MEDICI]
CHAPTER I
... and because, in writing about foreign affairs, I have arrived at the year 1463, it is necessary to go back many years if I am to narrate the troubles that occurred inside the city. But first I wish to point out, as is my custom, that those who hope that republics can be unified are greatly mistaken in this belief. It is true that some internal divisions harm republics while others benefit them. Those which harm them involve factions and partisans. Since a founder of a republic cannot prevent strife from occurring, he can at least see to it that there are no factions. Thus, he should note that there are two means of acquiring a reputation among the citizens of his city: by practicing public service and by pursuing private goals. Publicly, citizens gain a reputation by winning a battle, taking a town, carrying out a diplomatic mission with speed and prudence, and advising the republic wisely and successfully. Privately, citizens earn fame by helping this or that citizen, defending them from the magistrates, lending them money, getting them unmerited offices, and by gratifying the masses with games and public gifts. From this method of behavior arise factions and partisans, and a reputation gained in such a manner is as offensive as the other is beneficial, for a reputation gained by public means is not corrupted by factionalism since it is founded upon a common, not a private, good. And although one cannot prevent great hatreds even among citizens who act for the common good, nevertheless, when they have no partisans who follow them out of self-interest they cannot harm the republic; on the contrary, they must benefit it since it is necessary for them to work for the republic in order to fulfill their goals; and they must keep close watch on one another to see that civil liberties are not abused. The Florentine quarrels always involved factions and were therefore always harmful. Even a winning faction remained united only so long as its opponent existed; but when the defeated faction was destroyed, not being restrained by fear or internal control, the dominant faction would break up again. In 1434 Cosimo de’ Medici’s faction was in control, but because the defeated faction was large and was composed of very powerful me
n, Cosimo’s party remained united and humble for a time out of fear; since it did not break up or make itself invidious to the populace by corrupt practices, every time that organization had need of the people’s support to reassert its authority, it always found the people disposed to grant to its leaders all the authority and power they desired. Thus, from 1434 until 1455, a total of twenty-one years, Cosimo’s faction gained the authority of the balìa87 through the councils six times in the normal legal manner.
CHAPTER 2
As we have stated several times, there were in Florence two very powerful citizens, Cosimo de’ Medici and Neri Capponi. Of these two men, Neri was one of those individuals who had acquired his reputation by means of public service, so that he had many friends but few partisans. On the other hand, Cosimo had both public and private avenues to political influence, and he had both friends and partisans. While both men were alive they remained united, and they always obtained what they wanted from the people without any difficulty, for they combined benevolence with power. But when the year 1455 arrived, Neri died and the opposing faction was dissolved. The government had trouble in reasserting its authority. Cosimo’s own friends, being very powerful in the government, were the cause of this, for they no longer feared their opposition, which was removed, and they now hoped to diminish Cosimo’s power. This gave birth to that factional dispute which took place later, in 1466. Those in charge of the government urged in the councils, where the public administration was discussed, that the power of the balìa not be reassumed, that the voting bags be closed, and that the magistrates be chosen by lot on the basis of the scrutinies of the past elections. In order to check this move, Cosimo had two possible alternatives: to forcibly recapture the government together with his partisans, who had remained with him, and throw out his opponents; or to let matters take their course and to allow his friends to see, with the passage of time, that they were not diminishing his reputation but rather their own. Of these two remedies, he chose the second, for he knew very well that with this means of governing he ran no risk, since the voting bags were full of the names of his friends and he could reassert his authority when he pleased. Therefore, when the city had begun to choose its officials by lot, the masses believed that they had regained their liberty and had acquired magistrates who were chosen, not by the powerful, but by themselves, since now one friend of a powerful man was beaten, and now another. Thus, those men who had been used to seeing their homes teeming with guests and full of presents found them empty of goods and people. They realized that they were the equals of those whom they had deemed vastly inferior, and they saw as their superiors those whom they had deemed their equals. They were neither revered nor honored; on the contrary, they were often mocked and criticized, and they and the republic were discussed openly in every street and piazza. They soon realized that they, and not Cosimo, had lost the state. Cosimo acted as if this were not the case, and when any decision which pleased the people was made, he was the first to favor it. But what frightened the wealthy most, and what gave Cosimo the best opportunity to make them draw back, was that the tax system of 1427 might be reinstated, wherein taxes would be apportioned by law rather than according to influence.
CHAPTER 3
When this tax system was reestablished and the magistrate to administer it had already been appointed, the most influential men banded together and begged Cosimo to rescue them and himself from the hands of the masses and to return the government to that esteem which had brought them honors and had given him power. Cosimo replied that he would be happy to do so, but that he wished the law to be passed in a legal manner, as a reflection of the will of the people, and not by force, which he absolutely opposed. An attempt was made to set up a new law for a balìa in the councils, but it did not pass. Therefore, the wealthy citizens turned to Cosimo and with the greatest humility begged him to agree to a popular assembly. Cosimo flatly refused this request, for he wished to reduce them to a state of desperation that would make them fully recognize their error. And when Donato Cocchi, then Gonfaloniere of Justice, tried to call an assembly without his consent, Cosimo had him so ridiculed by the Signori, who were seated with him, that he became angry and was sent home like a fool.
Nevertheless, since it is not prudent to let matters run their course to the point where they get out of control, Cosimo decided that it was time to take things in hand when Luca Pitti, a brave, audacious man, became Gonfaloniere of Justice, so that if any blame arose from this undertaking it would be placed upon Luca and not upon himself. At the beginning of his term, Luca several times proposed the establishment of a new balìa to the people; not obtaining this, he threatened those who were seated in the councils with arrogant and spiteful words. To these words he later added deeds, for in August of 1458, on the eve of St. Lorenzo, after he had filled the palace with armed soldiers, he called the people into the piazza and with force and arms made them consent to what they had previously refused to accept freely. Thus, the government had been reestablished again and the balìa had been created, the most important magistrates being chosen according to the wishes of the few. In order to begin with terror a government that had been created by force, they banished Messer Girolamo Machiavelli, along with some others, and many more were deprived of their positions. Messer Girolamo was declared a rebel for not observing the rules of his banishment. While traveling about Italy urging the princes to move against his native city, he was arrested in Lunigiana through the treachery of one of the Signori there, and was brought to Florence, where he was put to death.
CHAPTER 4
This type of government lasted for eight years. It was oppressive and violent, since Cosimo was already old, tired, and weakened by poor health; since he could not pay as much attention to public affairs as he used to do, the city was plundered by just a handful of citizens. Luca Pitti was knighted as a reward for all he had done for the benefit of the republic. In order to be equally generous, he decreed that those who had formerly been called the Priors of the Guilds should henceforth be called the Priors of Liberty, so that they would at least retain the name, if not the substance, of what they had lost. He also decreed that where the gonfaloniere had formerly been seated above and to the right of the magistrates, in the future he should sit in their midst. And so that God might appear to participate in this undertaking, public processions and solemn church services were organized to give thanks for the restored privileges. Messer Luca was richly rewarded with gifts from the Signoria and Cosimo, an act that was repeated by the entire city as if in a competition, and it was the opinion of observers that the presents reached the sum of twenty thousand ducats. His reputation reached such heights, therefore, that it was not Cosimo but Messer Luca who governed the city. He became so confident of himself that he began the construction of two buildings, one in Florence88 and the other at Ruciano, about a mile from the city, both magnificent and regal in size. The one in the city was much larger than any other building ever built by a private citizen to that day. He spared no means whatsoever in their completion, for not only did citizens and private individuals give him gifts and supply him with materials needed for their construction, but entire towns and peoples also gave him aid. Besides this, all the exiles and anyone who had committed murder, theft, or anything for which he feared public punishment could find refuge within the buildings, provided that he could make himself useful in their construction. The other citizens, although not engaged in building to the extent he was, were no less violent or greedy, so that if Florence had had no foreign wars to destroy her, she still would have been ruined by her own citizens.
During this time, as we have said, the wars of the Kingdom of Naples took place. The Pope waged war in Romagna against the Malatesta family because he wished to despoil them of Rimini and Cesena. So Pope Pius wasted away his pontificate in these undertakings and preparations for a campaign against the Turks.
CHAPTER 5
But Florence continued with her internal squabbles and her difficulties. The
disunity in Cosimo’s party began in 1455, for the reasons mentioned above, but because of his prudence, as we have previously explained, this discord was silenced for a time. In 1464 Cosimo became gravely ill and departed from this life. Both his friends and his opponents mourned his death, since the latter, who did not love him for political reasons, saw the rapacity of the citizens while he was alive, when respect for him had rendered these citizens more bearable. They feared that they would be completely ruined now that he was dead, and did not have much faith in his son Piero. In spite of the fact that he was a good man, they nevertheless considered Piero sickly and a novice in politics; they feared that he might be obliged to show respect for the most greedy members of the Medici faction, who, without a bit in their mouths, would be able to increase their extortions. Therefore, everyone deeply mourned Cosimo’s passing.
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