by Aaron Klein
Regarding the CIA annex that was attacked, the Senate report reveals the facility was set up so that the movements of U.S. personnel were hidden from locals. The Senate report states that intelligence and State Department personnel should “generally be co-located overseas except where the IC [Intelligence Community] determines that, for operational reasons, co-location is not helpful in meeting mission objectives or that it poses a security risk.” Keeping intelligence facilities separate from State Department compounds “can provide important operational advantages.” The report quotes the unnamed chief of the CIA annex as saying, “We had the luxury that the Mission didn’t have of keeping our compound low-profile and making our movements – we used very good… protocol movements, and our vehicular moves were very much low-profile.” The annex chief continued: “So we had a security advantage, I guess you could say, over our State colleagues.”6
The Senate report quoted a June 12, 2012, CIA cable from Benghazi, which said that as “a direct result of a concerted effort to build and maintain a low profile we believe that the locals for the most part do not know we are here and housed/officed in a separate stand alone facility from our USG [United States Government] counterparts.” The report states that, according to the State Department, the nearby “Mission facility did not store classified information, and therefore no Marine contingent was present.” 7
BENGHAZI FACILITY “UNLIKE ANY OTHER IN RECENT HISTORY”
As far as security was concerned, the U.S. facility in Benghazi was one of a kind, according to the State Department’s Libya desk officer, Brian Papanu. “Benghazi was definitely unique in almost every – I can’t think of a mission similar to this ever, and definitely in recent history,” he stated.8
Regarding the unusual nature of the U.S. facility in Benghazi, the House report stated: “Documents and testimony obtained by the Committee during the course of its investigation show that the ad hoc facility in Benghazi, rather than being an example of expeditionary diplomacy, was instead an expedient way to maintain a diplomatic presence in a dangerous place. The State Department was operating a temporary residential facility in a violent and unstable environment without adequate U.S. and host nation security support.”9
Lee Lohman, executive director of the State Department’s Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, testified that he couldn’t remember U.S. diplomats ever having “gone into something in such an expeditionary way as this by ourselves without having military along with us.”10
Indeed, because the facility was so dangerous and did not meet the security standards set by the State Department, the Benghazi mission actually required a special waiver in order to be occupied by American personnel, including Stevens. The Senate report notes that “although certain waivers of the standards could have been approved at a lower level, other departures, such as the co-location requirement, could only be approved by the Secretary of State.”11 Meaning Hillary Clinton herself provided regular waivers to ensure the continued legal operation of the Benghazi mission.
This information is staggering. We know from scores of reports and from details to be presented throughout this book that Benghazi staff repeatedly petitioned for more security. Yet Clinton provided waivers for the legal use of a facility that was woefully unprotected in one of the most dangerous hotspots in the world.
“YOU’RE ON YOUR OWN.” NOT SET UP FOR PROTECTION
In a largely unreported item, a top State official revealed the State Department refused to install guard towers at the doomed U.S. facility in Benghazi, fearing the stations would draw too much attention to the compound. The admission by Patrick Kennedy, under secretary of state for management, raises immediate questions as to what was transpiring at the U.S. mission and why the State Department would fear drawing attention to the special facility.12
In an interview with CNN on November 18, 2013, Rep. Lynn Westmoreland (R-GA), chairman of the House Intelligence Subcommittee, disclosed that his committee had learned a directive was issued August 11 – one month before the attack – telling Benghazi staff they were on their own. “And so we are looking into that directive to find out exactly who put that out,” he stated. Westmoreland said the Benghazi compound “itself is not set up for protection.” He stated that when his committee interviewed the people who were on the ground, “they said they were really surprised [at] the lack of security at the mission facility… [P]eople at the facility had been wanting help, requesting help, requesting additional security… [T]hey just couldn’t believe that those guys were over there as unprepared and unequipped as they were.”13
It tuns out the Benghazi facility may have violated the terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which governs the establishment of overseas missions. Like most nations, the United States is a signatory to the 1961 United Nations’ convention. Article 2 of the convention makes clear that the host government must be informed about the establishment of any permanent foreign mission on its soil: “The establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent.”14
But according to the State Department’s ARB report, there was a decision “to treat Benghazi as a temporary, residential facility,” likely disqualifying the building from permanent mission status if the mission was indeed temporary. However, the same sentence in the report notes the host government was not notified about the Benghazi mission “even though it was also a full time office facility.”15
Article 12 of the Vienna Convention dictates, “The sending State may not, without the prior express consent of the receiving State, establish offices forming part of the mission in localities other than those in which the mission itself is established.”16 If the Benghazi mission was a “full-time office facility,” it may have violated Article 12 in that the mission most likely was an arm of the U.S. embassy in Tripoli, which served as the main U.S. mission to Libya, making the Benghazi facility an unauthorized mission.
ENEMY INSIDE THE GATES
If there were no guard towers, no military contingent, and the State Department all but refused to provide adequate security at the special mission, just who was protecting the compound?
According to the State Department, there were eight Americans present the night of September 11, 2012. Besides Stevens, there were two temporary-duty assistant regional security officers (ARSOs) who had accompanied the ambassador from Tripoli; information management officer (IMO) Sean Smith, who was said to have arrived in Benghazi one week earlier; and five diplomatic security agents, three of whom were assigned to Benghazi on short term.17
Due to the glaring lack of significant security at the mission and to the unarmed guards who served as the first layer of security, the State Department reached out to a UK-based security detail company that delivers security solutions for clients around the world. The mission’s entire security therefore depended on “armed but poorly skilled Libyan February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade militia members and unarmed, locally contracted Blue Mountain Libya guards,” the State Department ARB report reveals.18 Specifically, there were normally four armed February 17 Martyrs Brigade members who resided inside the compound’s guest house building, acting as a de facto rapid response unit. In other words, these militia members worked within the gated complex. Blue Mountain, a private firm hired by the State Department, further provided five unarmed local Libyan guards “per eight-hour shift, 24/7, to open and close the gates, patrol the compound, and give warning in case of an attack,” states the Accountability Review Board. The actual night of the attacks, only three of the four February 17 Martyrs Brigade members were present, with one militia man absent for several days purportedly due to a family illness.19
Now let’s pause here briefly. Perhaps even more mystifying than the lack of significant security at the mission or the unarmed guards who served as the first layer of security was the presence of armed February 17 Martyrs Brigade members within the complex. Just who are the February 17 Martyrs Brigade?
The February
17 Martyrs Brigade is part of the al-Qaeda–linked Ansar al-Sharia, a militia that advocates the strict implementation of Islamic law and that took credit for attacks against other diplomatic posts in Benghazi before the September 11 attacks.
Ansar al-Sharia would become the first group to take responsibility for the Benghazi attacks in social media. The organization later claimed it “didn’t participate [in the attack] as a sole entity,” claiming the assault “was a spontaneous popular uprising” to an anti-Muhammad film that was released on YouTube.20 Witnesses told the media they saw vehicles bearing Ansar al-Sharia’s logo at the scene of the attack and said gunmen taking part boasted of belonging to the group. Some witnesses said they saw Ahmed Abu Khattala, a commander of Ansar al-Sharia, leading the attack.21 Contacted by news media, Khattala denied he was at the scene.22 In chapter 6 we will investigate how a strange move by President Obama all but thwarted a mission by U.S. Special Forces who were reportedly just hours away from capturing Khattala. More on that unreported scandal later.
Before you start asking why in the world the State Department would hire a known al-Qaeda–linked Islamic extremist organization to “protect” the special mission, consider this. Not only is this group part of the Ansar al-Sharia banner that reportedly attacked other Western outposts in Libya, but the February 17 Martyrs Brigade may have assailed the very mission it was hired to secure. That’s right. The Senate’s extensive report on the Benghazi attack reveals that the U.S. Benghazi mission “had been vandalized and attacked in the months prior to the September 11–12 attacks by some of the same [Libyan] guards who were there to protect it.”23 (It is unclear whether the guards referenced in the report were the February 17 Martyrs Brigade or the unarmed, local Libyan guards provided by Blue Mountain.)
LOOK WHO REFUSED TO HELP FLEEING AMERICANS
Did the al-Qaeda-linked February 17 Martyrs Brigade compromise U.S. security the night of the attacks? The Senate report for the first time reveals the February 17 Martyrs Brigade militia refused to protect the U.S. security team that was trapped inside the compound. “Three armed members” of the brigade were present and working as part of the mission’s security external detail during the attack. The security team asked brigade members to “‘provide cover’ for them to advance to the gate of the Temporary Mission Facility with gun trucks,” the report says. “The 17th February Brigade members refused, saying they preferred to negotiate with the attackers instead.”24
According to CIA notes, “the security team initiated their plan of assault on the mission compound” anyway. Some members of the brigade ended up getting into the vehicle, and a few members followed behind on foot to support the team.25
The Senate’s picture of the February 17 Martyrs Brigade members refusing to “provide cover” contrasts sharply with the image of the brigade painted in the State Department’s ARB report. The ARB report recounted the February 17 Martyrs Brigade complained to the local Libyan government on the U.S. special mission’s behalf after a uniformed Libyan police officer was caught taking pictures of the compound before the attack. The ARB report states that as soon as the attack began, the Martyrs of 17 February Brigade guards advanced “towards the Villa B area.” It also claims the brigade helped American personnel escape a roadblock while fleeing the compound. “The driver, ARSO 1, reversed direction to avoid a crowd farther down the street, then reverted back to the original easterly route toward the crowd after a man whom the DS (Diplomatic Service) agents believed to be with February 17 signaled them to do so.”26
So were the February 17 Martyrs Brigade members helpful or not? It’s hard to tell for sure, but according to the ARB report, the gunmen the night of the assault “appear to have used filled fuel cans that were stored next to new, uninstalled generators” to burn down one of the living quarters on the compound.27 That’s how the U.S. special mission was set ablaze. Did the February 17 Martyrs Brigade militia plan this? Were the fuel cans left there deliberately? Why aren’t these glaringly obvious questions being asked?
As we will further explore in chapter 4, the intruders were said to have inside knowledge of the layout of the compound, including the precise location of a secret safe room where Stevens was later holed up. Was it the February 17 Martyrs Brigade that provided the attackers with that critical information? Were these militia members among the gunmen who carried out the actual assault that night?
I am not asking open-ended questions here. We will further explore the possible nature of the February 17 Martyrs Brigade’s relationship with the mission in the next chapter, utilizing data to offer a plausible explanation for why these dangerous Islamist thugs were on the State’s payroll and inside the gates of the compound.
SHOCKER: STATE PULLED AIRCRAFT, SPECIAL FORCES FROM BENGHAZI
Now let’s put on steroids the question of why we hired armed Islamic extremists to serve as our special mission’s quick reaction force. The State Department normally provides security for our embassies and diplomatic personnel in the form of Security Support Teams (SSTs), which are made up of special U.S. forces trained for counterattacks on U.S. embassies. Reports have emerged that months before the September 11, 2012, assault, the State Department pulled the SSTs from the Benghazi mission.
It gets worse. In another largely unreported detail, the State Department denied a request for the continued use of an aircraft to move personnel and security equipment. Such an aircraft could have aided in the evacuation of the victims during the attack. Ultimately, the U.S. special mission had to wait for a Libyan C-130 transport cargo aircraft and other planes to be secured to move the victims from Benghazi to Tripoli and then from Tripoli to Western hospitals.
This bombshell information is contained in a February 2014 report by Republicans on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The report documents that on May 3, 2012, four months before the attack, State Department under secretary Patrick Kennedy “terminated Embassy Tripoli’s use of a DC-3 aircraft that provided logistical support to the SST.”28 We mentioned Kennedy earlier in this chapter for also denying guard towers to the mission.
According to The Aviationist blog, the Dos Wing DC-3 aircraft “provides a wide variety of missions, including reconnaissance and surveillance operations, command and control for counter-narcotics operations, interdiction operations, logistical support, Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC), personnel and cargo movement by air.”29
Shortly after the attacks on the Benghazi mission began, congressional staff met to discuss the events. In that meeting Lt. Col. Andrew Wood, a former Special Forces member from the Utah National Guard, “called the DC-3 ‘vital’ to moving sensitive personnel and equipment to and from Benghazi and Tripoli.”30
The State Department’s ARB report into Benghazi doesn’t once mention the cancellation of the DC-3 aircraft or the withdrawal of the SST forces. It does detail how evacuees, including victims of the attack, waited for several aircraft to be procured to aid in the evacuation of Benghazi following the attacks. The report notes that staff of the U.S. embassy in Tripoli, including the compound’s nurse, took a chartered jet to help in Benghazi. That jet departed Benghazi with the wounded at 7:30 a.m. local time, or three hours after the final assault on the CIA annex in Benghazi. However, numerous other American personnel remained in Benghazi, apparently awaiting other aircraft.
The report states, “Embassy Tripoli worked with the Libyan government to have a Libyan Air Force C-130 take the remaining U.S. government personnel from Benghazi.” The cargo jet did not arrive back in Tripoli until 11:30 a.m. The Defense Department sent two Air Force planes, a C-17 and a C-130, from Germany to Tripoli to evacuate the wounded. Those planes arrived in Tripoli at 7:15 p.m. local time, according to the Accountability Review Board.31
The detail about the State Department’s cancellation of the DC-3 aircraft for the U.S. missions in Libya was first reported by CNN in October 2012, citing an internal State Department e-mail. At the time, CNN quoted State Department deputy spokesman Mark Toner saying it was common
practice to use a DC-3 in locations where no commercial flights were available. “When commercial service was subsequently established (in Libya), we then moved that asset back to other State Department business,” Toner added.32
However, unmentioned was that the DC-3 was recalled from Benghazi along with another Kennedy decision that makes little security sense. The House report relates Kennedy in July 2012 rejected the U.S. military’s sixteen-member Security Support Team “despite compelling requests from personnel in Libya that the team be allowed to stay.”33 It was that SST that required use of the DC-3 aircraft.
Eric Allan Nordstrom, regional security officer at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, told House Republicans that “retaining the SST until other security resources became available was a ‘primary issue’ for him,” the House report states. The House report did not find credibility in State Department claims that Ambassador Chris Stevens himself rejected the use of the SST. Gregory Hicks, the No. 2 at the facility under Stevens, “vehemently denied this claim,” according to the House report.34
WHO’S LYING? BENGHAZI WITNESSES VS. STATE DEPT. ON “ARMED” GUARDS
As explained in the introduction to this book, it is difficult to recount the timeline of the attacks and the specifics of what transpired that night due to the conflicting reports from the State Department and the eyewitnesses. One of the many strange contradictions between the State-sponsored ARB version of events and testimony provided by Benghazi witnesses and victims regards whether personnel inside the U.S. special mission were armed during the attack.
