by Aeschylus
478 / 395 beneath the ground The Erinyes will be offered a very different home beneath the ground in Athens, and will finally accept it when they understand that it, too, will bring them honor.
480–578 / 397–489 Third episode Athena enters in answer to Orestes’ prayer and asks first the Erinyes, then Orestes to explain their presence at her shrine. Both ask her to decide their dispute, but she prefers to have it tried by a jury of Athenian citizens, whom she goes off to select. The manner of Athena’s entry has been a source of much discussion. We agree with most modern commentators in deleting a line (405 in the Greek, following on our 488a) that suggests that she arrives in the orchestra in a horse-drawn chariot. This is an alternative that probably found its way into the text when the producer of a revival of the trilogy decided to give Athena an entrance to match that of Agamemnon in the first play. Athena’s description of her journey (486–88 / 403–4) suggests wingless flight, so it is possible that she entered on the stage crane (mêchanê), a device that permitted actors to be swung through the air and onto the stage or the roof of the stage building. There is nothing in the text, however, that necessitates her entering in anything other than the usual way, though presumably at a faster than usual clip.
480–85 / 397–402 Athena has been at Troy, taking possession of land awarded to her, i.e., to “Theseus’ sons.” the Athenians. Her temporary absence made possible the Erinyes’ binding song, but why this particular journey? Aeschylus uses it to underline (once more; see note on 336) the easy identification of Athena with her city and its people, who are never far from her mind. He also brings the Trojan War into the ambit of successful Athenian undertakings rewarded by grateful allies, i.e., into a kind of model for the role Athens had chosen for herself since taking the lead in opposing Persian expansion in the early part of the fifth century. There may, however, be a more specific allusion here. We know that there was conflict between Athens and Mytilene in the sixth century over the town of Sigeum in the Troad, and that it ended with Sigeum in Athens’ possession (see Herodotus, Histories, 5, 94–95). Herodotus also tells us (5, 63) that Sigeum fell into the hands of the Peisistratid family when their tyranny was overthrown and they were driven from Athens in 510, and must have been in the orbit of Persia for some time thereafter. By 465 / 64 Athenians were involved in fighting there, and an inscription of 451 / 50 makes it clear that Sigeum is by then a member of the Athenian alliance. In short, this was a place in which Athens had a special interest, and the suggestion that it was part of a grant by the Achaeans that made it “completely and forever” a dependency of Athens might well allude to whatever events had recently led or were then leading to Sigeum’s absorption into the Athenian sphere of influence.
488 / 404 my aegis A regular attribute of Athena, a goatskin garment, often depicted with a fringe of snakes around it and the head of the Gorgon that Perseus killed at its center.
500 / 417 “Curses” The curse launched on a wrongdoer from the grave sends the Erinyes out to seek vengeance, and in this sense they are indeed embodied curses.
512 / 429 He won’t swear he’s innocent, or yield if I swear to his guilt In Athenian legal practice, if the parties agreed to employ the so-called “evidentiary oath,” the trial opened with the accuser taking an oath that the defendant had committed the deed, and the defendant that he had not. Orestes here will not agree, since of course he did kill his mother, but the critical issue is not the deed, but whether it was justified. Athena recognizes this, distinguishing between seeming to be just by relying on an oath and doing justice by examining the merits of the case (513–15 / 430–32).
517 / 434 the final one the Greek phrase aitias telos, literally, the “endpoint of guilt” or the “completion of the case,” is reminiscent in its use of the language of fulfillment and finality of Orestes’ “waiting for justice to be fulfilled” (telos dikês); see note on 273.
518 / 435 The Erinyes here, and Orestes at 555–57 / 468–69, both accept Athena as sole judge of the case, making her decision not to do so but to appoint a jury of Athenians all the more remarkable.
524 / 441 Ixion See Glossary for details, and cf. note on 835–36.
528–38 / 445–53 This is Orestes’ most elaborate statement of his ritual purity, and Athena acknowledges its importance in her response (562–64 / 473–74). For the claim, see note on 266.
558–61 / 470–72 Despite the agreement of both parties to accept her decision, Athena demurs. She explains her reluctance in terms of the burden, too great even for her, to judge a case that will produce so much anger however it is decided. She does indeed face a genuine dilemma, since her verdict must either damage her suppliant Orestes (see further on 563 / 474) or expose her beloved city to the poisonous wrath of the Erinyes (see note on 566–69). The dilemma is very like that of King Pelasgus in an earlier play of Aeschylus, the Suppliants. Pelasgus must decide whether to accept the supplication of the Danaids, who are fleeing unwanted marriage to their cousins, the sons of Aegyptus, and risk a terrible war, or reject it and risk the wrath of Zeus, who protects the rights of suppliants. He, too, refuses to decide by himself and brings the issue before his people to gain their support. One difference here, of course, is that Athena is a great deity herself. The comparison thus underlines the fact that, notwithstanding the enormous disparity in power, gods seek to avoid the anger or displeasure of mortals by failing to meet their responsibilities to those to whom they have bonds of obligation or friendship.
563 / 474 a proper suppliant Athena explicitly acknowledge that Orestes’ status as a suppliant who is ritually pure and brings no harm makes it grievous for her to reject his plea of innocence (cf. 262–63 / 233–34), and legitimate for him to feel wronged if she should do so.
566–69 / 477–79 To reject the Erinyes is dangerous for Athens, dearest of all places to Athena’s heart (see note on 480–85), and therefore a threat to her, too. These lines foreshadow threats that the Erinyes will make as soon as Orestes is acquitted (906–17 = 941–52 / 780–87 = 810–17).
570–71 / 483–84 I’ll choose / a panel of judges Athena, having decided that judgment in this case cannot be rendered by a mortal or by herself alone, decides to judge it together with a chosen body of Athenians, establishing a tribunal for the purpose over which she will preside and in which she will, as it turns out, have the deciding vote. Here, however, she mentions only her role to choosing the jurors and emphasizes she is founding “a court to last forever” (573 / 484). Thus, this exceptional case leads not only to the first murder trial (797 / 682), but to an institution Aeschylus’ audience still knows.
577 / 487 my ablest citizens This translates a phrase, astôn emôn ta beltista, that does not necessarily imply high social standing. Like the members of the Areopagus Council in Aeschylus’ day, however, Athena’s jury was not chosen democratically by election or lot. (See Wallace, The Areopagos Council [see Introduction, footnote 12], 94–97.
579–659 / 490–565 Second stasimon The Chorus presents itself, and its case, in a new and surprising light. Orestes’ fate was at the center of the previous song, as the Chorus sang and danced its binding web around him. Here, his crime is only the starting point for a reflection that moves outward to encompass the importance of fear for the well-being of society, and the role of justice—the retributive justice of the Erinyes, needless to say—in the lives of individuals and communities. The Erinyes no longer present themselves as relentless bloodhounds or blood-sucking monsters; they are agents of a stern morality that makes them sound in places like the Elders of Agamemnon (see below on 614 / 520–21, 626–27 / 533, 633–35 / 539–42, 646–59 / 553–65), and will later be echoed by Athena (see note on 610–20). The ode reminds us, just before the trial begins, that the Erinyes’ case cannot easily be dismissed, despite their own repulsiveness. It is perilous in the extreme to leave the demands of justice unmet.
593–94 / 502 We’ll / let any murder pass The Erinyes depict the spread of violent crime as their own refusal, should they
be dishonored by Orestes’ acquittal, to continue to fulfill their function. They identify their work so completely with that of justice (604–5 / 511–12), that for them the survival of justice in human society hangs in the balance at Orestes’ trial.
609 / 516 the house of Justice falls In the previous ode, the Erinyes identified their task as “the destruction of houses” (417 / 354–55) in which injustice has held sway; here, they imagine a world in which they no longer do their work as one in which the house of Justice itself is destroyed.
610–20 / 517–28 These ideas will be repeated in very similar terms by Athena at 813–17 / 696–99.
614 / 520–21 Wisdom comes from wailing Literally, “prudence from duress,” but our version makes use of the homophony of stenos “straits” and steno, “groan.” The idea is very similar to Agamemnon, 200–10 / 176–83.
626–27 / 533 sacrilege / gives birth to recklessness Cf. Agamemnon, 868–70 / 758–59. Lines 626–30 / 533–37 as a whole echo Agamemnon 860–91 / 750–81, where the Elders are at pains to show that reckless behavior (hybris) is the result of wickedness, and that prosperity depends on respect for justice and the containing of ambitions and desires within sane boundaries. This view explains the seemingly paradoxical embrace of the “middle way” (622 / 530) by a band of “wild revelers” (590 / 500), whose attitude until now has hardly seemed moderate.
633–35 / 539–42 the altar / of Justice, / don’t kick it over Cf. Agamemnon, 437–40 / 381–84.
639–41 / 545–49 These are two of the three prime ordinances set forth at 311–12 / 270–11. The third, honor the gods, is represented by the injunction to “revere / … the altar / of Justice” (632–34 / 539).
646–59 / 553–65 An extended parable, like the story of the lion cub (Agamemnon, 818–43 / 717–36), using nautical images familiar from Agamemnon, e.g., destruction by storm (745–49 / 653–57), jettisoning cargo (1152–56 / 1008–13), striking a hidden reef (1151 / 1006–7).
660–902 / 566–777 Fourth episode There is another change of scene at this point, but it resembles the refocusing of attention from orchestra to stage building that marks the shift from Agamemnon’s tomb to the palace in Libation Bearers, rather than the marked change of locale from Delphi to Athens earlier in this play. As at 264 / 235, little change to the playing space is needed for the move from Athena’s temple to the Areopagus, the hill of Ares where Orestes trial will take place—the removal of the wooden statue of Athena, perhaps, and the placement on stage of a table with voting urns, and probably of benches for the jurors (who are instructed to stand up to cast their votes, 827 / 708).
This episode can be regarded as the turning point of the entire trilogy, since it enacts the institution of a new civic form of justice, replacing the old uncontrolled and unbounded pursuit of vengeance by a legal procedure whose verdict is binding on all parties, and therefore final. The long succession of crimes in the house of Atreus is brought to an end at last in Athens, and in the process the first trial by jury and the first court of law come into being there.
660 / 566 Herald No proclamation of the beginning of the trial appears in our text, and it may well be that no Herald appeared on stage. Taplin, Stagecraft [see Introduction, footnote 7], 393, assumes that the trumpet call (661–62 / 567–68) is heard and amounts in effect to the Herald’s summons, but it could equally well be that Athena’s mention of proclamation and trumpet suffice to evoke them, so that their enactment is not required.
662 / 567–68 Etruscan trumpet Greek lore attributed the invention of this instrument to the “Tyrrhenians,” whom we know as Etruscans, or alternatively considered it a gift to them from Athena.
665–66 / 572–73 both / the city and these jurors The treatment of jurors and city as separate groups has suggested to some commentators that at least a few extras, representing those who gather to see and hear the trial, have entered along with Athena and the jury. It seems likely, however, that Athena refers, with a sweeping gesture of her arms, to the spectators in the theater who do, in fact, represent the city.
669 / 574 My lord Apollo Apollo apparently enters silently and without announcement just before he is addressed, a procedure that is anomalous. The Chorus’ greeting cuts short Athena’s announced intention of expounding her laws (666 / 571) and changes the direction of the proceedings. Athena does not return to the establishment of her new ordinance until 795 / 681. Instead, the trial itself begins, and the inconclusive debate between Apollo and the Erinyes can only be settled when the jury votes. Athena’s formal founding-speech for the new court is postponed until that moment is at hand.
680 / 583 the pursuer The Greek word diôkôn is the standard legal term for “plaintiff,” but it literally denotes one who pursues, and thus describes as well the role that the Erinyes have been playing, and that is now being transformed from physical persecution to legal prosecution.
687 / 589 Two more to go There were three falls in a Greek wrestling match; see note on Libation Bearers 386. Orestes replies that the Erinyes haven’t thrown him at all, because he never denied that he did the deed, only that he has any guilt from it.
702–6 / 604–8 Orestes’ first question and the Chorus Leader’s answer correspond closely to the exchange at 235–36 / 211–12, but the subsequent dialogue moves in a new direction as Orestes’ challenges the commonsense assumption that mother and son are blood relatives. He seems to have backed into a position he himself does not fully understand. He had earlier called the killing of his mother “blood- / shed that’s my own,” i.e., the shedding of blood he shared with her (Libation Bearers, 1175–76 / 1028), and his only answer to the Chorus Leader’s indignant objection is to turn to Apollo for help. Apollo will make the argument for him at 769–74 / 658–61.
722 / 621 No oath is stronger than almighty Zeus This is the culmination of an argument designed to make Orestes’ deed tantamount to following the command of Zeus and thus obligate the jurors to acquit him if they are not themselves to flout Zeus’ will. Apollo’s statement is couched in general terms, as at 243–44 / 217–18, where marriage vows are said to be “greater than any oath,” but it very generality disturbingly incorporates the oath the jurors took (572 / 483), and which Athena will enjoin them to respect when reaching their verdict (829 / 710).
731–32 / 627–28 not even by the far-shot arrow of / some Amazon To die in close combat brought glory (see, e.g., Libation Bearers, 395–98 / 345–48); to be killed from afar by an arrow was less glorious; to be killed by a woman, even in battle, would be inglorious; to be killed by a woman’s arrow would be an even greater indignity. And, says Apollo, Agamemnon’s death was far worse even than that. For the Amazons’ battle against Athens, see note on 800–6.
750 / 641 chain up his ancient father, Cronus For the myth of Zeus shackling Cronus and the Titans under ground after defeating them, alluded to already at Agamemnon, 189–96 / 168–72, see Hesiod, Theogony, 664–735. Such treatment of a father by a child would be reprehensible by human standards, although of course the Chorus Leader neglects to mention Cronus’ habit of swallowing his children the minute they were born (Theogony, 453–67). The Chorus Leader, however, is simply disputing Apollo’s claim that Zeus ordained the priority of the father’s rights over all others.
756–58 / 647–48 Apollo insists that the finality of death makes it entirely different from the imposition of chains; but his argument that “nothing can ever raise again” the man who has blood has been “sucked dry” by the ground is turned against him by the Chorus Leader’s reminder that Orestes has spilled his own mother’s blood on the ground (762–64 / 652–53). They insist, as they have all along, that such a pollution derived from kindred blood can never be purified (764–67 / 654–56). Now Apollo has no alternative but to present the argument that mothers do not share kindred blood with their children.
769–70 / 658–59 the so-called mother of the child / isn’t the child’s begetter This view, later supported by Aristotle (who ascribes it to the philosopher Anaxagor
as, a younger contemporary of Aeschylus), cannot be regarded as the sole, or even the dominant, Greek view on the subject in Aeschylus’ day. See further Introduction, pp. 24–25. It is the conclusive argument not because we can be sure that Aeschylus’ audience would have found it convincing, but because the Erinyes have no answer to offer. As for the play’s “internal audience,” Athena accepts Apollo’s view as grounds for Orestes’ acquittal (855–57 / 736–38), but the human jurors are evenly divided as to his guilt, and thus half of them appear to regard Apollo’s argument as fallacious or inconclusive.
776 / 663–64 And here before us is our witness Apollo’s proof is the exceptional case of Athena, born (in the version of the myth given here) entirely without a mother, although in Hesiod’s account (Theogony, 886–900), she has a mother, Metis, who conceives her in the usual way, only to be swallowed by Zeus. In both versions, however, Zeus brings Athena to birth himself.
785 / 671 a friend and ally The second of three references to an alliance between Argos and Athens; the first was at 335–36 / 289–91; see further on 885–98 / 762–74.
