by Jack Devine
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Like Afghanistan, Iraq will remain high on our list of priorities even though the war has ended and our troops have pulled out. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his Shi’ite allies are walking a delicate balance between appeasing Iraq’s Arab neighbors and Turkey and maintaining close ties with the Iranian regime, which exercises increasing levels of influence. Hopefully, Maliki will be able to continue to walk this line while keeping sectarian violence under control and convincing the Sunni parties to continue to participate in the political process, something that seems less likely by the day. As recent news continues to show there are real risks in the current scenario, including the potential for safe havens governed by al-Qaeda affiliates in Sunni-dominated regions, and they could become critical should the situation in Syria intensify or Sunni insurgent groups decide to accelerate their attacks against Shi’ites, civilians, or the government. The extent to which Iraq aligns with Iran will also bear strongly on the regional balance of power, and could have a significant impact on oil supplies in the event of a conflict between Iran and Israel and/or the United States.
As in Afghanistan, and in fact even more so, Iraq’s natural resources—its oil—will in large part determine its fate. If the various political parties and entities, including the very independent and industrious Kurdish population, can find a way to effectively leverage Iraq’s great oil wealth without devolving into sectarian violence and political infighting, there is a chance for stability in that country. But I do not anticipate a democratic state of the sort originally envisioned by President Bush and his advisers. Tragically, nearly forty-five hundred American casualties and more than a million service tours were unable to secure that result for the Iraqi people. Instead, the best we can hope for in Iraq in the next several decades is decreased violence and enough stability to foster economic growth.
Key to America’s understanding and ability to influence the Iraqi government’s balancing act will be maintaining a robust intelligence infrastructure. This is all the more important now that our overt presence has been vastly reduced. Overall U.S. influence in Iraq is going to continue to decline, regardless of our boldest attempts to preserve ties with subsequent governments there. But that does not mean all is lost. While the details of any intelligence infrastructure in Iraq will of course remain classified, it is safe to assume that we will continue to maintain a presence there to monitor the worrisome rise in Iranian influence, al-Qaeda activities, and an unstable political situation that is further inflamed by divisions over the disposition of natural resources.
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Iran is another country that could destabilize the region if we’re not careful, though for very different reasons. The situation there is quite unlike what we are leaving behind in Afghanistan, and the strategic game being played goes beyond the subtle tribal and political issues that will dominate U.S. engagements in many other parts of the world. The Islamic government of Iran will continue to wage a rhetorical war, making the United States, Israel, and our allies extraordinarily nervous. And if an Iranian nuclear capability is our chief concern, then we absolutely should be worried, because in spite of U.S. and allied efforts to stymie Iran’s nuclear program, the Iranian regime will eventually obtain a nuclear weapons capability, even if it isn’t fully weaponized. And while the current efforts to negotiate a deal are worth a try, the stakes are high, and in the case of failure, the risks of escalation will shoot up dramatically.
Estimates vary as to when Iran will actually succeed in obtaining a nuclear weapon, but overall most experts agree it is likely to have capability to produce the bomb within the next few years, assuming the current accord to freeze enrichment in exchange for temporarily reduced sanctions does not significantly impact the pace of the program.3 While Iran has borne serious economic and political costs for its unwillingness to cooperate, it is clear the regime is intent on eventually developing a nuclear weapon capability. The Iranians probably see little chance that anyone will launch a large-scale attack to stop it as long as it keeps such a bomb disassembled. The unwillingness of the United States and Israel to initiate steps toward a preemptive strike surely underscores this assessment, and I happen to agree that an attack is ill-advised. At the same time, nonmilitary efforts, such as sanctions, have not arrested Iran’s overall enrichment program, although the argument could be made that such efforts have delayed weaponization, particularly in light of the accord.
There is nevertheless a dangerous potential for miscalculation—an attack by Israel or, worse, the United States. Given Iran’s continued antagonization of the international community, the threat of an attack against it is unlikely to deter the program sufficiently as to stop its progress. In the event of an attack, Iran would likely decentralize its program and further disperse its facilities and scientists, which would only delay the creation of a nuclear weapon. Such an attack would also have profound negative consequences, including instigating a decision by Iran’s leadership to weaponize (or accelerate weaponization), legitimizing Iran’s narrative in the eyes of the international community, and bringing regional players further onto the side of Iran. Thus, any efforts to deter Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons are unlikely to succeed.
The Iranian regime has used demonstrations of foreign aggression to garner internal political support and justify its bellicosity toward Israel, the United States, and the West in general. Thus, it is almost certain that overt action against Iran would amplify the regime’s message and reduce the potential for actual political change. Covert action and sustained, robust intelligence collection therefore remain the preferred tools to delay the development of an Iranian nuclear capability.
But again, Iran will almost certainly, at some point, achieve some version of that capability, despite what may appear to be a temporary lull. Fortunately, the reality of an Iranian nuclear capability may be less cataclysmic than many observers predict, as it could create a Cold War–like stalemate in the Middle East based on mutual deterrence. One remote though potentially problematic aspect of this approach is the possibility of Iranian-sponsored groups or affiliates, and specifically Hezbollah, gaining access to an Iranian nuclear arsenal. Most observers of Hezbollah believe that the organization now operates with relative autonomy from Iran, despite continued financial and material support and leader Hassan Nasrallah’s continued allegiance to the Ayatollah al-Khamenei. This lack of full control makes it unlikely that Iran would provide nuclear weapons to the group, as it would be unsure of its ability to control their use. Of course, an ascendant Iran would be problematic for other reasons, including its ability to influence the domestic political balance in neighboring states such as Syria and Lebanon. We are already seeing both Iran and Hezbollah play a significant, destabilizing role in the Syrian civil war, another conflict that calls for substantially enhanced U.S. covert action, for all the reasons outlined in this book. In the long term, continued Iranian support to groups such as Hezbollah could prove a more enduring and sophisticated threat than an Iranian nuclear capability.
This is not to say the United States should not seek to do everything possible short of war to prevent or slow Iran’s nuclear program. We should continue to gather information on and interfere with the program covertly while using overt means such as sanctions and diplomatic pressure to raise the cost to Iran of its weapons program. But we should be under no illusion that these actions will have a decisive effect, and thus should focus our efforts in such a way that when Iran achieves its goal, we have the greatest possible influence in the region and can encourage regime change in Iran.
Domestic political shifts away from cleric-dominated rule combined with the stability brought on by a nuclear stalemate could reduce strife between Iran and its neighbors and push domestic issues to the forefront. Once Iran has achieved its nuclear goals, the leadership will lose a powerful political platform. Economic growth and technology will also continue driving young, educated Iranians toward Western values, regardless of the clerical establi
shment’s attempts to maintain control. Unlike in places such as Pakistan, where economic stagnation will continue to drive the population toward extremism, employment opportunities and education mean that Iran will get less extreme over time, not more.
We should position ourselves now to encourage and take advantage of these trends within Iran. This includes robust intelligence collection, the establishment of a flexible and responsive network of sources within the political opposition, and the cultivation of potential leaders within the Iranian diaspora who could help govern Iran if and when the current regime collapses.
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As mentioned earlier, part of the reason international terrorism is on a downward curve is that the rest of the world is looking inward as well. Just as the U.S. economy and war fatigue will lead our country to focus internally over the coming years, populations around the world will increasingly concentrate on their own political futures and events within their home countries. To put it simply, as world populations gain access to information, they are realizing that they have enough problems of their own and can’t waste time worrying about what the United States is allegedly up to. This is not to say that U.S. policy is irrelevant to their affairs. But for the foreseeable future, much of the world will be, for lack of a better word, distracted.
The Middle East is the clearest and most obvious example. The events of the Arab Awakening represent the beginning of this shift, with populations looking to their own leadership and political systems, rather than to neighbors or international actors, to explain stagnation and strife. In a region that has historically blamed its problems on external actors—specifically Israel and the United States—the vocal expression of dissatisfaction toward players such as the Egyptian military and subsequently the Muslim Brotherhood is historic, not just for its potential to open societies that have long been suppressed, but for what it says about the way information is shared and power is viewed by disenfranchised but politically active citizens.
The Arab Awakening and subsequent events such as the ousting of President Morsi in Egypt in July 2013 demonstrate that populations across the Middle East are less and less willing to follow leaders who fail to provide for their needs and who deprive them of economic and political freedom. The Internet and social media outlets such as Facebook and YouTube have played an important though not ultimately the driving role in this evolution as citizens are now able to triangulate information fed to them by those in positions of power. This trend will increase as the means by which information is communicated grow and governments’ ability to circumvent them contract.
There are already indications of countries swept up in these events losing interest in or simply lacking the bandwidth to “fight” international conflicts. The extent to which the governments that emerge from the Arab Awakening engage with and continue to focus on relations with regional and international actors remains to be seen. However, it is likely such regimes will be forced, at least initially, to concentrate on responding to the needs and expectations of their people. Foreign policy will come second to meeting the populations’ demands.
In the process of charting a new course for political leadership in the region, the inspiration and motivation spurred by the Arab Awakening will collide with discord from those who ousted the previous regimes over the shapes of the states that should replace them. The rise of Islamist movements will be central to this problem as many elements within those countries feel uncomfortable with, and are likely to oppose, strong Islamic rule. Military officers and former government leaders, traditional and secular, will likely oppose Islamization, increasing the likelihood that some form of authoritarianism will prevail.
There are significant but underappreciated limits on the extent to which social media outlets, which played such a central role in the downfall of the old guard in the Arab Awakening nations, can actually lead to the construction of new, functional political orders. I do not rule out that these tools may eventually evolve to the point where they can foster productive political growth, in addition to channeling dissatisfaction. But there are few indications that we have reached this point. Today, social media outlets are best positioned to tell governments what they should not do; the people of the Middle East—not to mention Russia and China—need those tools to be able to tell the government what it should do. This is, of course, a much more complicated and difficult prospect, and one that I suspect will not occur for quite some time.
The inability to produce real social change, combined with a desire to maintain the status quo, could create political orders in much of the Middle East that resemble previous “strongman” regimes. They are likely to have a more Islamic flavor than earlier ones, to the detriment of religious minorities and women. Nevertheless, they will rise with the promise of preventing more radical factions from gaining control.
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From South Asia to Iran, the Middle East to China and Russia, the United States faces a range of challenges that, while resembling past problems in certain important ways, will test our ability to understand our adversaries’ intentions and react to them. Understanding intentions will be a critical piece of this fight, as will the robust use of covert action to influence and affect events abroad while staying lean and “under the radar.”
The United States is stretched so thin militarily that we will refrain from projecting sufficient military might to prevent Russia from broadening its influence in Ukraine. Moreover, economic threats are unlikely to significantly alter Putin’s position on that country.
This is especially true because Putin and the Russian people believe their national security interests are at risk and are willing to use force to preserve them. Ukraine is important to the United States, but it is not vital and will not be seen as such by the American people. Putin understands this and will stay the course, working to lessen the impact of our political and economic actions.
In addition, the Russians will use overt and covert muscle to undermine the government in Kiev. We should be alert to this and try to check them, including via covert action, but short of using force.
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On the organizational side, there have been several efforts to improve the structure of the intelligence community over the last several years. The most significant of these was the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2005, a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. In its account of the terrorist attacks, the commission faulted the CIA, the FBI, the military, and other agencies with a lack of information sharing. To ostensibly remedy this situation, the commission proposed the ODNI.
Despite the 9/11 Commission’s best efforts and generally accurate findings, the reforms recommended in its report were driven more by political expediency than a clear understanding of the conditions leading up to the attacks of September 11. They were also partially driven by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which the U.S. military assumed the major role. It was thus unsurprising that the military’s purview and power over its own intelligence activities were relatively undisturbed. The CIA’s role, on the other hand, was diminished, most clearly in the loss of its long-standing role as the coordinating—indeed, the central—agency in the broader intelligence community. Among members of Congress, it was distrust of the CIA, its perceived culpability for 9/11, and its failure to find WMD in Iraq that also helped propel creation of the new director of national intelligence, who assumed the role traditionally played by the DCI as the community’s titular head.
The result of the post-9/11 intelligence reforms has been, in my view, a diminished CIA in its traditional role, a muddled new intelligence bureaucracy with less coherence, and more fractured leadership. While it is extremely difficult to roll back any agency once erected by Congress, especially now that the DNI has been running for more than ten years, Congress should revisit its utility and perhaps curtail its staffing and tasking.
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Centralization of the intelligence community is a worthy cause, but it shou
ld have been done under the CIA, not with an external bureaucracy such as the DNI. When it was created in 1947, the CIA was envisioned as the central intelligence agency, and was given a preeminent role within the American intelligence community. Lieutenant General Ken Minihan, who served as the director of both the NSA and the Defense Intelligence Agency in the late 1990s, explains it quite simply: “The C in DCI matters, and the C in CIA matters.”4 I could not agree more. The thinking in 1947 was that the nation needed one agency that would bring together the central disciplines of the intelligence business—espionage and covert action (operations), analysis, and technology—under one guiding hand. Previously, the disparate intelligence functions were dispersed primarily among the various military services, with some additional functions being the responsibility of the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
I continue to believe that the Agency’s founding fathers got it right in the aftermath of World War II: the nation needed a strong, central intelligence agency that would bring together core missions so each could influence and enhance the others. Over the intervening decades, however, this vision slowly gave way again to a more dispersed intelligence community. New agencies were added, many of them inside the Department of Defense. This expanded the community and diluted the centrality of the CIA. Many of these agencies specialized in one particular aspect of intelligence collection, such as signals intelligence or satellites or human intelligence for military customers, and this made it somewhat harder to keep all the core missions of intelligence under the guidance of a single authority. The majority of the intelligence budget and personnel was allocated not to the CIA but to the Department of Defense. It is worth pondering that more than half the seventeen agencies that make up the intelligence community are part of the Pentagon.
Columbia professor Richard Betts describes the evolution of the intelligence community as a natural pendulum swing between centralization and decentralization. “You need both, centralization to ensure coordination and pluralism to ensure second-guessing. The tension is between the need to share and the need to know for information security purposes.”5 Pluralism is certainly worthwhile, but not when the organization designed to be at the center is moving farther toward the margins. Vice Admiral Tom Wilson, who was the director of DIA from 1999 to 2002, makes a good point on varying perspectives in the intelligence community, which is that different intelligence agencies have different customers, so they may end up looking at different elements of the same “targets” from very different perspectives, and with their customers’ specific requirements in mind. “What naval intelligence may do with regard to the Chinese navy in terms of getting a battle group prepared for a Western Pacific deployment or contingency is very different from what CIA is going to do on what the Chinese economy will allow them to spend in terms of establishing their navy, which is also different from what DIA would do on where their navy organizations are going with long-term development,” he said.6 I agree, but I would note that over the years the Defense Department has moved further into nonmilitary intelligence collection, based in part on its standing requirement for “a second set of eyes” or for “preparation of the battlefield.” In some cases, the Pentagon’s expanding role is justified by its mounting and increasingly complex set of requirements, including information for weapons designers and tactical doctrine developers, combatant commanders’ geopolitical needs, and the Joint Chiefs’ need to understand foreign military leaders. Nevertheless, even these sometimes appear to drift into what in the past was viewed as the domain of civilian collectors.
