I extend a special salute to the Miller Center at the University of Virginia, which fortuitously made dozens of transcripts from its George W. Bush Oral History Project publicly available just as I began writing this book. Thanks to Russell Riley, co-chair of the Miller Center’s Presidential Oral History Program, for cheerfully fielding my many queries and going beyond the call of duty to triple-check the original audio recording of General Peter Pace’s interview to make sure a colorful quotation was correct.
A special shout-out goes to Candace Rondeaux, a journalist and analyst who covered the war in Afghanistan for years. Thanks also to the Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training and its invaluable Foreign Affairs Oral History Program. Charles Stuart Kennedy, the program director since its inception in 1985, has personally interviewed more than one thousand retired American diplomats and the transcripts are always illuminating to read.
Several Post colleagues played essential roles in bringing this book to life, and I can’t thank them enough for their hard work and expertise. Nick Kirkpatrick reviewed tens of thousands of photographs of the war in Afghanistan and curated a remarkable selection of images. The beautiful map inside the cover is the result of Laris Karklis’s cartographic artistry. Julie Tate rigorously fact-checked the manuscript and helped compile the source citations. Needless to say, any errors or omissions are my responsibility alone.
It has been my greatest pleasure to collaborate with David Fallis, the front-line editor of this book and my longtime Post colleague and friend. We first teamed up on an investigative project more than two decades ago; his enthusiasm, drive and determination to get it right are unparalleled. A bulldog of a journalist, he belongs to that rare breed whose reporting and editing skills are equally of the highest caliber.
Finally, and most meaningfully, a heartfelt thank-you to my wife, Jennifer Toth, and our son, Kyle Whitlock. Jenny is a far more talented author and writer than me, and I cannot express how much I have depended on, and benefited from, her advice, love and steadfast support. Like many Americans, 9/11 reshaped our lives in unpredictable ways. Soon after we celebrated Kyle’s first birthday in 2001, The Post sent me to Pakistan to help cover the war, the start of a journey that ultimately took our family all over the world. The past two decades have been an adventure, but none of it would have been possible, or worthwhile, without them.
—Craig Whitlock
Silver Spring, Maryland
March 1, 2021
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© THE WASHINGTON POST
Craig Whitlock is an investigative reporter for The Washington Post. He has covered the global war on terrorism for The Post since 2001 as a foreign correspondent, Pentagon reporter, and national security specialist. In 2019, his coverage of the war in Afghanistan won the George Polk Award for Military Reporting, the Scripps Howard Award for Investigative Reporting, the Investigative Reporters and Editors Freedom of Information Award, and the Robert F. Kennedy Journalism Award for international reporting. He has reported from more than sixty countries and is a three-time finalist for the Pulitzer Prize. He lives in Silver Spring, Maryland.
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Endnotes
FOREWORD
“There was no campaign plan”: Gen. Dan McNeill interview, undated, Lessons Learned Project, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).
“no coherent long-term strategy”: Gen. David Richards interview, September 26, 2017, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“We did not know what we were doing”: Ambassador Richard Boucher interview, October 15, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“We didn’t have the foggiest notion”: Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute interview, February 20, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“magnitude of this dysfunction”: Ibid.
“I have no visibility”: Donald Rumsfeld memo to Steven Cambone, September 8, 2003, National Security Archive, George Washington University.
“this is about decades”: Gen. Peter Pace interview, January 19, 2016, George W. Bush Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
CHAPTER ONE: A MUDDLED MISSION
“I may be impatient”: Donald Rumsfeld memo to Doug Feith, Paul Wolfowitz, Gen. Dick Myers and Gen. Pete Pace, April 17, 2002, the National Security Archive, George Washington University. The document was partially declassified by the Defense Department on September 22, 2010.
“The only thing you can do”: Donald Rumsfeld interview with MSNBC, March 28, 2002.
the “most confident man” in America: Ibid.
“I am getting concerned”: Donald Rumsfeld memo to Larry Di Rita and Col. Steven Bucci, March 28, 2002, the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
“If I were to write a book”: Former senior State Department official interview, October 8, 2014, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“What were we actually doing”: U.S. official interview, February 10, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“If there was ever a notion”: Boucher interview, October 15, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“a systematic government”: Ibid.
“We received some general guidance”: Lt. Cmdr. Philip Kapusta interview, May 1, 2006, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
The secret, six-page document: Unsigned memo, “U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan,” October 16, 2001, the National Security Archive, George Washington University. Originally labeled as “draft for discussion,” a handwritten note on the document states that the strategy was approved at a National Security Council meeting on October 16, 2001. In an October 30, 2001 snowflake attached to the memo, Rumsfeld called it “a pretty good paper” and added: “It seems to me that it is useful to update this from time to time.” The document was declassified in full by the Defense Department on July 20, 2010.
“The U.S. should not commit”: Ibid.
“we wanted to avoid the big footprint”: Douglas Feith interview, March 22–23, 2012, George W. Bush Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
four hours to get it done: Ibid.
sat in front of his computer: Ibid.
“the fucking stupidest guy on the face of the earth”: Woodward, Plan of Attack, p. 281. In his own book, published after Woodward’s, Franks described Feith as “the dumbest fucking guy on the planet.” Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: Regan Books, 2004), p. 362.
“He was always right”: Gen. George Casey interview, September 25, 2014, George W. Bush Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
Feith got along well with Pace: Pace interview, Miller Center.
“I turned around to Pace”: Feith interview, Miller Center.
some obvious questions: Ibid.
“One of the guys actually said”: Kapusta interview, Combat Studies Institute.
“Around November we were wondering”: Pace interview, Miller Center.
“they needed a bath”: Maj. Jeremy Smith interview, January 9, 2012, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“Even before the plane stopped”: Ibid.
guarding the 2002 Winter Olympics: Vice Adm. Ed Giambastiani memo to Donal
d Rumsfeld, January 30, 2002, the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
“There was one shower”: Maj. David King interview, October 6, 2005, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“It was moon dust”: Maj. Glen Helberg interview, December 7, 2009, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“Afghanistan’s done”: Maj. Lance Baker interview, February 24, 2006, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“The guys just played video games”: Maj. Andrew Steadman interview, March 15, 2011, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“It was actually very boring”: Maj. Steven Wallace interview, October 6, 2010, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“We originally said that we don’t do nation-building”: Stephen Hadley interview, September 16, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“everybody was talking about a year or two”: Ambassador Robert Finn interview, October 22, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“How many more attacks have there been”: Gen. Tommy Franks interview, October 22, 2014, George W. Bush Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
“Now, we created other problems”: Ibid.
“There was no campaign plan in the early days”: McNeill interview, Lessons Learned Project.
“ ‘Who is General McNeill?’ ”: Donald Rumsfeld memo, October 21, 2002, the National Security Archive, George Washington University. The name of the memo recipient was redacted by the Defense Department.
CHAPTER TWO: “WHO ARE THE BAD GUYS?”
“Greetings from scenic Kandahar”: Roger Pardo-Maurer letter from Kandahar, August 11–15, 2002, the National Security Archive, George Washington University. In a September 13, 2002, snowflake, Rumsfeld asked his aide, Larry Di Rita, to obtain a copy of the Pardo-Maurer letter for him to read.
“a quasi-Venusian sub-Martian environment”: Ibid.
“If there is a landscape less welcoming”: Ibid.
“a formidable pack”: Ibid.
“crude vainglorious chumps”: Ibid.
“quite likely the deadliest bunch in town”: Ibid.
“Time is of the essence here”: Ibid.
“we didn’t know jack shit about al-Qaeda”: Robert Gates interview, July 9, 2013, George W. Bush Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
“The complexities will take a long time to unravel”: Jeffrey Eggers interview, August 25, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“Why, if we were focused on al-Qaeda, were we talking about the Taliban?”: Ibid.
“basically getting stoned at the time as a hippie”: Michael Metrinko interview, October 6, 2003, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
“Much of what we call Taliban activity was really tribal”: Ibid.
“ran around in beards and funny clothes”: Ibid.
his unit’s mission was to capture and kill “anti-coalition militia”: Maj. Stuart Farris interview, December 6, 2007, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“We had to figure out who the bad guys were”: Ibid.
“how the hell do you know it’s the Taliban?”: Maj. Thomas Clinton interview, March 12, 2007, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
just “hillbillies” from small towns: Maj. Gen. Eric Olson interview, July 23, 2007, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.
“They thought I was going to come to them with a map”: Special Forces combat adviser interview, December 15, 2017, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“I have no visibility into who the bad guys are”: Donald Rumsfeld memo to Steve Cambone, September 8, 2003, the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
a critical mass of intelligence reports: “Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today,” Report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, November 30, 2009.
“You say, ‘Why didn’t you?’ ”: Franks interview, Miller Center.
Yet nobody had asked for that many troops: “Tora Bora Revisited,” Report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, November 30, 2009.
During the apex of the fighting: Maj. William Rodebaugh interview, February 23, 2010, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“We were ready if they asked us”: Ibid.
In response to criticism: “Tora Bora Revisited,” Report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, November 30, 2009.
“Mr. bin Laden was never within our grasp”: Tommy Franks, “War of Words,” The New York Times, October 19, 2004.
a dubious set of talking points: “U.S. Department of Defense Talking Points—Bin Laden Tora Bora,” October 26, 2004, the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
“ ‘Tora Bora is the deal, Franks. He’s in Tora Bora’ ”: Franks interview, Miller Center.
The hotel assured its guests that it had removed pork from the menu: Dobbins, After the Taliban, p. 82.
“A major mistake we made”: Barnett Rubin interview, August 27, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“Everyone wanted the Taliban to disappear”: Barnett Rubin interview, January 20, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“we violated the Afghan way of war”: Todd Greentree interview, May 13, 2014, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
“the original sin”: “An Interview with Lakhdar Brahimi,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, Fall 2004.
“there was a missed opportunity”: Ambassador James Dobbins interview, January 11, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“Maybe we were not agile or wise enough”: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad interview, December 7, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
CHAPTER THREE: THE NATION-BUILDING PROJECT
they found overflowing toilets: Franks interview, Miller Center.
a thick haze of smoke: Metrinko interview, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
“mile after mile of basically lifeless lug”: Ambassador Ryan Crocker interview, January 11, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
one hundred Marine guards had to share a single toilet: Metrinko interview, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
“no real authority and nothing to work with”: Crocker interview, January 11, 2016, SIGAR.
allocating $143 billion for reconstruction: “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” January 30, 2021, SIGAR, p. 25.
“the writing is on the wall now”: Michael Callen interview, October 22, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“pretty hard to justify and defend”: Crocker interview, January 11, 2016, SIGAR.
no banks and no legal tender: Senior USAID official interview, June 3, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“It’s hard to explain to people”: Ibid.
Thirty people crowded around the table: Boucher interview, SIGAR.
“It was just like the American cabinet”: Ibid.
“This huge banquet with piles of rice and dead goats”: Ibid.
“We released the furies and then went home”: Hadley interview, SIGAR.
“Nation-building was not high on the agenda”: U.S. official interview, September 23, 2014, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
the policy had “changed from anti– to pro–nation-building”: U.S. official interview, December 4, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“There was a profound sense of a lack of possibility”: Richard H
aass interview, October 23, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“There was just not any appetite”: Ibid. In an email to the author in December 2019, Haass added: “There was no enthusiasm—as contrasted with Iraq, where there was altogether too much enthusiasm.”
“what is our theory and objectives?”: Senior Bush administration official interview, June 1, 2005, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
He summarized Rumsfeld’s mindset this way: Ambassador Ryan Crocker interview, December 1, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“There was no way the State Department”: Dobbins interview, SIGAR.
“the critical problem in Afghanistan is not really a security problem”: Donald Rumsfeld memo to President George W. Bush, August 20, 2002, the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
“we could run the risk of ending up being as hated as the Soviets were”: Ibid.
“a misunderstood figure”: Marin Strmecki interview, October 19, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“It is often easier to do stuff ourselves”: Ibid.
“We originally said that we won’t do nation-building”: Hadley interview, SIGAR. In an email to the author in December 2019, Hadley added: “There is a good reason we do not have a stabilization model that works. The United States has rightly invested heavily and consistently in our military—and produced the finest military the world has ever known. But the United States has underinvested in those civilian tools and capabilities of diplomacy, economic and social development, democratic governance, infrastructure development, and civilian institution building that are essential for any post-conflict stabilization effort to succeed. Even so, a lot positive was accomplished in Afghanistan.”
The Afghanistan Papers Page 30
