“Afghans, like most other people, are quite willing to accept large sums of money”: Metrinko interview, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
“an appalling piece of complete raw naivete”: Anthony Fitzherbert interview, June 21, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. In a December 2019 email to a Washington Post reporter, Fitzherbert added: “The ‘cash for poppies programme’ was finally abandoned and cancelled when it became clear that it was not only not working, but that it was having negative consequences. I hasten to add here that I myself had no direct involvement with this programme in any form or capacity.”
INL posted just one employee to the U.S. embassy: Barno interview, U.S. Army Center of Military History.
“There was literally no coordination”: Gilchrist interview, U.S. Army Center of Military History.
“no one’s in charge”: Donald Rumsfeld memo to Doug Feith, November 29, 2004, the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
“We somehow came up with the explanation that it was drugs”: Barnett Rubin interview, August 27, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“She thinks it is important to act soon”: Donald Rumsfeld memo to Gen. Dick Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith and Tom O’Connell, October 19, 2004, the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
“opium could strangle the legitimate Afghanistan state in its cradle”: State Department cable, “Confronting Afghanistan’s Corruption Crisis,” National Security Archive.
“Uribe was a credible leader”: John Wood interview, June 17, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“Karzai thought this would be seen by Afghans as chemical warfare”: Khalilzad interview, SIGAR.
“to halt all U.S. economic activity west of the Mississippi”: Ambassador Ronald McMullen interview, August 1, 2012, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
Wide-eyed congressmen saw poppies growing everywhere: State Department cable, Kabul to Washington, “Codel Hoekstra Sees Poppy Problem First Hand,” March 23, 2006, WikiLeaks. The cable was classified CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN.
“I would just say they were pretty flowers”: Boucher interview, SIGAR.
“desperate pressure for short-term results”: Ambassador Ronald Neumann interview, June 18, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“the single most ineffective program in the history of American foreign policy”: Richard Holbrooke, “Still Wrong in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, January 23, 2008.
“It actually strengthens the Taliban and al-Qaeda”: Ibid.
CHAPTER TWELVE: DOUBLING DOWN
“We may have done too good of a job explaining how bad it is”: Maj. Fred Tanner interview, March 4, 2010, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“He said it very professionally”: Ibid.
“there has to be more to solving this problem than killing people”: Maj. Gen. Edward Reeder interview, October 26, 2017, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. In a December 2019 email to a Washington Post reporter, Reeder added: “At the time of this quote in 2009, I was quite content with how General David McKiernan… was prosecuting the counterinsurgency campaign and had no issues with supporting his strategy. My point of the quote at the time I arrived in February 2009 as the commander of the Combined Forces Special Operations Command, I felt we need[ed] another alternative to attacking the Taliban… I thought we needed a grass roots, local defense initiative that would make the Taliban uncomfortable with fighting locals of the same ethnicity and shared tribal affiliation.”
“It was a lot more convoluted”: Maj. George Lachicotte interview, November 1, 2011, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“There wasn’t a clear strategy”: Ibid.
“What does it look like when it comes time for us to leave?”: Maj. Joseph Claburn interview, September 13, 2011, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“He pushes himself mercilessly”: Dexter Filkins, “Stanley McChrystal’s Long War,” New York Times Magazine, October 14, 2009.
“drunk on their Iraq experience”: Maj. John Popiak interview, March 15, 2011, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
a “properly resourced” counterinsurgency campaign: “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” International Security Assistance Force, August 30, 2009. The report was originally classified CONFIDENTIAL. The Defense Department declassified most of the report on September 20, 2009, after Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward obtained a copy and informed Obama administration officials that The Post intended to publish it. The Post published the declassified version on September 21, 2009.
“There are big implications with calling this a war”: Senior NATO official interview, February 24, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
To paper over the problem: Ibid.
“the perception was that al-Qaeda was no longer a problem”: Ibid.
“we rarely tried to understand what the disease was”: USAID official interview, October 18, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“he knew he would get in trouble if he said that”: Barnett Rubin interview, February 17, 2017, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“Pakistan will remain the single greatest source of Afghan instability”: State Department cable, Kabul to Washington, “COIN Strategy: Civilian Concerns,” November 6, 2009.
“dig us in more deeply”: Department of State cable, Kabul to Washington, “Looking Beyond Counterinsurgency In Afghanistan,” November 9, 2009. Both cables were classified SECRET. The New York Times obtained copies of the cables and published them online. Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Envoy’s Cables Show Worries on Afghan Plans,” New York Times, January 25, 2010.
“The timeline was just sprung on us”: Gen. David Petraeus interview, August 16, 2017, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
like Petraeus, he said he was “stupefied”: Rubin interview, February 17, 2017, SIGAR.
“there was a mismatch between deadline and strategy”: Ibid. In a December 2019 email to the author, Rubin added: “I am surprised I said that. Maybe the notes are wrong. I always firmly believed that the audience for the timeline was the Pentagon, no one else. I understood why the president wanted to do that, but he did not take into account how it would be heard in the region.”
“I can’t describe the smell”: Smith interview, Combat Studies Institute.
“Been there, done that”: Ibid.
“ ‘Hey sir, why the hell are we doing this?’ ”: Maj. Jason Liddell interview, April 15, 2011, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“I have a difficult time answering”: Ibid.
a string of backbiting, catty remarks: Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General,” Rolling Stone, July 8, 2010.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: “A DARK PIT OF ENDLESS MONEY”
“It’s like pouring a lot of water into a funnel”: David Marsden interview, December 3, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. In a December 2019 email to a Washington Post reporter, Marsden added that “the most important issue that affected the outcome [of the war] was totally in our control: the one-year rotation of personnel. As a very rare person who worked on Afghanistan in and out of the country for eight years I learned the impact of that almost like an Afghan.”
“We lost objectivity”: USAID official interview, October 7, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
Washington expected him to dole out roughly $3 million daily: Aid contractor interview, August 15, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“He said hell no”: Ibid.
lavished money on dams and highways: Lute interview, SIGAR.
“Can’t we get a bit more rational about this?”: Ibid.
“in some God-forsaken province”: Ibid.
“The police chief couldn’t even open the door”: Ibid.
“they wanted their kids out herding goats”: Special Forces team adviser interview, December 14, 2017, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“It blew my mind”: Tim Graczewski interview, January 11, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“Don’t know who did it”: Ibid.
found it largely deserted: “Shorandam Industrial Park: Poor Recordkeeping and Lack of Electricity Prevented a Full Inspection of this $7.8 million Facility,” SIGAR Inspection Report, April 2015.
“Why did we think providing electricity”: Senior USAID official interview, August 15, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
He had deep misgivings about the dam project: Crocker interview, December 1, 2016, SIGAR.
“I was sure it was never going to work”: Ibid.
“it was all nonsense”: NATO official interview, February 24, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
spent $775 million on the dam: “Afghanistan’s Energy Sector,” SIGAR 19-37 Audit Report, May 2019.
he raised what he called the “bigger” question: Eggers interview, SIGAR.
“Why does the U.S. undertake actions that are beyond its abilities?”: Ibid.
“Petraeus was hell-bent on throwing money at the problem”: U.S. military officer interview, July 18, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“What drove spending was the need to solidify gains”: Petraeus interview, SIGAR.
Afghan farmers were a century behind the times: Col. Brian Copes interview, January 25, 2011, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“a certain elitist bias”: Ibid.
“We were always chasing the dragon”: Senior USAID official interview, November 10, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“the shit kicked out of me”: Former State Department official interview, August 15, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“They started shouting, ‘We have cleared Garmsir’ ”: Barna Karimi interview, January 16, 2017, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
they paid little attention to who was benefiting: Safiullah Baran interview, February 18, 2017, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
a brother who was in the local wing of the Taliban: Ibid.
“Afghans are some of the most jealous people I’ve ever met”: U.S. official interview, June 30, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
a giveaway that they were cut-and-pasted: Army civil-affairs officer interview, July 12, 2016, Lessons Learned project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“the smartest thing to do is nothing”: Ibid.
Likened the flood of aid to “crack cocaine”: Brian Copes interview, February 25, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
built a replacement greenhouse out of iron rebar: Ibid.
“Congress gives us money to spend”: Ibid.
Despite its best efforts: “Department of Defense Commanders’ Emergency Response Program: Priorities and Spending in Afghanistan for Fiscal Years 2004–2014,” SIGAR Office of Special Projects, April 2015.
“nothing but walking-around money”: Ken Yamashita interview, December 15, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. In a December 2019 email to a Washington Post reporter, Yamashita added: “CERP is walking-around money in the sense that it was never meant to be used as long-term reconstruction funding. Some of the reconstruction was meant to rebuild after military engagement; at other times it was meant to provide support to community leaders. In this second purpose, it did serve a political purpose by supporting the leadership of the community.”
“a dark pit of endless money”: NATO official interview, February 24, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“We wanted hard quantitative metrics”: U.S. Army officer interview, June 30, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“It was an insult to the people”: Wesa interview, SIGAR.
“all the schoolteachers quit their jobs”: Thomas Johnson interview, January 7, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. In a December 2019 email to the author, Johnson added: “Unbeknownst to the Canadians the village’s few schoolteachers, who were making between $60–80 per month, immediately quit their jobs to dig irrigation canals at a higher salary and obviously disrupted the village’s educational system. As soon as this fact was relayed to the Canadians, they raised the salaries of the schoolteachers and the problem was corrected.”
“There weren’t enough teachers to fill them”: U.S. military officer interview, July 11, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: FROM FRIEND TO FOE
“He thought he was corrupt as hell”: Rubin interview, January 20, 2015, SIGAR. In a December 2019 email to the author, Rubin added: “I tried to convince Holbrooke that he was blaming Karzai for problems whose source was the U.S. Given the system we had set up of off-the-books money for counterterrorism forces and militia leaders, Karzai could not compete politically without getting access to the same sources of money himself. The ‘official’ political system of elections and so on was a façade for the real power game. The former was supported by the State Department, the latter was run by CIA and the Defense Department.”
“The reason Karzai made deals with the warlords”: Gates interview, Miller Center.
he leaned over and whispered a message: Ibid.
“there was blatant foreign interference”: Ibid.
the spy agency encouraged him: Partlow, A Kingdom of Their Own, p. 44–47.
Pakistan’s ISI spy agency first floated Karzai’s name: Ambassador James Dobbins interview, July 21, 2003, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
“Karzai was telegenic and cooperative”: Ibid.
dove on top of Karzai: Ian Shapira, “The CIA acknowledges the legendary spy who saved Hamid Karzai’s life—and honors him by name,” Washington Post, September 18, 2017.
Karzai’s satellite phone rang: Lyse Doucet, “The Karzai years: From hope to recrimination,” BBC News, July 11, 2014.
“Hamid, what’s your reaction?”: Ibid.
“Just a cold, drafty palace to try and preside over”: Ambassador Ryan Crocker interview, September 9, 2010, George W. Bush Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.
Crocker jumped at the chance for a homemade meal: Ibid.
“We need a flag”: Crocker interview, December 1, 2016, SIGAR.
“That’s up to you”: Ibid.
“Like I had a clue”: Crocker interview, Miller Center.
“It was a day I will never forget”: Donald Rumsfeld memo to President George W. Bush, December 9, 2004, the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
The menu rarely changed: Khalilzad, The Envoy, p. 132–133.
“When I went to Iraq, Karzai was so popular”: Khalilzad interview, SIGAR.
Karzai needed to spend hours talking: Strmecki interview, SIGAR.
accusing Ahmed Wali Karzai of controlling the drug trade: Sami Yousafzai, “A Harvest of Treachery,” Newsweek, January 8, 2006.
“we have never had clear evidence that one could take to court”: Department of State cable, Kabul to Washington, “Karzai Dissatisfied: Worries about Newsweek; Plans More War Against Narcotics,” January 10, 2006, WikiLeaks. The cable was classified CONFIDENTIAL.
For years, the agency paid him: Dexter Filkins, Mark Mazzetti, and James Risen, “Brother of Afghan Leader Said to be Paid by C.I.A.,” The New York Times, October 27, 2009.
“By targeting him, we were damaging our relations”: Greentree interview, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
“Karzai was never sold on democracy”: Hadley interview, SIGAR.
&nbs
p; “Whenever we do an airstrike”: Amir Shah and Jason Straziuso, “Afghan officials: US missiles killed 27 civilians,” Associated Press, July 6, 2008.
Witnesses reported that as many as sixty children died: Letter to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on U.S. Airstrikes in Azizabad, Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch, January 15, 2009.
“in self-defense, necessary and proportional”: Memorandum for Acting Commander, “Executive Summary of AR 15-6 Investigation,” U.S. Central Command, October 1, 2008.
“financial, political, and/or survival agendas”: Ibid.
“We killed our allies”: U.S. military officer interview, January 8, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“Every time we had a huge fight with Karzai”: Gates interview, Miller Center.
“People were just dissing Karzai”: Ibid.
Biden threw down his napkin: Woodward, Obama’s Wars, p. 70.
He wants to get rid of me and of you: Kai Eide, “Afghanistan and the U.S.: Between Partnership and Occupation,” Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2014.
“two contrasting portraits”: State Department cable, Kabul to Washington, “Karzai on the State of U.S.–Afghan Relations,” July 7, 2009, WikiLeaks. The cable was originally classified SECRET.
“a paranoid and weak individual”: Ibid.
Karzai accused Holbrooke of undermining him: Packer, Our Man, p. 484–486.
“once bitten, twice shy”: Margaret Warner, “Interview with Afghan President Hamid Karzai,” PBS Newshour with Jim Lehrer, November 9, 2009.
“It strains credulity to expect Karzai to change”: State Department cable, “COIN Strategy: Civilian Concerns.”
“He used erratic behavior as a technique”: Ambassador Marc Grossman interview, June 13, 2014, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
CHAPTER FIFTEEN: CONSUMED BY CORRUPTION
Much of the money landed in the emirate of Dubai: Andrew Higgins, “An Afghan exodus, of bank notes,” Washington Post, February 25, 2010.
The Afghanistan Papers Page 33
