by Norman Stone
8Barsukov: Podgotovka p. 56.
9M. N. Pokrovski: Drei Konferenzen (Berlin 1920) p. 28 for Izvolski’s view of the need for a navy. Shatsillo remains the outstanding source on naval matters (and cf. his articles in Istoricheskiye Zapiski 75 (1965) and 83 (1969) on naval matters). There is still much use in M. Petrov: Podgotovka Rossi k voyne na more (Moscow 1926); cf. the official Soviet history: Flot v pervoy mirovoy voyne (2 vols. Moscow 1964) which takes a surprisingly pious attitude.
10W. A. Suchomlinow: Erinnerungen (Berlin 1925); Rödiger: ‘Iz zapisok’ in Krasny Arkhiv 60(1933) pp. 92–133 esp. p. 93–4; V. Kokovtsev: Out of my Past (Stanford, Calif. 1935); V. A. Apushkin: General ot porazheniya V. A. Sukhomlinov (Leningrad 1925, French translation Paris 1952) which collects all the legends; Sukhomlinov’s ‘Dnevnik’ in Dela i Dni (Petrograd 1920–21) vols. 1 and 2; and various of the hearings in Padeniye tsarskogo rezhima (7 vols. Leningrad 1924–27), especially the ‘dopros Polivanova’ in vol. 7 p. 54ff. Golovin’s attacks on Sukhomlinov; Plan voyni (Paris 1936) pp. 160f.,178, 212.
11A. A. Ignatiev: 50 let v stroyu (2 vols. Moscow 1955) I. p. 526 quotes this view of Belyayev’s.
12B. Pares: The Fall of the Russian Monarchy (London 1939) pp. 283–4 for a characteristically cracked version of the fall of Grand Duke Nicholas; A. A. Polivanov: Memuary (Moscow 1924) vol. 1 p. 62; Rödiger ‘Iz zapisok’ p. 106, ‘dopros Polivanova’, pp. 62, 85, 176. Polivanov was one of the most successful tacticians of the Russian army—he identified the winning side well in advance, and always, somehow, managed to keep afloat in that most difficult period of a régime’s decline, when the old is clearly going but the new has not yet arisen to replace it. He abandoned the old establishment in time to keep his credit and profit from the changes of 1905–6; then stuck to Sukhomlinov rather than to Palitsyn; then cultivated links with the Duma (Guchkov) in preparation for Sukhomlinov’s fall; in 1912, fell foul of Sukhomlinov, had to sit out of affairs for two years or so, and surfaced again as Grand Duke Nicholas’s candidate for Sukhomlinov’s succession in June 1915; managed to be dismissed by the Tsar in 1916; took only a very modest rôle in the Provisional Government; and surfaced again in the Red Army, to sign the Treaty of Riga for the Bolsheviks.
13Voyeykov’s ‘dopros’ in Padeniye vol. 3 p. 58ff., cf. p. 313ff. (Beletski) and vol. p. 361ff, 2 p. 9ff. (Andronikov); Sukhomlinov’s ‘Dnevnik in Dela i Dni I (1920) pp. 219—238 refers to some of these intrigues; the ‘Tagebuch des Grossf. Andrej Wladimirowitsch’ in Frantz: Russland auf dem Weg p. 146 repeats some ‘inside’ stories; and an irreplaceable source for these currents in the army is always M. K. Lemke: 250 dney v tsarskoy stavke (Petrograd 1920) pp. 89–90, 476, 485 and passim. Lemke—who edited the works of Herzen and Bakunin—served in Stavka’s press department, and wrote an immense diary that also contains a large number of documents that came his way. It is a work of great perception, distinguished by the width of its want of sympathy.
14Zuyev: Padeniye vol. 3 p. 19. Hecame from the Police Department (usually allied with Sukhomlinov’s war ministry) and attained the command of 25. Corps. After confusions near Krasnostaw, Grand Duke Nicholas removed him; but Sukhomlinov and Ivanov then arranged for him to take command of 12. Corps. Bonch-Bruyevitch’s career: his memoirs, Vsya vlast Sovietam (Moscow 1958 and 2 ed. 1964) and Ya. Lisovoy: ‘Revolyuts. Generaly’ in Bely Arkhiv (Paris) vol. 1 (1926) p. 50. He cultivated Sukhomlinov through Dragomirov’s widow, publishing an edition of Dragomirov’s work on tactics, and being introduced to Sukhomlinov in recompense. He served with Sukhomlinov in Kiev, and received a high post in III Army—commanded by Ruzski, a friend and client of Sukhomlinov—when war came. In mid-September, Ruzski and Bonch-Bruyevitch went to command the army group against Germany. But Stavka seems to have been out for his blood. After the Myasoyedov affair, which, despite Bonch-Bruyevitch’s efforts to tack round to the Stavka side, discredited all the Sukhomlinotsy, he was sent off to be third-in-command of the passive VI Army, and was later demoted still further, to be garrison commander in Pskov. Here, he declared sympathies with the revolution and, with the help of his brother, a prominent Bolshevik, achieved prominence in the Red Army, Some hints as to the behaviour of the cliques in ‘Zapiski N.N.Romanova’ Krasny Arkhiv 1931 No. 47 p. 159, Lemke p. 220ff. for Rennenkamf’s career and cultivation of links with Grand Duke Nicholas and court-figures hostile to Sukhomlinov (Beloselski-Belozerski).
15Α. L. Sidorov: Finansovoye polozheniye Rossii v gody pervoy mirovoy voyni (Moscow 1960 is the outstanding source on army finance.
16Shatsillo p.48.
17Vys. utv. osobiye zhurnaly sovieta ministrov i osobhky soveshchaniy (minutes of the Council of Ministers, microfilm-copy in the Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif.) 1915/166 of 6(19) March.
18Barsukov: Podgotovka p. 66, 75f.; A.M. Zayonchkovski: Podgotovka Rossii k mir. voyne. Plan voyni (Moscow 1926) p. 84f. The regular component in a German company was usually five officers and twelve men for eighty soldiers; in a Russian, at best two officers and eight men.
19Zayonchkovski: Podgotovka pp. 30,40f. 152; Barsukov: Podgotovka p. 7of.; Polivanov: ‘dopros’ pp. 62–4; Kokovtsev 253f.; F. F. Palitsyn: ‘Dnevnik’ in Voyenni sbornik(Belgrade) vol. 4 p. 267; A. von Schwarz: Ivangorod v 1914–15gg. (Paris 1969) pp. 13, 19; S. Khmelkov: Borba za Osowiec (Moscow 1939) p. 9; Velichko: Russkiye kreposti (Moscow 1926).
20Sidorov op. cit. p. 65f. In 1910, the proposals were to spend 81 million roubles on heavy field artillery, 372. 6 million on fortresses; v. also table in Barsukov: Podgotovka pp. 56–7, and cf, pp. 88, 94–5.
21The authoritative work on planning is Zayonchkovski: Podgotovka. Barsukov and Manikovski cover artillery-aspects thoroughly; N. Kozlov: Snabzheniye russkoy armii voyenno-tekhnicheskim imushchestvom vol. (Moscow 1926) covers engineering preparations, automobiles etc; K. Ushakov: Podgotovka voyennikh soobscheniy k voyne (Moscow 1926) is an invaluable survey of strategic railway-planning; Materialy po istorii franko-russkikh otnosheniy za 1910–1914gg. contains pp. 697–718 minutes of the General Staff meetings with France; N. Valentinov: ‘Voyenniye soglasheniya s soyuznikami’ in Voyenno-istoricheski sbornik (Moscow 1920f.) 2, 1920, pp. 94–128 discusses these in a wider context.
22G.U.G.Sh: Voyenniye sily Avstro-Vengrii (2 vols. Saint Petersburg 1912) vol. 1 p. 126–7.
23The ‘Great Programme’ is discussed by Sidorov op. cit. p. 44ff. and in his ‘Iz istorii podgotovki tsarizma k voyne’ in Istoricheski Arkhiv 1962 No. 2 pp. 120–155; Barsukov: Podgotovka p.81f and 95–6; Barsukov: Russkaya artilleriya vol. 1 table, p. 56 and 63ff. In 1914, there were 685 batteries of field cannon (5,480), 85½ of light (48—line) field howitzers (512) and 60 of heavy field artillery (240). After the ‘Great Programme’ there would be twice the number of batteries, and, generally, a fifth more artillery, with significant increases in high-trajectory types; 1,176 light field howitzers, 468 heavy field guns, 6,048 light field cannon, 666 mountain cannon, such that a Russian army corps of two divisions would acquire a weight roughly equivalent to that of a German first-line army corps of 1914.
CHAPTER TWO
1W. Foerster: Graf Schlieffen und der Weltkrieg (Berlin 1925).
2K. Ropponen: Die Kraft Russlands (Helsinki 1968) p. 268.
3Reichsarchiv: Kriegsrüstung und Kriegswirtschaft vol. 1 (Berlin 1930). pp. 211–236 and Anlageband, passim. cf. vol. 2 (Berlin 1925) p. 15f.
4M. Schwarte: Der Weltkrieg Technik im Weltkreig (Berlin 1920) p. 60ff. for German artillery.
5L. Burchardt: Friedenswirtschaft und Rüstungspolitik (Freiburg 1970)
6A. L. Sidorov: Finansovoye polozheniye p. 32.
7H. Herzfeld: Die deutsche Rüstungspolitik von dem Welthrieg (Berlin 1923) Rüdt von Collenberg: Die deutsche Armee 1871–1914 (Berlin 1922) Général Buat: L’ armée allenande (Paris 1920).
8K. Ushakov: Podgotovka passim, but especially p. 99ff. and appendix Cf. H. von Staabs: Aufmarsch nach zwei Fronten (Berlin 1925) p. 26ff. and Reichsarchiv: Feldeisenbahnwesenvol. 1 (Berlin 1928) pp. 1–47. The
best western-language source for the whole issue of Russian preparedness is G. Frantz Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg (Berlin 1924) and the introduction to his Russland auf dem Weg.
9Kurt Riezler: Tagebücher (ed. K. D. Erdmann, Göttingen 1972) p. 184. Lichnowski ‘England von dem Krieg’. report of 19 August 1914 in Auswärtiges Amt, Akten betreffend den Krieg 1914 Band 2 p. cf. A. A. England No 78 Band 31 Bethmawn Hollweg to Lichnowsky 10 and 16 June 1914.
10A. J. P. Taylor: War by Timetable (London 1970) is the best statement of this view of the war’s outbreak, but of course there are many other views, the dominant one of which, at the moment, is still F. Fischer: Griff nach der Weltmacht (Düsseldorf 1964) and Krieg der Illusionen (Düsseldorf 1971).
CHAPTER THREE
1F. Franek: ‘Die Entwicklung der osterreichisch-ungarischen Wehrmacht in den ersten zwei Kriegsjahren’ (Ergänzungsheft No. 4 of the Austro-Hungarian official history, Oesterreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg, Vienna 1932) p. 10. Sickness rose from 23.5% of losses to 47% in the same period.
2Materialy po istorii franko-russkikh otnosheniy za 1910–1914gg. (Moscow 1922) p. 698f. give the texts (in Russian and French) of General Staff discussions. At the 9th meeting, in August 1913, Zhilinski undertook to send 800,000 men against Germany ‘in the main by the 15th day of mobilisation’.
3Ushakov: Podgotovka (op. cit. Chapter 1) p. 106f. and prilozheniye 6; he shows that the north-western front, by the 13th day, was only sixteen trains short of its complement. S. Dobrorolski: ‘O mobilizatsii russkoy armii’ in Voyenni Sbornik (Belgrade) I pp. 91-116. A. L. Sidorov: ‘Zhelezno-dorozhny transport in Istoricheskiye Zapiski No. 26 (1948) pp. 3–64, especially p. 24.
4Jean Savant: L’époée russe (Paris 1945) p. 18. There are many similar examples; the best-known account of ‘unreadiness’ is N. N. Golovin: Iz istorii kampanii 1914 goda na russkom fronte. Nachalo voyni i operatsii v Vostochnoy Prussii (Prague 1926, English translation 1928) p. 345 and passim.
5Generalny Shtab RKKA: Sbornik dokumentov mirovoy voyni na russkom fronte. Manevrenni period 1914 goda: Vostochno-Prusskaya operasiya (Moscow 1939) pp. 525–7, and cf. E. Barsukov: Podgotovka (op. cit. Chapter 1) table pp. 134–5.
6Sbornik (as in note 5) p. 540, no. 803.
7Ibid. p. 528f. no. 798 (nos. 795–801 on supply). The most thorough contemporary investigation was the report drawn up by General Panteleyev after the disaster. There is certainly no suggestion in it that things went as they did because of the crushing artillery weakness of which Golovin speaks again and again. The report (‘doklad pravitelstvennoy komissii, naznachennoy v 1914 godu dlya rassledovaniya usloviy i prichin gibela 2. armii’) appears as document no. 804 in Sbornik. Panteleyev’s findings that ‘materially, everything was complete’ are borne out by the dozen special articles devoted to this campaign by various (formerly highly-placed) authors in the Belgrade Voyenni Sbornik: v. e.g. K. Adaridi’s article in IX (1928) on 27th infantry division p. 162–85, or Rosenchild-Paulin’s on 29th infantry division in VIII (1926) pp. 291–45.
8Savant op. cit. p. 80. The cavalrymen none the less thought highly of their own activity—e.g. B. Gourko: Memories and Impressions (London 1918), and V. Zvegintsev: Kavalergardy (3 vols. Paris 1936, 1938 and 1964).
9N. Kozlov: Ocherk snabzheniya russkoy armii voyenno-tekhnicheskim imushchestvom I (Moscow 1926) p. 7f.
10N. V. Abakanovitch: ‘Istoricheski obzor organizatsii i ustroystvo provolochnoy svyazi armii’ in Voyenno-inzhenerni Sbornik vol. 2. (Moscow 1918–19) pp. 197–336 pp. 198 and 201.
11Sbornik pp. 87f. and nos. 87–133 (p. 129ff.) on deployment.
12Sukhomlinov: Dnevnik (op. cit. Chapter 1) p. 232.
13Life in Stavka is best seen from the following: V. Kondzerovski: Vospominaniya (Paris 1967); M. K. Lemke: 250 dney (op. cit. Chapter 1); A. Samoylo: Dve zhizni (Moscow 1958); G. Shavelski: Vospominaniya poslednego protopresvitera russkoy armii i flota (2 vols. New York 1954); A. Bubnov: V Tsarskoy Stavke (New York 1955); N. M. Romanov, ‘Zapiski’ in Krasny Arkhiv 47 (1931) pp. 140–83. The despatches of General Hanbury-Williams(v. Chapter 7) also reveal much of Stavka’s ways—including the consumption of spirits, despite official prohibition.
14v. note 13 (particularly Lemke pp. 190, 624 and 801, Kondzerovski p. 10, Samoylo p. 142f); W. Hubatsch: Hindenburg und der Staat (Göttingen 1966) p. 24; K. Peball: Briefe an eine Freundin’ in Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs 25. (1972) pp. 492–503.
15Planning is best seen from the documents in Sbornik p. 27ff. (Nos. 1,2 and 9 particularly); relations with allies in Materialy (op. cit.) and N. Valentinov (Volski): Snosheniya s soyuznikami po voyennym voprosam vo vremya voyni (Moscow 1920) pp. 22–3.
16My account of operations is taken mainly from the following:
a) Osnovniye direktivy i direktivinye ukazaniya Verkhovnogo Glavnokomanduyushchego i zhurnaly soveshchaniy, a set of all strategic orders issued by the first Stavka (i.e. until late August 1915), of which a copy is preserved in the ‘Archive of Grand Duke Nicholas’, with the Golovin-Archive in the Hoover Institution, Stanford, California. This is of course a very important source, although it is less important in those engagements—such as East Prussia in August 1914—that are extensively covered in secondary works and collections of documents. Whenever I refer to a Stavka order, it may none the less be assumed that I have used the original version in the Osnovniye direktivy (the orders are readily identifiable by their dates and addressees). The instructions regarding IX Army are given, for instance, in Yanushkevitch to Zhilinski of 25th and 28th July (old-style), Danilov to Alexeyev 30th July, by which an attack of six corps was prescribed, four against Thorn—Breslau, two against Breslau—Posen. The source is hereafter identified as ‘O.D.’
b) Sbornik as quoted in note 5. It belongs to an unfinished series of documentary collections, for Red Army use, on various campaigns of the war in the east, and represents the single most important source on Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes.
c) 1.1. Vatsetis: Operatsii na vostochno-prusskoy granitse v. 1 (Moscow 1929) which is the most solid documentary investigation
d) G. Isserson: Kanny mirovoy voyni (Moscow 1926) which is less solid.
e) Reichsarchiv: Der Weltkrieg vol. 2 (Berlin 1925) which is an exhaustive, but still not very reliable, German account
f) M. Hoffmann: Tannenberg, wie es wirklich war (Berlin 1925)
g) Memoirs, such as those of Ludendorff, François, Hindenburg, Morgen. They proved to be of limited usefulness.
17Figures for respective strengths are taken, unless otherwise specified, from Vatsetis p. 28f and the Reichsarchiv volume p. 370f: Golovin’s figures/Nachalo p. 345 are fanciful, based on an assumption that all German divisions were of first-line strength, and that Russian second-line divisions did not count. In reality, nearly half of Germany’s infantry divisions, and more than half of those fighting in the east, were second- or third-line, with half or less than half of the artillery of a first-line division; while Russian second-line divisions had as many guns as first-line ones, whatever the differences in quality between them.
18Vatsetis p. 29.
19G. Frantz: Russland (op. cit. Chapter 1) p.128, Kondzerovski p. 52. The famous story that Rennenkampf and Samsonov had come to blows during the war with Japan appears to lack foundation (v. Savant p. 261). The general with whom Rennenkampf quarrelled was Mishchenko. Just the same, it is clear that Samsonov and Rennenkampf came from different cliques of the army—Rennenkampf a well-known protégé of Grand Duke Nicholas, well-established at Court, and able to mobilise many high aristocrats on his behalf when there was a danger of his being blamed for Tannenberg; Samsonov, commanding general in Turkestan—an appointment controlled by the Glavny Shtab, and hence a Sukhomlinovite satrapy.
20Sbornik No. 147 (Rennenkampf to Yanushkevitch, 19th August. Rennenkampf put the blame for it all on Zhilinski).
21German plans: E. Ludendorff: Kriegserinnerungen (Berlin 1919) p. 37f., but cf. Hoffmann p. 14, 29f.
22Vatsetis p. 40.
24Sbornik p. 228ff(nos. 261–86) covers I Army until 1. September, p. 245–322 (nos. 287–438) II Army in the same period. There are also useful remarks as to Rennenkampf ’s behaviour in Savant, passim.
25Golovin: Nachalo p. 234f., Vatsetis p. 165f. and Sbornik no. 356.
26Sbornik p. 269–70, no. 347 (intelligence showed that there was only one corps before II Army), and cf. Vatsetis p. 134 for Mileant’s report that the Germans were retreating, and Bayov’s that both 1. and 17. Corps had retired into Königsberg. The group opposing II Army was of course quite small—20. Corps (Scholtz) and two Landwehr groups. It is characteristic of Golovin’s methods (p. 206f) that he should reckon that Scholtz’s group was actually superior to the centre of II Army—four infantry divisions, with 42 batteries, against five and 36 on the Russian side. First, only two of the German divisions were ‘active’, with 12 batteries each. The other two were third-line, with three batteries each. Again, each Russian battery contained eight guns; each German, six.
27Vatsetis p. 169f and Reichsarchiv p. 184f.
28Sbornik p. 564f. covers the Russian 4th infantry division, which lost 5,283 men and 73 officers.
29Golovin p. 230, and Reichsarchiv p. 170f.
30Sbornik p. 556f. and 559f.; no. 429 pp. 316–8 is Postovski’s report, and no. 428 pp. 313–6 Zhilinski’s; cf. Hoffmann p. 80ff. for the surrenders.
31O. D. Yanushkevitch to Zhilinski 24 August cf. Sbornik p. 791f. and Vatsetis p. 291f.
