118. Dieter Wisliceny, “Re: Editor in Chief of the ‘Grenzbote,’ Fritz Fialla [sic],” handwritten note, July 26, 1946, Bratislava; prosecution document T/1107. Wisliceny’s version seems credible, though not because it corroborates Eichmann’s. It is impossible to verify statements by comparing them with Eichmann’s: he simply corroborated other people’s lies if he thought they might exonerate him. The Madagascar case is one example of a tangle of lies and false corroborations that resulted in the falsification of the whole history of the affair. The tangle is masterfully unraveled in Brechtken, “Madagaskar für die Juden.” Rademacher claimed it was Eichmann, not he, who came up with the idea, although the work on the Madagascar Plan can be clearly traced back to Rademacher. Eichmann agreed with the lie, because the legend that he came up with a plan for a Jewish state, rather than just deporting Poles and Jews to Eastern Europe, was significantly better than the truth for his self-image. The stories are a perfect match but are some considerable distance from the truth. There are many documented examples of Eichmann’s use of the lies other people told in their defense.
119. Eichmann is proved to have been with Himmler on August 11, 1942, but it is not known whether they spoke about the Fiala reports on this occasion. Heinrich Himmler’s Appointment Diary, entry for August 11, 1942.
120. Himmler visited Prague on July 6–7, 1942. Heinrich Himmler’s Appointment Diary, p. 606. The first article appeared on July 7, 1942.
121. Der Grenzbote—deutsches Tagblatt für die Karpatenländer, nos. 301, 302, and 304, Bratislava, November 7, 8, and 10, 1942.
122. Eichmann to Thadden, June 2, 1943, prosecution document T/1108. Eichmann mentions Slovak, Sklovenská politika: Gardiete, Magyar Hirlap, and Pariser Zeitung, as confirmed by all witnesses (including those for the prosecution).
123. The first reports were broadcast on the radio news from London on March 3, 1942. Print media followed, with the usual delay. See, for example, the front-page story “New Ghetto Policy: Theresienstadt in Place of Lublin—The Martyrdom of Jews in the Protectorate” in Die Zeitung (London), March 6, 1942:
Neutral correspondents in Berlin bring news of Himmler and Heydrich’s new plan, to send all the Jews still living in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia to the fortress town of Theresienstadt, whose population is to be evacuated. The town will be turned into a large ghetto. This plan signals a change in the original Jewish policy of the “Third Reich,” resulting from the new situation. The vision of the original plan was to transport all Jews from Germany and German-occupied areas to Eastern Poland, where they would live in large concentration-camp ghettoes as slave laborers.—The Jewish center of Lublin was one of the first results of this diabolical plan. The Nazis banked on the unaccustomed hard work and insufficient food supplies decimating Europe’s uprooted Jewish population in short order. The remainder—if indeed there was a remainder after the end of the war—would be taken to a Jewish reservation overseas, along with the Jews from the rest of the German-enslaved world. The island of Madagascar was provisionally earmarked for this.
124. Walter George Hartmann from the German Red Cross wrote a fundamentally positive report after the visit on June 28, 1943. Memo on the organizational course of the visit to Theresienstadt, June 30, 1943, Hartmann, Deutsches Rotes Kreuz Archiv, 176/I. See Birgitt Morgenbrod and Stephanie Merkenich, Das Deutsche Rote Kreuz unter der NS-Diktatur 1933–1945 (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, and Zurich, 2008), pp. 386ff. In the days following, however, he gave a different opinion of this visit to André de Pilar: “The situation in the ghetto is appalling. There is a shortage of everything. The people are terribly malnourished,” and the medical supplies were “entirely insufficient.” But Hartmann still fell for the event’s most important propaganda lie and referred to Theresienstadt even to Pilar as a “terminus camp,” which was reassuring. Gerhart Riegner, World Jewish Congress, notes on his conversation with André de Pilar, July 7, 1943, prosecution document T/853.
125. “Theresienstadt: A ‘Model Ghetto,’ ” Aufbau, August 27, 1943, based on an article by Alfred Joachim Fischer in Free Europe (London), June 1943.
126. Aufbau, September 3, 1943, p. 21.
127. Hannah Arendt, “The True Reasons for Theresienstadt,” Aufbau, September 3, 1943, p. 21.
128. “Heydekampf Report” on the visit on June 23, 1944; held with the written correspondence on the organization in the Deutsches Rotes Kreuz Archiv, 176/I. See Morgenbrod and Merkenich, Deutsche Rote Kreuz, pp. 390ff. Maurice Rossel, the International Red Cross delegate, wrote a blindly naïve report that fulfilled the organizer’s wishes. Eichmann’s colleagues had managed to get a look at this report by September 22, 1944.
129. In her impressive book, Leni Yahil sees a connection between the rumors of mass murders and the attempt to hide evidence. Die Shoah: Überlebenskampf und Vernichtung der europäischen Juden (Munich, 1998), pp. 610ff.
130. Sassen transcript 32:8.
131. See Bettina Stangneth, “Dienstliche Aufenthaltsorte Adolf Eichmanns, 12.3.1938 bis Mai 1945,” annotated list for the special exhibition Facing Justice: Adolf Eichmann on Trial, Topography of Terror and Memorial Foundation, Berlin, July 2010 (unpublished).
132. Sassen transcript 3:5.
133. Sassen transcript 11:13.
134. Sassen transcript 22:14.
135. Eichmann’s extreme reaction to the failed deportations in Denmark has still not been adequately explained. He was with Himmler on September 24, 1943, shortly before the campaign was due to begin, so the possibility that he might have supported it himself cannot be ruled out. Tatiana Brustin-Berenstein, “The Attempt to Deport the Danish Jews,” Yad Vashem Studies 17 (1986), p. 191, quotes the microfilm of pages from Himmler’s diary (Washington; originals in BA Koblenz, September 24, 1943, MF 84/25). According to Thadden’s statement (April 16, 1948), Rolf Günther had told him in confidence that the campaign was “being sabotaged by German offices, presumably the embassy.” “Eichmann had already reported to the Reichsführer and wanted the head of the saboteur.” Eberhard von Thadden, affidavit, Nuremberg, April 16, 1948, prosecution document T/584.
136. Wilhelm Höttl and Dieter Wisliceny—evidently having colluded while they were in jail in Nuremberg—claimed that Eichmann reacted aggressively toward photographers, even smashing their cameras in the heat of the moment, though he paid for the damage afterward. The collection of photos of Eichmann from earlier years is, for the period, very extensive.
137. Klaus Eichmann, “My Father Adolf Eichmann,” Parade, March 19, 1961.
138. Bernard Lösener referred in detail to these bully-boy tactics. See Lösener, “Als Rassereferent im Reichsministerium des Innern,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 9, no. 3 (July 1961), pp. 264–313.
139. There is no independent source for Eichmann’s claim. He told Sassen that Wolff had tried to push through an exception to the deportations, but he had vehemently refused, citing some basic considerations: “So in this case I had to countermand him, and when he said that I was SS Obstubaf. and he was SS Ogrf. [a more senior rank], I said yes indeed, I know that Ogrf., but may I remind you that you are attached to the Gestapo and you are speaking to an adviser to the Secret Police, Ostf. Eichmann.” Eichmann then challenged Wolff to a duel, but Himmler did not allow it. Sassen transcript 14:8–9. The fact that Ludolf von Alvensleben, long a close friend of Wolff’s, also belonged to the Sassen group increases the story’s plausibility.
140. Wisliceny reports by turns that either he or Eichmann was Himmler’s brother-in-law, or that Eichmann claimed either he or Wisliceny was connected to power in this way. Der Kasztner-Bericht über Eichmanns Menschenhandel in Ungarn (Munich, 1961) (in fact, the report of the Jewish Rescue Committee from Budapest, 1942–45), hereafter cited as the Kasztner Report; and Wisliceny, Cell 133 Document, prosecution document T/84.
141. The few existing accounts of this affair follow either Wisliceny’s contradictory version or the statement Eichmann gave in his interrogation, sometimes without mentioni
ng these highly dubious sources. For example, Klaus Gensicke, Der Mufti von Jerusalem, Amin el-Husseini und die Nationalsozialisten (Frankfurt am Main, 1988), esp. pp. 164–67, which relies entirely on the interrogation. Martin Cüppers and Klaus-Michael Mallmann, “ ‘Elimination of the Jewish National Home in Palestine’: The Einsatzkommando of the Panzer Army Africa, 1942,” Yad Vashem Studies 35 (2007), pp. 111–41, base their account uncritically on Wisliceny’s, which is a surprising feature of their otherwise impressive work. See also Zvi Elpeleg, The Grand Mufti: Haj Amin al-Husseini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement (London, 1993). Even Wiesenthal, Großmufti—Großagent der Achse, remarkable in many other aspects, largely follows Wisliceny, again without revealing this source (pp. 37ff). He also conducted a conversation with Kasztner, from whom he heard Eichmann’s Hungarian story.
142. Adolf Eichmann on II-1, Re: Foreign travels, September 1, 1939, BA Koblenz, R58/523, folio 23; identical with Yad Vashem Archive, M-38/194.
143. The meetings were the subject of colorful press coverage, starting with the Wochenschau and the Völkische Beobachter.
144. Jeffrey Herf, “Hitlers Dschihad,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 58 (April 2010), pp. 258–86.
145. Kurt Fischer-Werth, Amin Al-Husseini: Großmufti von Palästina (Berlin-Friedenau, 1943), with a color cover image featuring an unmistakable portrait of al-Husseini.
146. Fritz Grobba (Foreign Office), annotation, July 17, 1942, PA AA, R100 702 C/M, p. 153.
147. Suhr’s secretary witnessed this meeting. Margarethe Reichert, hearing, October 17, 1967, BA Ludwigsburg, B 162/4172, sheet 296.
148. Four-page handwritten report “Re: Grand Mufti of Jerusalem,” Bratislava, July 26, 1946 (prosecution document T/89) and Wisliceny, Cell 133 Document (prosecution document T/84).
149. Moshe Pearlman, The Capture of Adolf Eichmann (London, 1961), p. 98.
150. Andrej Steiner, statement, corroborated by his colleagues Oskar Neumann and Tibor Kovac, Bratislava, February 6, 1946. Wisliceny’s commentary of March 5, 1946, quoted next, is handwritten on the transcript of the statement; prosecution document T/1117.
151. Al-Husseini protested to Ribbentrop on May 13, 1943, and wrote to the Hungarian and Romanian foreign ministers. Documented in Gerhard Hoepp, Mufti-Papiere: Briefe, Memoranden, Reden und Aufsätze Amin al Husseinis aus dem Exil 1940–1945 (Berlin, 2004), documents 78, 82, 83.
152. We now know that al-Husseini’s source of information was not Eichmann but a contact in London.
153. One route these lies took was from Eichmann to Wisliceny to Kasztner (passing into the history books via Kasztner’s postwar conversations with Simon Wiesenthal). This is evident from the word-for-word agreement between Wisliceny’s unpublished reports and Wiesenthal’s early texts. Another route went via the Foreign Office. Kasztner Report, p. 115.
154. The contact he claimed to have with Chief of the Abwehr (German military intelligence service) Wilhelm Canaris is one example.
155. “Meine Memoiren,” p. 119.
156. Interrogation, pp. 564ff.
157. On March 25, 1944, al-Husseini noted in his diary, in Arabic, that he wanted to meet the “expert in Jewish matters.” On September 29, 1944, there is another Arabic entry: “Topic: the Jews of Italy, France and Hungary. And who is the expert on Jewish matters?” The entry containing Eichmann’s name, on November 9, 1944, is noted in painstakingly produced Latin characters. We can assume from this that someone had answered al-Husseini’s question. The interpretation of this entry is still suspect, but it does allow us to tentatively conclude that Eichmann had not made enough of an impression on al-Husseini in January 1942 for the grand mufti to remember his name. Facsimiles of all the relevant pages can be found in the trial papers. Prosecution document T/1267-69; enlarged, T/1394.
158. Gerhard Lehfeldt, “Bericht über die Lage von ‘Mischlingen’ ” (Berlin, mid-March 1943), in Berlin, Rosenstraße 2-4: Protest in der NS-Diktatur: Neue Forschungen zum Frauenprotest in der Rosenstraße 1943, ed. Antonia Leugers (Annweiler, 2005), as document 6, pp. 233–38; here p. 235. On the background, see Nathan Stoltzfus, “Heikle Enthüllungen. Gerhard Lehfeldts Bericht an Kirchenfürsten beider Konfessionen über den Massenmord an den Juden Europas,” ibid., pp. 145–80.
159. Eichmann spoke about Günther at length in Argentina, explaining that Günther had used his absence to push through death sentences against Eichmann’s Jewish contacts whom Eichmann had wanted to spare for tactical reasons. But since Eichmann assumed Günther was still alive, he asked Sassen to remove this transcript. It is missing from the Hagag version and from the original transcript (Eichmann Estate). The page is now in BA Ludwigsburg, “Miscellaneous” folder. See “Aftermath” in this book.
160. The fact that the witnesses had the opportunity to discuss their statements with one another in Nuremberg, and to get their stories straight, explains some of the extraordinary parallels in what they said later. There was contact between Höttl, Kaltenbrunner, Wisliceny, Wilhelm Bruno Waneck, and later Rudolf Jänisch, as reciprocally evidenced by their statements. There was a similar connection between Hans Jüttner, Otto Winkelmann, and Kurt Becher.
161. For Eichmann’s first appearance in Hungary, see the stenographic transcript of his speech to the Jewish representatives on March 31, 1944, prosecution document T/1156.
162. Sassen transcript 9:10. Eichmann liked this phrase and used it often. See 10:6 and 33:8.
163. Sassen transcript 9:4.
164. Kasztner Report, p. 110. Joel Brand gives a similar quote, but this one is taken from Kasztner.
165. Ibid., p. 244.
166. Eichmann made such dire threats to Raoul Wallenberg that there was a diplomatic protest in Berlin, which the Foreign Office smoothed over for Eichmann. Shortly afterward one of Wallenberg’s employees died in an attack on his official car, and the Hungarians saw a probable connection between the attack and Eichmann’s threats. Foreign Office to Edmund Veesenmayer, December 17, 1944, prosecution document T/1232. BA Koblenz, Blue volumes, Dokumente des UD zu Wallenberg von 1944–1965, 49 vols., no. 800-2: telegram no. 438 of October 22, 1944. See Christoph Gann, Raoul Wallenberg: So viele Menschen retten wie möglich (Munich, 1999), p. 126. Based on the memories of Elisabeth Szel, who was married to one of Wallenberg’s chauffeurs. From a report by Eric Sjöquist. See Bernt Schiller, Raoul Wallenberg: Das Ende einer Legende (Berlin, 1993), pp. 97ff.
167. Kasztner Report, pp. 135ff.
168. Wisliceny reported to Kasztner, “Eichmann is afraid of a new scandal,” ibid., p. 295.
169. “As Eichmann confessed to me himself in Hungary, this plan came from him and Globicnig … and was suggested to Himmler by him. Hitler then gave the order personally.” Wisliceny, Cell 133 Document (prosecution document T/84), p. 8.
170. Sassen transcript 34:6.
171. Der Weg: Zeitschrift für Fragen des Judentums (Berlin) 1, no. 26 (August 16, 1946).
172. Kasztner Report, p. 139.
173. Ibid., p. 178, and later in the prison notes.
174. At the end of 1944, Wisliceny even claimed that Eichmann had been dismissed and that he, Wisliceny, had been made the inspector of Theresienstadt, to protect the Jews—two lies he tried unsuccessfully to deny in Bratislava. Kasztner Report, Wisliceny commentary, March 25, 1947, prosecution document T/1116.
175. As early as May 3, 1944, Wisliceny claimed that Eichmann had “cut him off” because of his overly close personal contacts with Jews, but this was a lie. Kasztner Report, p. 85. In the fall of that year, he claimed: “I tried to intervene to help stop the unhappy foot-march out of Budapest. But it was unbelievably difficult to do even the smallest thing against Eichmann.” Ibid., p. 274.
176. Sassen transcript 12:6–7.
177. Kurt Becher avoided punishment thanks to an affidavit from Rudolf (Rezsö) Kasztner, having managed to play the role of helper convincingly. Kasztner’s support of him was taken badly, but in 1947 he was clearly still not in a position to recognize how Becher had e
ntrapped him. And he was by no means alone in this regard: in 1955, Andreas Biss, Alex Weissberg, and Joel Brand were still trying to secure Becher’s cooperation on a book. Kurt Becher, statement for Eichmann’s trial, Bremen, June 20, 1961. Becher’s image cultivation clearly functioned better than Eichmann’s.
178. For instance, Laszlo Ferenczy, who as head of the Hungarian police force was substantially involved in all anti-Jewish measures, He explained to Kasztner that he was terribly afraid of Eichmann. Kasztner Report, p. 155.
179. Ibid., p. 62.
180. Brand was held in Cairo from June 12, 1943, to January 5, 1944. The interrogation of Bandi Grosz, who traveled with him, was submitted to London on July 13, 1944.
181. The cover was blown on Joel Brand’s mission after only a short time. On July 18, 1944, a flood of radio reports and newspaper articles appeared. Translations were published in Hungary by July 19. Public opinion was disastrous (prosecution document T/1190). The New York Times headline on the same day was “A Monstrous ‘Offer’: German Blackmail. Bartering Jews for Munitions.” See also New York Herald Tribune, July 19.
182. Shlomo Aronson, “Preparations for the Nuremberg Trial: The O.S.S., Charles Dwork, and the Holocaust,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 12, no. 2 (1998), pp. 257–81.
183. Sassen transcript 73:8.
184. Wilhelm Höttl, statement for Eichmann’s trial, Altaussee, May 26, 1961.
185. Sassen transcript 49:8.
186. Horst Theodor Grell, statements for Eichmann’s trial, Berchtesgaden, May 23, 1961. See also IMT NG-2190.
187. Presenting the list, Ben-Gurion called Eichmann the “worst and most dangerous of all war criminals,” and Wiesenthal used the phrase “number-one enemy of the Jews.” Wiesenthal, Großmufti—Großagent der Achse, p. 46.
188. Sassen transcript 25:5.
189. Stefan Hördler, “Die Schlussphase des Konzentrationslagers Ravensbrück. Personalpolitik und Vernichtung,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 56, no. 3 (2008), pp. 222–48, especially p. 244. Hördler corrects the assumption that the final mass murder using gas was committed on March 30–31, 1945, after which the gas chambers were dismantled. According to his investigation, the mass killings ended between April 15 and April 24, 1945, since Moll’s mobile Sonderkommando was also being used in Ravensbrück.
Eichmann Before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life of a Mass Murderer Page 57
