Figure 8.1 Warrior wearing traditional Iranian armour, Kitab-i Samak ‘Ayyar (‘Book of Samak the Adventurer’), c. 1330, Shiraz, Iran
The arrangement of the Fatimid armies in combat was clearly laid down, with each unit having defined tactical responsibilities. As Lev points out, the infantry was organised in tightly packed ranks with heavy pike-armed infantry in the front, supported by missile troops behind.7 The cavalry performed diverse tasks – assault, scouting, raiding, pursuit and other activities. Lev also stresses the high level of Fatimid siegecraft. Given all this, why were the Fatimids so unsuccessful against the Crusaders? The failure of the Fatimid armies in Palestine was due much more to problems of leadership and finance than to military weaknesses in the army.8 Nor should it be forgotten that the Fatimids were facing a foe not hitherto encountered in the warfare of the Levant, a foe accustomed to a style of combat for which the Fatimids were unprepared and actuated by a militant religious faith which energised the morale of the entire Crusader army.
The Role of the Turkish Horsemen
It is worth remembering that it was Central Asia – the launching pad for the Turkish invasions of the Islamic world – which was the source for the ‘celestial’ or ‘blood-sweating’ horses so prized in China from the second century BC onwards.9 As al-Jahiz (d. 255/868–9) mentions long before the coming of the Franks, the Turks were accustomed to fighting on horseback. The nomadic invasions of the eleventh century did, however, bring the Turkish horse archers into greater prominence and their astonishing success came, as Boudot-Lamotte puts it, from the ‘union of horse and bow’.10 Their extraordinary mobility formed a sharp contrast with the heavily mailed and armed knights of western Europe.
The Turks were famed for the so-called ‘Scythian’ method of shooting, also called the ‘Parthian shot’ (figure 8.3),11 which was of very ancient origin. They would come charging at full speed towards the enemy and then at the last moment wheel round and shoot as they retreated. According to al-Tarsusi, the Turks ‘all pull the arrows right back as far as their chests’.12 Such tactics as these were ideal for disconcerting the Frankish cavalry. The last thing the Turks were ready to do was to ‘stand and fight’. It is important to note that Turkish horsemen such as these performed a key role in the armies of Nur al-Din, Saladin and their successors.
Figure 8.2 Turkish horse-archer, Pseudo-Galen, Kitab al-Diryaq (‘The Book of Antidotes’), c. 1250, Iraq
The reputation of the Turcomans and of other Turkish troops as mounted archers was legendary. Over millennia the Turks in their nomadic milieu had learned speed and mobility on horseback; these were characteristics of Turkish warfare even before the arrival of the stirrup.13 They would appear and disappear, lay ambushes, harass their foes, choose their own time and location for fighting and then move away when the enemy had barely had the time to react. According to al-Jahiz in his well-known treatise on the merits of the Turks, their ability with the bow and arrow was remarkable:
Figure 8.3 Turco-Mongol mounted archer, painting, sixteenth century, Iran
If a thousand Turkish horsemen charge and discharge a thousand arrows all at once, they prostrate a thousand men; and there is no other army that can charge as well … Their arrows hit the mark as much when they are retreating as when they are advancing.14
Even when the impact of their bows did diminish in accuracy, they could still shoot and injure horses at a considerable distance.
It would be misleading to assume that the Turks were archers alone; in the context of a pitched battle rather than a harassing pursuit of an enemy convoy, the Turcomans could and did engage in hand-to-hand fighting with lance or sword, haying disencumbered themselves of their bows by hanging them over their shoulders. Although the Turks kept a range of animals other than horses, it was the horses that were used in raids and other military encounters. It is noted in the sources that the Turcomans often had not just one horse but several, which enabled them to keep up the harassment in a raid by recourse to fresh horses when needed.
The remarks of al-Jahiz, although made during the ninth century with special reference to the Turks used by the ‘Abbasid caliphs as their bodyguards and crack troops, hold good too for the twelfth-century Turks in both their nomadic environment and as slave soldiers of medieval Muslim rulers. Al-Jahiz is quick to point out the equestrian skills of the Turks, their resilience and sheer gritty determination in the face of adversity:
His patience for continuing in the saddle and for going on without stopping and for long night journeys and for crossing a country is remarkable … and supposing at the end of a Turk’s life one were to number his days, it would be found that he had spent longer time sitting upon his beast than he had spent sitting upon the earth.15
The Turks had a great capacity to disconcert their enemy by grouping and regrouping and returning repeatedly to the fray. Unlike the more formally disposed order of their enemies, such as the armies of settled Muslim rulers, the Turks were not organised into three main divisions, the right and left flanks and the centre; instead, they were in many small groups which tried to encircle the enemy. Although these groups were separate, they were able to reinforce each other when required and kept up the relentless pressure on the enemy.
Figure 8.4 Horseman, fresco, tenth century, Nishapur, Iran
Following their time-honoured lifestyle, the Turks fought for plunder, and this was often criticised by medieval writers who came from sedentary backgrounds:
The Turk does not fight for religion nor for interpretation of Scripture nor for sovereignty nor for taxes nor for patriotism nor for jealousy … nor for defence of the home nor for wealth, but only for plunder.16
Al-Tarsusi gives some insight into the tactics of medieval Muslim mounted archers in Saladin’s army. If the enemy is positioned far away but within striking distance of arrows, al-Tarsusi advises the archers to disperse and to shoot at them separately. He counsels the archers to join up together if the enemy comes closer. If the enemy has dismounted, al-Tarsusi tells the Muslims to hasten to position themselves in such a way that the enemy is between water and marshy ground. If this is impossible, he concludes: ‘Precipitate yourselves upon them, shooting at their riding animals, and shoot again and again, for that will be the cause of their being defeated.’17
At the battle of Balat in 513/1119 the devastating effects of the hail of Turkish arrows is graphically described by the Aleppan chronicler Ibn al-‘Adim. Noting that all the Turks attacked as one from all directions, he comments: ‘The arrows were like locusts because of the vast quantity of the arrows which fell onto the horses and men …’18
In his description of the battle of Balat, Ibn al-Qalanisi also stresses the importance of the archers in bringing about this victory: ‘They [eyewitnesses] saw some of the horses stretched out on the ground like hedgehogs because of the quantity of arrows sticking into them.’19
A key factor in Turkish military strength lay in their horses. For centuries they had been justifiably famed in the caliphal and other Muslim armies for their ability with the bow whilst on horseback. But the exact role played by their horses remains tantalisingly obscure. The bonds between men and horses must have been very strong but we do not know, for example, how the Turkish nomads tended their steeds or how they deployed them in raids and battles. Slow, heavy horses were probably used to carry weapons and supplies; once arrived near the battle front, these would be corralled and lighter, faster horses would be mounted for the actual fray.
Figure 8.5 (above, opposite and overleaf) Coins of various Turcoman principalities, twelfth-thirteenth centuries, Turkey and Iraq
The Avoidance of Military Engagement and the Use of Stratagems
The Muslim military manuals devote considerable space to the strategy of war, although their instructions are rather unspecific and vague.
The importance of conserving manpower and deploying stratagems to avoid military engagement is emphasised. Al-Ansari says rather cryptically: ‘Victories which have occurred through e
xcellence of stratagem and grace of ingenuity, with the self safe and the armies preserved and with no expenditure of effort, are the best.’20 Battle with the enemy is emphatically the last resort, undertaken only when all other stratagems have failed. As al-Ansari points out:
In general, the one seeking to do battle against the enemy should not move to engage him, but should accept safety and peace as long as they are granted to one … One does not seek victory by engaging him so long as victory can be attained through stratagems.21
In his Mirror for Princes work, Yusuf Khass Hajib also points out the importance of using guile and cunning with which ‘you make the enemy’s face yellow’.22
The evidence in the Muslim chronicles confirms that the model advice in the military manuals was carried out in practice by rulers and commanders. Al-Maqrizi remarks in his obituary of the Ayyubid sultan al-‘Adil, Saladin’s brother (d. 615/1218): ‘Al-‘Adil did not see it as wise to engage his enemy openly, preferring rather in his designs to use guile and deception.’23
The Importance of Good Leadership
The fate of the army general was crucial to the eventual outcome of the battle. If he fell, the morale of the whole army was affected. This was the case in the battle of Marj al-Suffar in 520/1127 when Tughtegin fell from his horse and, thinking that he had been killed, his companions fled.24
Such an incident explains why Muslim military manuals stress the importance of good leadership in the army. Al-Ansari, for example, writes:
The general of the army must be perfect of intelligence, strong of heart, full of courage, greatly vigilant, very cautious, strong in resolution; perceptive about the rules of wars … aware of stratagems … informed about the management of armies and the organisation of troops … painstaking about the maintenance of morale among his soldiers; disinclined to give battle through favouring stratagems whenever possible …25
The importance of charismatic leadership is also stressed by the chroniclers. Saladin’s presence could snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. As Ibn Shaddad records:
On the day of the great battle on the plain of Acre the centre of the Muslim ranks was broken, drums and flags fell to the ground, but he stood firm with a handful of men until he was able to withdraw all his men to the hill and then lead them down into battle again, shaming them into turning and fighting.26
Ultimately the victory was given by God to the Muslims.27
Even allowing for the panegyrics showered on Baybars in the sources, he emerges beyond dispute as an outstanding general, towering over Nur al-Din and Saladin in his grasp of the practicalities of war. He ruled his territories with an iron hand and controlled his army with similar austerity and discipline. According to Ibn Shaddad, Baybars forbade all gatherings, had everyone watched, and kept the spies in their turn under surveillance. Even at home, people feared that the walls had ears. Those who disregarded his prohibitions were hanged, drowned, crucified, imprisoned, banished and blinded at the sultan’s orders.28 His recent biographer, the German scholar Thorau, remarks that he consistently distinguished himself as a military commander.29
Yet even a first-class general could not achieve much without good troops and weapons. Like the Persian vizier Nizam al-Mulk, the Central Asian Turk Yusuf Khass Hajib, writing in Chagatay, is interested in military strategy. He stresses that it is not the size of an army that matters but the quality of its troops and weapons:
Look not for numbers in your troops
But soldiers choice and weapons sure.
Few and disciplined are the best:
Many a large troop did not endure.30
A Muslim Army on the Move
During the period of the Crusades the chief theatre of war was Syria. Certain predictable patterns can be discerned in the Muslim war effort against the Franks. Campaigns were usually undertaken in the spring. The preparations for important campaigns were prolonged and complicated; an army on the move over long distances and for several months at a time needed a vast amount of provisions, equipment and camp followers. Small wonder that there was little attempt to conceal the progress of a large expeditionary force.
The observance of the faith of Islam was an essential aspect of the life of an army on the move, not only for purposes of ideology and morale but also for the reinforcement of corporate discipline. This was particularly the case from the time of Nur al-Din onwards and was certainly a vital part of Mamluk military life. Prayers were probably conducted in the open by the army on campaign, although it is interesting to note that in 661/1262–3 Baybars ordered the manufacture of a tented mosque (jami‘ kham). This structure contained a mihrab and a maqsura and was pitched to the right of the royal tent.31 Whether this practice harked back to his own steppe heritage or had some other source is not clear.
Figure 8.6 Horsemen waiting to participate in a parade, al-Hariri, al-Maqamat (‘The Assemblies’), 634/1237, probably Baghdad, Iraq
Amongst the personnel escorting the Mamluk army were doctors, including surgeons and pharmacists, as well as those who tended to the spiritual needs of the army, such as Qur’an readers, preachers, religious lawyers and Sufi shaykhs. Women often went with the army. The military expedition would be accompanied by a large baggage train transported by carts which were drawn by oxen or other beasts of burden. Food and arms were transported with the army. In Mamluk times, camels were used when possible. The different sections of the army were recognised by their banners (raya) (plates 8.1 and 8.2; cf. figure 8.6). The commander-in-chief had his own standard (liwa’). The army would also be accompanied by drummers (cf. figures 8.7 and 8.9) and trumpeters. Usama mentions an incident when trumpeters were used to instil order and discipline into the army during a dangerous march through enemy territory.32
Figure 8.7 A drum in use during an attack on a city, fragment of Rashid al-Din, Jami‘ al-Tawarikh (‘World History’), early fourteenth century, Tabriz, Iran
Battles
Introduction
Despite the genuine reluctance on both sides in the conflict to engage in open battles, with their high risk factor, a number of key battles did take place and they are recorded in the Islamic sources. Their propaganda value, if the Muslims were victorious, was enormous, but the surviving accounts of them are virtually useless for anyone seeking to gain an overview of Muslim battle strategy or to find the cause of individual victories on either side. Nearly two centuries of Crusader occupation saw surprisingly few battles, however, and yet they have been given a disproportionate amount of attention in accounts of the Crusades.
The Battle Formation of the Muslim Armies
Lo! Allah loveth those who battle for His cause in ranks, as if they were a solid structure.33
In view of this Qur’anic injunction it is not surprising that the faithful believed in the efficacy and necessity of fighting on the battlefield in even and closely serried ranks like rows of worshippers at prayer. The Muslim military manuals, too, have something to say about the disposition of troops. Indeed, al-Tarsusi devotes a special section in his manual to the disposition (tartib) of the Muslim armies.34 The details he provides correspond to the references to battle formations in the Islamic chronicles, although there must have been some variations between armies in different periods and areas during the Crusades. [He writes that: ‘Amongst the principles are that the army should have a centre, a right wing and a left wing.’35 The battle order of the troops should be as follows:
Plate 8.1 Mamluk banner, openwork steel, fifteenth century, Egypt
The foot soldier is placed in front of the knight in order to be as it were a fortress for him. A fence or cuirass or parapet should be placed in front of each foot soldier in order to fend off from him the harm of those who would attack him with sword or lance or piercing arrow. Between every two of these men an archer … should be positioned in order that he may shoot if an opportunity presents itself.36
These preliminary measures are clearly designed to protect the cavalry and to choose the ideal moment for the charge. As al
-Tarsusi explains: ‘The cavalry and the champions behind them should stand aside from the danger from which these archers protect them.’ Eventually a ‘door is opened’ for them through which to charge.37
Al-Tarsusi seems to be well aware of enemy tactics:
It is necessary when arranging the battlefield to organise the contingents (ajnad), one by one, and to arrange the cavalry flag by flag, portion (khamis) by portion, since the custom of the enemy is to attack in their entirety … as do the accursed Franks and neighbours like them.38
Without describing any specific battles, al-Ansari speaks at considerable length about the desirable conduct of the army in battle.39 The army should have its back against a mountain, river or hill. Alternatively, the commander should build trenches or set up ambushes.40 The sun and wind should be behind the rear of his army, to dazzle and blow dust into the enemy’s eyes.41 He outlines how to set up ambushes.42 When in battle formation, the army should have a centre and a left and right flank (figures 7.10 and 8.8). The infantry is to be positioned in front of the cavalry.43 The different parts of the army should attempt to hold their positions.
Yusuf Khass Hajib offers the following counsel in his book:
Put trusty men in the van and the rear, and some also in the wings, both left and right. Then, as they approach the opposing force, let them meet them head on and raise a shout. They should let fly their arrows while yet at some distance; as they draw closer, attack with their spears; and when they engage in the fray, use sword and battle-axe, grab hold the collar, fight tooth and nail.44
The Crusades- Islamic Perspectives Page 56
