33 E. Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama [Today War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987), p. 125.
34 S. Peres, Lech im Anashim [Go with People] (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1978), p. 47.
35 This and the following episode are described in Naor, Laskov, p. 283 ff.
36 S. Rolbant, The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army (New York: Barnes, 1970); Z. Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army (San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books, 1974); J. Larteguy, The Walls of Israel, p. 161.
37 For the failure of the Egyptian efforts see Saad el Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), pp. 79-80.
38 Y. Melman and D. Raviv, Meraglim lo Mushlamim [Imperfect Spies] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1990), pp. 117-120.
39 Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama, p. 61.
40 Peres interview with Der Spiegel, February 24, 1965.
41 For an account of his reasoning see S. Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East (New York: State University of New York, 1992), p. 48 ff.
42 Cf. S. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), chap. 2.
43 Peres on Israel TV, October 30, 1996.
44 Cf. Y. Allon, Masach shel Chol [A Curtain of Sand] (Tel Aviv: Ha-kibbuts Ha-meuchad, 1959). This is the most sustained argument in favor of a conventional strategy ever written by an Israeli.
45 Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 71 ff.
46 P. Pean, Les deux bombes (Paris: Fayard, 1982), pp. 113-121.
47 For discussions of Eshkol’s performance as minister of defense see Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama, pp. 42, 48, 133; Y. Rabin, Pinkas Sherut [A Service Record] (Tel Aviv: Maariv), vol. 1, pp. 112-114, 121; Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel, pp. 106-107.
48 S. Peres, Battling for Peace (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995), p. 166.
49 Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama, p. 42; M. Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 215, 220.
50 Cf. Y. Chasdai, Emet Be-tsel Ha-milchama [Truth in the Shadow of War] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1978), p. 19.
51 D. Ben Gurion, Yoman Ha-milchama, 1948-1949 [War Diary, 1948-1949] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1982), vol. 1, p. 270, entry for March 29, 1948.
52 Bar Kochva, Merkevot Ha-plada, p. 515.
53 U. Narkis, Chayal shel Yerushalayim [A Soldier for Jerusalem] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1991), p. 297.
54 Chasdai, Emet Be-tsel Ha-milchama, p. 21.
55 Larteguy, The Walls of Israel, p. 145.
56 D. Ben Gurion, Yichud Ve-yeud: Devarim al Bitchon Yisrael [A Unique Destiny: Notes on Israeli Defense] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1971), p. 176.
57 Cf. D. Horowitz, “Flexible Responsiveness and Military Strategy: The Case of the Israeli Army,” Policy Science 1 (1970): 191-205; also M. van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 198-199.
58 Y. Rabin, “Acharei Ha-timron Ha-gadol” [After the Great Maneuvers], Maarachot special issue (August 1960): 6-9.
59 Cf. W. Laqueur, The Road to War 1967: The Origins of the Arab-Israel Conflict (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969 ed.), chap. 2.
60 The Samua raid is analyzed in great detail in A. Ayalon, “Mivtsa Magressa” [Operation Shredder], Maarachot 261/262 (March-April 1978): 27-38.
61 Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, vol. 1, p. 121.
62 A blow-by-blow description of this and the following incidents may be found in O. Bull, War and Peace in the Middle East: The Experience and Views of a U.N. Observer (London: Cooper, 1973), p. 75 ff.
63 The incidents are described in Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, vol. 1, pp. 121-123; cf. also S. Teveth, The Tanks of Tammuz (London: Sphere Books, 1970), p. 56 ff., and N. Bar Tov, Dado: Arbaim U-smoneh Shanim Ve-esrim Yom [Dado: Forty-Eight Years and Twenty Days] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), vol. 1, pp. 106-107.
64 Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, vol. 1, p. 125. Here the chief of staff mistakenly says that the Syrians had given up two years before the 1967 war rather than one.
65 Bull, War and Peace in the Middle East, p. 101. In the last interview he ever gave, Dayan even claimed that 80 percent of the incidents had been deliberately provoked by Israel; Yediot Acharonot, April 27, 1997, p. 3.
66 Bull, War and Peace in the Middle East, pp. 109-110.
67 Weizman, On Eagle’s Wings, p. 197; also Peres, Battling for Peace, p. 101.
68 Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, vol. 1, p. 125.
69 Yediot Acharonot, April 8, 1967, p. 5.
70 For the role played by the Soviets see Laqueur, The Road to War, pp. 40-41.
71 British Foreign Office memo, March 16, 1966, Public Record Office, Kew, FO/371/18684.
72 For the details see Hersh, The Samson Option, chaps. 8 and 9; also McG. Bundy, Danger and Survival: The Political History of the Nuclear Weapon (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 510.
73 The most detailed account of these events is O. Brosh, “Tfissot shel Ha-meimad Ha-garini Be-sichsuchim Ezoriyim Rav-Tsdadiyim Ve-emdot Be-inyanan” [Perceptions and Public Attitudes Toward the Nuclear Dimension in Multinational Regional Conflicts] (Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University, Jersualem, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 63-66.
74 For these events, as well as the relevant sources, see M. van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1993), pp. 107-108.
75 Al-Difa [Amman, Arabic], May 12, 1966; New York Times, January 4, 1966. The story was later confirmed by Ismail Fahmi in Al Shab [Cairo, Arabic], February 17, 1971, and in Al Aharam [Cairo, Arabic], February 26, 1971.
76 Telegram, U.S. Ambassador, Cairo, to State Department, April 11, 1964, No. A 737, LBJ Library, NSF Country File UAR, Box 158, item 39; quoted in Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 198-199.
77 E.g., Al Achbar [Cairo], February 5, 1965; Al-Thwara Arabia [Baghdad], February 7, 1966; Radio Baghdad, May 6 and 10, 1966; and Al-Manar [Amman], February 14, 1967.
78 Al Nahar [Beirut], May 21, 1963, quoted in Maarachot 155 (November 1963): 10; Al Aharam [Cairo], August 20, 1965 and January 8, 1966.
79 Cf. Abdel Ghani el Gamasy, The October War (Cairo: American University Press, 1993), p. 23; also A. E. Levite and E. B. Landau, Be-einei Ha-aravim: Dimuya Ha-garini shel Yisrael [In Arab Eyes: Israel’s Nuclear Image] (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1994), p. 42, and the sources therein quoted.
80 Ibid., p. 41.
81 Ha-arets, August 8, 1996, p. 1. This is based on a statement by a TAAS man, M. Merdor.
82 Peres, Battling for Peace, p. 167.
83 Ibid., p. 101.
84 The various statements are summarized in M. Gilboa, Shesh Shanim Ve-shisha Yamim: Mekoroteah Ve-koroteah shel Michlemet Sheshet Ha-yamim [Six Years and Six Days: The Origins and Course of the Six Day War] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969), pp. 98 and 101.
85 Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama, p. 54.
86 Cf. Dayan, Avnei Derech, p. 396.
87 M. Zak, Hussein Osse Shalom [Hussein Makes Peace] (Ramat Gan: Bar Illan University Press), p. 35 ff.
88 Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, vol. 1, p. 136; Weizman, On Eagle’s Wings, pp. 199-200.
89 Weizman, On Eagle’s Wings, pp. 202-203.
90 L. Rabin, Kol Ha-zman Ishto [Always His Wife] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1988), p. 112.
91 Figures on the IDF’s strength in this period range from 180,000 (Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama, p. 202) to 300,000 (S. Ali El-Edroos, The Hassemite Arab Army, 1909-1979 [Amman: The Publishing Committee, 1980], p. 350). The last-named figure is probably inflated to show how heroic Jordan’s army was; the former was understated in order to disguise Israel’s true strength.
92 Y. Tal, Bitachon Leumi—Meatim Mul Rabim [National Defense—the Few Against the Many] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1996), p. 142. Some confirmation that this was indeed the true figure may be found in A. Braun, Moshe Dayan Be-milchemt Yom Ha-kippurim [Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1993), pp. 131, 137. According to him, Dayan on October 9, 1973, said that the IDF, having lost about 500 t
anks (100 in the north, 400 in the south), was back to the number it had had in 1967.
93 E.g., R. S. and W. Churchill, The Six Day War, p. 27; Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, p. 215; Laqueur, The Road to War, p. 68.
94 Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, vol. 1, p. 150.
95 For this episode see Gilboa, Shesh Shanim Ve-shisha Yamim, p. 168.
96 Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama, p. 203.
97 Ibid., p. 162.
CHAPTER 11
1 Y. Rabin, Pinkas Sherut [A Service Record] (Tel Aviv: Maariv), vol. 1, p. 142; also Abdel Ghani el Gamasy, The October War (Cairo: American University Press, 1993), p. 38.
2 Dr. S. Mutawi, Jordanian representative to a Washington, D.C., conference, June 1992, quoted in interview with Maj. Gen. (ret.) M. Amit, Maarachot 325 (June-July 1992): 15.
3 M. Zak, Hussein Osse Shalom [Hussein Makes Peace] (Ramat Gan: Bar Illan University Press), p. 106.
4 S. Ali El-Edroos, The Hassemite Arab Army, 1909-1979 (Amman: The Publishing Committee, 1980), p. 362.
5 According to M. Dayan, Avnei Derech [Memoirs] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1976), p. 473, they did have a plan for invading the upper Jordan Valley but cancelled it during the night of June 5-6 when the extent of the Egyptian defeat became clear.
6 Damascus Radio, July 7, 1966; and the Syrian newspaper Al-Mussawar, December 16, 1966. On Syrian support for PLO terrorism inside Israel see also W. Laqueur, The Road to War 1967: The Origins of the Arab-Israel Conflict (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969 ed.), p. 55 ff.
7 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1967-1968 (London: IISS, 1968), pp. 40-41.
8 Military Attaché, Damascus, “Annual Report on Syrian Armed Forces,” January 21, 1966, FO/371/186923.
9 Perhaps the best analysis of the Israeli deployment is T. N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 338.
10 Dayan, Avnei Derech, p. 430. The actual quote is from N. Bar Tov, Dado: Arbaim U-smoneh Shanim Ve-esrim Yom [Dado: Forty-Eight Years and Twenty Days] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), vol. 1, p. 125.
11 Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, vol. 1, pp. 156, 161, 169; Laqueur, The Road to War, p. 147.
12 E. Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama [Today War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987), p. 203.
13 Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, vol. 1, pp. 142-143.
14 M. Gilboa, Shesh Shanim Ve-shisha Yamim: Mekoroteah Ve-koroteah shel Michlemet Sheshet Ha-yamim [Six Years and Six Days: The Origins and Course of the Six Day War] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969), p. 75.
15 For these efforts cf. Zak, Hussein Osse Shalom, p. 112 ff.
16 For the details cf. Laqueur, The Road to War, chap. 5.
17 Dayan, Avnei Derech, pp. 426-430, and Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama, p. 216, describe the meeting that led to the decision.
18 Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama, p. 207.
19 Apparently the departing Israeli squadrons were detected by one radar, stationed in Jordan, but defective communications prevented it from sounding the alarm; Gamasy, The October War, p. 58.
20 A list of Egyptian losses was given by Brigadier General Hod on Israel Radio, June 6, 1967.
21 Ezer Weizman, On Eagle’s Wings (Tel Aviv: Steimatzky’s, 1979), p. 216.
22 Cf. his own account in R. Eytan, Sippur shel Chayal [A Soldier’s Story] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1991), p. 92 ff.
23 The best analysis of the Egyptian dispositions is G. W. Gawrych, Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), pp. 82-86.
24 See Sharon’s own account in A. Sharon, Warrior (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 188 ff.
25 Gawrych, Key to the Sinai, p. 116.
26 Y. Dayan, Israel Journal: June 1967 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), pp. 65-70.
27 See the account in M. van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 201, which is based on an interview with General Gavish.
28 The battle is described in M. Naor and Z. Enar, eds., Yemei Yuni: Teurim min Ha-milchama, 1967 [June Days: Episodes from the 1967 War] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1967), p. 132 ff.
29 S. Ali El-Edroos, The Hassemite Arab Army, 1909-1979 (Amman: The Publishing Committee, 1980), p. 374. For Hussein’s reasons for entering the war see also Zak, Hussein Osse Shalom, p. 111; Hussein of Jordan, My “War” with Israel (London: Owen, 1969), pp. 125-126; and J. Lunt, Hussein of Jordan (London: MacMillan, 1989), p. 143.
30 For a blow-by-blow account of these battles see U. Narkis, Achat Yerusahalayim [Jerusalem Is One] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975); also M. Gur, Har Ha-bayit Be-yadenu [Mount Temple Is in Our Hands] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1974).
31 Rooshdi, The Hassemite Arab Army, p. 366.
32 E. N. Luttwak and D. Horowitz, The Israeli Army (London: Allen Lane, 1975), p. 267; Bar Tov, Dado, vol. 1, p. 128; M. Bar Kochva, Merkevot Ha-plada [Steel Chariots] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1989), p. 170.
33 Rooshdi, The Hassemite Arab Army, p. 386.
34 For this episode see U. Narkis, Chayal shel Yerushalayim [A Soldier for Jerusalem] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1991), pp. 330-33 1.
35 Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, vol. 1, p. 203.
36 Bar Tov, Dado, vol. 1, p. 131.
37 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 131-136.
38 Dayan, Avnei Derech, p. 474; see also the recent account by S. Nakdimon in Yediot Acharonot, May 30, 1997, pp. 16-27.
39 Bar Kochva, Merkevot Ha-plada, p. 221.
40 Quoted in Bar Tov, Dado, vol. 1, p. 145.
41 Cf. M. Eldar, Shayetet 11 [Flotilla 11] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1996), p. 40.
42 Dupuy, Elusive Victory, p. 331.
43 B. H. Liddell Hart, “The Strategy of a War,” Encounter (February 1968): 18.
44 Figure from Dupuy, Elusive Victory, p. 40.
45 Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama, p. 208.
46 E. Shor, ed., Derech Ha-mitla [By Way of the Mitla] (Ramat Gan: Massada, 1967), p. 127, recounts the experiences of Yoffe’s brigade; Bar Kochva, Merkevot Ha-plada, p. 219, recounts the experiences of his armored brigade against the Syrians.
47 Bar Kochva, Merkevot Ha-plada, p. 225.
48 Cf. the analysis of “war for existence” in M. van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 142-149.
49 S. Peres, Battling for Peace (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995), p. 167.
50 For an analysis of American press attitudes in particular see M. W. Suleiman, “American Mass Media and the June Conflict,” in I. Abu Lughod, ed., The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 146-147, table 4.
51 Number for June 10-16, cover.
52 F. Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1968), pp. 62-63.
53 G. Yakobi, Otsmatah shel Echut [The Power of Quality] (Haifa: Shikmona, 1972).
54 E.g., S. Peres, Ha-shalav Ha-ba [The Next Stage] (Tel Aviv: Am Ha-sefer, 1965), p. 181.
55 Y. Harkavi, “Basic Factors in the Arab Collapse During the Six Day War,” Orbis 2 (1967): 677-691.
56 J. Larteguy, The Walls of Israel (New York: Evans, 1969), pp. 87 (interview with Yariv) and 146 (interview with Gonen).
57 F. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 163.
58 Cf. Dayan, Avnei Derech, p. 436.
59 R. S. and W. S. Churchill, The Six Day War, p. 191.
CHAPTER 12
1 For this and the following paragraphs see R. Pedatsur, Nitschon Ha-mevucha: Mediniyut Memshelet Eshkol Ba-sthachim Le-achar Milchemet Sheshet Ha-yamim [The Triumph of Embarrassment: The Eshkol Government and the Territories After the Six Days’ War] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1996), p. 30 ff.
2 For some figures on the distances between Israel’s major centers and the new and old borders see A. Levite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 71.
3 For the com
plex processes that were involved in the decisionmaking process see Pedatsur, Nitschon Ha-mevucha, esp. pp. 145 ff., 177 ff., and 221 ff.
4 A later version of the so-called Allon Plan is Y. Allon, “The Case for Defensible Borders,” Foreign Affairs 55:1 (October 1976): 38-55. A full-length discussion is Y. Cohen, Tochnit Allon [The Allon Plan] (Efal: Ha-kibbuts Ha-meuchad, 1973).
5 Cf. M. Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 213 ff.
6 N. Safran, From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967 (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 158.
7 Figures from G. Yaakobi, Otsmatah shel Echut (Haifa: Shikmon, 1972), p. 120.
8 According to the order of battle in T. N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 181., 612-613.
9 Cf. Y. Greenberg, “Ha-hachlata al Kitsur Sherut Ha-chova Be-TSAHAL Bi-shnat 1963” [The Decision to Cut Conscript Service in 1963], Medina, Minhal Ve-yechasim Ben-leumiyim 40 (Summer 1995): 67-77.
10 E. Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama [Today War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987), p. 125.
11 Ibid., p. 138. In contrast, Major General Meron once told this author that the decision resulted from the fact that the Chieftain’s suspension system was too delicate for the rough terrain of the Middle East.
12 M. Dayan, Avnei Derech [Memoirs] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1976), p. 563.
13 Z. Levkovits, “Hebetim Be-logistika” [Logistic Aspects], Maarachot 332 (September-October 1992): 36.
14 S. Rolbant, The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army (New York: Barnes, 1970), p. 172.
15 Between 1976 and 1973 there were only nine, of whom four later changed their mind: R. Gal, A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 256, n. 4.
16 On the link between unit cohesion and psychiatric casualties see M. van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 91-97.
17 Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama, p. 48 ff.
18 The raid is described in detail in R. Eytan, Sippur shel Chayal [A Soldier’s Story] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1991), pp. 114-117; also Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama, pp. 322-334.
The Sword And The Olive Page 53
