Admiralty Secretary Nepean agreed: ‘I consider your indisposition to be a serious public misfortune in the present moment.’111 Lord Hood understood the problem: ‘It is undoubtedly to be lamented that the Russian fleet at Revel was not attacked when evidently at your mercy. This I imagine to be the primary cause of your complaints.’112 Official permission for return on health grounds was sent the same day.113
Meanwhile, on 8 June a British government Official Proclamation lifted the embargo on Russian, Swedish and Danish shipping.114 The government was anxious for the campaign to end; with a French invasion threatening, part of the Baltic fleet was moved to Cork even before Nelson came home. If any of the Baltic powers stepped out of line, they would be attacked without hesitation, but this looked increasingly unlikely.115 The Danes were blatantly in breach of the armistice, equipping ships, reinforcing defences and parading French officers at the Crown Prince’s elbow. Nelson, who had not yet received his permission to leave, sent Captain Sutton to isolate Denmark from Norway, and considered going back to bombard Copenhagen.116 Not that he was worried by the prospect of fighting any combination of Baltic navies: though large in numbers, they were in every other respect insignificant.117 Nelson knew the best use of his time was to make the fleet efficient and keep it fully stored, ready to go anywhere. His fleet-management skills had convinced St Vincent that he could command a major theatre in the future. The Earl rejoiced that Nelson’s labours had ‘finished so advantageously for your country and honourably to yourself’.118
Permission to return home finally arrived on 13 June. The campaign was over, and Nelson was anxious there should be no inquiry into Parker’s conduct, which he characterised as ‘idleness’ rather than ‘criminality’.119 On 17 June the convention was signed at St Petersburg, after further Russian attempts to revive the old nonsense about free ships and free goods. When St Helen’s countered by declaring that the King would not accept ‘a principle so injurious to His most valuable interests’, and was ‘determined to combat its establishment at every risk, and by the most persevering & vigorous exertions’, Count Panin gave way and signed.120
Two days later Nelson hauled down his flag in Kioge Bay, boarded the brig Kite and sailed for England, reaching Yarmouth on 1 July. He did not leave without thanking his fleet and subordinates. The junior flag officers spoke for many. Deeply affected by Nelson’s approval, Totty promised to ‘trace the Path to Glory which Your Lordship has so long pursued, to the eminent advantage of your country and your own immortal honour’.121 Poor Totty did not get much further along the path, dying within a year, victim of the unhealthy West Indies command.
Nelson’s last service in the Baltic was highly significant. He gathered the intelligence necessary to ensure the British could always come back. On 12 June he sent in ‘remarks made on the passages of the Belt and drawings of the same, which I request you will be pleased to lodge in the records of the Admiralty, that they may be referred to in case they are wanted’. The Board minuted: ‘Acquaint his Lordship that My Lords very much approve of his having employed the persons therein mentioned on this important service.’122 Nelson’s work on the charts continued. On 21 June Alecto and Amazon rejoined the fleet after passing through the Great Belt. Alecto’s captain reported the passage ‘a very desirable one’.123 Suitably impressed, Pole reported that no time would be lost, and no risk incurred, by coming home through the Belt, and he would be glad to make the attempt. He sent the sixty-four-gun Polyphemus and Dart ‘to examine well the passage of the Belt’.124 Four days later he reported to Nelson: ‘We found the passage of the Belt all that could be wished for large ships.’125
It would be mid-July before Sweden and Denmark accepted the Convention, dictated to them by London and St Petersburg, and until they did Pole remained with a squadron at Kioge, finally departing on 20 July. The fleet was given new instructions to pass the Belt, and after a slow but secure passage emerged into the Kattegat on 1 August. Pole’s final report stressed that the Belt was much better for big ships. The Admiralty was very pleased and ordered that the report be sent ‘to Mr Dalrymple [the new Hydrographer of the Navy] for his information’.126
Britain had defeated a massive threat to her security, and re-emphasised the value of sea control as a decisive weapon of war. Without Nelson, this would not have happened: not only did he guarantee the victory, he also created a highly efficient combat-ready fleet out of a collection of hurriedly manned old ships, and gathered strategically significant intelligence for the Hydrographic Office. The Baltic command showed Nelson at full power, despite his protestations of ill health. For France, by contrast, the Baltic campaign was a major defeat, and Bonaparte was among the few men to mourn the mad Tsar, who had been a vital asset in his war with Britain. Had Paul been able to continue his aggressive programme, Russia would inevitably have been humiliated and Bonaparte would have seized the chance to push his power further east, without Britain being able to influence affairs. But now Bonaparte was forced to concede the need for peace with Britain, and Nelson’s next task would be to block his attempts to coerce her into unnecessary concessions. He landed at Yarmouth on 29 July, and lost no time setting out for London.127
Notes – CHAPTER XI
1 Spencer to St Vincent 28.11.1800; Morriss, R. ed. The Channel Fleet and the Blockade of Brest 1793–1801, Aldershot, Navy Records Society, 2001, p. 590.
2 Feldbaek, O. Denmark and the Armed Neutrality: 1800–1801 is the definitive study of this issue. His The Battle of Copenhagen 1801 contains an excellent summary.
3 Le Donne, J. The Russian Empire and the World 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment, pp. 54–64, 302
4 Ehrman, Pitt III, p. 398; speech in House of Commons on 2.2.1801
5 Smith, E A. Lord Grey, 1764–1845, pp. 78–9
6 Coupland, ed. The War Speeches of William Pitt the Younger, pp. 288–301. The appearance of this volume in 1915 only emphasises the extent to which that generation looked back to the French wars for inspiration.
7 Ehrman, J. The Younger Pitt: Vol.III, p. 411
8 Spencer to St Vincent 28.11.1800; Spencer IV pp. 273–4
9 St Vincent to Spencer 7.12.1800; Spencer IV pp. 274–5
10 Lord Whitworth (ex Amb.) to Spencer 18.12.1800; Spencer IV p. 275
11 Dundas to Spencer 3.1.1801 SP III pp. 287–8
12 Grenville to Carysfort 16.12.1800. Fortescue VI pp. 407–9
13 King’s speech 31.12.1800; St Vincent I p. 51
14 Dundas to Admiralty Secretary Evan Nepean 9.1.1801; ADM 1/4168
15 St Vincent was keen to get rid of old followers of Hood, including Donnett and Young, from the Channel fleet. Morriss pp. 567, 578–9
16 Admiralty to Nelson 9.1.1801; Add. 34,934 f19
17 Spencer to St Vincent 26.1.1801; Spencer IV p. 279
18 See Lyon, D. Sailing Navy List pp. 250–1 for the six vessels purchased.
19Parker to Spencer 11.1.1801; Spencer IV pp. 275–7
20 Thesiger to Spencer 16.1.1801; Spencer IV pp. 278–9
21 Nelson to Spencer 17.1.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 274–5
22 Admiralty to Nelson 17 and 18.1.1801; Add. 34,934 f25 and 34,923 f25
23 St Vincent to Spencer 23.1.1801; Spencer IV p. 264
24 St Vincent to Nelson 26.1.1801; Croker Collection, NMM 10
25 Nelson to Emma 25.1.1801; Morrison II pp. 108–9. Pettigrew printed many of these letters in the 1840s, but this quote, and much of the other interesting matter, was edited out.
26 Nelson to Emma 26 and 28.1.1801; Morrison pp. 1909–10, and Nicolas IV p. 279.
27 Nelson to Emma 14.2.1801; Morrison II pp. 114–15
28 Nelson to Emma 19 and 22.2.1801; Morrison II pp. 118–21
29 ADM 3/144N
30 Lord Grenville to Admiralty 2.2.1801; FO13/1
31 Nelson to Admiralty 2.2.1801; Nicolas IV p. 282
32 St Vincent to Nepean 9.2. Spencer IV p. 265
33 The Nelson–Troubridge Correspondence in CRK/14
and Naval Miscellany I is critical to this process, and the inner history of the campaign.
34 St Vincent to Simcoe 22.2.1801; St Vincent Papers I p. 82. Dundas to Admiralty 23.2.1801 and Dundas to Duke of York (Secret) 23.2.1801; ADM 1/4168. The Cumloden Papers.
35 Secretary of State to Admiralty 23.2.1801; ADM 1/4168
36 Admiralty to Nelson 26.2.1801; Add. 34,934 f. 32
37 Nelson to Emma 1, 4, 6 and 11.3.1801,; to Wife 4.3.1801; Morrison II pp. 123–9
38 St Vincent to Nelson 8.3.1801; St Vincent I p. 84
39 Nelson to Troubridge 7 and 10.3.1801; Laughton, J.K. ed. The Naval Miscellany I, Navy Records Society 1901 pp. 415–18. St Vincent to Hyde Parker 11.3.1801; St Vincent I pp. 86–7
40 Nelson to Troubridge 11.3.1801; Miscellany I p. 419
41 Nelson to Troubridge 7.3.1801; Miscellany I pp. 414–15
42 Nelson to Troubridge 10 and 29.3.1801; Miscellany I pp. 417–18 and 424–5
43 Order of Battle 10.4.1801; Add. 34,918 f.16.
44 Dundas to Admiralty (Secret) 14.3.1801; ADM 1/4186
45 Admiralty to Hyde Parker (Secret) 15.3.1801; Add.34,934 f. 38
46 Nelson to Troubridge 16.3.1801; Miscellany I pp. 420–1
47 Vansittart to Hawkesbury 14.3.1801; Add. 31,233 f. 11–9
48 Vansittart to Hawkesbury 19.3.1801; Add. 31,233 f. 34
49 Hyde Parker’s Journal 22.3.1801; ADM 50/65.
50 Cumloden Papers 23.3.1801. Hyde-Parker to Admiralty 23.3.1801; ADM 1/ 4 39 and 48
51 Nelson to Hyde– Parker 24.3.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 2956
52 Hyde Parker to Nelson 24.3.17801; CRK/8
53 Cumloden Papers 24.3.1801
54 Ibid. 26.3.1801
55 Domett to Nelson 26.3.1801; CRK/4
56 Nelson to Troubridge 29.3.1801; Miscellany 1 pp. 424–5
57 Nelson to Emma 30.3.1801; Morrison II p. 132
58 Parker’s Journal 31.3. and 1.4.1801 ADM 50/65
59 Cumloden Papers 31.3 and 1.4.1801
60 The key words in the Stewart quote are usually given as ‘jug’ and ‘bale’, but these make no sense. Allowances should be made for Nelson’s accent and the noise of battle. Nelson to Berry 9.3.1801; Nicolas IV p. 292
61 Minto letter of 19.5.1801; Minto III p. 219
62 Nelson to Davison 4.4.1801; Nicolas VII p. ccv
63 Hamond to Captain Andrew Hamond 5.4.1801; Hamond Papers, Duke University
64 She became HMS Nassau and captured another Danish battleship in 1808
65 The main focus of literature on this campaign has been the Slagt por Reden, the battle for the roadstead. This has diverted attention from the wider aims of the campaign, and the impact this terrifying demonstration of power had on European opinion.
66 Nelson to Emma 6.4.1801; Morrison II p. 135. Nelson to St Vincent 9.4.1801; Nicolas IV p. 341
67 Nelson to Admiralty 9.4.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 339–41. Nelson to Troubridge 9.3.1801; Miscellany I p. 427
68 Nelson to Minto 9.4.1801; Nicolas IV p. 342
69 Balfour to Nelson 17.4.1801; CRK/2
70 St Vincent to Parker 5.4.1801; St Vincent I pp. 88–9
71 Parker to Admiralty 9.4.1801; ADM 1/ 4
72 Typically Bligh, who had fought like a lion, was so unsure of himself as to ask Nelson for a testimonial, which he was told was ‘perfectly unnecessary’. Nelson to St Vincent 14.4.1801; Nicolas IV p. 343
73 Hobart to Admiralty 16.4.1801 Secret; ADM1/4187. Admiralty to Parker 17.4.1801 Secret; Add.34,934 f. 43
74 Spencer to Nelson 19.4.1801; CRK/10
75 St Vincent to Lord Mayor 15.4.1801 to Parker, Nelson 17.4.1801; St Vincent I pp. 89–91
76 Davison to Nelson 4.4.1801; CRK/3
77 St Vincent to Nelson 25.4.1801; St Vincent I p. 93. Nelson to Maurice 15.4.1801; Nicolas IV p. 138
78 Admiralty to Nelson 21.4.1801; Add. 34,934 f. 57
79 St Vincent to Nelson 21.4.1801; St Vincent I pp. 92–3
80 St Vincent to King 21.4.11801; Aspinall, George III 1798–1801. p. 517
81 Parker to Admiralty 25.4.1801; ADM 1 /4 65. Parker to Nelson 23.4.1801; CRK/8
82 Nelson to Emma 20 and 23.4.1801; Morrison II pp. 139 and 142
83 Nelson to Davison 23.4.1801; Naish pp. 586–7. Nelson to Troubridge 23.4.1801; Miscellany I p. 429
84 Nelson to Troubridge 28.4.1801; Miscellany 1 pp. 431–2
85 Nelson to Davison 22.4.1801; Nicolas VII pp. ccvii–ix. Parker to Admiralty 30.4.1801; ADM 1/ 470. St Vincent to Nelson 1.5.1801; St Vincent I p. 94
86 Hyde Parker to Nelson 9.4.1801; CRK/8
87 St Vincent to Lord Hawkesbury (Foreign Secretary) 4.5.1801; St Vincent I PP. 94–5
88 Hobart to Admiralty 5.5.1801; ADM 1/4187. Admiralty to Nelson 6.5.1801 (Secret); Add. 34,918 f. 86
89 St Vincent to Duckworth (C.in.C. West Indies) 15.5.1801; St Vincent to Hawkesbury 21.5.1801; St Vincent 1 pp. 96–7
90 Nelson to Admiralty, Davison, St Vincent, Addington 5.5.1801; Nelson to Admiralty 7.5.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 352–9. Nelson to Troubridge 7.5.1801; Miscellany I pp. 432–3. Cumloden Papers.
91 Nelson to Emma 5.5.1801; Morrison II p. 144
92 Nelson to Admiralty 5.5.1801; ADM 1/ 4 71 and 74
93 Nelson to Vansittart 12.5.1801; Nicolas IV p. 368
94 Nelson to St Vincent 16.5.1801; Nicolas IV p. 370. Cumloden Papers.
95 Garlike to Nelson 15.5.1801; FO 95/217
96 Nelson to St Vincent 16.5.1801; Nelson to Davison 12.5.1801; quote Nicolas IV pp. 370 and 373.
97 Nelson to Admiralty 17.5.1801; Nicolas IV 375.
98 St Vincent Standing Orders 25.4.1801; Add. 34,918 f. 52.
99 Nelson to Admiralty 22.5.1801; ADM 1/4 81–3 and 86. are typical.
100 Nelson to Lord Carysfort (Minister at Berlin) 19.5.1801; Nicolas IV p. 375. Dr Baird to Sick and Hurt Board 10.5.1801; Baird to Nelson 30.5.1801; Add. 34,918 f59 and 65.
101 Nelson to Admiralty 23.5.1801; Nicolas IV p. 383
102 Nelson to Admiralty 23.5.1801; ADM 1/4 90, enclosing Fremantle to Nelson 23.5.1801; CRK/5
103 Nelson to St Vincent 22.5.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 379–80
104 Lambert, The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy against Russia, 1853–1856, p. 74
105 Nelson to St Helen’s 22.5.1801; Nelson to Admiralty 23.5.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 380–3
106 Garlike to Hawkesbury (Secret) 24.5.1801; FO 95/217
107 Nelson to Count Pahlen 26.5.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 393–4
108 St Vincent to King 24.5.1801; Aspinall, George III pp. 542–3
109 St Vincent to King 30.5.1801; Aspinall, George III p. 545
110 St Vincent to Addington and Nelson 31.5.18o1; St Vincent I pp. 100–1
111 Nepean to Nelson (Personal) 31.5.1801; Add. 34,918 f. 67
112 Hood to Nelson 1.6.1801: CRK/6
113 Admiralty to Nelson 31.5.1801; Add. 34,934 f. 98
114 Admiralty to Nelson 8.6.1801; Add 34,934 f. 112
115 Hobart to Admiralty 12.6.1801 (Secret); ADM 1/4187
116 Nelson to Admiralty St Vincent 12.6.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 411–12
117 Nelson to Ball 4.6.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 400–1
118 St Vincent to Nelson 3.6.1801; St Vincent 1 p. 103
119 Nelson to Admiralty 13.6.1801; Nicolas IV pp. 413–14. Nelson to Davison 15.6.1801; Nicolas IV p. 416
120 St Helen’s Hawkesbury 18.6.1801; FO 95/217.
121 Totty to Nelson 16.6.1801; CRK/12
122 Nelson to Admiralty 12.6.1801; ADM 1/4 108. Admiralty to Nelson 26.6.1801; Add. 34, 934 f. 119
123 Admiral Pole’s Journal 21.6.1801; ADM 50/43
124 Pole to Admiralty 26.6.1801; ADM 1/4 123. Pole Journal 26.6.1801; ADM 50/43
125 Pole to Nelson 30.7.1801; CRK/10
126 Pole to Admiralty 9.8.1801; and endorsement of 10.9.1801; ADM 1/ 4
127 Nelson to Nepean 29.6.1801; ADM /4 127
Horatia, Nelson’s daughter, aged two
CHAPTER XII
Defying Bonaparte 1801
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br /> With the end of the war in sight, the last remaining anomalies cleared away by the Baltic and Egyptian campaigns, Britain and France were in a position to negotiate. However, the peace process would see the role of the armed forces enhanced, rather than reduced.
Henry Addington’s government lacked the heavyweight political figures of Pitt’s team – but also the ideological prejudice that had prevented it from responding to a changing situation. While Foreign Secretary Grenville had been wholly opposed in principle to any peace with the French republican government, his replacement Lord Hawkesbury was more pragmatic, and with Cabinet concurrence opened negotiations with the French on 21 March. The British position was greatly improved by the battle of the Copenhagen Roads, and the subsequent collapse of the Armed Neutrality. The French position in Egypt was crumbling, and Malta could not hold out much longer.1
In early March Bonaparte sent Admiral Latouche Tréville to Boulogne to concentrate the ships for a planned invasion. This was a bluff: there were few ships available, and those at other ports found it very difficult to creep along the coast to join his command. The main purpose of the manoeuvre was to create the impression of a threat to combine with his overtures for peace – this was Bonaparte’s favourite negotiating technique.2 In May and June, Bonaparte, realising his extra-European strength was slipping away, moved his troops to the Channel to increase his diplomatic leverage. The fact that the threat was not real was less significant than the determination it indicated. The French began to look to novel weapons, like Robert Fulton’s submarine, prompting much ridicule in Britain. By late July the threat of invasion appeared to be growing, as new camps opened between Boulogne and Bruges. The public was alarmed: on 21 July the Army warned that invasion was imminent, the following day a mass rally of volunteers in Hyde Park demonstrated the national will to resist, and on the 24th the nation’s hero was called on once again.
St Vincent created a new command for Nelson: he was to control all the ships and vessels on the coast between Orfordness and Beachy Head, without interfering with the existing North Sea, Nore and Downs commands. He was to position his forces along the coasts to block or destroy any invasion attempt, and attack enemy invasion craft in their assembly ports. St Vincent justified his decision to the local commanders by stressing that recent intelligence suggested invasion was highly probable. Therefore it was necessary to place the whole defence force under one officer, ‘who will have no other duty to perform than that of attending to this important object’. These instructions were based on discussions with the Earl and Nelson, ‘Memorandum on the Defence of the Thames Estuary etc.’, combining stationary blockships and local craft with a concentrated sea-going force to intercept any attempt by the French to cross the channel. He considered forty thousand to be the smallest likely invasion force.3
Nelson: Britannia's God of War Page 31
