QUESTION: Was Tiger Force ever given orders to the effect “Kill everything that moves?”
CARPENTER: Yes. Lt. Hawkins has given that order to the Tiger Force. I recall one incident in the area of the village where Ybarra killed and scalped the NVA in June/July 67, when we were walking into an inhabited hamlet that had several Vietnamese farmers, men and women, they were on our right flank, the lead element of this platoon came under fire from the front and Hawkins had the platoon shoot all of the farmers on our flank. We killed about ten of the farmers then stopped firing. The enemy on our front had departed, leaving several pieces of ammo and canteens behind in their position. We moved into the village and set up camp after that, nothing was done about shooting the farmers. No one went to see if the farmers had weapons or not. We knew the farmers were not armed to begin with but shot them anyway because Hawkins ordered it.
QUESTION: Who was there during this incident?
CARPENTER: The whole Tiger Force platoon, everyone that wasn’t KIA’d or hospitalized.
The sworn witness statement of Michael Allums on January 17, 1974. The document was Exhibit 16 of the Coy Allegation. It included the following:
QUESTION: About the same period, July 1967, in an area west of Duc Pho, do you have any knowledge of Tiger Force members firing on some farmers that were working outside a hamlet?
ALLUMS: I’m not sure if this is the same incident, but I remember walking along a trail and some people being to our right flank. The people started to run from where they had been working in the field and the order was passed to open fire. I remember the incident so well as I was really put down and I did not open fire with an M79 I was carrying.
Books
Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Press, 1983.
Schell, Jonathan. The Military Half. New York: Knopf, 1968.
The Winter Soldier Investigation: An Inquiry into American War Crimes. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.
CHAPTER 12
Main Sources
We interviewed numerous Tiger Force members about the last days of the Song Ve Valley campaign, including William Carpenter, Barry Bowman, and Ken Kerney. We drew on interviews with Dennis Stout and the friends and family of Donald Wood. In addition, we talked at length to dozens of villagers from the Song Ve, including Nyugen Dam, Lu Thuan, and Kieu Trak.
For the section on the defoliation of the Song Ve Valley, we relied on the unit history of the 1st Battalion/327th Infantry and historical records about the defoliation in South Vietnam during 1967. We also drew on the interviews with Nyugen Dam and numerous villagers who recounted how they became sick shortly after U.S. planes sprayed the valley with defoliants.
Our account of the meeting between Lieutenant Donald Wood and Lieutenant Stephen Naughton was based, in part, on CID documents included in the Tiger Force case. Wood was clearly upset by the platoon’s behavior in the field and reported the misconduct to Naughton, who was his supervisor. During the CID investigation, Wood told agents he complained to Naughton and a high-ranking battalion officer. Wood said he couldn’t remember the officer’s name. Officers were always rotating out of the 1st Battalion/327th Infantry. At any given time, there were more than twenty battalion officers stationed at Duc Pho.
Dennis Stout provided us with the perspective of his last days in Vietnam. By the end of July, Stout was disillusioned with the war and the Army’s command structure. He said he witnessed atrocities in the field but was ostracized for reporting them. He said he promised himself he would collect as much evidence about the atrocities as he could—including locations and names of soldiers who committed the crimes—so he could report them when he was discharged from the Army.
Army Records
The sworn witness statement of Donald Wood on January 22, 1974. The document was Exhibit 45 of the Coy Allegation. It included the following:
WOOD: A few days later, after we returned to Duc Pho, I discussed the incident with the battalion XO whom I cannot identify and was advised to return to my duties with the unit. After working with the Tiger Force for another mission which lasted several weeks, I was able to obtain a transfer and finished my tour with other units in the battalion.
The sworn witness statement of CID agent James Alexander on February 5, 1975. Alexander interviewed Naughton about Tiger Force and Wood’s complaint. The document was Exhibit 124 of the Coy Allegation.
Books
Bilton, Michael, and Kevin Sim. Four Hours in My Lai. New York: Penguin Books, 1992.
Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Press, 1983.
The Pentagon Papers. New York: Bantam Books, 1971.
Schell, Jonathan. The Military Half. New York: Knopf, 1968.
Topmiller, Robert J. The Lotus Unleashed: The Buddhist Peace Movement in South Vietnam 1964-1966. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002.
CHAPTER 13
Main Sources
We talked at length with numerous Tiger Force members about the move to Chu Lai and their early days in Quang Tin province. We interviewed dozens of Vietnamese who lived in Quang Tin in August 1967, including Colonel Nguyen Thai, a Vietcong soldier who set up ambushes against U.S. troops in the province.
For the section about the terrain of Quang Tin province, we drew on extensive interviews with Tiger Force soldiers and the Vietnamese people. Tiger Force soldiers told us that the terrain in Quang Tin was covered with triple-canopy jungles—so thick it was often difficult to see more than a few meters ahead.
For other parts of the chapter, particularly the historical context of the Vietnam War in July and August 1967, we drew on several books, newspaper articles, and interviews with historians. We also relied on the unit history of the 1st Battalion/327th Infantry, which included information about the move to Quang Tin and the unit’s first weeks in the province.
Army Records
The unit history of the 1st Battalion/327th Infantry. It contained the following information: “At the termination of Operation Hood River on 10 Aug., the 1st Battalion (Airborne)/ 327th Infantry conducted an airlift of the companies from Quang Ngai Airstrip and truck convoy from Carentan base to Chu Lai. The following five days were spent in refitting activities and preparation of the coming operation.”
The sworn witness statement of Gerald Morse on March 17, 1975. The document was Exhibit 315 of the Coy Allegation. It included the following:
MORSE: In the triple-canopy jungle, visibility, even in the daytime, was extremely limited. Sometimes you couldn’t see ten yards ahead.
Books
Anderson, David. Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998.
Beattie, Keith. The Scar That Binds. New York: New York University Press, 2000.
Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Press, 1983.
Langguth, A. J. Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975. New York: Touchstone, 2000.
The Pentagon Papers. New York: Bantam Books, 1971.
Schell, Jonathan. The Military Half. New York: Knopf, 1968.
Topmiller, Robert J. The Lotus Unleashed: The Buddhist Peace Movement in South Vietnam 1964-1966. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002.
Valentine, Douglas. The Phoenix Program. New York: Morrow, 1990.
The Winter Soldier Investigation: An Inquiry into American War Crimes. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.
CHAPTER 14
Main Sources
We interviewed numerous Tiger Force soldiers and officers, including William Carpenter, William Doyle, Ken Kerney, Barry Bowman, and Gerald Morse. We also relied on witness statements taken by CID investigators during the Coy Allegation.
Our account of the platoon’s first days at Chu Lai was based on extensive interviews with Tiger Force soldiers who said they were “singled out” at the base, partly because of their reputation in the field. For the parts of the chapter about Chu Lai’s history, we relied on Army documents, books, and interviews with historians.
For the section on Li
eutenant Colonel Gerald Morse’s first encounter with Tiger Force in the field, we drew on information provided by platoon members, particularly from William Doyle. In addition, we examined the battalion’s radio logs, which detailed the platoon’s daily movements.
For Morse’s military record and background, we relied on Army personnel files and CID documents from the Coy Allegation.
Our account of the fight between Tiger Force and the Marines was based, in part, on information from Bill Carpenter.
Army Records
The witness statement of Captain Robert Morin on February 18, 1975. The document was Exhibit 333 of the Coy Allegation. It included information from CID agent Philip Lindley about his interview with Morin. Lindley said Morin recounted a story about Tiger Force capturing an unarmed elderly man. The soldiers allegedly tortured the man before drowning him in the Song Ve River in 1967.
LINDLEY: Morin did remember hearing the story at a party with a group of officers assigned to the battalion and Morin thought the battalion commander probably heard the account of the incident at the same time that he did. Further, Morin thought that either a Tiger Force platoon leader or a platoon sergeant from the Tiger Force had recounted the incident for the group.
Books
Fall, Bernard. Street Without Joy. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole, 1994.
Herring, George. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1996.
Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Press, 1983.
Langguth, A. J. Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975. New York: Touchstone, 2000.
Olson, James S., and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.
The Pentagon Papers. New York: Bantam Books, 1971.
Schell, Jonathan. The Military Half. New York: Knopf, 1968.
CHAPTER 15
Main Sources
We interviewed numerous Tiger Force members about search-and-destroy missions in the Que Son Valley and other parts of Quang Tin province. We also interviewed friends and family members of Terrence Kerrigan.
For the section about the ambushes and dangers in the Que Son Valley and skirmishes with the North Vietnamese Army, we drew on dozens of interviews with Tiger Force soldiers. In addition, we examined the unit history of the 1st Battalion/327th Infantry. By late August 1967, many Tiger Force members said they came to the grim conclusion that the war was becoming a quagmire.
Our account of Private James Messer’s death and the platoon’s frustration was based on extensive interviews with Tiger Force members.
For the section about bunkers, we talked at length with Tiger Force soldiers. We also drew on interviews that CID agents conducted with platoon members during the Coy Allegation.
For the section about the platoon’s assault on a village along the Son Ly River, we relied on a lengthy interview with Tiger Force medic Barry Bowman. During the Coy Allegation, CID agents interviewed Bowman three times, but he never told them about the attack—or that he executed a wounded prisoner. Bowman discussed the shooting for the Toledo Blade series “Buried Secrets, Brutal Truths.” The four-day series ran October 19 to 22, 2003.
Our account of James Cogan shooting the old man was based on CID records and interviews with Tiger Force soldiers. Carpenter told the CID in 1973 that Cogan fired two shots into the elderly Vietnamese. But for the Toledo Blade series “Buried Secrets, Brutal Truths,” Carpenter said he was actually the one who fired the second shot.
Army Records
The sworn witness statement of William Carpenter on January 18, 1973. The document was Exhibit 23 of the Coy Allegation. It contained the following:
CARPENTER: Sometime in July or August 1967 we entered a village west of Chu Lai and saw an unarmed 20-year-old man run from a hut with a rucksack on his back. The Tiger Force opened up and killed the running man, then searched the hut. There was an old man inside. He was the father of the man we had just killed. Trout ordered Cogan to kill the old man and Cogan took him behind the hut and shot him with a .45 pistol through the mouth and left him laying on the ground. I saw that the old man was still moving and told Cogan that that old man was alive. Cogan then went to the old man and shot him with the .45 again, this time in the throat, killing him. I watched this second shooting of the old man by Cogan and I heard Trout order Cogan to shoot the man in the first place.
The sworn witness statement of Barry Bowman on May 31, 1973. The document was Exhibit 41 of the Coy Allegation. It contained the following about Cogan shooting the elderly Vietnamese man:
BOWMAN: We approached a hooch when a young Vietnamese ran from the hooch. He was told to stop and as he continued to run he was shot and killed. I remember he had some kind of bag with him. Inside the hooch was an old man wearing a white hat and he was taken outside and behind the hooch, where one of the combat engineers shot him twice in the head with a .45-cal. pistol. He was still alive after he was shot the first time and the combat engineer had to shoot him a second time to kill him. I saw the incident myself.
QUESTION: Was the old man armed and were there any indications which lead you to believe that he was an enemy?
BOWMAN: There were no such indications and he was not armed. In my opinion this was also an unjustified killing.
For the section about Kerrigan following Trout’s order to kill the Vietnamese man, we talked to Tiger Force soldiers and Kerrigan’s friends and family members. We also depended on witness statements that were part of the CID investigation of Tiger Force.
A casualty report about James Messer’s death. The document was Exhibit 436 of the Coy Allegation. It contained the following about the private: “Died on 22 August 1967 in Vietnam as the result of gunshot wounds received in hostile ground action.”
The sworn witness statement of Forrest Miller on January 18, 1974. The document was Exhibit 54 of the Coy Allegation. It included the following about the attack on the bunkers:
QUESTION: How were the children killed?
MILLER: They were in bunkers, and we threw in hand grenades.
QUESTION: Would this have been the normal thing to do for the Tiger Force to kill the children found in the village?
MILLER: In any other area, no. However, in this area, a free-fire zone, yes.
The sworn witness statement of Kenneth Kerney on June 18, 1974. The document was Exhibit 112 of the Coy Allegation. CID agent Charles Fann wrote a report based on his interview with Kerney. It contained the following about the bunkers:
FANN: According to Kerney, they yelled to the people to come out by using short Vietnamese phrases that the soldiers had picked up. No interpreter was available to talk to the people. Kerney did not recall hearing an order to use hand grenades because the members of the Tiger Force knew what to do. He could not furnish an account of how many people were killed during the incident but did see bodies brought out of the bunkers. According to Kerney, a search of the bunkers failed to show any sign of Vietcong supplies or to substantiate that the village sympathizers were with the Vietcong. No return fire was received by the Tiger Force. The Tiger Force did not have access to gas grenades to flush the people from the bunkers. Kerney could not explain why it was necessary to get the people out of the bunkers.
The sworn witness statement of Charles Fulton on June 24, 1974. The document was Exhibit 120 of the Coy Allegation. It contained the following about the attack on the bunkers:
FULTON: Once in the immediate area of the bunkers, one of the NCOs (the one that always wore the Tiger fatigues) who I think may have been Ssg. Haugh gave the order to throw hand grenades into the bunkers. I was among some of the guys that threw them into the bunkers. I threw mine into the tall one. I also remember one of the medics throwing hand grenades into the bunkers also. That bunker was flush with the ground. I don’t know what happened after that for we continued on for about 25-30 meters and then stopped to set up our perimeter for we stayed there that night. I do remember that all during the night we kept hearing hu
man sounds which came from the direction of the bunkers.
Books
Grossman, David. On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. Boston: Little, Brown, 1996.
Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Press, 1983.
The Pentagon Papers. New York: Bantam Books, 1971.
Schell, Jonathan. The Military Half. New York: Knopf, 1968.
Shay, Jonathan. Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character. New York: Atheneum, 1994.
The Winter Soldier Investigation: An Inquiry into American War Crimes. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.
CHAPTER 16
Main Sources
We interviewed numerous Tiger Force soldiers, including William Carpenter, Barry Bowman, Floyd Sawyer, and William Doyle. We also talked at length with friends and family members of Gerald Bruner. We drew from sworn witness statements taken by CID agents during the Coy Allegation.
For the biographical information about Bruner’s childhood, we drew on numerous interviews with family members, including his wife, Karen, and brothers, Jack Bruner and Michael Stuckey. They provided us with Bruner’s letters from Vietnam—letters in which he began questioning the U.S. objectives in the war.
For the section on Tiger Force soldiers abusing two prisoners, we relied on extensive interviews with numerous Tiger Force members, including Bowman and Sawyer. In an interview with us, Bowman said he was so upset by the killing that he told a chaplain. Sawyer told CID investigators he shot the prisoner because the detainee was trying to escape. In addition, Sawyer told CID agents he had no idea the prisoner was set up by Tiger Force. When we interviewed Sawyer, he said he killed the prisoner because he was fleeing. He said soldiers beat the prisoners—including the one he shot—and the platoon “killed a lot of people we shouldn’t have.” But he added, “I’ve worked so hard to shut it off that the whole thing is a blank spot in my life.”
Our account of the confrontation between Doyle and Bruner in a farming village was based on interviews with Tiger Force members and CID documents. It is interesting to note that, before he died at age fifty-nine, Bruner made a tape about his four tours of duty in Vietnam for a Pearl Harbor commemoration ceremony. On the tape, he condemned the shooting of the farmer: “To me, this was what you call murder—they flat-out murdered the guy.” In an interview, Doyle told us he would have killed the farmer himself—instead of ordering the execution—but his gun jammed. “You want to know the truth? I had my rifle on rock and roll and the goddamn thing misfired.”
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