by Richard Mead
That Dick was fully in control of his battle was clear to all, including the war correspondent of the Daily Express, who wrote about how he had met ‘a thin, tall and softly spoken man with a deceptively mild appearance. I found it reassuring hearing him explain the battle. It is this sense of professionalism that runs right through the Army now. We would hold here, and here, and here, he said, but not here, and for this reason, and with that plan in view. It was succinct and clear and mathematical without either optimism or pessimism.’ Dick’s ‘scientific’ grasp of a battle or even a wider campaign was remarked upon by many who served with him, from Alexander downwards, and it was never displayed to better advantage than at Salerno.
Clark was not so confident. A strong counter-attack was mounted by the Germans against VI US Corps on the afternoon of 13 September, leaving 45 US Division at risk of being cut off. Although his divisional commanders remained resolute, Dawley himself proved unequal to the situation, so Clark effectively took command of the corps himself. By the following afternoon, the situation was so dire that he asked Admiral Hewitt, the American commander of the naval task force, to prepare two plans, one for the evacuation of VI US Corps to the British sector, the other the reverse. When he heard about this from Commodore Oliver, Dick was furious. Charles Richardson, who had noticed like many others that whenever Dick was deeply concerned he would lower his voice to a whisper, was visiting his HQ at the time and heard the volume drop significantly. Dick had actually seen Clark that morning when there had been no mention of such a plan and he now sent a signal to say that, as it had not been discussed, there was no possibility of it happening.
Alexander, following the battle from Hewitt’s flagship, supported Dick’s stance and Clark’s plans were dropped. To bolster the position the C-in-C arranged with his naval and air force counterparts for two British battleships to be brought in to shell the Germans and for bombers to be diverted from other operations, whilst Clark ordered 82 US Airborne Division to drop first one and then a second parachute regiment into the American beachhead to bolster the defences. Perhaps more significantly, a major part of the German attack found itself in a dead end between the Sele and one of its tributaries, causing their whole offensive to grind to a halt. By the following day Clark, who had in the meantime displayed considerable personal courage in leading his troops on the ground, had recovered his nerve and was now determined to stay put.
The crisis had passed and the Germans had lost their last chance to push the Allies into the sea, but there were many days of bitter fighting ahead. On 15 September Alexander visited both corps, accompanied by Clark and Air Marshal Coningham, AOC of the Desert Air Force.5 Dick took them to the HQs of 46 and 56 Divisions and 169 and 201 Brigades and then gave them a picnic lunch on the beach. The C-in-C was delighted with Dick’s handling of the battle, but unimpressed with Dawley. He conveyed his views on the latter to Clark, who agreed that he would have to be relieved, but it was some days before Eisenhower took the decision to replace him with Major General John P. Lucas.
On the following day, the arrival of 7 Armoured Division’s 131 Lorried Infantry Brigade allowed Dick to begin the process of shifting his weight to the left. He described his situation in a signal to Darby: ‘I am strong on my right in front of 56 Division, but the situation in the SALERNO area is NOT satisfactory, owing to the shortage of troops and the fact that some Inf Bns are now very tired… The most dangerous sector for the enemy to attack is at VIETRI.’ He instructed the Rangers to thin out in the hills to the east of Castellammare in order to be able to attack the main road to Naples if the situation demanded.
On 18 September came the first signs that the Germans were withdrawing on the right when Battipaglia was firmly occupied at last and 56 Division’s reconnaissance regiment found the road clear right into the hills at Olevano. With VI US Corps now in control to the south, having both brought in 3 US Division and joined up with the leading elements of Eighth Army, Dick was able to shift his weight to the left yet again, positioning 56 Division to advance up the main road to San Severino, the alternative entrance to the Plain of Naples, whilst concentrating the remainder of the corps on forcing the direct route through the Nocera defile. The rest of 7 Armoured Division was landed and preparations made for it and 46 Division to attack from Vietri through the defile, with the Rangers and 23 Armoured Brigade coming down from the Chiunzi Pass to cut off the enemy’s retreat.
Before this could happen there were two notable events for Dick. The first came on 19 September when he received the news from his staff that some of the reinforcements shipped over from North Africa were refusing to join the units to which they had been assigned. The story behind this had begun five days earlier during the crisis, when urgent requests were sent to Tripolitania District to send any men who were available from the reinforcement and transit camp there. A draft of some 1,500 was put together and picked up by three Royal Navy cruisers. The majority of the men were Eighth Army veterans, most of whom had served in Sicily in either 50 or 51 Divisions and had been sick or lightly wounded. They were told that they were returning to their units, but found themselves instead at Salerno. Many of them, from Scottish or north-east English regiments, were thoroughly dismayed by this, not least because it was by then known that their original divisions would be returning to the UK. When they were ordered to report to 46 and 56 Divisions as replacements for battle casualties, they refused to do so. The majority were in due course persuaded to march off, but some 350 remained behind, in no mood to comply. It appeared that X Corps had a mutiny on its hands.
On hearing this, Dick decided that he would appeal to the men personally and drove down to their transit camp. Climbing onto the bonnet of his jeep, he told them that he was shocked by their action, but had been briefed on their grievances and understood that there had been a ‘cock-up’. He undertook to see that all of them were returned to their units as soon as possible, but said that for the moment they were urgently needed by X Corps. To boos and jeers he told them to think it over, otherwise there would be serious consequences. As a result another 50 men agreed to follow their orders. It was an extremely busy day for Dick and he was due to meet Clark at Vietri, so he had to leave, giving instructions to his staff to try and persuade the others before taking the necessary action. More agreed to return to duty, but 192 were left, who were duly arrested and tried for mutiny.6
The second event was one which nearly cost Dick his life. It took place on 20 September on a part of the front on which the Germans were retreating before 56 Division. His diary recorded it succinctly:
‘Got ambushed this am. West of PEZZANO. I was on the ground with Hugh S. when both armd Cs and my dingo7 were hit with A. tk guns, we had to walk home 2m! A few bullets near me! V. stupid to go so far, but thought recce patrols ahead. An Italian warned us too! Hugh is hopeless at present!’
Smith told the full story later (see Appendix I) and, indeed, it was always known afterwards as ‘Hugh’s Little Ambush’. Dick had been given to understand that 56 Division’s reconnaissance regiment had relieved the equivalent unit in 46 Division, but whereas the latter had withdrawn, the former had not arrived to take its place. Although this was some excuse for his lack of suitable precautions, the incident was also characteristic of his frequent decisions to find out in person what was happening as close to the front line as possible. An old friend, Wilfred Lyde, spotted him driving his own jeep at a time when the battle was not going well, ‘his calm, almost casual manner… an inspiration to everyone.’8 There were to be many instances later in the campaign when divisional and brigade commanders found their corps commander well forward of their own positions, indeed up with forward observation posts or even the leading infantry companies.
The X Corps offensive to push the Germans back through the passes began on the night of 22/23 September, with attacks by 46 Division towards Nocera and by 56 Division up the road to the north towards Avellino. There was fierce fighting in the hills on either side of the two routes, with
pockets of Germans holding out until the last moment and delaying the capture of both villages and high ground. Cava was taken on 24 September, but 46 Division made slow progress until two days later, when it appeared that a withdrawal of more than local significance was taking place. By the morning of 27 September the leading vehicles were in Camerelle, just short of Nocera, and plans were issued for the final break-out.
On the following day the tanks of 7 Armoured Division burst through as far as Scafati, 23 Armoured Brigade, which had come down the Chiunzi Pass, reached the sea at Castellammare, and 56 Division passed through San Severino. By 29 September the line ran from Torre Annunziata around the southern flank of Mount Vesuvius to Sarno and at 0930 hrs on 1 October the armoured cars of the King’s Dragoon Guards reached the centre of Naples. The first great city of mainland Europe had fallen to the Allies.
Chapter 18
River and Mountain
‘The last two nights,’ Dick wrote to Lettice on the day Naples was liberated, ‘I have had a pleasant site alongside some world famous ruins.’ At Pompeii his HQ was not far behind the forward troops, who were mostly bypassing Naples in response to Clark’s determination to keep pushing forward as fast as possible. Although delayed by demolitions, X Corps reached the River Volturno by 5 October and closed up to the south bank on a 20-mile front three days later. Reconnaissance patrols reported that all the bridges had been destroyed and that the Germans had dug in on the other bank in strength, so an assault crossing would be necessary.
Positioned on the right at Capua was 56 Division, where it was in contact with 3 US Division, part of VI US Corps. It had been reinforced by 168 Brigade, back again after its exertions in Sicily, but had lost its GOC, Graham having broken his shoulder when his jeep tumbled into a bomb crater. For the next three months it would have four brigades rather than the usual three and it acquired an excellent GOC in the shape of Gerald Templer, whom Dick was delighted to have under his command.1 Elsewhere, 7 Armoured Division was concentrated near Santa Maria la Fossa, and 23 Armoured Brigade opposite Cancello, whilst 46 Division extended the line from there to the sea. Both the Commandos and the Rangers had been transferred out of the corps, Dick writing warm letters of thanks and congratulation to their commanders.
‘The Volturno is the very devil,’ wrote Dick in his diary on 9 October, ‘v. high banks and after the recent rains over 6 ft deep everywhere.’ It was also, in his sector, over 100 yards wide for most of its length and flowing at 4 miles per hour. The steep and slippery banks rose to 20 feet on the northern side, where a belt of trees gave good cover for the defenders, who were also well protected by minefields: it was thus a considerable obstacle. The enemy’s stand on this river, albeit a brief one, was to give the Allies a serious jolt. From Eisenhower downwards, many believed that the Germans would now conduct a withdrawal to the line of the Apennines north of Florence, where intelligence reports had been received of fixed defences being constructed. On the enemy side, even Hitler was in favour of a withdrawal north of Rome, arguing that the southern half of the peninsula would be impossible to hold after the desertion of the Italians, and he was supported in his view by both the OKW (Armed Forces High Command) and Rommel. Neither he nor the Allies had reckoned with the stubbornness of the man who would, over the next year, conduct the one of the most skilful withdrawals in military history. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring believed that the topography of Italy offered unparallelled opportunities for defence and he was loathe to let the Allies advance so far north that they could use the captured territory for bases to bomb Germany. In defiance of his orders he began the preparations of defensive lines much further south, the first of which to the west of the Apennines lay along the Volturno. Kesselring regarded it as only temporary, but he needed to buy time there while he prepared a much stronger line to the north.
THE VOLTURNO, CAMINO & THE WINTER LINE
For several days Fifth Army remained halted, although its time was well spent in bringing up boats and bridging equipment, building rafts and giving the inexperienced soldiers some very basic training in river crossing. Dick had by now adopted Montgomery’s practice of locating a small Tactical HQ as close as possible to the front line, with the Main HQ situated further back and a Rear HQ, dealing largely with supplies and reinforcements, further back still. His mobility was greatly assisted by the use of a motor caravan, which housed both his personal office and his sleeping quarters. He described it to Lettice: ‘My caravan… has a good desk all down one side, lots of room for my photos, etc., two cupboards with shelves & hanging room for coats each side of the door (at the back) & a bed down the other side which in the day is an excellent sofa seat. At the front end, in a separate compartment with a sliding door, is a basin, looking glass, etc. All most complete, the only crab I have is that I am always banging my head on something as I cannot stand upright.’2 He was now looked after by a new batman, Wagstaff, who arrived during the Volturno battle, as well as by Hugh Smith, who, he wrote ‘is definitely improving, but I think he will always be a better businessman than a soldier.’3 Dick’s time was largely spent preparing his corps for the forthcoming battle, but he was able to get away for one day to attend the liberation thanksgiving service in the cathedral at Naples, going on afterwards to meet the Cardinal Archbishop in his palace with Clark, and then to visit the Roman ruins at Herculaneum.
Clark’s orders were that X Corps and VI US Corps should attack simultaneously on the night of 12/13 October. The Army Commander arrived at X Corps HQ on the morning of 12 October to find Dick in a pessimistic mood. Not for the last time, Dick was unhappy about an attack along a whole front rather than concentrated on a weak point. In this case he believed that a much better plan would be for the Americans to move first, as the river was much narrower in their sector and the ground significantly less marshy on the other side, and for the British to cross on the following day when some of the enemy reserves had been drawn away. He asked Clark to walk with him alone in a nearby field, so that he could express his very strongly held opinion without embarrassing his staff. After a vigorous debate, Clark rejected his proposal and gave an unequivocal order to go ahead with all the crossings at the same time. Having lodged his objection, Dick accepted it, although he made it clear how difficult it was for him to receive from an American commander an order to British troops with which he fundamentally did not agree. This did nothing for the relationship between the two men, which would come under further strain as the campaign developed.
The crossings began at 2050 hrs. On the far left 46 Division put two brigades in DUKWs (amphibious vehicles) successfully across the river near its mouth at Castel Volturno, accompanied by two squadrons of tanks from 23 Armoured Brigade in LCTs, but a battalion crossing further upriver proved fruitless. The division now found itself in flat countryside criss-crossed by numerous canals and drainage ditches, which offered excellent possibilities for defence, but little opportunity for attacking tanks. The fighting developed into an attritional infantry battle, but with a 5-ton ferry working well reinforcements could be passed across and the Germans were pushed back. On 17 October Dick was able to make his first crossing of the river in this sector.
In the centre 7 Armoured Division, whose crossing was intended to be diversionary, managed to get a foothold by the evening of the first day opposite the village of Grazzanise, the small bridgehead then reinforced by anti-tank guns ferried over by a large raft. Work was begun on a 9-ton Bailey bridge, but the site came under immediate artillery fire from the Germans and it was not until 1600 hrs on 16 October that it was completed. At much the same time a ford was found which proved suitable for waterproofed tanks and by the end of that day a full regiment was across.
56 Division, starting its battle before Templer’s arrival and temporarily under the command of Lou Lyne, was markedly less successful than the others in its own crossing at Capua. The assault boats were mostly sunk by heavy mortar and artillery fire and the crossing was temporarily abandoned, while the few troops who had
reached the far bank were withdrawn as they could not be adequately supported. On the division’s right 3 US Division had made a successful crossing and was building a 30-ton bridge at Treflisco, so Dick asked if the corps boundary could be shifted for 56 Division to use it. Clark obliged, whilst at the same time making clear his disappointment with the division’s performance. On the morning of 15 October, 201 Guards Brigade crossed and occupied the high ground to the north in support of the American advance and, on the same day, a successful crossing was made at last at Capua: two days later work was begun on a new 30-ton bridge for the rest of the division. Now 56 Division was able to form up for an advance to the west of Route 6, which led towards Cassino, whilst Dick decided to pull 46 Division in from the canal country and send it along Route 7 towards the mouth of the River Garigliano. Heading towards the same objective was 7 Armoured Division, following a route parallel to the coast.
Dick had been working at a frenetic pace throughout the battle, visiting all his formation HQs and many individual units almost daily and calling on Lucas at VI US Corps and Lucian K. Truscott, the Commanding General of 3 US Division. Numerous dignitaries, including Alexander, turned up at his own HQ, Clark bringing with him Henry Morgenthau, the US Secretary of the Treasury, who was on a tour of the theatre. On 21 October Eisenhower arrived to invest Dick formally with the Legion of Merit. Ever modest, Dick found this acutely embarrassing as ‘there was a veritable battery of cameras at very short range.’4
