by Richard Mead
In spite of the fact that the attacks were to be successive rather than simultaneous, Dick was unhappy with the plan. He once again felt that there was a serious dispersal of force rather than a concentration at one particular point, advancing the argument that this should be near the coast and not into the Liri Valley, which would be heavily defended. He was particularly critical of the single division attack across the Rapido: Keyes had agreed with him initially, wanting the two corps to combine in an attack though the Aurunci Mountains, but the American had been persuaded that the topography forbade such an operation. When Al Gruenther and Charles Richardson visited Dick to discuss the plan he expressed his concern, the volume of his voice dropping to an ominously low level. ‘As we left’, wrote Richardson later, ‘Dick McCreery’s voice, still a whisper but choked with emotion followed us to our jeep: “It’s not on! Tell your Army Commander he will have a disaster.”’2 And so it proved to be.
Dick’s own plan, forced on him by Fifth Army against his better judgement, split his corps in two. Two of his divisions, 5 and 56, followed by 23 Armoured Brigade, were to cross the Garigliano first and establish a strong bridgehead on the other side, exploiting through the Aurunci Mountains towards Ausonia if circumstances permitted, but primarily accomplishing Clark’s main objective of drawing in the German reserves. Two days later 46 Division would attack, crossing the river south of the junction between the Liri and the Rapido, but its role was quite different, to protect the flank of 36 US Division in its assault. The plan was issued on 10 January, Dick held a corps coordinating conference three days later and a final conference two days after that, attended by Clark who according to Dick’s diary ‘said some nice things about 10 Corps.’
The operation was launched on the night of 17/18 January. 5 Division crossed in complete silence on a two-brigade front, 17 Brigade actually sending one of its battalions out to sea in DUKWs before looping round to land on the coast north of the Garigliano’s mouth. The rest of 17 Brigade and the two leading battalions of 13 Brigade made more conventional crossings, but whereas the former found itself stuck in minefields in the triangle between the river, the coast and Route 7, the latter was able to make substantive progress towards the division’s main objective, the town of Minturno. As day broke on 18 January, both brigades were in exposed locations, but a bridgehead of sorts had been established. Over the next two days both 15 Brigade and 201 Guards Brigade were fed in to bolster the position.
Templer also took his division across the river on a two-brigade front, in this case supported by the full weight of his artillery. 167 Brigade met some resistance and only one battalion achieved its objective, but 169 Brigade, with 40 (Royal Marine) Commando in support, had no such difficulty and quickly established a bridgehead, which was soon strong enough to take 168 Brigade as well and to link up with 5 Division. Dick now had a firm foothold north of the Garigliano.
The Germans were taken completely by surprise. Their observers had not noticed the concentration of 5 and 56 Divisions, whose guns had been brought up by night, camouflaged and then left unmanned. The only formation in the area was 94 Infantry Division which was rocked back on its heels. For the Allies it created a brief opportunity which was not to be repeated. In the words of the talented commander of XIV Panzer Corps, Frido von Senger und Etterlin, in whose sector the operation took place: ‘The thrust by the British X Corps against 94 Inf. Div. had special significance, for if it had led to a breakthrough, the entire German front would have been rolled up from the south.’3 If Clark had listened to Dick about concentrating the attack near the coast and had positioned a strong force to exploit the initial success, it could have gone either up Route 7 towards Anzio and Rome or through the defile formed by the River Ausente to Ausonia and thence into the Liri Valley. Neither would have been easy, but for many hours there was nothing of substance in the way. However, other than 23 Armoured Brigade, Dick had no more resources and the opportunity was missed.
This did not mean that Clark had not achieved his objective. On the contrary, von Senger’s appeal to Kesselring for help resulted in the latter ordering both 29 and 90 Panzer Grenadier Divisions from their positions south of Rome down to the Minturno area as quickly as possible, the former to block the Ausente defile, the latter to prevent any further advance up Route 7. Kesselring’s immediately available reserves had been committed, just as Clark wanted.
On 19 January 46 Division also tried to cross the river, but was spectacularly unsuccessful. Unlike 5 and 56 Division, which had used DUKWs and other relatively robust small craft, 46 Division was forced to rely entirely on rubber boats, as all the other available DUKWs were on their way to Anzio. Moreover, whilst the river had been flowing relatively slowly close to its mouth, at the division’s main crossing point it was narrower but much faster flowing, the volume increased not only by the nearby junctions with the Rapido and another river, the Peccia, but also by the opening of sluice gates further north by the Germans. In the fast current, the frail craft proved exceptionally difficult to handle and a number were swept away. Swimmers were sent across with ropes attached to cables, but even with the help of these the boats were unmanageable, many becoming waterlogged. By this time the Germans had realized what was happening and had begun to react.
With a single company on the far bank, Dick ordered it to be evacuated and further attempts to be abandoned, although he also instructed Hawkesworth to carry out a feint crossing on the night of 20/21 January to draw the defenders away from 36 US Division. This division duly attacked then and again two nights later, with disastrous results, much as Dick had predicted.4 Keyes felt let down and Clark was once again very angry with what he saw as a lack of determination by the British. The facts were clear, however – 46 Division could not have succeeded with the equipment it was forced to use. With that exception X Corps was the only part of Fifth Army to break though the Winter Line, both 34 US Division and the FEC having fallen short of their objectives in the north. It was Clark’s refusal to exploit success on Dick’s front, almost certainly because he wanted the glory to lie with the Americans rather than the British, that condemned the whole operation to failure.
The landings at Anzio went ahead as planned on 22 January, notwithstanding that the condition originally imposed by the planners, that a breakthrough should have been achieved to the south, had in no way been fulfilled. They were a success at first and VI US Corps managed to establish itself ashore without difficulty, not least because of the absence of 29 and 90 Panzer Grenadier Divisions from the area. Lucas, however, proved to be excessively cautious and just dug in, allowing Kesselring not only to bring down reinforcements from the north, but also to call back 29 Panzer Grenadier Division as von Senger’s front stabilized. The beachhead became, in Churchill’s words, ‘a stranded whale’.
Dick was still faced with a great deal of fighting to hold the positions he had captured. On 21 January, the arrival of 90 Panzer Grenadier Division allowed the Germans to mount vigorous but ultimately unsuccessful counter-attacks on 5 Division, in an attempt to drive a wedge through Minturno to the Garigliano. Meanwhile, 17 Brigade remained pinned down in the minefield close to the sea, although the divisional engineers managed to get a 9-ton bridge across the river behind them, while work started on preparing for vehicles the railway bridge carrying the main line from Naples to Rome, which had been badly damaged. No bridge was available to 56 Division, which was forced to continue to use rafts and attracted considerable artillery fire. Its hold on the key Damiano ridge was proving tenuous and it failed to break through to its objective of Castelforte.
Dick crossed the Garigliano for the first time on 20 January when he visited the Tac HQs of both 13 and 15 Brigades, running an artillery gauntlet in both directions. He decided to bring 46 Division’s 138 Brigade into the bridgehead directly after the aborted crossing, in order to consolidate his line on the right of 56 Division, with another brigade following a few days later, but he had to leave the third brigade on the near side of the Garigl
iano along the stretch where the west bank was still held by the Germans. Dick asked for II US Corps to take over this sector, but the request was rejected by Clark. By 24 January, it was becoming clear that 5 Division was in no state to mount an offensive and that the troops in 56 Division were very tired. Although Dick received a modest reinforcement in the shape of 2 Special Service Brigade, formed out of 9 and 43 (Royal Marine) Commandos, it was not enough to mount more than local operations.
The Germans clearly remained concerned by the X Corps foothold to the north of the Garigliano and took all necessary steps to keep it bottled up there. The corps intelligence summary on 2 February reported that units from no fewer than 12 German divisions had been identified opposite the corps, whilst the German defences had been strengthened to a point where, without further resources, Dick’s options were very limited. Gradually the fighting settled down to patrolling and small-scale actions.
The situation at Anzio had by now become very serious, with the Germans mounting strong attacks on the beachhead. On 30 January Dick was ordered to send a brigade up there immediately and chose 169 Brigade from 56 Division, which arrived at Anzio on 3 February. He received 1 Guards Brigade from 6 Armoured Division as a replacement, only to be told that the rest of 56 Division would be following its departed brigade. Templer wrote later to Dick that he had hated leaving X Corps, but he formed a very high regard for Truscott, who relieved the hapless Lucas at VI US Corps within a fortnight of 56 Division’s arrival there.
In spite of these tribulations Dick himself remained in good heart. Gregson-Ellis, a personal friend, wrote in a letter to Dick’s mother, Minnie, thanking her for a consignment of books for the troops, that he had never seen him look better, whilst Lieutenant Colonel Lord William Montague-Douglas-Scott, 5 a friend of Lettice’s, wrote to her that he looked fitter and less close-drawn than he had during the Salerno battles. Dick himself claimed that this was because he was getting plenty of exercise climbing mountains to visit his various units. He moved his Main HQ to Templer’s former site at Sessa Aurunca, from where he could reach them faster. On the professional side he was delighted that Alexander’s new chief of staff was John Harding, recovered at last from the injuries he had received before the capture of Tripoli.
Change was now in the air. In mid-February and again in mid-March Bernard Freyberg’s New Zealand Corps, which had relieved II US Corps opposite Cassino itself, made two disastrous attempts to force the German positions, the first one preceded by the destruction of the monastery by heavy bombing. After these failures, Alexander decided to shift his weight significantly from the Adriatic, where little further progress looked possible, to the southern sector, moving Eighth Army’s boundary to include Cassino and the Liri Valley entrance and bringing XIII Corps and II Polish Corps south. Fifth Army would then comprise II US Corps, which would relieve X Corps, and the FEC.
At the end of February 46 Division, which had been continuously in action since the previous September, began to be relieved by the newly arrived 4 Division prior to leaving for the Middle East to rest and refit. After that 5 Division was also relieved in order to go to Anzio to replace 56 Division, which followed its former partner for a well-earned rest. For the first and last time since the departure of the Rangers, this move brought an American formation under Dick’s direct command in the shape of 88 US Division, which had just completed several months’ training in Morocco. Its arrival was followed by that of 4e Division Marocaine de Montagne from the FEC, releasing 4 Division back to Eighth Army and 23 Armoured Brigade to V Corps on the Adriatic coast. On 31 March X Corps itself transferred from Fifth Army to Eighth Army.
Clark wrote a fulsome letter to Dick:
On the occasion of the separation of 10 Corps from Fifth Army, I wish to tell you what a privilege it has been for me to have had your corps under my command and how much I value my personal association with you during the period in which we have been fighting together.
The association of Fifth Army with yourself, your staff and the units of 10 Corps brought us from the shores of Africa to your present position north of the Garigliano River. Despite many difficulties encountered in the bitterly opposed Salerno landing, the subsequent expansion of the beachhead and the severe fighting later in the mountainous area north of Naples, the 10 Corps under your leadership has consistently fought with a courage and determination which have resulted in wresting many square miles of territory and inflicting severe losses on him. At the same time the entire corps, following the example of its commander and staff, has demonstrated a spirit of cooperation towards the other components of the Fifth Army, which has provided perhaps the most impressive example thus far of the fighting solidarity of the United Nations, and has proved conclusively to the Nazi enemy the futility of his efforts to sew discord among them.
May I express to you the keen pleasure which I have had in our personal association during these past months, and my regret that our official relationship is being interrupted at this time. My staff joins me in wishing the very best of fortune to you and the members of your staff. We shall follow your future activities with great personal interest and hope to be able to see you frequently as time goes on.
Dick wrote a generous reply. The truth was that the relationship was not as portrayed, although it never came near to breaking point. Clark had been deeply frustrated by what he had seen as X Corps’ failures at the Volturno, Monte Camino and the Garigliano, notwithstanding that they were hugely outweighed in the balance by the successes. At one point he was moved to describe Dick as a ‘feather duster’, almost as inappropriate a description as it is possible to imagine. Dick did not dislike Clark, but he thought him vain and he doubted his military skill. On the other hand the two staffs had got along very well, indeed Al Gruenther was deservedly popular at Dick’s HQ, and there was no animosity in general between the British and the Americans as there had been on occasion in Tunisia. Nevertheless both Dick and Clark were almost certainly relieved by their separation. They were not to know that the relationship would be resumed before the year was out.
Dick’s staff certainly deserved some respite and their reward was for the corps to take over the quietest sector of the Winter Line, high up in the Apennines, allowing the Polish Corps to step to the left. Before Dick himself went there he was able to take his first leave since arriving back in the Mediterranean in August 1943. After two days in Naples, including a visit to the opera, he left for Sorrento. Vesuvius was in full eruption and the site of one of his former HQs had been engulfed by lava, while fine ash was covering everything from Torre Annunziata onwards. He spent a lot of time reading (one book which he particularly enjoyed was Arthur Bryant’s The Years of Endurance, about the early stages of the Napoleonic Wars, which resonated strongly with those British who had experienced 1940 – 42) and otherwise relaxing and he was back at his old HQ on the evening of the fifth day in time to pack up for the move into the mountains.
The new Main HQ was at Pesche, a small village close to Isernia, which allowed him access to all sections of his long front, albeit by very winding mountain roads. At the beginning of April the only fighting troops in the corps were the King’s Dragoon Guards, giving rise to a quip by some wag at Eighth Army HQ that Dick was holding the front in his sector ‘with a squadron of armoured cars and a volley of oaths’! Gradually the various formations and units which would now comprise the corps assembled, and they were a very mixed bag. The most sizeable formation was 2 New Zealand Division, but this was in the course of recovering from its bitter experiences at Cassino and was hardly fit for battle. The others were all smaller, respectively 2 Parachute Brigade, 11 Canadian Brigade Group, 24 Guards Brigade Group and, for the first month, 28 Brigade, whilst the corps also recovered its own guns, 2 Army Group Royal Artillery (2 AGRA), which had been lent to the New Zealand Corps for the Cassino battles.
The most intriguing new member of the corps was 1° Raggruppamento Motorizzato, an Italian co-belligerent formation which was given the rather more
impressive title of Corpo Italiano di Liberazione on 17 April. Formed of volunteers from elements of the Legnano and Messina Divisions in the old Italian Army, with an infantry and a Bersaglieri regiment each of approximately brigade size and other infantry components, its own artillery, engineers and services, it was not dissimilar to a British division in size and was armed, clothed and otherwise supplied entirely by the Allies. Dick went to visit it and liked what he saw, particularly the Alpini battalion, which was well suited to the country in which they were all now situated. The formation had seen action in December 1943, when it had participated effectively in the battle for Monte Lungo as part of VI US Corps, and its commander, Lieutenant General Umberto Utili, was generally well regarded.
Smallest of the new units to arrive at X Corps, but closest to Dick’s heart, was the 12th Lancers, which would in due course provide an additional armoured car regiment. Now commanded by ‘Kate’ Savill, it had to put away its armoured cars for the immediate future and join the King’s Dragoon Guards as Hermonforce, named after the KDG’s CO. Hermonforce took over part of 24 Guards Brigade Group’s sector and began immediate patrolling as infantry.
Dick did an immense amount of driving and walking through the mountains over the next two months. The journeys were made more difficult by the poor quality of the roads and his front was huge for the forces he deployed, stretching as it did from about 10 miles north-east of Cassino along the upper reaches of the Rapido and then over the watershed to the Sangro, following that river through Castel di Sangro to near the village of Pizzoferato, its boundary with V Corps on the Adriatic. Dick had few days off, but one he particularly enjoyed was a visit with Cooke to General Guillaume, the commander of the Morocccan Goums. He was invited to ride by horse up the track to Monte Camino, where the French unveiled a memorial to those who had died there during the battle. After speeches, Dick making his in French, he enjoyed a typically excellent lunch at Guillaume’s HQ, at which he sat next to General Georges Catroux, one of the first senior officers to declare for de Gaulle and now the Governor General of Algeria. ‘A v. vital personality,’ wrote Dick in his diary.
