The split of the “Damascus wing”
From the outbreak of the leadership crisis within the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood until its resolution in 1972, the organization went through a period of confusion during which Ikhwani members, mostly from Damascus, became progressively marginalized by a “northern axis” comprising Brothers originating from Latakia, Aleppo, Hama and other cities. Today, most analysts refer to the split which emerged at the time as resulting from the tensions which, in Syrian politics and society, have historically plagued relations between Aleppines and Damascenes. But, while geographical factionalism certainly played a role in the unfolding of the crisis, it would be a mistake to view the rising tensions within the organization at the time as being a purely regionalist phenomenon.
In many ways, the difficulty in analysing the deep roots of the emergence of the leadership crisis arises because many of its protagonists give different reasons for the tensions, depending on the camp to which they belonged. Having a discussion with members of the Ikhwan on the split of the Damascene Brothers from the mother organization remains delicate as this episode underlies the many political, personal and, to a certain extent, religious and ideological differences which have plagued the Muslim Brotherhood’s ranks—with significant consequences on the movement’s shape ever since.
In order to properly understand the root causes of the split of the late 1960s, a deconstruction of the reasons given by each camp is necessary. The “Damascus wing”, on the one hand, has often suggested that its leadership became marginalized throughout the 1960s because its moderate ideology of endorsing parliamentary politics and rejecting the use of violence against the regime had itself become a minority position within the organization at a time when young Syrians increasingly embraced the jihadist struggle led by the Fighting Vanguard.
On the other hand, however, members who belonged to the “northern axis”, which challenged Issam al-Attar’s leadership in the late 1960s, often mention the Damascene leader’s over-reliance on a small clan of followers originating from the capital. This, in their view, gave the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood a regional, almost clannish structure, which had not prevailed at the time of Mustapha al-Sibai’s tenure as leader of the organization. Some also raise the issue of Issam al-Attar and his Damascene followers’ Salafism, a religious tendency that has been criticized for its harsh line on Sufis, who form an overwhelming majority of Muslims in the cities of Aleppo and Hama. Finally, Issam al-Attar’s continued leadership of the Islamic movement, despite his forced exile from Syria, is often cited as the main reason why groups not belonging to his “Damascus wing” rebelled against him, claiming that in a time of crisis for the Ikhwan, who started to suffer from fierce Ba’athist repression from the mid-1960s onwards, the organization could not afford to have a leader removed from the country and from its most pressing concerns.
While all these factors certainly played a role and, to a certain degree, sometimes overlapped, others seem to have merely served as a pretext for what was, in the end, a purely political split. The supposedly ideological divergences between the two groups belong to that last camp of pretexts used to explain the crisis. At the time, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood—whether its members came from Hama, Damascus, Aleppo or elsewhere—never questioned the movement’s commitment to democracy and non-violence. A few young activists had decided to adopt a more radical stance against the Ba’ath regime but they remained, throughout the 1960s at least, a minority on the fringes of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although Issam al-Attar had been criticized by Hamawites such as Said Hawwa for calling for an end to the jihadist violence that had burst out at Hama during the April 1964 riots against the Ba’ath, the most senior Ikhwani figures from the city, such as Muhammed al-Hamid, nevertheless sided with the Damascene leader’s non-violent position. This happened again when, in January 1965, Issam al-Attar asked the hundreds of Ikhwani members who had gathered at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus for an anti-regime rally to remain peaceful and reject calls for a confrontation with the Ba’athist security forces.12 All in all therefore, the attitude adopted with regards to the Ba’athist regime throughout the 1960s did not, at this stage, become an issue so significant that it created splits at the leadership level.
If claims that ideological differences led to a leadership split need to be strongly qualified, the same is true for the accusation that Issam al-Attar surrounded himself with solely Salafist followers who exclusively originated in the Syrian capital. Here, it is worth stressing that, for many Ikhwani members who belonged to the “northern axis”, the issues of Salafism and geographic factionalism overlapped as Issam al-Attar’s religious inclination had roots in the emergence of the Salafiyya movement in late Ottoman Damascus. Until today, the former Damascene leader is sometimes criticized by prominent Sufi figures inside the Muslim Brotherhood for having surrounded himself with Salafists, such as Mehdi al-Istambuli and Zuhair Shawish, who did not hold favourable views of the Ikhwan’s Sufi members. Seemingly backing their claims, some academics have suggested that the Salafism of certain Damascene Brothers played a role in the deterioration of relations with Sufi ulama and Muslim Brothers coming from other cities. For example, Umar Faruk Abd Allah, author of the most detailed account of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood written in the early 1980s, wrote, “Because the Salafis often condemned the traditional schools of Islamic law for alleged deviation from the Qur’an and sunnah and took even harsher positions against the Islamic tradition of Sufism, al-Attar never enjoyed a favourable relation with the Syrian ulama who, as a rule, follow one of the traditional schools and often are Sufis.”13 Such claims have been supported by key personalities belonging to the “northern axis”, whose members are often associated with powerful Sufi orders such as the Naqshbandiya in Hama.
The argument, however, can be countered on the grounds that some inside the “Damascus wing”, such as Muhammed Hawari or Hassan al-Houeidi, did not follow the Salafist doctrine preached by Issam al-Attar and instead remained faithful to a Sufi order and a Sunni school of jurisprudence. Thus, the fact that Issam al-Attar’s Salafism became an issue for some inside the Ikhwan should be seen not as a religious quarrel between Sufis and Salafists but rather as the product of a growing resentment on the part of many belonging to the “northern axis” at the fact that Salafi-affiliated Damascene Brothers were, for a time at least, monopolizing the leadership of the Ikhwan. Their Salafism, as a product of the peculiar sociopolitical and religious environment specific to the Syrian capital, was therefore rejected more for symbolizing the leadership of the “Damascus wing” than for its religious meaning.
Indeed, it cannot be denied that during at least some of the time of Issam al-Attar’s leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood the levers of power in the organization became increasingly centered on its Damascene members. From Zouheir Salem to Ali Sadreddine al-Bayanouni, key Ikhwani figures quote the Damascene leader’s “geographic factionalism” as having been the driving force behind the rebellion led by the “northern axis” against the “Damascus wing”.14 It is true that, from the mid-1960s onwards, Issam al-Attar tightened his grip on the organization by surrounding himself with mostly Damascene colleagues. While in the early 1960s, the Executive Committee, the top decision-making body of the Syrian Ikhwan, was composed of five members coming from the cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Latakia respectively, the same organ became overwhelmingly dominated by Damascenes from the mid-1960s until the leadership crisis of 1969. Indeed, according to Muhammed Hawari, a leading figure of the “Damascus wing”, when Issam al-Attar reshuffled the Executive Committee in October 1964, he nominated him as well as Muwafaq Da’abul and Teissir Ayti, all Damascenes, to the top decision-making body. Amin Yagan from Aleppo was then the only non-Damascene Ikhwani figure to reach a leadership position.15
“I have made some mistakes while being leader of the Ikhwan,” Issam al-Attar acknowledged in an interview, “but never did I make a distinction between Syrian Brothers coming from Damascus
or Aleppo.”16 In fact, when the 1969 leadership crisis broke out, a few prominent Ikhwani members who were not from the capital supported him, such as Hassan al-Houeidi from Deir ez-Zoor and Muhammed Riyad al-Shuqfah from Hama.17 In addition, the geographic factionalism generally associated with the “Damascus wing’s” leadership of the organization during the 1960s should perhaps be seen more as a result of than as a reason for the emergence of factionalism within the Muslim Brotherhood. The moment when Issam al-Attar reshuffled his Executive Committee in favour of the Damascene Brothers coincided with a period in which his leadership was already facing severe criticisms from many inside the movement. “In such circumstances, it was only natural for Issam al-Attar to rely on his Damascene colleagues, whom he knew best and trusted most,”18 suggested Muhammed Hawari. So, if ideology, geographic factionalism and religious bias all seem to have been, to varying degrees, factors merely used in retrospect to legitimize the leadership crisis, what were its root causes?
The answer, as in every political formation composed of ambitious people who compete against each other for power, lies in a clash of personalities. This occurred in the Ikhwan during the mid-1960s and subsequently took on a regional and, at times, religious and ideological tone. The very character of Issam al-Attar seems to have played a role in his own marginalization from power in the late 1960s. A former secondary school teacher, he had quickly risen to prominence and had become, by the late 1950s, the preacher of the mosque at the University of Damascus Faculty of Islamic Law. As recognition for someone known as being intellectually gifted, this was a prestigious and influential position, for his Friday sermons were listened to by tens of thousands of pious Syrians. Issam al-Attar’s passionate sermons are often given as the reason for joining the movement of the Muslim Brothers in late 1950s Syria.
However, despite the Damascene leader’s ability to move the masses through brilliant speeches, criticism is often made of his lack of true leadership skills and political vision. In a statement echoed until today in Ikhwani circles, Umar Faruk Abd Allah went as far as asserting that Issam al-Attar “confused being a great speaker with being a great leader”.19 His style of leadership, which in the eyes of some was in substance more intellectual than political, was an aspect of al-Attar’s handling of the organization that particularly irritated many outside Damascus who were prepared to challenge him. Others also claimed that the Damascene leader was simply an unskilled politician who did not give any direction to the Ikhwan at a time when strong leadership was needed. These critics quote Issam al-Attar’s refusal to take up ministerial responsibilities in the successive governments that preceded the Ba’ath takeover in March 1963. The Damascene leader was also criticized when, in a tacit alliance with Syria’s bourgeoisie, he delivered a series of key sermons denouncing the then prime minister, Bashir Al-Azmeh, for being “unworthy of the function” given “his strong left-wing inclination”.20 The sermons are believed to have led to mass student demonstrations eventually resulting in the prime minister’s resignation a few months later, opening the door to political instability from which the Ba’ath Party would ultimately benefit the most.
Eventually, however, it was Issam al-Attar’s exile from Syria that proved to be the most convenient pretext for asking him to renounce his leadership position. Ali Sadreddine al-Bayanouni, then a prominent member of the “Aleppo faction”—and therefore of the “northern axis”—who was to rise to the leadership of the Ikhwan in the late 1990s, stated that the divergences within the organization, which had been growing since the early 1960s, eventually came to a head when the Damascene leader was forced into exile by the Ba’athist regime. “On the top of all, Issam al-Attar was now outside Syria at a time when we precisely needed a leader on the ground, based inside the country”,21 remembered Bayanouni. Many inside the organization came to resent the Damascene leader for being based abroad, some going as far as suggesting that he had abandoned his Ikhwani troops at a time of crisis.
Issam al-Attar’s exile, however, was far from voluntary. He had been prevented from returning home when, on his return from a trip abroad in April 1964, the Ba’athist authorities refused to let him in on the grounds that the Muslim Brotherhood was supposedly behind the violent clashes at Hama a few weeks earlier between Islamist activists and the regime’s security apparatus. “The regime blamed me for Marwan Hadid’s activism,”22 al-Attar explained. There is no evidence, however, that the violence at Hama at the time was supported by the Ikhwan’s leadership. As a matter of fact, Muhammed Hawari, a close Damascene associate of Issam al-Attar, suggests quite the opposite. “While we were on a trip to Mecca, in Saudi Arabia, for a meeting of the International tanzim (organization) of the Muslim Brotherhood, Professor al-Attar and I learned through the radio about the violent clashes at Hama, before immediately and publicly denouncing the violence exercised on both parts.”23 It can only be inferred that, precisely at a time when the Ba’ath was desperately attempting to solidify its power, blaming the Ikhwan for the violence at Hama was a convenient way to weaken a potentially powerful political competitor. At any rate, al-Attar’s exile proved detrimental not only to the Syrian Islamic movement, now led from abroad, but also to the leader himself, who came to increasingly rely on his Damascene followers in order to maintain his grip on the organization’s leadership, thereby giving rise to the accusations of “regional factionalism”.
The issue of al-Attar’s exile became even more salient when, after being based in Arab states such as Lebanon for a time, then Jordan and Kuwait, the Damascene leader decided to travel all the way to Europe, first to Geneva and Brussels, before eventually settling down in Aachen in Germany, where he resides to this day. According to al-Attar, he moved to Europe in order to “avoid having the Syrian Ikhwan being used by Arab states as a bishop on the regional chessboard.”24 In any case, the European exile of the Muslim Brotherhood’s leader made communication with the Ikhwan’s base in Syria more difficult over the years and, eventually, greatly weakened his grip on a movement increasingly rebelling against its own leader. According to Issam al-Attar, the tipping point was reached in 1967–68 when he became physically unable to lead the organization for some time. “I fell gravely sick and, in a context of rising divergences amongst Ikhwani members, some took up this occasion to challenge my leadership.”25
The “northern axis”, which, for the overlapping reasons stated above challenged the leadership of the “Damascus wing”, was led by Amin Yagan, a Brother from Aleppo who had also been al-Attar’s deputy at the helm of the organization during the mid-1960s, before increasing divergences divided the two figures. Yagan was, by the admission of a leading member of the “Damascus wing”, a very active and charismatic figure. He was supported by other prominent personalities within the movement, such as Adnan Sa’id from Latakia, Adnan Saadeddine and Said Hawwa from Hama and Sheikh Abdel Fatah Abu Ghuddah from Aleppo. This “northern axis” had the support of most members on the ground and opposed Issam al-Attar’s numerically inferior “Damascus wing” which, despite its name, included not only prominent Damascene Brothers such as Muwaffaq Da’abul, Zuhair Shawish and Muhammed Hawari, but also a few other Ikhwani figures from elsewhere, such as Muhammed Riyad al-Shuqfah from Hama and Hassan Houeidi from Deir ez-Zoor, who both felt that Issam al-Attar should not be pushed out before his term as the Ikhwan’s leader expired.26
Between 1969 and 1972, the Ikhwan were left with virtually no coherent leadership, the divergences and resentment between the two groups only growing over time before they effectively became separate entities. When new elections were organized, in a common effort to put differences aside by letting rank and file members decide who should be their leader, the candidate of the “northern axis”, Sheikh Abdel Fatah Abu Ghuddah of Aleppo, emerged as the clear victor.27 Because he was a respected religious scholar on whom all factions belonging to the “northern axis” could agree temporarily, it has been claimed that Abu Ghuddah merely served as a compromise figurehead. “Ambitious young membe
rs of the ‘northern axis’ instrumentalized Sheikh Abu Ghuddah’s scientific and religious caution while he himself did not even have political ambitions”,28 a member of the “Damascus wing” claimed bitterly.
Despite official recognition of the new leadership by the international tanzim of the Muslim Brotherhood, Issam al-Attar’s “Damascus wing”, in its majority at least, never joined the whole group again. It was clear, according to the Damascene Muhammed Hawari, that the only reason why the international body of the Ikhwan eventually supported the “northern axis” stemmed from an old feud which, in the early 1960s, had been pitting the Egyptian Ikhwan against the “Damascus wing” of the Syrian branch. When the international tanzim of the Ikhwan met in 1963 to propose to the Syrian branch that it should integrate into the wider organization, political differences emerged between the Damascus and Aleppo wings of the movement on whether or not to accept the proposal. Traditionally, the murshid, or leader, of the international Muslim Brotherhood had always been Egyptian. This was because the original organization had been established in Egypt and because the Egyptian Ikhwan were the most influential branch within the international tanzim. While the “Damascus wing” wished to change this state of affairs, proposing that the murshid of the international Muslim Brotherhood could be of any nationality belonging to the tanzim, the “Aleppo faction” supported the Egyptian Ikhwan’s claim to leadership and wished to see the Syrian branch integrate into the wider organization without any preconditions. Muhammed Hawari therefore suggests that, because the Egyptians never forgot this episode, one should view the support they granted to the “Aleppo faction” when it sought to challenge the “Damascus wing”, via their influence in the international tanzim, through the lenses of this feud.29
Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria Page 12
