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*168Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*142Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*144Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*145Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*146Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*147Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*151Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*159Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*161Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*164Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*165Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*169Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*143Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*148Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*149Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*153Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*155Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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†156 Held noncompensated employment, hence not counted in aggregate number of State Department staffers elsewhere (Table 5).
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*162Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*163Cases not on Lee list (total 28).
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*170 And also weren’t in the State Department, which may be why McCarthy didn’t present them to Tydings. All four, however, were connected closely with some of McCarthy’s most important cases—Lattimore/IPR and Service/Amerasia.
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†171 With no apparent sense of contradiction, the Tydings report did discuss some of the additional McCarthy cases—Lattimore, Service, Jessup, Hanson—on their alleged merits, but omitted these from its mathematical comments, which simply mirrored those of State.
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‡172 That is, Fishburn’s case was presented in substance by McCarthy to the Senate, even though McCarthy’s typist would later enter the name as Washburn. Thereafter, McCarthy did present Fishburn’s name to Tydings, as this was one of the 22 additional cases provided on March 14. Fishburn was thus in effect twice cited by McCarthy and twice scrubbed out of the record by State and Tydings. (To confuse matters further, and possibly prompting the typist’s error, there was a “Washburne” on both the Lee list and McCarthy’s roster.)
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*173This total excludes Dr. Harlow Shapley, who held a noncompensated appointment.
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*174Which doesn’t necessarily mean the total number of suspects declined in these ratios, as still other cases would be added to State’s payroll in the succeeding years, thus pushing the numbers back up to some indeterminate level.
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*175As John Peurifoy put it in his “response” to Karsten, “all McCarthy has done is to shake 2 years’ dust off some old reports …None of these committees suggested that there are any Communists in the State Department… he was simply reciting, somewhat incorrectly, items from this shopworn list of 108 cases.” Peurifoy assistant Carlisle Humelsine would reinforce this, saying, “The Senator picked up an old list that was furnished to the 80th Congress. He is riding piggyback on the 80th Congress committee that made the investigation and cleared the department.” (Emphasis added.)
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*176Nor was it necessarily as innocuous as the quote selected by Oshinsky makes it appear. See note, Chapter 26.
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*177This was in all probability the November 27, 1945, summary referred to in Chapter 11, which enjoyed a considerable circulation on the Hill. Given the date of this report, however (June 10, 1947), the FBI memo referred to could have been one of the later wrap-ups—either February 21, 1946, or October 21, 1946.
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*178This was an obvious reference to Gustavo Duran, who had worked for Braden.
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†179 The report referred to by Ferguson was of further interest as it zeroed in on the case of Hamilton Robinson and his relationship with Miller. Following a discussion of the Marzani case and the year-long delay in doing anything about it, the report asserted: “…there followed the substitution of unqualified men for…competent, highly respected personnel who theretofore held the intelligence and security assignments in the department. The new chief of controls is a man utterly devoid of background and experience for the job, who is and at the time of this appointment was known to be, a cousin and close associate of a suspected Soviet espionage agent.”
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‡180Representative Jonkman, as we have seen, was indeed actively interested in these issues beginning in the summer of ’46, and had exerted pressure on Panuch and Klaus to take measures against Marzani. In the course of this effort, Jonkman became convinced that Panuch was a main source of the security problem, and was thus well inclined toward Peurifoy as the new anti-Panuch in the division. This evidently resulted in Jonkman’s willingness to accept Peurifoy statements at face value, which wasn’t a wise thing to do.
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*181He would later issue such subpoenas, which were ignored by the Truman administration, with no effort thereafter by the Senate to enforce them.
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*182This was in all probability the reason Tydings reversed himself so abruptly on the matter of the additional 22 cases, which he originally promised to pursue but then refused to look at. He had made a similar pledge in the case of Gustavo Duran, and that too would be ignored, most likely for identical reasons.
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*183Lodge would later expand on these comments, saying that “the files which I read were in such an unfinished state as to indicate that examination of each file would have been a waste of time…” He added that “in some of the more important cases the report of the FBI full field investigation was missing…It should also be noted that the subcommittee was allowed to see the files only under such stringent limitations as to preclude our getting much essential information…”
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*184Tydings, it appears, had been misled by a passive-voice construction used by Truman Justice. Peyton Ford had written to Tydings on June 16, saying the FBI had furnished the pertinent data and that “the State Department files have been checked, and I can assure you that all of the reports and memoranda furnished the State Department are contained in the files.” (Emphasis added.) Tydings converted this into his statement that the FBI had done the checking—which it hadn’t.
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*185The sole exceptions to this rule were that, in the case of a decision against an employee, the ruling could be appealed to the central Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission and that this board could also, at its discretion, pick up cases for post-audit. The first of these provisions, of course, did nothing to reverse a ruling that cleared a suspect, while the second was seldom exercised in adverse fashion toward an employee. At no time, either before or after the Truman program was enacted, was the FBI empowered to “clear” employees or not.
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*186In these exchanges, Snow and McCarthy both veered from the main point—the condition of the files circa 1950. As for Snow’s statements on that topic, it seems unlikely he could personally have vouched for the integrity of the files, given their voluminous nature, loose-leaf condition, and accessibility to so many people. Unless Snow had intimate knowledge of every item in these files and photographic recollection, his assurance was an impossibility.
Still less could he have vouched for the condition of the files during the five-month period when they were locked up in the White House.
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*187As one member of the board expressed it: “When they [the State Department] operate as they do—merely showing a resignation by the individual…he immediately goes over to another agency and says, ‘I have worked for the State Department for five years. Here is my personnel action sheet. I resigned a few weeks ago.’ There is nothing in the personnel action sheet to tell the personnel officer that there is an investigation of that person. He gets the job…or [the personnel officer] has to go running around…to find out if there has been an investigation of this man…”
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*188Meigs was one of the cases listed by Sam Klaus in 1947 as a target of security action, but was then being dealt with cautiously because he was the head of the State Department employees’ union. Though McCarthy didn’t say so in this exchange, it was his highlighting of the case that brought Meigs to the attention of the Army and almost certainly caused his dismissal. (See Chapter 25.)
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*189McCarthy’s statement reads as follows: “During the entire year of 1949, Mr. Service was under investigation by the FBI. Reports were forwarded to the Loyalty Review Board which reflected adversely on his desirability as a State Department employee. On December 28, 1948, the Loyalty Review Board received a copy of such a report, and again on February 18, 1949, March 10, 1949, April 4, 1949, May 11, 1949, September 7, 1949, and September 21, 1949…. Service’s file was requested by the Loyalty Review Board repeatedly until the year 1949, but wasn’t received by it until February 24, 1950.”
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*190It’s also mentioned in the Anderson-May book as a “forgery,” with zero explanation of the contents.
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*191As to the accuracy of the McCarthy data, one FBI memo commented that “although the document was proven not to be a [CSC] summary, it did contain considerable excerpts from our loyalty reports.” Another stated: “The FBI reports in two of these files, as assembled at LRB, are set up in the same order as McCarthy’s ‘exhibit’…[The McCarthy information] follows exactly the same order of the FBI reports referred to…[Also] Senator McCarthy referred to the ‘173 page transcript’ of the hearing afforded [Posniak] by the State Department Loyalty Review Board…It would therefore appear that Senator McCarthy had access not only to…the FBI reports, but the entire file relating to [Posniak].”
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†192Supporting the notion that the document may have come to McCarthy by this route was the fact that McCarran, as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, had regular access to FBI reports or summaries thereof, a unique prerogative in the Senate that backbencher McCarthy did not enjoy. If McCarthy received the document from McCarran, a much-respected colleague, he would have had no particular reason to question the form in which it was presented.
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*193A still-later FBI memo on Nash confirmed the accuracy of McCarthy’s statement: “After McCarthy made this speech, we conducted an inquiry and decided that, based on the information in the speech, McCarthy probably had access to the results of our loyalty investigation of Nash.”
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*194A further FBI entry, based either on an informant report or microphone surveillance, describes a November 1945 Communist Party meeting in Alameda County, as follows: “According to confidential sources, Jack Manley stated at this meeting that he and Steve Nelson were close to Oppenheimer as Oppenheimer was a party member. Manley also stated that Oppenheimer told Steven Nelson several years ago that the Army was working on the atomic bomb…Katherine Sanders, a Communist Party functionary also present at this meeting, stated that Oppenheimer was a Communist Party member.”
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*195The timeline on these reports, plotted against Truman’s actions, is instructive. Truman nominated White for the IMF position on January 23, 1946—two and a half months after the first Hoover letter prominently mentioning White and a month and a half after the November comprehensive memo was delivered to the White House. The nomination would not be voted on by the Senate until February 6, at which time Truman also had the February memo geared to White. It’s thus clear that Truman and his aides had ample warning that White was an identified Soviet agent before the nomination ever happened, and had a heads-up mainly devoted to White before the matter was voted by the Senate.
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*196In a further footnote to all the above, Hoover added that if the idea was to contain White and monitor his actions by surrounding him with trustworthy people, the project was aborted early on by the appointment of V. Frank Coe, yet another Bentley suspect, as secretary of the IMF. Indeed, the Coe appointment was in some ways even more telling than that of White. Coe had been named as a suspect in FBI reports to the White House, Treasury, and Truman Justice dated February 23 and 24 and March 4, 1946. Coe wasn’t appointed to the IMF until three months later (June ’46).
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*197Thus, on February 14, 1946, a Bureau entry reflected that “at 10:14 A.M. Gerry Askwith contacted Joan Redmont [who] said that she and Bernie would attend her party of 6:45 P.M. tonight.” Askwith said that “she, Mallon and others including Alice Raine [wife of Philip] would be in attendance.” Thereafter, on March 27, “Helen Scott contacted Joan Redmont saying she had seen Redmont and Jerry Askwith at the Press Club…Jerry Askwith subsequently contacted Joan Redmont and asked Joan if she cared if the Krafsurs came on Monday (to a party planned for the Redmonts by Jerry Askwith)….” On April 25, Joan Redmont talked with Helen Scott about a dinner with the Minter Woods, mentioning that “Jerry Askwith was also at the Woods.”
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*198“CSA” = Chief Special Agent at the State Department security shop.
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†199 McCarthy upgraded this to “known Communist,” something he also did in other cases.
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*200So listed in the McCarthy-Matthews file. The surname was actually “Griffiths.”
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*201In fact, the Lee list treatment was a good deal more damaging than McCarthy’s, though his second version did include one of his upgrades. McCarthy on Lloyd:“Both the individual referred to and his wife—this is in the file of the investigative agency—are members of Communist front organizations. He has a relative who has a financial interest in the Daily Worker.” And: “The file indicates he is a very close friend of reported Communists, and that he is closely associated with members of Communist front organizations.”
Lee list on Lloyd:“One informant states he is a friend of C-36, of FCC, a reported Communist. He is a member of the National Lawyers Guild and Washington Book Shop. His wife belongs to the ‘League of Women Shoppers.’ The applicant is a subscriber to ‘New Masses’ and was closely associated with members of the ‘American Peace Mobilization’ and ‘Washington Committee for Democratic Action’ [both cited as Communist fronts by Francis Biddle]. A relative of his has a financial interest in the Daily Worker.”
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*202This was, as noted, the local of a national union expelled from the CIO in 1950 on the grounds that it habitually followed the Communist line on labor and all other matters. According to a compilation by the AF of L, which watched such matters closely, other members of this State Department unit included Lois Carlisle, Francis Tuchscher, Sam Fishback, and Marcel Elinson. All these except Elinson were on the McCarthy list of cases. She was the innocuous-sounding case No. 104 selected by historian David Oshinsky for emphasis in discussion of the Lee list, though she wasn’t a McCarthy suspect.
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†203When McCarthy first went before the Senate, it appears he didn’t yet know the whereabouts of Meigs, as, in contrast to many other cases, he made no reference to where Meigs was working. However, McCarthy’s researchers
were on the trail and would discover the suspect was with the Army. (An undated notation in the McCarthy backup file on Meigs records “an individual by this name is listed in the Department of Defense phone directory for February 1950.”)
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*204The British spelling was used, as the phrase was lifted from a Gilbert and Sullivan lyric.
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*205Hanson had described the Chinese Reds as “hard-headed, hard shooting realists” (among other things). McCarthy quoted this as “straight shooting.”
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†206This was also a favorite theme of Professor Lattimore. See Chapter 29.
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*207She was in fact, as the backstage records show, a particular favorite and protégé of Benton.
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*208This House committee report was in turn referenced to a story in the Daily Worker describing a massive “collective security” petition allegedly signed by 1,000 people and highlighting the names of five “notables” connected with this effort, including such as Henry Stimson, Gov. Elmer Benson of Minnesota—and Clarence Hathaway, editor of the Daily Worker. Obviously, the motives of such as Stimson in signing such a petition would have been quite different from those of Clarence Hathaway. “Collective security” was CP jargon at the time for getting Western nations to help defend the USSR from Hitler—a line instantly reversed with the coming of the Nazi-Soviet pact.
*208As to the various upstanding and patriotic citizens serving with Mrs. Brunauer on the board of Peace Efforts, there were some she (and Tydings) forgot to mention. One of these was William Hinckley, head of the American Youth Congress; another was Margaret Forsyth, an officer of the American League for Peace and Democracy. As a study of the various boards and panels reveals, there was a considerable overlap between the Peace Efforts agitation and these notorious fronts.
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*209As would later be brought out by Stephen Brunauer himself, most of the adverse information on his case stemmed from the Office of Naval Intelligence, which he blamed for his ongoing security troubles. McCarthy apparently got his material from the ONI, in which event the most likely conduit was Robert Morris, who had been an officer with that service.
Blacklisted By History Page 85
