“But you can’t be a party to this maneuver,” I interjected. “After all, this is an official report on our activities. The deputy chief of staff, the chief of staff and very likely General MacArthur will read it. Personally, I don’t like what General Willoughby is trying to do to you. You’re right in the middle with this report.”
When General Shepard didn’t answer I decided that I had said enough. I’m sure he thought my comments over very carefully, though, because the next day he came into my office and said, “Get your cap, Frank. I want you to accompany me to GHQ. You haven’t met General Fox, the deputy chief of staff, and I’d like to have him know you.”
After introducing me to Major General Alonzo P. Fox, General Shepard brought out our weekly report and turned it over to the deputy chief. Then, to my surprise, he proceeded to explain in detail the Mori situation and his meetings with Colonel Hattori and the other officers of the Japanese Imperial forces. I was very proud of my boss at that moment and genuinely relieved to have CASA disentangled from this affair. Nevertheless, I was deeply disturbed by what appeared to me to be an underhanded maneuver by the G-2 Section to bring purgees into the NPR against written directives and obviously in a way that would circumvent opposition from other GHQ staffs.
Later that day, it was necessary for me to visit Colonel Laurence E. Bunker, aide to General MacArthur. After completing my business, Colonel Bunker asked me, “Frank, how’s the organizing of the NPR going?”
“Well, as you can understand we’ve had our problems,” I said. “We have no experienced Japanese in the NPR because of the purge policy, and most of the work has to be done by our American staff. But I understand, with the acceptance of General Willoughby’s plan to use former career officers, things will go much better.”
Colonel Bunker whirled around in his chair, his eyes blazing. “What do you mean?” he asked.
“I have the impression that the purge policy is to be revoked, or at least we’ll be permitted to use some former officers of the Japanese Imperial forces in the NPR.”
“The general hasn’t approved that,” snapped Colonel Bunker. “He will never agree to the use of purgees in the NPR. General Willoughby better stop this one-man resistance before someone’s head comes off.”
Leaving Colonel Bunker’s office, I was satisfied that no purgees would be authorized in the NPR for some time. Even if Colonel Bunker did not go to General MacArthur directly, I knew he was friendly with General Whitney and his message would reach its destination.
As I had anticipated, on August 9, 1950, General Shepard, on instructions from GHQ, called in ex-Colonel Hattori and the six former Imperial officers who were to command the induction centers and informed them that for the present they and the other career officers were ineligible for the NPR.
The G-2 Section, however, was not prepared to give up yet. General Shepard was visited by an intelligence officer whose mission was to induce the chief of CASA to incorporate Colonel Hattori and his Imperial Army associates into the Advisory Group. He explained that the occupation forces purge directive provided certain categories for exceptions. Under these exceptions, Colonel Hattori and other distinguished Imperial officers were authorized to work for SCAP. G-2 would make these officers available to CASA. He pointed out that the Japanese police officials and civilians who were being assigned to the NPR were not qualified to organize, train, and develop a military force. Colonel Hattori and his staff would provide liaison and guidance. He cautioned, however, that the assignment of the Demobilization Bureau officers would have to be handled in the strictest secrecy to avoid criticism from the other sections of the GHQ staff. He assured General Shepard there would be no problem; G-2 would make sure no one found out about the operation. Colonel Hattori and his specially selected staff, he said, were exceptionally qualified for the task, and they were organized to assume a major part of the organizational load. CASA in fact would have little to do except supervise. Then he tipped his hand.
“We think it’s very important that we do this,” he said. “The arrangement will enable the Hattori team to keep abreast of developments in the NPR, and in this way prepare them for taking over command of the force when the misfits they are now sending you are thrown out.”
By this time, General Shepard had had enough of the G-2 Section’s intrigues to outwit the supreme commander. Supported by General Fox, he decided to make a clean break. I was genuinely pleased when finally one day he instructed me, “From now on I want you to give G-2 nothing to do with the NPR. If they ask for information or progress reports, refer them to the office of the deputy chief of staff, General Fox.”
We may have closed the official channels between CASA and G-2, but I am sure this in no way hampered Willoughby from knowing anything he wanted to know about the NPR. He did, however, have to intensify his covert operations and change his tactics.
With the rejection of the Hattori team by CASA, Willoughby turned his wrath on the Japanese who were being appointed by the government to the top positions in the NPR. The struggle for control of the new force was finally focused on the appointment of the chief of the General Group. This post was similar to that of our chief of staff of the Army, and as such, the chief of the General Group was to be the top man in uniform.
Early in September 1950, Prime Minister Yoshida submitted the name of Keizō Hayashi, former official of the Imperial Household Agency (Kunaichō), governor of Tottori Prefecture, to fill the post of chief of the General Group. Under instructions contained in our basic directive, General Shepard forwarded the Hayashi nomination for clearance to General Whitney of the Government Section and to General Willoughby.
I think it is interesting to note that there was more to the appointment of Hayashi to this post than initially met the eye. He was, of course, a civilian with absolutely no military experience. But as the assistant steward of the Imperial household, Hayashi was as intimately associated with Emperor Hirohito as tradition would permit any person to associate with the son of heaven. After the war, Hayashi was one of a very limited circle of Japanese to see and talk with the emperor. In light of my close work with Mr. Hayashi for more than a year and a half, I became convinced that Emperor Hirohito named Hayashi to be the emperor’s personal representative in the new Japanese military force. I might add that we were very fortunate to have General Hayashi as the chief of the General Group. He was a sincere, intelligent person who, as a dedicated and patriotic Japanese interested in the welfare of his country, understood power and valued the friendship of the United States.
We anticipated no problems on Hayashi’s clearance with the Government Section. General Whitney had a consistent record of permitting the Japanese government maximum latitude in selecting their key government officials. In this case, considering the importance of cooperation between our military and the new forces of Japan, General Whitney swiftly found Hayashi qualified under the law and cleared him for immediate appointment.
General Willoughby, however, egged on by Colonel Pulliam and loyal to the Hattori team, decided on a waiting game, blocking the appointment of Hayashi for more than a month. For weeks, he calmly sat on the nomination, neither clearing nor disqualifying Hayashi. The delay created serious difficulties for our staff and the Japanese because we had to proceed with the organization of a headquarters without a chief. In the meantime, on the American side a vicious dogfight developed in the GHQ staff. CASA, G-3, and the Government Section joined forces to fight Willoughby. But I must say that he was not one to give up easily.
As the delay continued, one could feel the anxiety in the Japanese government. Mr. Keikichi Masuhara, the civilian head of the NPR, began to query General Shepard practically every day regarding the status of the Hayashi nomination. Under this pressure, General Shepard finally reported the situation to the chief of staff. But after ten years as MacArthur’s intelligence chief, Willoughby had little concern or respect for the chief of staff. When the chief pressed him unduly, Willoughby settled the matter in his customary
manner. On October 2, Mr. Masuhara, in a highly excited state of mind, rushed into General Shepard’s office with a letter from G-2 GHQ SCAP. The letter was signed by Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, Willoughby’s deputy, and informed the Japanese government that the nomination of Hayashi to be chief of the General Group was disapproved.
“What do I do now?” asked Mr. Masuhara. “General Willoughby does not like Mr. Hayashi. I know he wants Colonel Hattori to be chief. But the Japanese government has confidence in Mr. Hayashi.”
General Shepard studied the letter carefully for some time, absorbed in deep thought. Then he looked up at the director general.
“Tell me, Mr. Masuhara, does the prime minister want Mr. Hayashi?”
“Sure,” answered the director general.
“Then there is only one thing you can do. Go to Mr. Yoshida and ask him to take the matter up personally with General MacArthur.”
“I see,” answered Mr. Masuhara. And off he went on the double.
A few days later, General Whitney called Shepard to inquire whether he still wanted Mr. Hayashi for the post of chief of the General Group. When Shepard answered in the affirmative, General Whitney said, “You can have him.” With that, the controversy ended, and Mr. Hayashi became the first chief of staff of the new military establishment of Japan.
On the day that General Hayashi completed his first year of service as chief of the General Group, I went over to congratulate him and to thank him for his fine cooperation. We sat around sipping tea and reminiscing.
“Do you remember, Colonel,” asked Hayashi, “the first day I came into your office?”
Did I remember? How could I forget the new chief of staff of the NPR reporting for duty in that long-tail cutaway? I smiled, “Oh, I remember that day very well, General.”
“I was all excited that day,” went on General Hayashi. “It was a great triumph for me. You recall my nomination had been held up for over a month. G-2, as you know, did not want me to be chief of staff. They had someone else in mind for the post.” And he laughed.
“But what you don’t know,” he explained,
is that there were personal objections to me. Colonel Pulliam opposed me. We had a personal disagreement several years ago. He was very angry at me. In 1945, at the time of the surrender, I was an official in the Home Ministry [Naimushō]. I remained there until October when I was appointed governor of Tottori Prefecture. After fourteen months, I returned to the Home Ministry as chief of the Local Administrations Bureau. About that time, 1947, the police forces were reorganized in Japan, and the National Rural Police was established. Our government decided to appoint Mr. Noboru Saitō director general of the National Rural Police. As the chief of the Bureau of Local Administration, I had to “carry the ball,” as you say, for Mr. Saitō. Colonel Pulliam, as the chief of the Public Safety Division of SCAP, demanded we designate Chief Suzuki of the City of Ōsaka director general of the Rural Police. You know Suzuki-san well, Colonel. He was your chief of police in Ōsaka.
I nodded and General Hayashi continued his story.
Well, we agreed that Suzuki was a fine man, but there were many in the Japanese government who didn’t like him. You know, Colonel, the people of Japan thought that he was too close to the Americans. We have all tried to cooperate with the occupation forces, but our people want their leaders to be Japanese in spirit. I am sorry, but Suzuki-san earned the displeasure of many Japanese. I tried to explain to Colonel Pulliam why we opposed the Suzuki appointment. He became very angry, jumped up and down, and pounded the table. He yelled at me. “God damn it,” he said, “you want a saint to be a chief of police? If you appoint a saint, I will get rid of him the next day.”
“I was not especially against Chief Suzuki,” General Hayashi went on. “It was a matter of principle. He had earned the displeasure of many Japanese, and we wanted the right to appoint the director general without interference from Americans. And so Mr. Saitō was appointed, and that made Colonel Pulliam very angry at me. When I was nominated for my post, Colonel Pulliam did everything to stop me. I am sorry he did not like me.”
“Are you saying, General Hayashi,” I asked, “that the delay in your appointment resulted from a personal disagreement with Colonel Pulliam?”
“It was more that G-2 wanted a former Imperial officer in as chief of the General Group,” answered General Hayashi. “General Willoughby had chosen Colonel Hattori for the post, and he had the whole Demobilization Bureau waiting to take over the NPR.” And he laughed, obviously enjoying the events of that struggle.
I laughed with General Hayashi, assuring him that all Americans were now happy that he was the chief of the General Group. I was sincere in what I said because I had learned to respect General Hayashi and considered him a staunch friend of the United States. In fact, in my experience in Japan, I found that those who could really be counted among our friends were those who were the most patriotic Japanese—those most devoted to Japan. On the contrary, I always shied away from those Japanese who tied to impress me with their devotion to America.
The appointment of General Hayashi having been confirmed, the principle was firmly established that if a Japanese nominee qualified under the law for appointment in the NPR, there would be no interference from Americans. Furthermore, it was clearly established that the leadership for the new force would have to come from others than career officers. Until they were depurged at some future date, former Imperial officers would be ineligible for the NPR.
Though General Willoughby had received a severe setback, he was still in an excellent position, as head of the intelligence-gathering agencies, to paint a black picture of the NPR. His intelligence summaries and specially provided studies stressed the capability of the Japanese Communist Party to penetrate the NPR. The organization was a natural target for the communists, he contended, and he uncovered diabolic plots by the comrades to take over the new army. His reports varied as to the time that the communists would seize control of the new organization, but he intimated that the takeover would be facilitated if the force continued to be officered by incompetent and inexperienced civilians. The remedy of course was to end the purge and induct former officers of the Imperial Japanese forces.
When the communist scare tactics seemed to have no impact on GHQ, reports began to appear alleging corruption in the procurement sections of the NPR and inefficiencies in training, organization, and logistics. These reports found their way to the desks of the top staff officers in GHQ, generating inquiries to CASA and difficulties for our staff and the Japanese. By the end of 1950, however, Colonel Pulliam returned to the United States for retirement and General Willoughby began to fade away quietly, showing less and less interest in the NPR as his own time for retirement approached.
On the Japanese side, the struggle for control intensified. New maneuvers were now undertaken. The Hattori clique joined forces with various splinter groups of former Imperial Army and Navy officers and politicians. Their efforts centered on discrediting the new force.
Critical articles began to appear in the Japanese press blowing up management difficulties into corruption and inefficiencies. Some of these articles unfortunately contained a measure of truth; the initial costs of organizing the NPR were very high. When the alleged procurement irregularities were finally investigated, it was found that most of them were nothing more than human mistakes made by inexperienced personnel working under the severe pressure of trying to organize a new military force in the face of emergency in Korea and the vacuum that existed in Japan. Nevertheless, certain sensational newspapers were highly successful in inflaming an easily outraged public against Japan’s new military establishment. The Japanese editorial below was typical of the criticism unleashed by self-serving former militarists:
In the light of the low morale and numerous scandals in the National Police Reserve, preparations are steadily progressing for conversion of the NPR into a new Japanese Army. . . . However, capable former military officers and civilian experts in national
defense maintain that it will be difficult to foster a strong guiding principle and united spirit in the NPR, since it has become overridden with corruption worse than that exposed in government administration offices, and its personnel is composed of all sorts of people gathered together from various government offices. They, therefore, insist that an entirely new army should be created instead of converting the NPR into a military force. . . . Qualified former military leaders are reluctant to join the NPR. Only a very limited number of former military men of dubious character are willing to sell themselves to the NPR.
The effort, of course, in these editorials was to undermine confidence in the new organization with a view of eliminating it completely and organizing in its place something more responsive and acceptable to military men such as Colonel Hattori and his colleagues in the Japanese Demobilization Bureau.
In addition to the propaganda line about inefficiency and corruption, a campaign was launched to disdain the NPR because it was too American. The salvation for Japan, according to these experts, was to make a clean break with what had been imposed. These men argued that Japan should build a new Japanese-oriented army, divorced from American military concepts. Former Japanese military officers and so-called military experts began to question whether the American army system was the best for Japan. Wasn’t it too expensive in concept? Wasn’t the American discipline too fragile for the Japanese? How could Japan, a poor country, get the money that was needed to buy ammunition that Americans fired up in practice? Articles were published to show that the yobitai, or NPR soldier, under American training and discipline had no fighting spirit. He was pictured as a hired mercenary lacking patriotism. When some of the younger officers of the NPR who accepted and admired the American training methods spoke out for the new concepts, they were derided as young, inexperienced upstarts.
Throughout this difficult period, Mr. Masuhara and General Hayashi bore the brunt of these attacks. It was distressing enough for the director general to carry his heavy responsibilities, but he at least was a civilian official performing a political task. General Hayashi, on the other hand, was a civilian converted overnight into a general officer with the title, position, duties, and prerogatives of a military commander. Though he better than anyone else in those formative days appreciated his limitations, he was in fact the top soldier in uniform directly responsible for the command of all the troops. Under those circumstances, most of the senior officers of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy who had lost the war for Japan were now panting on the sidelines waiting to pounce upon him.
An Inoffensive Rearmament Page 11
