While these differences in views and attitudes generated rivalries and divisions among the various military groups that surfaced during the “reverse course” environment, their fundamental rightist orientation encouraged wide agreement on many issues. Uniformly, as in the prewar days, they argued that the crisis in Japan was spiritual and the people had to be aroused to the dangers confronting the nation. American tutelage had lulled the Japanese into a false sense of security, and the new liberal concepts of democracy were destroying the traditions of the country. An apathetic Japan was exposing its borders and the soul of its people to alien ideological subversion, from the West to American democracy and from the Soviets to communism. Of the two evils, the more immediate danger to the nation and the people was communism. Duty therefore demanded that the former Imperial officers in this crisis act to save Japan.
This patriotic anticommunism fit nicely with our own views of the world situation. Though the former Imperialists grossly exaggerated the strength of the Communist Party, they gained a warm reception in many American quarters. Arguing that rearmament was the only hope for resisting communist aggression, the new militarists were applauded by Americans. As so often happens in human endeavors, views that coincided were motivated by completely different objectives. On the one hand, the Americans were urging swift and extensive rearmament primarily to build up a strong military force in Japan in the hope that in an emergency we would have massive Japanese ground forces to throw in against the communists in Korea. Most of the nationalists, however, considered such an adventure totally inimical to Japan’s interests.
As the nationalists grew stronger, they began to favor with increasing conviction a military force for Japan independent of all foreign powers. They wanted neither domination by the United States nor commitments to the West. They admitted that Japan would need American weapons and equipment for the initial rearmament, but they argued for early restoration of Japanese armament factories and facilities. Firm in their determination that professionals should make decisions on the buildup of Japanese forces in Japan’s interest, they resented bitterly American supervision of the rearmament program. Most of the nationalists demanded that the NPR be disbanded and that a fresh start be made under professional supervision. Critical of the civilian leadership in the NPR, they urged wholesale firings of the amateurs.
Refraining from a direct attack against the parliamentary system, the nationalists did not spare the whip against the new democratic ideas. Deploring the emphasis on the rights of the individual, they contended that the family structure was being undermined and the hearts of fighting soldiers weakened. They urged a massive Japanese revival of traditional virtues. Soft civilian concern for the rights of the people had no place in the military forces of Japan. They advocated revision of the constitution, restriction of the civilian bureaucracy, and rededication to ancient Japanese virtues of discipline, obedience, and self-sacrifice.
Within CASA, the ideas of the nationalists were supported mainly for the reasons previously mentioned, to accelerate rearmament for immediate American military purposes. Personally, I considered these objectives too shallow and lacking an appreciation of long-term human and American interests. Because I was concerned with the impact the nationalist groups might exert, I kept myself carefully informed of their activities.
Colonel Takushirō Hattori and his associates, who in time became known as the “Hattori Agency” (Hattori Kikan), were a unique group that played an important role in those crucial days. As I have mentioned in a previous chapter, Colonel Hattori and his colleagues, with access to the records of the Demobilization Bureau, controlled the main depository of Japanese resources and knowledge. For years after the surrender, Hattori and his fellow officers from the Imperial Army and Navy served as the main point of contact between the occupation forces and the Japanese professional military leaders. Major General Willoughby, General MacArthur’s intelligence officer, who had been the supervisor and sponsor of this clique of former Imperial elite, had promised and did his utmost to deliver to Colonel Hattori the command of the NPR. When this did not materialize and the American Advisory Group refused to incorporate the Hattori element into the CASA organization, Colonel Hattori switched his approach, moving the Hattori Agency into the political environment of Japan.
The core of the group at the time consisted of ten or so former Imperial colonels and lieutenant colonels, most of whom had served in the Demobilization Bureau. They were supported by some three hundred members in the prefectures. The announced purpose of the agency was to collect and disseminate information on the rearmament of Japan. The group’s slogan was freedom, independence, and self-defense. In their hidden agenda, the members continue to visualize themselves eventually filling the command structure of the new army. Joining other groups of former military officers, they found the NPR wanting in many categories.
Steeped in the emotional traditions of the Imperial past, these groups viewed the NPR and American supervision and training methods with skepticism and aversion. They were critical of American discipline and fighting spirit. Ignorant of modern military concepts, they deplored the use of massive equipment and heavy consumption of ammunition. They accused the NPR of being paid mercenaries who, like the American soldiers they tried to imitate, would not fight unless they were served ice cream daily. They argued that Japan could not afford to pay for the great volume of ammunition that the Americans were requiring the Japanese to expend in training. Suspicious of heavy equipment, they pointed out that bridges in Japan would collapse under the weight of our tanks, artillery, and engineering equipment. They urged the government to disband the NPR and start anew, building ground, sea, and air forces designed for the special defense of Japan. Though they grudgingly acknowledged that under the circumstances then prevailing in the world, American weapons, aircraft, and naval vessels would initially be required, they wanted to be free of any American controls.
Some Americans were surprised to find that Colonel Hattori and his group not only criticized the adequacy of the NPR but questioned overall American military capability in the Far East. Hattori contended that in Asia, which was important to Japan, the Russians were militarily far superior to the United States. The war in Korea, he pointed out, was demonstrating that although the Americans were equipped with superior weapons, they were hardly holding their own against the Chinese, who were fighting with second-grade equipment. His point was that he feared that Japan would find itself as unprotected and unprepared as the Philippine Islands had been against Japanese assaults in the Pacific War.
I was told that in 1951 Colonel Hattori had submitted a fantastic recommendation to GHQ SCAP suggesting that Japan immediately organize twenty infantry divisions, with former company grade officers as the nucleus. He is said to have estimated that such a force could be formed in one month and that given two or three months’ training, these units would become as effective as any American troops. If he really made such a recommendation, he certainly knew nothing about the logistics of equipping, housing, deploying, and training a force of this magnitude. Yet he went on to suggest that in the event of an emergency Japan could field fifty divisions.
These ideas were so far out of line with the modest four-division force that Prime Minister Yoshida was trying to nurse along that they were rejected firmly and inalterably. When in the autumn of 1951, after many of the former military officers were depurged, the government refused to call Colonel Hattori and his associates to the command of the NPR, the agency turned bitterly against the new organization. Attacking the civilian bureaucrats in the NPR, the Hattori group sent a circular to prospective candidates among the former officers advising them not to join the NPR. I am informed that later, when the depurged cadres became integrated into the military forces, Colonel Hattori became reconciled to the new organization.
In 1956, following the formation of the National Defense Council, Colonel Hattori was suggested for the important post of councillor, in which he would have been responsi
ble for coordinating defense planning. By this time, however, he had made many powerful enemies. His opposition to civilian control of the military had been so uncompromising that it became a major issue in considering him for the council. The civilian officials in the Defense Agency were irrevocably against his candidacy. Moreover, he had also become unpopular in navy circles for advocating a unified command structure for the ground, sea, and air forces. Ironically, his close association with the occupation forces in the end militated against his appointment. Colonel Hattori came very close to the top in his many efforts to project himself into the rearmament of Japan, but somehow fate, each time, acted to shut him out of the establishment.
A man who sometimes collaborated with Colonel Hattori—but who had his own wide following among Japanese nationalists—was former army colonel Masanobu Tsuji. Colonel Tsuji belonged to many organizations and formed several of his own, but he was never a member of the Hattori clique. An aggressive propagandist, he inspired a movement not unlike those of the prewar extremists. After the purge restrictions were lifted, Colonel Tsuji became a successful politician and was repeatedly re-elected to the Diet.
A dynamic young officer, Colonel Tsuji, beginning as an instructor at the military academy, served in many important assignments in the Imperial Army. At the outbreak of the Pacific War, he was chief of the Operations Section of the First Division of the General Staff (Rikugun Sanbō Honbu Daiichibu Sakusenka). He has been credited with being one of the most ardent protagonists of war with the United States. He gained fame as a shrewd strategist, planning the Japanese campaign that resulted in the conquest of Singapore. On the cessation of hostilities, the British listed Colonel Tsuji as a war criminal, but Tsuji would not permit himself to be shot or to rot in an Allied prison. Disguising himself as a Buddhist monk, Colonel Tsuji remained hidden in Southeast Asia and China for three years—until the war crimes trials were over in Japan.
On his return home, Colonel Tsuji avoided the occupation forces. He became active in numerous military nationalist organizations. One of the early organizations he joined was a group headed by the notorious former major general Takeo Imai. This group advocated disbanding the NPR and urged former military officers not to cooperate with the civilian-dominated organization. Colonel Tsuji and General Imai evolved a fantastic program designed to give Japan an independent military force. They pressed the government to demand weapons from the United States, and if the United States would not cooperate, then the group urged the government to appeal for military aid to the Russians. They considered the situation in Japan so critical that martial law should be declared and a crash rearmament program launched. As a clincher, they wanted the commander of the new military forces to assume control of the economy, administration, and judiciary of the nation. In 1951, despite his efforts to stay away from the occupation forces, Colonel Tsuji was indicted for violating the purge directive.
Basically, Colonel Tsuji was a follower of Kanji Ishiwara and his East Asia League philosophy. With Ishiwara, Tsuji believed that Japan’s future was in East Asia, in a federation or at least a coprosperity sphere with mainland Asians. After the war, he contended that it would be impossible for Japan to enjoy prosperity as a satellite of the United States. Abhorring the Russians, he advocated armed neutrality, proposing a Japan strong enough to stand independently between the Soviet Union and the United States. He stressed the need for cooperation among Asian people and contended that Japan’s destiny lay with neither the Russians nor the Americans. This view, especially during the Korean War, had a strong appeal to both extreme Right and extreme Left.
Unlike Hattori, Colonel Tsuji consolidated his support throughout the country. He waged an aggressive political campaign. Pleading for an independent, neutral, armed Japan, he built strong support among neutralists and nationalists as well as among the extremists on both the left and the right. It is difficult to estimate the extent of his following. As the elections developed, his main support centered in Tōhoku and Kyūshū. He was elected to the Diet time and again by a large vote. Although he was initially very hostile to the NPR, he mellowed as more and more of his followers joined the organization and were given important posts. He nevertheless persisted in demanding an independent, self-sufficient, neutral military force free of “interference” from the United States.
By the time I departed Japan in May 1952, I was informed that in addition to approximately sixty fairly well-known nationalist groups centering on former generals, admirals, and colonels, there were upward of four hundred others in various stages of formation and existence. “They are growing like mushrooms after a rain,” said my informant.
The far-reaching inspirational teachings of Ishiwara created a movement that deserves our attention because it motivated not only former military officers, but farmers, religious leaders, educators, and the general public. Disillusioned with Japan’s aggressive program in Manchukuo (Japan’s name for Manchuria), which at the time was alienating Asians from Japan, Lieutenant General Ishiwara proposed a cooperative approach for building an Asian federation that would include Japan, China, and Manchukuo. Organizing his East Asia League in 1939, General Ishiwara developed his theories for a coprosperity sphere in Asia. General Tōjō, having little sympathy for cooperative forces, bypassed Ishiwara during the war, but the “Ishiwara thesis” had many supporters in the nation. After his death in 1949, his broad concepts became increasingly popular with various groups of former military officers. In addition to his views on a coprosperity sphere, Ishiwara predicted what he called a “Final War” between Asian forces and the Western world. Motivated by strong religious convictions, Ishiwara also preached a form of Buddhist pacifism. As Korea polarized the world into two power camps, Ishiwara’s predictions seemed to be fulfilled and followers seemed to move in two directions. One group urged Japan to prepare for the Final War, while another organized the Harmony (Peace) Party (Chōwa [Heiwa] Tō). Though the Harmony Party opposed rearmament, it was also antigovernment, distrustful of Americans, and advocated Ishiwara’s program of Asia for Asians. As the party became increasingly pacifist, an aggressive minority that included Colonel Tsuji broke away to form the East Asia League Comrades Association (Tōa Renmei Dōshikai). Subsequently, Colonel Tsuji and some followers split away from that association to form their own self-defense league. The Harmony Party and the splinter groups evolving from it included many influential officers who worked with the public, and some pushed impatiently at the highest level of government for a massive ground force, while others opposed rearmament completely, putting their hope of security in international authority—both views inspired by Ishiwara.
By the spring of 1952, as it became evident that the Yoshida government planned to expand the initial NPR force, the views of the former military officers received wide coverage in the press, especially the ideas of Colonels Tsuji and Hattori. Wondering what the senior Imperial leaders who were now helping the government with plans for the expansion thought of some of the loudly acclaimed programs, I asked a former Imperial general about Colonels Tsuji and Hattori.
“Ah so,” he responded. “Some say that it was the Hattori-Tsuji team that persuaded General Tōjō to start the Pacific War. All I can say is that those two flunked the test once. They should never again be allowed to jeopardize the nation.”
I think it is fair to say that the organizations created by the former Imperial officers had little influence on American thinking and moved “One Man” Yoshida not a mite. Their arguments were noisy, attracted attention in the press, and caused some trouble for those of us working with the NPR, but they had little impact on the speed or the nature of the rearmament program. Many of the proposals they advocated were acceptable to both the United States and Japan, but at the time they were made, neither the world situation nor the political environment in the country were favorable for their implementation. The Japanese people wanted security, but they were more concerned with their human wants. What may be important for the future, however, is that th
e Imperial officers in their public and private debates hammered out some very significant national positions.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
DAWN OF A NEW ERA
The cycle of events was closing upon itself. Six years and eight months had passed since Emperor Hirohito, on September 2, 1945, sadly declared, “We command all our people forthwith to cease hostilities, to lay down their arms and faithfully to carry out the provisions of the instrument of surrender and the general orders issued by the Japanese government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters hereunder.”
Some, apologizing to their emperor for their real or imagined failure in the war, committed seppuku in the tradition of the samurai. The mass of the people, obeying their emperor’s instructions, continued to work, suffer, and endure.
On April 28, 1952, Japan regained its sovereignty. Robert D. Murphy, the first American ambassador to Japan since December 8, 1941, correctly timed his arrival in Tōkyō with the official closing of the doors at the headquarters of the supreme commander of Allied powers. At 10:30 p.m., the occupation government was abolished. In a prepared statement made on debarking from the Pan-American clipper Good Hope, Ambassador Murphy said, “This is a day for rejoicing and I rejoice with the people of Japan on this happy occasion. Our two nations have joined hands in a new partnership dedicated to the preservation of peace.”
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