by Tom Clancy
Says one consultant, “Three years of working in the Pentagon showed me some really squirrelly things in the area of procurement. The system is hosed and nobody wants to fix it because they may lose something.”
IN SEARCH OF AIR SUPREMACY
To return to our question: What price air supremacy? Especially when superiority is likely good enough? The plain fact is, in the thirty years since the Vietnam air war, Americans have rarely been engaged in aerial combat. Through Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, U.S. aircrews shot down 53 hostile aircraft; 46 of those by Air Force Eagles and Vipers. In that same period the Air Force lost no planes to enemy aircraft; the Navy lost one and maybe two. Meanwhile, the U.S. lost nearly 60 combat aircraft to SAMs and AAA.
Therefore, how do we justify gold-plated fighters such as the FA-22? The Air Force is 48-zip against Libya, Iraq, and Yugoslavia. We have not engaged a major air power since Korea, though we certainly had problems with the Vietnamese. But occasional heavy losses to Hanoi’s MiGs was in no way due to inferior technology; quite the opposite. Some MiG killers insist that part of our problem was overreliance on gadgets at the expense of tactical stick and rudder skills. Top Gun, Red Flag, and other programs obviously solved those problems.
JSF is likely to live a double life in tactical squadrons. It can be employed early in an air campaign, relying on its stealthiness to attack targets within the air defense envelope while other birds (presumably B-2s) attack the hard targets at the core. When the SEAD phase has largely been completed, F-35s can then become bomb trucks, packing larger (nonstealthy) loadouts to other targets.
Close air support also is a JSF mission, though the Air Force remains institutionally indifferent. A-10s have been related heavily to the Guard and Reserve, which deploys frequently, as joint operators constantly laud the Warthog as the most valuable bird in the barn. The type is long out of production but the CAS mission just won’t go away. Therefore, the F-35 will likely have a 25mm cannon for tank busting, though a 27mm was considered.
SUPER SAMS
With no comparable enemy fighter on the horizon, the FA-22 is likely to remain semi-inviolate in the air-to-air arena. Not so from the ground. We may be entering an era in which the initiative is swinging toward the defense for a change, with the major opposition to FA-22 and F-35 coming from ground-based air defenses, primarily new or upgraded surface-to-air missiles.
In recent years, Russian SAMs have progressed from the “single digit” types (SA-2 through 9) into the next-generation “double digit” variety. The SA-10 Grumble, with a range of nearly 50 miles, is optimized for use against tactical aircraft, and, with a Mach 6 sprint speed, very quick off the mark.
The SA-12 Gladiator already is available in A and B models. Similar to the Patriot concept, it’s intended to knock down tactical ballistic missiles within 60 miles but is probably adaptable to aircraft.
The SA-20 Triumph represents a major leap: with a published range of nearly 250 miles, it has three times the reach of the still formidable SA-6, and is automatically operated with digital programming.
Furthermore, all three double-digit SAMs can be integrated into a combined missile and radar network affording low to high altitude coverage of a considerable area. The Russians, perennially cash-poor, have exported the missiles individually but also collectively as the S-300 system. A follow-on S-400 option is likely.
For clients farther down the scale, improved SA-2s through -9s have been upgraded with digital avionics, more sensors, and improved guidance packages. That translates into greater range and reliability, which means more lethality.
New-generation SAMs will constitute a far greater threat than enemy aircraft. SA-20 in the S-300 air defense system has the potential to destroy tankers, AWACSs, and even J-STARSs, or at least push them farther from the combat arena. The latter would result in a denigration of the almost unlimited aerial refueling and battle control that we have taken for granted for so long. The actual loss of a tanker, let alone an AWACS, probably would produce the same result.
HOW MUCH AIR-AIR?
Over North Vietnam, U.S. aircrews faced a paradox. Well, all right, a lot of paradoxes, including running orders which, distilled to their essence, said, “Don’t lose but don’t win.” From the tactical perspective, we found ourselves frequently opposed by motivated young men who may never have driven an automobile but could do a creditable job in a MiG-21. The Air Force’s premier combat leader in that theater, Colonel Robin Olds, was an ace in two airplanes during World War II but he envied his Vietnamese counterparts. “Hell,” he insisted, “if I’d have been one of them I’d have got fifty of us!”
The Vietnamese quickly mastered the canned intercept: following GCI vectors to the point of a six o’clock low pop-up from the weeds, hosing a couple of Atolls at a formation of Yankee Air Pirates, and ducking back to paddy level to escape. One such loss per mission was enough to discomfit many Americans. Vietnamese hit-and-run tactics could not affect the outcome of the air war—and in fact did not—but they inflicted frequent losses on the strike package. Besides, it was humiliating to lose a $2 million aircraft flown by a professional with a master’s degree to a former peasant.
The next enemy could plan to emulate the NVAF, though the God’s-eye view provided by AWACSs and J-STARSs reduces the possibility. Nevertheless, it happened in Desert Storm when concern about blue on blue incidents allowed a red bandit to mix with the friendlies and bag a Navy F/A-18.
A lingering concern is adequate air-to-air training, as adversary units have been substantially reduced from the pinnacle of 1990. Things went so well in Desert Storm (34-0) that the Air Force did away with its aggressor squadrons entirely. The Navy and Marines retain dedicated “red bandits” but there are so few that civilian contractors now help to fill the gap. Meanwhile, other gaps remain . . .
THE ECM GAP
Electronics are here to stay: They have become at least as important as airframes. Electronic warfare (EW) goes hand in glove with electronic countermeasures (ECM), with an aviation heritage dating to the Second World War. Jamming hostile radars and communications has become even more important since Vietnam, as it not only helps prevent friendly losses but contributes to achieving the specific mission.
However, the U.S. Air Force got out of the ECM business after Desert Storm in 1991. With retirement of the EF-111 Raven, the blue suits were forced to rely on the Navy and Marine Corps to save their electronic bacon. EA-6Bs, or “Purple Prowlers,” were integrated into operational plans (purple being the mixture of two shades of blue with Marine green).
It goes even beyond that. Air Force pilots and WSOs are flying Navy Prowlers today. But it does not solve the Air Force’s long-term ECM problem.
The good news: Purple works. As usual, the operators sort things out and work together if for no other reason than their mission (and perhaps their existence) requires it. However, since the Navy and Marines decided to replace the long-serving Prowler with the EF-18G, the Air Force anticipates problems. The “Electric Hornet” lacks some of the Prowler’s versatility, but at least it’s a dedicated EW platform capable of operating with the strikers. However, some Air Force careerists are nervous about swabbies and jarheads becoming involved in USAF expeditionary wings. It looks bad, they admit behind closed doors, to remind budgeteers and congressmen that the USAF must rely on Brand X and Y for a crucial combat role: jamming enemy radars and radios.
The Air Force conducted a Prowler replacement study in 2002 and concluded that buying its own EF-18s was not an option. Certainly there was no historic reason for the decision, since the Air Force readily adopted the F-4 Phantom and A-7 Corsair II, both of which enjoyed long non-carrier careers. But, whatever its reason for passing on the Hornet, the Air Force decided to build new pods for the B-52H which will assume a stand-off jamming mission among its other tasks. The Air Force also intends to launch a hurry-up program for electronic warfare UAVs (Unmanned Air Vehicles) equipped with jammers, affording an “overhead” ECM capability t
o enhance the B-52. There have been references to a couple of “black” programs that may or may not work out, but in either case they will involve considerable expense.
We can expect the 366th Wing of the future to include both standoff and overhead jammers, with increasing reliance on UAVs. While some things may indeed last forever, not even B-52s fit that category!
The Air Force’s current tactical aircraft have job security for the near term, and even beyond. Some 700 A-10s were delivered from 1976 to 1984, and though the latest Warthogs are nearly twenty years old, upgrades are planned on remaining aircraft beginning in 2004. The big, ungainly looking Thunderbolt remained beloved of infantrymen in both Iraq wars, and A-10 pilots insist there’s nothing comparable on the horizon: not even the Joint Strike Fighter affords as much bang for the buck. Consequently, Warthogs could still be flying in 2028.
The F-15C/D is expected to retire in 2030, and though the air superiority Eagle has met only sporadic opposition since 1991, it’s still the world standard. Meanwhile, the F-15E remains in low-rate production (as few as three per year), but the newest “mud eagles” are rated at 16,000 service hours: double the lifetime of earlier F-15s. Their dual-purpose mission ensures that they will be occupied well into the future.
Meanwhile, the F-16, still in production, remains a growth industry, especially for the export market. Even Poland is expected to obtain several dozen Falcons under generous terms.
FUTURE WARS
The past quarter century has tossed up some oddball wars: Britain versus Argentina; America versus Iraq (twice); and America versus Afghanistan, of all places. Even including the Balkan mini-wars of the 1990s, U.S. air supremacy never was remotely in doubt. Therefore, some pundits are inclined to wonder why we are spending (in the late Carl Sagan’s words) billions and billions of dollars on gold-plated new flying machines when we do just fine with what we already have.
The official reason has to do with worldwide threats: We cannot assume that recent trends will continue indefinitely. After all, the last time an American plane was shot down by an enemy aircraft was 1991, and the previous air-air loss was 1972. One month’s routine peacetime flying in the States is far more dangerous, statistically speaking. But there are still threats on the horizon, and some of them could represent serious opponents. We have to be ready to play in the big leagues, even if we practice in the minors.
The other reason, of course, is politics. Which is to say, money. Today, most large defense programs represent subcontractors in most states. Among 1,150 firms involved in the FA-22 program, the Raptor managed to miss only four states, while adding Puerto Rico for good measure. That translates into jobs, which translates into votes. If that seems cynical, so be it: scratch a cynic and I’ll show you a realist. In short, expensive Pentagon projects combine powerful elements: jobs, votes, and power to defend America.
Besides, the record shows that on occasion America does need defending, even if only through deterrence.
China, for instance.
The PRC has one of the largest air forces on earth; it is also one of the least capable. RAND projections estimate that in 2005, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) will count 120 bombers, 325 attack aircraft, and 2,000 fighters. Of the latter, half are aging J-6s (Chinese built MiG-19s of mid-1950s origin), while later designs such as Su-27s and -30s require Russian support. Airlift is surprisingly small: only 425 transports of all types for a 1.8 million man army with 40 maneuver divisions and as many brigades.
Other shortcomings include aerial tankers and airborne early warning types, while there seems to be no capability to suppress enemy air defenses. Foreign observers note a remarkable lack of integration in China’s own defense network, partly due to interservice rivalry that negates joint operations.
China is upgrading some of its tactical squadrons, but slowly, and without the ability of indigenous support. In other words, 50% of the PLAAF will be eligible for the Antique Aircraft Association. With large starting numbers, the Chinese could “surge” hundreds of sorties against a specific area on Day One; thereafter the figures would decline dramatically, both from attrition and deferred maintenance.
Meanwhile, China has acquired SA-10s and is working on something in the SA-20 class.
Obsolete technology represents only part of the PLAAF’s problems. Institutionally, it has suffered from inexperienced leadership—the first pilot to command the service only took office in 1985; the first post-Korean War pilot to lead the PLAAF assumed command nine years later. The air arm exists primarily to support the army, and probably runs behind the navy in political influence.
According to one study, Chinese aircrews lack adequate flight time. Reportedly, bomber crews average eighty hours a year, fighter pilots barely 100. The published figure of 150 hours annually for attack pilots clearly demonstrates the PLAAF’s priorities: supporting the army. By comparison, NATO standards call for at least 180 hours per annum with a far wider variety of capabilities: strike, air combat, night and all-weather flight, and low-level navigation. PRC sortie generation is classed as miserable: one flight per four or five days.
In the 1990s the PLAAF began acquiring small numbers of world-class aircraft, notably Russian-built Sukhoi-27s and -30s. SA-10 surface-to-air missiles appeared, as did Iluyshin-76 transports. But the PRC has been too cash-poor to obtain, let alone produce, such sophisticated equipment in quantity. That may explain Chinese efforts to acquire foreign technology by other means: the reputed scandals involving Israeli sales of Patriot missiles and airborne radars being two examples.
In short, if there’s ever to be a fourth generation of American fighter aces, it may well come at expense of the PLAAF—though China could still win the war. In fact, in 2004 America’s first Eagle ace may not yet be born.
Another potential opponent (we don’t have “enemies” anymore), of course, is post-Soviet Russia.
Russian military aviation remains potent but aging. As of 1997, Frontal Aviation included 180 bombers, 940 fighters (mainly 400 MiG-23s and 345 MiG-29s), 1,070 attack types (including 360 Su-24s), 760 recce and EW types, and 1,450 transports.
The Air Defense Force (a separate organization) included 860 fighters (300 MiG-31s), while Naval Aviation numbered 270 bombers or strike aircraft, 210 fighters, and almost 100 recce/EW birds.
However, despite the impressive numbers, about 70% are late 1970s to early 1980s models, and 80% continue operating beyond their normal overhaul period. High fatigue life will only continue to reduce availability.
The most advanced bandit flying today—and likely in the foreseeable future—is the Sukhoi-30. It is highly capable, relatively affordable (flyaway cost is pegged at under $40 million), and may be built in China and/or India. However, as of 2003 it remains in low-rate production.
The Su-30 has demonstrated adaptability to thrust vectoring (tests were flown in 1997), so presumably the option for future models remains open. But nobody has tangled with the Sukhoi yet, and based on the historic record, there is little cause for concern.
Other regional competitors such as North Korea and Cuba are nonstarters. Their pilots typically log ten to twenty hours annually, and, according to one consultant, “They spend their flight time trying not to die.”
If history is any indicator, the next war is likely to flare up in an unexpected corner of the globe. Most likely the opponent will be a relatively small nation or alliance of such states, short on hardware but possibly long on determination and innovation. (Who, for instance, anticipated that America would be run out of Somalia by local clansmen wielding rocket-propelled grenades as effective anti-aircraft weapons?)
JOINT TACTICS
How will Raptor and JSF be employed?
Nobody’s speaking for the record yet, but here are some options:
Two-plane sections will penetrate enemy airspace at supercruise or better, perhaps with three or more UAVs preceding the fighters. Drones are likely to become a familiar aspect of Raptor ops, even an essential one. T
hey can provide decoys, overhead jamming, and perhaps enhanced SEAD capability. Control of UAVs may be from ground or airborne operators.
Raptors will live and operate with JSFs. It’s entirely possible that the Bold Tigers and Wild Boars will work together in those types.
Sometime after 2012, FA-22s and F-35As would be expected to fly complementary missions. Raptors would gain air superiority over perhaps more numerous, but less capable, enemy fighters, permitting JSFs to attack targets in hostile territory. Strike planners explain that in the opening hours of conflict, F-35s carrying two one-ton precision weapons internally would dash in at supersonic speed, stealthily delivering their ordnance against command and control targets: essentially the Desert Storm scenario. The Suppression of Enemy Air Defense mission is generally expected to proceed quickly. At least that’s the plan.
Once the SEAD phase is accomplished, and stealth is presumably unnecessary, F-35s would switch to external ordnance loads. At that point, greater weight of bombs on target would offset the reduced stealthiness of the JSF, since external loadouts increase radar signatures.
Raptors also are likely to escort B-2s on deep penetration missions, affording an all stealth strike package. Based on previous experience, however, ultra high ticket items such as B-2s will still have jammer support, contrary to the Spirit’s “sales brochure” which convinced Congress that stealth bombers are self-supporting. (Before World War II, Congress accepted the Air Corps’ concept of the self-escorting bomber, which would “always get through.” While dedicated crews inevitably reached their targets, equally dedicated young National Socialists extracted a potentially prohibitive price until the advent of the P-51 Mustang. There may be a lesson for today’s world.) At more than $2 billion per airframe, however, the Air Force understandably wants to hedge its bets.
