Schleicher received his answer on 23 January at a meeting with Hindenburg, who declared that while “he would consider dissolving the Reichstag, he could not take responsibility for postponing the election beyond the deadline specified by the constitution.”75 This decision was hardly a surprise. By resorting to Papen’s old emergency plan, Schleicher was admitting that, just like his predecessor, he had failed to establish a broad parliamentary majority to tolerate his government. Hindenburg found it presumptuous that the chancellor would try to take the same escape route that he had used to drive his predecessor from office. By this point the Reich president seems to have decided to drop Schleicher—a decision made easier since he was being kept informed about the secret negotiations between Papen and Hitler and knew that a potential alternative was emerging. It is possible that Hindenburg was also influenced by the fact that a few days previously in the parliamentary budget committee, talk had turned to the misuse of public funds for the restoration of debt-ridden aristocratic estates. The so-called “Eastern Help scandal” made waves, especially as several of Hindenburg’s friends were implicated. They in turn accused Schleicher of not protecting them and stepped up their attacks upon him.76
The Social Democrats and the Centre Party were greatly alarmed by rumours about Schleicher’s intention to cancel the fresh elections mandated by a dissolution of parliament. On 25 January, the SPD party leadership and the leaders of the Social Democratic parliamentary faction “vehemently protested against the plan to proclaim a so-called emergency legal situation,” arguing that it would amount to a coup d’état.77 The Prussian state president, Otto Braun, even spoke of a “call for high treason.”78 In a letter of 26 January, the chairman of the Centre Party, Prelate Ludwig Kaas, also warned the Reich chancellor that he was headed down a legally unjustifiable path: “Moving back the date of the election would be an undeniable violation of the constitution with all the legal and political consequences that would entail.”79 These protests by Germany’s two largest democratic parties further undermined Schleicher’s position. What the pro-democracy politicians did not realise was that the biggest danger was not posed by Schleicher’s suggested violation of the constitution, but by the installing of a cabinet of “national concentration” under Hitler.
On the morning of 28 January, Schleicher called a cabinet meeting and announced that he would only appear before the Reichstag on 31 January if the Reich president gave him an order to dissolve parliament. He said he did not want to present the public with a “pointless spectacle of certain defeat.” If Hindenburg refused as expected to issue such an order, Schleicher would submit the cabinet’s resignation. Shortly after noon, once the ministers had approved this plan, the chancellor adjourned the meeting and made his way to see the president. As he had five days previously, Hindenburg coolly rejected Schleicher’s request for a dissolution order, saying that Schleicher had failed “to win over a parliamentary majority” and that another solution would have to be found.80 After only twenty minutes, Schleicher returned to his cabinet with the news that he “might as well have been talking to a wall” and that “the old man seemed not to register arguments, but simply to be reciting words he had memorised.” Finance Minister von Krosigk noted in his diary: “We are all deeply shaken. The Schleicher cabinet has been toppled after two months by the Reich president withdrawing his confidence.”81 Shortly after his dismissal of Schleicher, Hindenburg officially called upon Papen to start negotiations to form a new government. “He is now unabashedly playing the role of the president’s favourite since he has nothing else behind him and almost the entire German people against him,” wrote Harry Kessler, who believed Germany was headed for another Papen-led cabinet. “It sickens me to think that we will once again be ruled by this infamous oaf and reckless gambler…The whole thing is a mix of corruption, back-room dealings and nepotism that recalls the worst days of the absolutist monarchy.”82
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On 27 January, the day before Schleicher’s resignation, Hitler returned from Munich to Berlin. That afternoon, in Göring’s office, Hitler and Frick met with Hugenberg and Otto Schmidt-Hannover. Göring opened the meeting by announcing that Papen now supported Hitler being named chancellor and that Franz Seldte, the leader of the Stahlhelm, had agreed to join a Hitler-led cabinet. But Hugenberg still remained reserved, rejecting Hitler’s demand that a Nazi be named the Prussian interior minister, which would have given the NSDAP control over the police force in the largest German state. The DNVP chairman also demanded that Schmidt-Hannover be made state secretary in the Reich Chancellery and that a further DNVP member be appointed Reich press spokesman. Hitler would not hear of this, and the meeting, Ribbentrop noted, “ended in quarrel.”83 Hitler was so outraged at Hugenberg’s behaviour that he wanted to depart immediately for Munich, and Göring and Ribbentrop only just managed to persuade him to stay in Berlin. Old fears resurfaced that the conservatives would derail him just before he reached his goals, as they had the preceding August. “Hitler is very sceptical and mistrustful,” Goebbels noted. “With justification. These people are one big gang of swindlers.”84 Rumours circulating in Berlin that Papen was about to be called to head a “battle cabinet” only strengthened Hitler’s distrust.85 In any case, he refused to meet that evening with the former chancellor. Negotiations seemed once again to be on the verge of breaking down. It was Papen who kept them going. On the evening of 27 January, he declared that the importance of the quarrel between Hugenberg and Hitler should not be exaggerated. The main thing was that he, Papen, “had now come out fully in favour of Hitler as chancellor” and was willing to do everything to persuade Hindenburg. For Ribbentrop, this assurance was the “turning point in the whole matter.”86
Indeed, over the course of 28 January, Papen succeeded in finally overcoming Hindenburg’s resistance to the idea of Hitler as chancellor—on the condition that the NSDAP leader formed his government “within the framework of the constitution and with the assent of the Reichstag.” Hugenberg, who met with Papen that afternoon, also proved to be far more conciliatory now that Schleicher had resigned, remarking that “We need to enter into a pact with Hitler and try to limit his power as much as possible.” Hugenberg wanted to be named the economics minister of both the Reich and Prussia, arguing that uniting the two positions made political sense. Hitler for his part told Papen that Hugenberg could pick and choose which posts he wanted—with the exception of Reich interior minister and Prussian state commissioner, which were to be reserved for Nazis.87 On the surface this was a remarkable compromise and a striking turnabout from Hitler’s previous policy of all-or-nothing. In reality, however, Hitler was gambling that by using those two positions the National Socialists could consolidate power as they had in Thuringia in 1930. Papen contacted Finance Minister von Krosigk, who agreed to join the Hitler cabinet as long as he was “able to work professionally.”88 Konstantin von Neurath and Paul von Eltz-Raubach likewise agreed to continue in their previous posts.
When Papen reported to Hindenburg late in the evening of 28 January about how negotiations were progressing, the president was pleased at what he considered Hitler’s “moderation.” Hindenburg was also impressed by the fact that most of the conservative ministers whom he favoured and who had served in Papen’s and Schleicher’s cabinets would be retained. The president decided to replace Schleicher at the Defence Ministry with one of his confidants, Lieutenant General Werner von Blomberg, the commander of the military district in East Prussia, who was at the time a member of the German delegation to a disarmament conference in Geneva.89 Oskar von Hindenburg was charged with summoning Blomberg back to Berlin by telephone. With that, no obstacles to a Hitler cabinet remained. Still, those closest to Hitler feared that Hindenburg might still change his mind. “The old man is unpredictable,” Goebbels warned. “We should be under no illusions about that!”90
On 29 January, the last deals were done. That morning the negotiators agreed on the make-up of the cabinet, with Papen accepting Hitler’
s proposal to make Frick Reich interior minister. For his part Hitler had to swallow—“with barely concealed resentment”—Hindenburg’s appointment of Papen and not himself as Reich commissioner of Prussia. By way of compensation, Göring was named Prussian interior minister and deputy Reich commissioner, which gave him control over the Prussian police—something Hugenberg had wanted to prevent. As a new condition for his participation, Hitler demanded that fresh elections be called and a subsequent enabling law be passed. This was an idea he had already proposed in his negotiations with Hindenburg in November 1932,91 although it required the assent of both his conservative-nationalist coalition partners and above all the German president.
That afternoon, at a meeting with Hugenberg and Stahlhelm leaders Franz Seldte and Theodor Duesterberg, Papen sought to overcome the final objections to a Hitler cabinet. Hugenberg was promised the Economics Ministry as well as that of agriculture in both Prussia and the Reich. The prospect of being in charge of such a mega-ministry was so appealing that he agreed to support the deal Papen had negotiated with Hitler. Seldte, who was tipped for the Labour Ministry, also agreed to join the cabinet. Only Duesterberg, who had been subject to scathing attacks from National Socialists only months before for having a Jewish grandfather,92 warned against “the dynamics of Hitler’s nature and his fanatic mass movement.” Hugenberg brushed aside such concerns, arguing that the dominance of traditional conservatives in the cabinet would neutralise the threat of Nazi abuse of power and “fence Hitler in.” Duesterberg prophesied that Hugenberg “would one night have to flee through his ministerial gardens in his underwear to avoid arrest.”93 Few traditional conservatives were that prescient. Most were aware of the risk entailed by a pact with Hitler but believed the Nazi leader could be kept in check. “If we go with Hitler, we have to restrain him,” DNVP Deputy Chairman Quaatz wrote in his diary on 29 January.94 It would not be long before it became apparent how utterly misplaced all ideas of restraining Hitler actually were.
What Papen failed to mention to Hugenberg was that Hitler had insisted on fresh elections—a demand that the DNVP chairman would hardly have accepted since the NSDAP was likely to gain votes at the conservatives’ expense, making it all the more difficult to rein in Hitler. When Papen briefed Göring about the outcome of the meeting, he also gave the impression that “everything was a done deal.” Göring immediately passed on the message to the Nazi leadership anxiously waiting in the Hotel Kaiserhof. Goebbels remained sceptical: “We don’t yet dare believe it. Is Papen being honest? Who knows?”95 There were persistent rumours in Berlin that Hindenburg ultimately wanted to appoint a Papen–Hugenberg “battle cabinet” without Nazi involvement but that the Reichswehr would not tolerate such a move. Later that afternoon Hitler met with General Kurt von Hammerstein, the head of the army chief of command, at the Bechsteins’ villa. There the NSDAP chairman was asked “whether he thought the negotiations with the Reich presidential palace about assuming power were genuine or just for show.” If the latter were the case, Hammerstein promised, the military command would try to use its influence in Hitler’s favour, although Schleicher would likely retain the post of defence minister. Hitler disingenuously said that nothing had been decided yet and promised to notify Hammerstein as soon as he “saw things clearly.”96
That evening, Schleicher and Hammerstein sent their go-between Werner von Alvensleben to Goebbels’s apartment, where Hitler and Göring were waiting. His task was to gain information about the status of negotiations, but he went well beyond that, taking it upon himself to announce: “If the folks on Wilhelmstrasse are only pretending to negotiate with you, then the Reich defence minister and the army chief of staff would have to alert the garrison in Potsdam and sweep the entire pigsty on Wilhelmstrasse clean.”97 The Nazi leadership interpreted this ill-advised statement as proof that Hindenburg intended to appoint a Papen–Hugenberg cabinet and that the Reichswehr was considering a coup d’état. It was hardly beyond the realm of possibility that Hindenburg would be deposed and his son Oskar arrested. “So it’s a coup,” Goebbels commented. “A threat. In earnest or a joke? Reported to Göring and Hitler waiting in the room next door. Göring spoke immediately to Meissner and Papen…We deliberated at length. Hitler in full motion.”98 The NSDAP chairman took the rumours very seriously and had the leader of the Berlin SA, Count Wolf-Heinrich von Helldorff, put all Brownshirts in the German capital on high alert. The Nazi leadership also charged the “trustworthy” police major Walter Wecke, later commander of the Hermann Göring Regiment, with “preparing for a lightning strike to occupy Wilhelmstrasse with six police battalions.”99
Although it soon emerged that the rumours of a coup were entirely unfounded, they served to hasten the pace of developments. Papen saw his conviction that there was no time to lose reinforced, and late in the evening on 29 January, he presented Hindenburg with a final list of cabinet members. As had been agreed, it contained only three National Socialists: Hitler as chancellor, Frick as interior minister and Göring as Reich minister without portfolio, deputy Prussian interior minister and Reich commissioner for aviation. Three of the party-unaffiliated ministers had previously served in the Papen and Schleicher cabinets: Foreign Minister von Neurath, Finance Minister von Krosigk and Postal and Transport Minister Eltz-Rübenach. Reichswehr Minister von Blomberg, Economic and Agriculture Minister Hugenberg and Labour Minister Seldte were new appointments. The post of justice minister was left vacant because Papen wanted Hindenburg to think that negotiations with the Centre Party were under way and one ministry had to be left open in case of agreement; the position was intended to go to Franz Gürtner, who had held it under Papen and Schleicher. Swearing-in ceremonies were scheduled for 11 a.m. the following day.100
The Reich president’s decision was not announced publicly, so on 30 January 1933 the morning newspapers were still in the dark as to what was going on. Some still thought that the appointment of a Papen–Hugenberg cabinet excluding the National Socialists was the most likely outcome. The Frankfurter Zeitung speculated that Hitler would once again make impossible demands to avoid the responsibility of power.101 Schleicher had thought much the same, having told his cabinet on 16 January that “Hitler didn’t really want to come to power.”102 But the leader of the NSDAP was on the verge of his greatest triumph. Hitler and his entourage stayed up until 5 a.m. in the Goebbelses’ apartment, ever fearful that some unforeseen events would throw everything back up in the air.103 When Blomberg arrived at the Anhalter Bahnhof train station early that morning, Oskar von Hindenburg immediately took him to Wilhelmstrasse, where at 9 a.m. he was sworn in as the new Reich defence minister.
Meanwhile Papen summoned Hugenberg, Seldte, Duesterberg and Schmidt-Hannover to his apartment on Wilhelmstrasse to inform them that the new cabinet was about to be made official. When Duesterberg and Schmidt-Hannover protested against the hasty appointment of Hitler as chancellor, a “flustered” Papen interjected: “If a new government has not been formed by 11 a.m. the Reichswehr will be marching, and we will face a military dictatorship under Schleicher and Hammerstein.” Soon afterwards Hitler and Göring arrived. Once more, the NSDAP chairman demonstrated what a fine actor he was, immediately going up to Duesterberg, taking his hand and declaring in a solemn voice and with tears in his eyes: “I greatly regret the personal insults to you in my newspapers. I give you my word that I did not order them.”104
Around 10:45 a.m., a quarter of an hour before the scheduled swearing-in ceremonies, the group proceeded through the ministerial gardens to the Reich Chancellery, where Hindenburg had been residing since the summer of 1932, while the presidential palace was being renovated. Duesterberg later recalled that, as the other ministers designate arrived one by one, with the exception of Eltz-Rübenach, who had fallen ill, Hitler, Papen and Hugenberg negotiated the final unresolved questions in Meissner’s office. It was only now that Papen and Hitler revealed to the DNVP chairman that Hitler intended to dissolve the Reichstag and call for new elections. Hugenberg was
taken aback and vehemently protested, arguing that the November 1932 election had accurately mirrored the relative strengths of the parties and that a fresh poll was unnecessary. In a grand gesture, Hitler gave his word of honour that the make-up of the cabinet would not change, regardless of the outcome of a new election. But the blindsided Hugenberg refused to give in even after Papen pleaded with him not to endanger the agreement, which had been so hard to reach. The formation of the new government looked as though it would fall through literally at the last minute. The appointed time for the swearing-in ceremony came and went, and Hindenburg was getting impatient. Meissner burst into the room, watch in hand, and complained: “It’s 11:15. You can’t keep the Reich president waiting any longer.” Duesterberg recalled: “At that point, Hugenberg relented. Hitler had got his way. Proud and triumphant, with his underlings in his wake, he marched victoriously up the stairs to the first floor, where the elderly gentleman was awaiting the new cabinet.”105
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