202 See Wiedemann’s shorthand notes dated 25 Feb. 1939: “I am the only head of state who doesn’t have a bank account.” BA Koblenz, N 1740/4.
203 See the files in BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 26/2557, NS 10/115, NS 10/116, NS 10/119, NS 10/120; Brückner’s notebook from 1935, which has an appendix containing a detailed breakdown of all expenditure. BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 26/1209. See also Dietrich, 12 Jahre mit Hitler, p. 210; Schroeder, Er war mein Chef, p. 72; Rose, Julius Schaub, p. 135; Krause, 10 Jahre Kammerdiener, p. 45.
204 Max Domarus, Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen 1932–1945. Vol. 1: Triumph. Part 1: 1932–1934, Munich, 1965, p. 200. The wages were transferred to a fund to benefit those left behind by deceased SA men and police. See Schwerin von Krosigk to Staatssekretär Lammers, 15 March 1933; BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 10/115.
205 See Guido Knopp, Geheimnisse des “Dritten Reiches,” Munich, 2011, pp. 177f.
206 Wagener, Hitler aus nächster Nähe, pp. 358, 362; transcript of an interview with Anni Winter (undated); IfZ München, ZS 194.
207 Hanfstaengl, Zwischen Weissem und Braunem Haus, p. 164. See Hitler, Monologe, p. 218 (dated 22 Jan. 1942): Hitler said that when he was still eating meat, he had “sweated tremendously” during his speeches and needed to drink six bottles of water to get through them. “When I became a vegetarian,” he asserted, “I only had to take a sip of water now and again.”
208 Schirach, Ich glaubte an Hitler, p. 129; see Dietrich, 12 Jahre mit Hitler, p. 219.
209 Delmer, Die Deutschen und ich, p. 152.
210 Hanfstaengl, Zwischen Weissem und Braunem Haus, p. 44
211 Schirach, Ich glaubte an Hitler, p. 67.
212 See Ulf Schmidt, Hitlers Arzt Karl Brandt: Medizin und Macht im Dritten Reich, Berlin, 2009, p. 137; Hans-Joachim Neumann and Henrik Eberle, War Hitler krank? Ein abschliessender Befund, Bergisch-Gladbach, 2009, pp. 110, 223f.
213 Speer, Erinnerungen, p. 138. See Theodor Duesterberg, Der Stahlhelm und Hitler, Wolfenbüttel and Hannover, 1949, p. 99: “It was not his thing to laugh at himself.” See Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 236 (entry for 27 July 1933): “Long dinner with the Führer. We laughed about Schaub’s fiasco until our cheeks started to hurt.”
214 See Tischgespräche, p. 181 (dated 3 April 1942); Fest, Hitler, p. 709; Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923–45: Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas, Bonn, 1950, p. 366.
215 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 1/2, p. 189 (entry for 25 Feb. 1927). See also Hitler’s letter to Arthur Dinter dated 25 July 1928, in which he said that at the age of 39 he had “at most 20 years” to achieve what he had set out to do. Albrecht Tyrell, Führer befiehl…Selbstzeugnisse aus der “Kampfzeit” der NS DAP: Dokumentation und Analyse, Düsseldorf, 1969, no. 78d, p. 205.
216 See Schirach, Ich glaubte an Hitler, pp. 114f. On Hitler’s stomach cramps see Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 1/3, p. 150 (entry for 23 Dec. 1928), pp. 168f. (entry for 20 Jan. 1929).
217 Krebs, Tendenzen und Gestalten, pp. 136f.; see also Richard Walter Darré, Notes 1945–1948, p. 34. Darré characterised Hitler as being obsessed with the “conviction that he had to achieve everything he believed destiny had charged him with before he died.” Darré added: “That meant he was always in a kind of rush, which of course also affected the people around him and his subordinates.” IfZ München, ED 110, vol. 1.
218 Speer, Erinnerungen, p. 120. Heinrich Hoffmann recorded Hitler saying: “If some people think I insist too much on my plans being carried out quickly, I can only say that I sense I won’t live to be very old. That makes me try to complete all of my plans. After me, no one will be able to complete them.” Das Hitler-Bild: Die Erinnerungen des Fotografen Heinrich Hoffmann, ed. Joe J. Heydecker, St. Pölten and Salzburg, 2008, pp. 150f.; See Dietrich, 12 Jahre mit Hitler, p. 140.
219 Transcript of an interview with Hanskarl von Hasselbach 1951/52; IfZ München, ZS 242.
220 See Rose, Julius Schaub, p. 112; Dietrich, 12 Jahre mit Hitler, p. 218; Hanfstaengl, Zwischen Weissem und Braunem Haus, p. 284. See Rudolf Hess to his parents, 19 Dec. 1933: “Astonishingly the Führer is very well—despite the incredible strain he is under…” BA Bern, Nl Hess, J1.211-1989/148, 51.
221 Hamann, Winifred Wagner, pp. 325f.
222 Wagener, Hitler aus nächster Nähe, p. 199.
223 See Wiedemann, Der Mann, p. 85; Krause, 10 Jahre Kammerdiener, p. 38. On the safety precautions for Hitler and the Reich Chancellery see official instructions in BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 43 II/1104a.
224 Krause, 10 Jahre Kammerdiener, pp. 40f. On Schreck’s pistols see Carl Walther Waffenfabrik, Zella-Mehlis, to SS-Oberführer Schreck, 4 Dec. 1935; BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 10/121.
225 Speer, Spandauer Tagebücher, p. 29 (entry for 1 Nov. 1946).
226 Schroeder, Er war mein Chef, p. 73.
227 Speer, Spandauer Tagebücher, p. 140 (entry for 15 Feb. 1947). See Schroeder, Er war mein Chef, p. 73; Schirach, Ich glaubte an Hitler, pp. 114f.
228 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 5, p. 358 (entry for 24 June 1938); Max Wünsche’s daily diaries from 22 June 1938. On the following day Adjutant Schaub telephoned Schmeling and afterwards reported back to Hitler; BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 10/125. The film of the boxing match was banned by the Propaganda Ministry, with the explicit approval of Hitler. Ibid. dated 14 July 1938. On Schmeling’s reception at the Reich Chancellery see Max Schmeling, Erinnerungen, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin and Vienna, 1977, pp. 262f., 361–5.
229 Speer, Erinnerungen, p. 57.
230 Dietrich, 12 Jahre mit Hitler, p. 151.
231 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 2/2, p. 251 (entry for 29 March 1932).
232 Quoted in Schmölders, Hitlers Gesicht, p. 61.
233 Kessler, Das Tagebuch, vol. 9, p. 601 (entry for 6 July 1933).
14 Totalitarian Revolution
1 Baldur von Schirach, Ich glaubte an Hitler, Hamburg, 1967, p. 168.
2 Theodor Heuss to Peter Rassow, 7 Feb. 1933; Theodor Heuss, In der Defensive: Briefe 1933–1945, ed. Elke Seefried, Munich, 2009, pp. 109f.
3 Quoted in Josef and Ruth Becker (eds), Hitlers Machtergreifung: Dokumente vom Machtantritt Hitlers—30. Januar 1933 bis zur Besiegelung des Einparteienstaats 14. Juli 1933, Munich, 1983, p. 297. Typical of the attitudes of the conservative ministers in the cabinet was a statement by Schwerin von Krosigk in a letter to former Reich Chancellor Hans Luther on 16 April 1952: “Before National Socialism came to power, I had great respect for its idealistic goals, serious reservations about its methods and rowdy representatives, and fond hopes that it would ‘shed its skin.’ ” BA Koblenz N 1276/23. On the process of disillusionment for the German nationalists see Hermann Beck, The Fateful Alliance: German Conservatives and Nazis in 1933. The “Machtergreifung” in New Light, New York and Oxford, 2008, pp. 124ff., 133ff., 228ff.
4 Quoted in Becker, Hitlers Machtergreifung, p. 217.
5 See Richard Walter Darré, Notes 1945–1948, p. 42: “Nothing could be further from the truth than the belief that there had been a plan from the very start for the whole development of the Third Reich.” Darré added that Hitler had acted “as an ingenious tactician reacting to the moment.” IfZ München, ED 110, vol. 1. See also Hans-Ulrich Thamer, Verführung und Gewalt: Deutschland 1933–1945, Berlin, 1986, p. 232; Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1914–1949, Munich, 2003, p. 606.
6 Victor Klemperer, Ich will Zeugnis ablegen bis zum letzten: Tagebücher 1933–1941, ed. Walter Nowojski with Hadwig Klemperer, Berlin, 1995, p. 9 (entry for 10 March 1933). In April 1933, during a conversation about “the horrendous situation in Germany,” the Franco-American publisher Jacques Schiffrin said that he could not understand how “there was no resistance anywhere from anyone.” Count Harry Kessler remarked, “I couldn’t give him an explanation either.” Harry Graf Kessler, Das Tagebuch. Vol. 9: 1926–1937, ed. Sabine Gruber and Ulrich Ott with Christoph Hilse and Nadin Weiss,
Stuttgart, 2010, p. 555 (entry for 5 April 1933).
7 Sebastian Haffner, Geschichte eines Deutschen: Die Erinnerungen 1914–1933, Stuttgart and Munich, 2000, pp. 145–8, 152, 176–8.
8 Cabinet meeting on 30 Jan. 1933; Akten der Reichskanzlei: Die Regierung Hitler. Part 1: 1933/34. Vol. 1: 30 Januar bis 31 April 1933, ed. Karl-Heinz Minuth, Boppard am Rhein, 1983, no. 1, pp. 1–4 (quotations on p. 2).
9 See Rudolf Morsey, “Hitlers Verhandlungen mit der Zentrumsführung am 31. 1. 1933,” in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 9 (1961), pp. 182–94.
10 Cabinet meeting on 3 Jan. 1933; Die Regierung Hitler, part 1, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 5–8 (quotations on p. 6)
11 Hindenburg’s decree dated 1 Feb. 1933; ibid., no. 3, p. 10n6. No one insisted on written confirmation of Hitler’s assurance that the make-up of the cabinet would not change regardless of the outcome of the election. When Schwerin von Krosigk protested to Papen, the latter replied that “you can’t begin cooperating with an act of mistrust.” Schwerin von Krosigk to Holm Eggers, 21 Aug. 1974; BA Koblenz, N 1276/42.
12 Hjalmar Schacht, Abrechnung mit Hitler, Hamburg, 1948, p. 31; see also Hjalmar Schacht, 76 Jahre meines Lebens, Bad Wörishofen, 1953, p. 379: “My impression was that Hitler was weighed down by the burden of responsibility placed upon him.”
13 Government appeal to the German people, 1 Feb. 1933; Max Domarus, Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen 1932–1945. Vol. 1: Triumph. Part 1: 1932–1934, Munich, 1965, pp. 191–4.
14 Quoted in Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Hammerstein oder Der Eigensinn: Eine deutsche Geschichte, Frankfurt am Main, 2008, p. 114.
15 Hitler’s speech to military commanders has survived in three forms: 1. notes of Lieutenant General Curt Liebmann; first reprinted in Thilo Vogelsang, “Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930–1933,” in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 2 (1954), pp. 397–439 (text on pp. 434f.); 2. notes of General Horst von Mellenthin; first reprinted in Carl Dirks and Karl-Heinz Janssen, Der Krieg der Generäle: Hitler als Werkzeug der Wehrmacht, Berlin, 1999, pp. 232–6; 3. a transcript, probably made by one of Hammerstein’s daughters, which was sent by KPD agents to Moscow on 14 Feb.; reprinted in Andreas Wirsching, “ ‘Man kann nur Boden germanisieren’: Ein neue Quelle zu Hitlers Rede vor den Spitzen der Reichswehr am 3. Februar 1933,” in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 49 (2001), pp. 517–50 (text on pp. 545–8). Liebmann’s notes are the most extensive, which is why they are the source for all further quotes, unless otherwise noted.
16 Mellenthin’s notes read: “Marxism must be pulled up by the roots and eradicated”; Dirks and Janssen, Der Krieg der Generäle, p. 235. The Hammerstein transcript reads: “Our goal is the subjugation of Marxism by any means necessary.” Wirsching, “Eine neue Quelle,” p. 547.
17 In the Hammerstein transcript, the language of this passage is sharper: “The army will then be capable of conducting an active foreign policy, and the goal of increasing the German people’s living space will be reached through military force. The goal will probably be the East. Nonetheless, it is impossible to Germanicise the populations of land that has been annexed or conquered. You can only Germanicise territory. As Poland and France have done, several million people will have to be ruthlessly expelled.” Wirsching, “Eine neue Quelle,” p. 547.
18 Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck: Eine Biographie, Paderborn, 2008, pp. 101, 103.
19 Raeder’s statement before the Nuremberg military court; reprinted in Wirsching, “Eine neue Quelle,” p. 548f. (quotation on p. 549).
20 Die Regierung Hitler, part 1, vol. 1, no. 17, p. 51 (dated 8 Feb. 1933). On the relationship between Hitler and the military leadership during the early phase of the regime, see Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Armee und Drittes Reich 1933–1939: Darstellung und Dokumente, Paderborn, 1987, pp. 51f.
21 Die Regierung Hitler, part 1, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 9 (dated 1 Feb. 1933).
22 Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels. Part 1: Aufzeichnungen 1923–1941, ed. Elke Fröhlich, Munich, 1998, vol. 2/3, p. 122 (entry for 3 Feb. 1933), p. 213 (entry for 4 Feb. 1933).
23 Reprinted in Bernd Sösemann, with Marius Lange, Propaganda: Medien und Öffentlichkeit in der NS-Dikatur, Stuttgart, 2011, vol. 1, no. 53, pp. 95–9. See Die Regierung Hitler, part 1, vol. 1, no. 9, pp. 29f. (dated 2 Feb. 1933), no. 11, pp. 34f. (dated 3 Feb. 1933).
24 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 123 (entry for 4 Feb. 1933). On the election campaign of February/March 1933 see Gerhard Paul, Aufstand der Bilder: Die NS-Propaganda vor 1933, Bonn, 1990, pp. 111–13.
25 Quoted in Becker, Hitlers Machtergreifung, pp. 57–60 (quote on p. 59).
26 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 126 (entry for 11 Feb. 1933).
27 Domarus, Hitler, vol. 1, part 1, pp. 203–8.
28 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 127 (entry for 11 Feb. 1933).
29 Erich Ebermayer, Denn heute gehört uns Deutschland…Persönliches und politisches Tagebuch, Hamburg and Vienna, 1959, pp. 21f. (entry for 11 Feb. 1933).
30 Jesko von Hoegen, Der Held von Tannenberg: Genese und Funktion des Hindenburg-Mythos, Cologne, Weimar and Vienna, 2007, pp. 378–80.
31 Papen to Hugenberg, 12 Feb. 1933; BA Koblenz, N 1231/38. On the origins of the “Battle Front Black, White and Red” see Beck, The Fateful Alliance, pp. 93f.
32 Hoegen, Der Held von Tannenberg, p. 382. See Wolfram Pyta, Hindenburg: Herrschaft zwischen Hohenzollern und Hitler, Munich, 2007, p. 817.
33 The content of the meeting, according to the report by the leader of the Berlin offices of Gutehoffnungshütte, Martin Blank, to Paul Reusch, 21 Feb. 1933, reprinted in Dirk Stegmann, “Zum Verhältnis von Grossindustrie und Nationalsozialismus 1930–1933,” in Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 13 (1973), pp. 477–80. See also Fritz Springorum to Paul Reusch, 21 Feb. 1933, ibid., pp. 480f.; Henry A. Turner, Die Grossunternehmer und der Aufstieg Hitlers, Berlin, 1986, pp. 393–5; Joachim Petzold, Franz von Papen: Ein deutsches Verhängnis, Munich and Berlin, 1995, pp. 170–3. On Gustav Krupp’s position see Harold James, Krupp: Deutsche Legende und globales Unternehmen, Munich, 2011, pp. 196–9. On the 75:25 split there followed a disagreement as not all donors wanted “Battle Front Black, White, Red” to receive a quarter of the money. See Hugenberg to Schacht, 2 March 1933; Schacht to Hugenberg, 3 March 1933; BA Koblenz, N 1231/38.
34 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 133 (entry for 21 Feb. 1933).
35 Ibid., p. 130 (entry for 16 Feb. 1933). See Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers: Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung, Munich, 1969, pp. 90–5.
36 Directive from Göring dated 17 Feb. 1933; Becker, Hitlers Machtergreifung, pp. 74f.
37 Kessler, Das Tagebuch, vol. 9, p. 542 (entry for 17 Feb. 1933).
38 Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, p. 95.
39 See Heinrich August Winkler, Der Weg in die Katastrophe: Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik 1930 bis 1933, Berlin and Bonn, 1987, p. 879; Joachim Fest, Hitler: Eine Biographie, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin and Vienna, 1973, p. 541. On SA terror attacks against the left see Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich, London, 2004, pp. 317–21.
40 Kessler, Das Tagebuch, vol. 9, p. 444 (entry for 19 Feb. 1933). See ibid., p. 544 (entry for 20 Feb. 1933), p. 545 (entry for 22 Feb. 1933).
41 On the controversy over the Reichstag fire see, most recently, Sven Felix Kellerhoff, Der Reichtagsbrand: Die Karriere eines Kriminalfalles, Berlin, 2008. When all the arguments are considered, the thesis that van der Lubbe acted alone is the most plausible. In the summer of 1945, in the Mondorf internment camp near Luxembourg, Schwerin von Krosigk asked Göring who had been responsible for the Reichstag fire, saying “You can tell me the truth.” Göring responded that he would have been proud if he had “set the Reichstag ablaze,” but “unfortunately he was completely innocent.” Schwerin von Krosigk to Fritz Tobias, 27 Jan. 1970; BA Koblenz, N 1276/40; see also Schwerin von Krosigk to Heinrich Fraenkel, 20 Jan. 1975; ibid.
42 See
Ernst Hanfstaengl, Zwischen Weissem und Braunem Haus: Erinnerungen eines politischen Aussenseiters, Munich, 1970, pp. 294f.; Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 137 (entry for 28 Feb. 1933): “Hanfstaengl called with the news: the Reichstag is burning. What an imagination [I thought]. But it was true.”
43 Rudolf Diels, Lucifer ante portas…Es spricht der erste Chef der Gestapo, Stuttgart, 1950, p. 194. Göring said to Papen: “This can only be a Communist attack on our new government!” Franz von Papen, Der Wahrheit eine Gasse, Munich, 1952, p. 302. Sefton Delmer (Die Deutschen und ich, Hamburg, 1963, p. 190) also quoted Göring telling Hitler that the fire was “definitely the work of the Communists.”
44 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 137 (entry for 28 Feb. 1933).
45 Diels, Lucifer ante portas, p. 194.
46 Delmer, Die Deutschen und ich, p. 191.
47 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 137 (entry for 28 Feb. 1933).
48 André François-Poncet, Als Botschafter in Berlin 1931–1938, Mainz, 1947, p. 95.
49 See Thamer, Verführung und Gewalt, p. 254; Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich, pp. 334f.
50 Cabinet meeting on 28 Feb. 1933; Die Regierung Hitler, part 1, vol. 1, no. 32, pp. 128–31 (quotation on pp. 128, 129).
51 Reprinted in Becker, Hitlers Machtergreifung, pp. 107f.; Sösemann, Propaganda, vol. 1, pp. 105f. See the comprehensive analysis by Thomas Raithel and Irene Strenge, “Die Reichstagsbrandverordnung: Grundlegung der Diktatur mit den Instrumenten des Weimarer Ausnahmezustands,” in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 48 (2000), pp. 413–60.
52 Karl-Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer and Gerhard Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung: Studien zur Errichtung des totalitären Herrschaftssystems in Deutschland 1933/34, 2nd revised edition, Cologne and Opladen 1962, p. 82.
53 Ernst Fraenkel, Der Doppelstaat: Recht und Justiz im “Dritten Reich,” Frankfurt am Main and Cologne, 1974, p. 26. See Norbert Frei, Der Führerstaat: Nationalsozialistische Herrschaft 1933 bis 1945, new and expanded edition, Munich, 2001, p. 51.
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