208 ADAP, Series D, vol. 2, no. 221, pp. 281–5 (quotation on p. 282).
209 Ibid., no. 282, pp. 377–80 (quotation on p. 377).
210 Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, p. 102.
211 See Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, pp. 313f., 324–32.
212 Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, p. 24 (dated May 1938); see ibid., p. 27 (dated 18 July 1938).
213 See Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, pp. 335–8 (quotation on p. 338).
214 Ibid., pp. 339f.
215 Ibid., pp. 342f.
216 Sworn statement by Colonel General Wilhelm Adam regarding the meeting on 4 Aug. 1938 (1947/48); IfZ München ZS 6. See also Müller, Generaloberst Beck, pp. 351–4.
217 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 5, p. 393 (entry for 25 July 1938). See Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, p. 29 (entry for 2 Aug. 1938).
218 Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, p. 112.
219 Wiedemann, Der Mann, p. 172.
220 Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, p. 32 (dated 17 Aug. 1938). On the speech of 10 Aug. 1938 see the transcript by General Gustav Adolf von Weitersheim dated 13 Feb. 1948; IfZ München, ZS 1655. Further, Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, pp. 112f.; Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, p. 355.
221 Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, p. 33 (dated 20 Aug. 1938).
222 See Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, pp. 356–8; Christian Hartmann, Halder: Generalstabschef Hitlers 1938–1942, 2nd revised and expanded edition, Paderborn, 2010, pp. 62–4.
223 Shirer, Berliner Tagebuch, p. 118 (entry for 4 Aug. 1938).
224 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 5, p. 331 (entry for 3 June 1938).
225 On the Wiedemann mission, see the guidelines issued by Hitler on 15 July 1938 and Wiedemann’s memorandum for Ribbentrop about his conversation with Halifax on 18 July 1938; BA Koblenz, N 1720/3. That same day Wiedemann flew to Berchtesgaden to brief Hitler, but Hitler preferred to take a two-hour walk with Unity Mitford and only gave his adjutant five minutes. Wiedemann’s essay “Crisis of spring and summer 1938”; BA Koblenz, N 1720/4. See also Wiedemann, Der Mann, pp. 159–67. Max Wünsche’s daily diaries, 15 July, 19 July 1938; BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 10/125.
226 See Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, p. 28 (dated August 1938).
227 Hamann, Winifred Wagner, p. 371.
228 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 29 (entry for 1 Aug. 1938). See also Unity Mitford’s account in a letter to Diana Mitford, 4 Aug. 1938; Charlotte Mosley (ed.), The Mitfords: Letters between Six Sisters, London, 2007, pp. 130f.
229 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 39 (entry for 10 Aug. 1938).
230 Ibid., p. 49 (entry for 19 Aug. 1938). See ibid., p. 52 (entry for 21 Aug. 1938): “At the moment, his mind is completely occupied by military questions.”
231 Sworn statement by Colonel General Wilhelm Adam regarding the Western border discussion with Hitler on 27 Aug. 1938 (1947/48); IfZ München, ZS 6; see also Anton Hoch and Hermann Weiss, “Die Erinnerungen des Generalobersten Wilhelm Adam,” in Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Miscellania: Festschrift für Helmut Krausnick zum 75. Geburtstag, Stuttgart, 1980, p. 55.
232 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 68 (entry for 1 Sept., 2 Sept. 1938).
233 Dirksen to Wiedemann, 29 Aug. 1938, and Wiedemann’s telegram to Dirksen, 1 Sept. 1938; BA Koblenz, N 1720/6. According to Max Wünsche’s diary of 31 Aug. 193, Meissner was afterwards informed “that the Führer will not receive Envoy Dirksen (concerning information from Chamberlain).” BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 10/125.
234 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 70 (entry for 3 Sept. 1938). See Helmuth Groscurth, Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938–1940, eds Helmut Krausnick and Harold C. Deutsch, Stuttgart, 1970, pp. 111f. (entry for 4 Sept. 1938).
235 Schmundt’s records from 4 Sept. 1938; IMT, vol. 25, pp. 404–69; ADAP, Series D, vol. 2, no. 424, pp. 546f.
236 Deutschland-Berichte der Sopade, 5 (1938), pp. 915f.; see Ian Kershaw, The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the Third Reich, Oxford, 1987, pp. 133f.; Evans, The Third Reich in Power, pp. 674f.
237 Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, pp. 36f. (dated 8 Sept., 10 Sept. 1938). See Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, pp. 120f.
238 Domarus, Hitler, vol. 1, part 2, pp. 897–906 (quotations on pp. 901, 904, 905).
239 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 88 (entry for 13 Sept. 1938); Shirer, Berliner Tagebuch, p. 123 (entry for 12 Sept. 1938).
240 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 89 (entry for 14 Sept. 1938).
241 See Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 394f.
242 See Birgit Schwarz, Geniewahn: Hitler und die Kunst, Vienna, Cologne and Weimar, 2009, p. 171.
243 Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 395–8. On the events of the Chamberlain visit see also Max Wünsche’s diary of 15 Sept. 1938: according to Wünsche, Chamberlain’s plane took off at 10:15 a.m. and landed at 12:36 p.m. in Munich. At 4:05 p.m. his chartered train arrived in Berchtesgaden, and the British delegation got to the Berghof at 5:10 p.m. At 5:30 p.m, Hitler and Chamberlain’s one-on-one talks commenced. The prime minister left at 8:10 p.m. BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 10/125.
244 Ernst von Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, Munich, 1950, p. 244.
245 Die Weizsäcker-Papiere 1933–1950, p. 143 (? Sept. 1938).
246 ADAP, Series D, vol. 2, no. 490, pp. 639f.
247 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 97 (entry for 18 Sept. 1938).
248 Ibid., p. 99 (entry for 19 Sept. 1938).
249 Chamberlain’s letter to his sister, Ida, 19 Sept. 1938; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, pp. 110, 112.
250 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 105 (entry for 22 Sept. 1938); see ibid., pp. 101 (entry for 20 Sept. 1938), 103 (entry for 21 Sept. 1938): “The Führer will show Chamberlain his map, and that will be it!”
251 See Nevile Henderson, Fehlschlag einer Mission: Berlin 1937 bis 1939, Zurich, 1940, pp. 174f.; Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 400.
252 Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 400f.; see Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, London, 1990, pp. 457f. (according to Kirkpatrick); Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 107 (entry for 23 Sept. 1938).
253 Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 402. Goebbels’s contention that in his letter Chamberlain “had basically expressed his agreement with Hitler’s demands” was apparently based on a willful misunderstanding. Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 108 (entry for 24 Sept. 1938).
254 Shirer, Berliner Tagebuch, p. 133 (entry for 22 Sept. 1938).
255 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 109 (entry for 24 Sept. 1938).
256 See Henderson, Fehlschlag einer Mission, p. 178; Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 404.
257 Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 404f.; see Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, pp. 109f. (entry for 24 Sept. 1938); Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, p. 185.
258 Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 405f.; see Bullock, Hitler, p. 460 (according to Kirkpatrick’s notes).
259 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 113 (entry for 26 Sept. 1938).
260 Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 407; see Henderson, Fehlschlag einer Mission, p. 181; Bullock, Hitler, p. 461 (according to Kirkpatrick’s notes).
261 Shirer, Berliner Tagebuch, p. 137 (entry for 26 Sept. 1938); see Groscurth, Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers, p. 124 (entry for 26 Sept. 1938): “A speech by the Führer in the evening. Terrible, ignoble bellowing.”
262 Domarus, Hitler, vol. 1, part 2, pp. 923–32 (quotations on pp. 925, 927, 930, 932). Goebbels described Hitler’s tirade as “a psychological masterpiece.” Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 166 (entry for 27 Sept. 1938).
263 Shirer, Berliner Tagebuch, pp. 137f. (entry for 26 Sept. 1938).
264 Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 408f.; Henderson, Fehlschlag einer Mission, pp. 182f.; Bullock, Hitler, pp. 463f. (according to Kirkpatrick’s notes).
&nb
sp; 265 See Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 116 (entry for 27 Sept. 1938): “Question: are the English bluffing or are they serious? Answer: they’re bluffing.”
266 Ibid., p. 118 (entry for 28 Sept. 1938).
267 See Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, Der Schattenmann: Tagebuchaufzeichnungen 1938–1945, Frankfurt am Main, 1983, pp. 9–11 (entry for 27 Sept. 1938); Shirer, Berliner Tagebuch, pp. 138f. (entry for 27 Sept. 1938); Henderson, Fehlschlag einer Mission, pp. 183f.
268 See Kershaw, The Hitler Myth, pp. 135–7; Frank Bajohr and Christoph Strupp (ed.), Fremde Blicke auf das “Dritte Reich”: Berichte ausländischer Diplomaten über Herrschaft und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1933–1945, Göttingen, 2011, pp. 491f. Even a convinced Hitler supporter such as Ilse Hess was asking at the end of Sept. 1938, “whether in a couple of years the Sudetenland would have fallen into our laps like ripe fruit in any case, without our risking so much right now.” But she added: “And the Führer knows what is right.” Ilse Hess to Rudolf Hess, 28 Sept. 1938. BA Bern, Nl Hess, J1.211-1989/148, 61.
269 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 125 (entry for 2 Oct. 1938). In Wiedemann’s recollection, Goebbels said over lunch at the Reich Chancellery on 28 Sept. 1938: “My Führer, you saw the division marching through Berlin. If you think the German people are ready for war, then you’re fooling yourself.” Wiedemann’s shorthand notes, 25 Feb. 1939; BA Koblenz, N 1720/4.
270 Hitler to Chamberlain, 27 Sept. 1938; reprinted in Henderson, Fehlschlag einer Mission, pp. 343–6 (quotation on p. 346). See Bullock, Hitler, pp. 465f.; Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 409f.
271 Die Weizsäcker-Papiere, p. 170 (notes from October 1939 with a look back at 1938/39), p. 144 (dated 27 Sept. 1938).
272 Ulrich von Hassell, Vom anderen Deutschland: Aus den nachgelassenen Tagebüchern 1938–1944, Frankfurt am Main, 1964, p. 19 (entry for 29 Sept. 1938); see Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 119 (entry for 29 Sept. 1938): “Yesterday: dramatic day.”
273 Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 410. The above quotation in Wiedemann, Der Mann, p. 178.
274 Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 411; see François-Poncet, Als Botschafter in Berlin, p. 333; Schäfer, André François-Poncet als Botchafter in Berlin, pp. 309f.
275 See Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 411f.; see Falanga, Mussolinis Vorposten, pp. 107f.
276 See Henderson, Fehlschlag einer Mission, p. 187; Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 413; Falanga, Mussolinis Vorposten, p. 108.
277 See Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, p. 128; Henderson, Fehlschlag einer Mission, pp. 189f.; François-Poncet, Als Botschafter in Berlin, p. 335.
278 François-Poncet, Als Botschafter in Berlin, pp. 336f. According to Weizsäcker, Hitler was “revolted by the whole conference…He was never one for par inter pares.” Die Weizsäcker-Papiere 1933–1950, p. 172 (notes from October 1939).
279 Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 414.
280 See Die Weizsäcker-Papiere 1933–1950, pp. 171f. (notes from October 1939); Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, pp. 188f.
281 Text of the Munich Agreement in Domarus, Hitler, vol. 1, part 2, pp. 942f.
282 Shirer, Berliner Tagebuch, p. 140 (entry for 30 Sept. 1938). On 1 Oct. 1938, Golo Mann wrote in his diary: “The end of France. The good people just don’t realise that.” Tilmann Lahme, Golo Mann: Biographie, Frankfurt am Main, 2009, p. 141.
283 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 122 (entry for 30 Sept. und 1 Oct. 1938).
284 Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 417; text of the communiqué in Domarus, Hitler, vol. 1, part 2, p. 946.
285 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 125 (entry for 2 Oct. 1938).
286 Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, p. 40 (dated 1 Oct. 1938).
287 Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, p. 138.
288 Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 417f.
289 Hamann, Winifred Wagner, p. 377.
290 Deutschland-Berichte der Sopade, 5 (1938), pp. 942, 943.
291 Erich Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten…Die Wilhelmstrasse in Frieden und Krieg. Erlebnisse, Begegnungen und Eindrücke 1928–1945, Stuttgart, 1950, p. 260.
292 Wilhelm Treue, “Rede Hitlers vor der deutschen Presse (10 November 1938),” in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 6 (1958), p. 182.
293 Deutschland-Berichte der Sopade, 5 (1938), pp. 393f.; see Mann, Tagebücher 1937–1939, p. 303 (entry for 2 Oct. 1938): “The better part of the world is in deep desperation.”
294 See the convincing account by Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, pp. 366–8, which corrects previous research.
295 See Hartmann, Halder, pp. 101–15; Rainer A. Blasius, Für Grossdeutschland gegen den Krieg: Ernst von Weizsäcker in den Krisen um die Tschechoslowakei und Polen 1938/39, Cologne and Vienna, 1981, pp. 45, 55f.
296 See Gerd R. Ueberschär, “Die Septemberverschwörung 1938 und Widerstandsbewegungen bis zum Kriegsbeginn,” in idem, Für ein anderes Deutschland: Der deutsche Widerstand gegen den NS-Staat 1933–1945, Frankfurt am Main, 2006, pp. 37f.
297 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 127 (entry for 3 Oct. 1939); see ibid., p. 139 (entry for 10 Oct. 1938): “The Führer wants to break up the Czechs, either by war or through peaceful means.” Around the same time, Weizsäcker told Hassell that Hitler had said that “the Czech problem will have to be liquidated within a few months.” Hassell, Vom anderen Deutschland, p. 21 (entry for 10 Oct. 1938).
298 Domarus, Hitler, vol. 1, part 2, pp. 954–6.
299 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 158 (entry for 24 Oct. 1938); see ibid., p. 234 (entry for 21 Jan. 1939): “Wiedemann is going to California as a consul general. He lost his nerve in the crisis.”
300 Schacht to Wiedemann, 18 March 1939 (addressed from the Hotel Monte Verita in Ascona); BA Koblenz, N 1720/8. See ibid. for numerous further documents expressing individuals’ regrets that Wiedemann was leaving Hiter’s service. On 23 Feb. 1939 Wiedemann set sail on the MS Hamburg from Bremen to New York.
301 Hassell, Vom anderen Deutschland, pp. 23f. (entry for 15 Oct. 1938).
302 Ibid., p. 24 (entry for 23 Oct. 1938). See also François-Poncet’s view in Schäfer, André François-Poncet als Botschafter in Berlin, p. 311.
303 ADAP, Series D, vol. 4, no. 81, p. 90; also reprinted in Domarus, Hitler, vol. 1, part 2, pp. 960f.
304 Text of the declaration in Domarus, Hitler, vol. 1, part 2, p. 982. For the back story see Michalka, Ribbentrop und die deutsche Weltpolitik, pp. 259–64; Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, pp. 674f.
305 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 246 (entry for 1 Feb. 1939).
306 Text of the speech in Jost Dülffer, Jochen Thies and Josef Henke, Hitlers Städte: Baupolitik im Dritten Reich. Eine Dokumentation, Cologne and Vienna, 1978, pp. 289–313. See also the report of the 10 Feb. 1939 speech by General Hans Jordan (based on notes). The decisive passage read: “An officer shouldn’t only be a ‘soldier.’ Today, wars between people are ‘world-view wars.’ For that reason, today’s warrior has to be suffused by his world view.” IfZ München, ED 57.
307 Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, p. 45 (dated 18 Feb. 1939).
308 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, pp. 279f. (entry for 11 March 1939).
309 Ibid., p. 283 (entry for 13 March 1939).
310 See the minutes of State Secretary Hewel on the talks between Hitler and Tiso, 13 March 1939; ADAP, Series D, vol. 4, no. 202, pp. 212–14: Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 285 (entry for 14 March 1938): Hitler told Tiso in no uncertain terms that “Slovakia’s historical hour has come. If the Slovaks do nothing, they’ll be swallowed by the Hungarians.”
311 See Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 286 (entry for 15 March 1938); Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, p. 151.
312 See Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, p. 152; Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 287 (entry for 15 March 1938): “The Führer made them wait until midnight
, which slowly but surely softened them up. That’s what was done to us in Versailles.”
313 See Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 427, 429.
314 See Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, p. 152.
315 Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 429f.; see the minutes by State Secretary Hewel on the meeting of 15 March 1939; ADAP, Series D, vol. 4, no. 228, pp. 229–34.
316 See Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 430f.; Speer, Erinnerungen, p. 130; Hoffmann, Hitler wie ich ihn sah, pp. 98f.; Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 287 (entry for 15 March 1938): “Negotiations were conducted with raw bitterness. Hacha passed out once.”
317 ADAP, Series D, vol. 4, no. 229, p. 235. Facsimile in Thamer, Verführung und Gewalt, p. 603.
318 Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, p. 218.
319 Die Weizsäcker Papiere 1933–1950, p. 152 (dated 16 March 1939). See Conze et al., Das Amt, p. 135.
320 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 287 (entry for 15 March 1938).
321 Schroeder, Er war mein Chef, pp. 88,
322 See ibid., pp. 88f.; Eberle and Uhl (eds), Das Buch Hitler, p. 92; Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, p. 153.
323 Text in Domarus, Hitler, vol. 2, part 1, pp. 1098–100.
324 See Conze et al., Das Amt, p. 135.
325 R. Buttmann’s diaires dated 19 March 1939; BayHStA München, Nl Buttmann 89.
326 Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, p. 156.
327 Deutschland-Berichte der Sopade, 6 (1939), p. 276. See ibid., pp. 278–86; Bajohr and Strupp (eds), Fremde Blicke auf das “Dritte Reich,” p. 528.
328 See Wendt, Grossdeutschland, pp. 166f.; Schmidt, Die Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches, pp. 311f.; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, p. 165.
329 Erich Kordt, Wahn und Wirklichkeit, Stuttgart, 1947, p. 144.
330 See Henderson, Fehlschlag einer Mission, p. 246. Henderson only returned to Berlin on 25 April. Ibid., p. 254.
331 Domarus, Hitler, vol. 2, part 1, p. 1105.
332 Goebbels, Tagebücher, part 1, vol. 6, p. 292 (entry for 19 March 1939). See ibid., p. 293 (entry for 20 March 1939): “Rightly, the Führer doesn’t take the protests in Paris and London at all seriously. They’re a false alarm.”
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