by Concrete Hell- Urban Warfare From Stalingrad to Iraq (epub)
The other major group of insurgents were the Sunni nationalists. These fighters’ loyalties were first to their sheiks and tribe, and second to the former Ba’athist government of Iraq. Many of them had had high rank and extensive military experience in the former Iraqi army or in other aspects of Saddam Hussein’s intelligence and security apparatus. They considered themselves legitimate resisters of the foreign occupation and the Shi’ite-led Iraqi government. Through their tribal affiliations they had widespread popular support.
Both the Islamists and the nationalists were supported by criminals who hired out their services for pay. These criminals typically operated in small independent groups and were willing to snipe, emplace IEDs, and even attack Coalition Forces (CF) positions for predetermined payments. Bonuses were paid to these groups for the success of their operations and often they were required to show video evidence in order to be paid. In the first years of the Iraqi insurgency, 2003–05, the two major factions of the insurgency, Islamists and nationalists, worked together against the Coalition Forces. However, in areas where they had dominance, the Islamists, primarily AQI, began to enforce strict Sharia law. They arbitrarily killed or mutilated violators of strict Islamic law, and also began to demand both material and monetary support from the local populations. Anyone who protested against, or resisted, AQI demands was summarily executed. By the end of 2005 the nationalist Sunni resistance leaders realized that AQI were potentially a larger threat than CF. However, it was difficult for the nationalists to resist AQI’s dominance because the nationalist sheiks were not unified, and AQI used highly visible executions to intimidate large portions of the population.
In the spring and summer of 2006, Iraqi nationalist insurgents and AQI controlled virtually all of the city of Ramadi. Insurgents could openly travel almost anywhere in the city, in groups, and carrying their weapons, without fear of CF or police notice, attack, or reprisals. CF estimated that in the summer of 2006 there were a total of about 5,000 insurgents active in Ramadi.
The 1BCT relieved the 2BCT, 28th Infantry Division, a brigade from the Pennsylvania National Guard. The 2BCT, over its year-long deployment, 2005–06, kept the two major supply routes (MSRs) –Route Michigan and Route Mobile – through the Ramadi area open, and protected itself and the main government complex in the center of the city. However, it had done little else to improve the US position in Ramadi. As the BCT redeployed, two regular battalions working in the city remained in the area and came under 1BCT control. The first of these was the 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines, whose major job was protecting the government building in the city center. The Marines operated out of Hurricane Point, on the northwest side of central Ramadi. The other was the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, who had responsibility for the east side of Ramadi and access from that direction. They operated out of Camp Corregidor just south of Route Michigan on the east side of the city.
The 1BCT, under the command of Colonel Sean MacFarland, arrived in Iraq in January 2006 configured as a typical cold war US armored brigade. It contained two tank battalions and a mechanized infantry battalion, with supporting elements that included a combat engineer battalion, an artillery battalion, a support battalion (medical, maintenance, and supply), a reconnaissance troop, an intelligence company, and a signals company among others. Immediately after arriving in theater the BCT lost its mechanized infantry battalion on a separate mission. It then proceeded to relieve the 3rd Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar. For five months it operated in Tal Afar under the operational control of the 101st Airborne Division. In May it was ordered to Ramadi to relieve the national guard and took control of AO Topeka in June. It left one armored battalion in Tal Afar to provide heavy armor to the Stryker brigade that assumed control of that city.
Operations in Al-Anbar Province were under the command of Major General Richard Zilmer, US Marine Corps, and the 1st Marine Division. The 1st Marine Division, acting as a joint (multiservice) and combined (multinational) command – Multinational Forces West (MNFW) – commanded all ground military forces in the province. As the 1BCT moved from its positions in Tal Afar to Ramadi it moved from under the command of the 101st Airborne Division to MNFW. The BCT arrived in Ramadi in late May with only one of its original three combat battalions. It was then augmented by battalions remaining in Ramadi as well as the Central Command operational reserve so that when it began operations it had five combat battalions under its command.
The 1BCT’s initial deployment committed all five of its combat battalions to operations. The 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry (TF 1/6), operated out of Camp Diamond and was responsible for Ramadi north of the Euphrates River. The 1st Battalion, 35th Armor (TF 1/35) operated out of Camp Ramadi, a Saddam Hussein palace compound on the west side of the Habbaniyah Canal, just northwest of the central city. It was responsible for Ramadi west of the canal. The 1st Battalion, 37th Armor (TF 1/37) also operated out of Camp Ramadi, but was responsible for southern Ramadi east of the canal. The 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines (3/8 Marines) operated out of a combat outpost (COP), Hurricane Point in the northwest corner of the central city, and had a company permanently stationed at the central government complex in the center of downtown. The 1st Battalion, 506th (1/506) Infantry was stationed at Camp Corregidor on the east side of the central city and was responsible for the eastern portion of the city and area of operations. In total the BCT had over 5,000 personnel, 84 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and 77 M-1 Abrams tanks under its operational control in AO Topeka.
In addition to the ground-combat battalions at its disposal, the 1BCT included the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery. That battalion was given two tasks: develop and supervise a close-combat training program for the Iraqi army (and later police), and provide indirect fire support to the maneuver battalions in the city. The 16th Engineer battalion was designated to provide combat engineer support to the maneuver battalions, including the building of COPs. Two additional attachments to the BCT gave the brigade unusual capabilities. One of those detachments was two platoons of US Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) teams. These two SEAL platoons gave the BCT its own special operations capability. The other attachment was a section of Small Unit Riverine Craft (SURCs) which belonged to the navy but were operated by the Marine battalion. The SURCs were used to patrol the Euphrates River and Habbaniyah Canal, they were able to search watercraft, look for swimmers, and also to insert and support patrols and snipers. This capability facilitated the BCT’s ability to maneuver by water around Ramadi, avoid IEDs, and denied the waterways to the insurgents.
A New Plan
Though, geographically the US forces were well positioned to surround the city, in May 2006 operations were limited to securing the bases, and the central government complex downtown. The forces in and around Ramadi did not have the combat power to seize the city from AQI control. In the spring of 2006 the MNFW asked for a considerable additional number of troops to replace the 2BCT, 28th Infantry Division. They got 1/1 BCT. They wanted light infantry, they got a heavy armored BCT. They were told by their higher headquarters that commanders would get what they asked for, but they didn’t. The 1BCT had five maneuver battalions available for operations in and around Ramadi. Ramadi was four times the size of Fallujah, yet in comparison, during the second battle for Fallujah, in November and December 2004, the US Marines employed eight battalions, of which two were mechanized and the other six were large Marine light infantry battalions.
However, comparisons with Fallujah were not important because the 1BCT’s specific guidance from the MNFW was to “Fix Ramadi but don’t do a Fallujah.” The spectacular destruction, civilian casualties, and high allied casualties that characterized the battle for Fallujah were not acceptable in the battle for Ramadi. The 1BCT was prohibited from executing a street-by-street, block-by-block, conventional approach to securing Ramadi, even if they had had the combat power to do so. Another approach was called for.
Overall the US and theater strategy in early 2006 was to turn the war over to Iraqi security forces so that U
S forces could begin to disengage and return to the US. Tactically, this translated into hunkering down on the forward operating bases, taking as few casualties as possible, and giving responsibility to Iraqi forces as they reached appropriate levels of training and readiness. Sometimes, areas were turned over to Iraqi forces regardless of their ability to accept that responsibility. The problem in Ramadi, however, was that the strategy required that an area be under US control before it was turned over to the Iraqi army (IA) or Iraqi police (IP), and Ramadi was not under US control. AQI had control over all areas of the city where US forces were not physically stationed. The 1BCT had to alter these conditions before the area could be turned over to the Iraqi army and Iraqi police.
The 1BCT was assigned two Iraqi army brigades to work with. One brigade was newly formed and proved not to be too valuable in combat. The other brigade had a good deal of experience. Both brigades were very understrength, and the soldiers of both were primarily Shi’ite Muslims – a problem because of the traditional distrust and animosity between the Iraqi Shi’ite and Sunni Muslim populations. The 1BCT assigned the entire newly formed Iraqi army brigade to partner with the US battalion at Camp Corregidor in eastern Ramadi. The more experienced Iraqi army brigade had each of its three battalions partnered with an American battalion: one with 1/6 Infantry north of the river; one with 1/35 at Camp Ramadi; and one with 3/8 Marines in Ramadi. Members of these Iraqi army units participated in all operations conducted by the BCT. Initially there were only approximately 100 ineffective Iraqi police in Ramadi. As more police became available they were also integrated into operations. The Iraqi forces, though not that important militarily, were important politically to the American objective of turning control of Ramadi over to the government.
The 1BCT did not have the combat power to seize a city the size of Ramadi quickly in a single operation. Additionally, the BCT’s guidance was to not conduct a conventional urban attack as had been undertaken in Fallujah. Therefore the BCT determined to seize control of Ramadi using the technique developed by the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment a year previously in the city of Tal Afar. This technique was a phased operation built around several premises. First, the BCT had to disregard the forward operating base (FOB) approach to urban warfare. This approach, conceptually developed before the invasion of Iraq, envisioned basing combat units outside of the urban area and then projecting combat power into the city to achieve very specific effects. It was designed to minimize the amount of urban combat, and the amount of contact between military forces and the civilian population. The FOB approach worked when the combat units were working in support of friendly indigenous forces already inside the city, or when the city was under the control of a conventional opponent who had identifiable critical vulnerabilities that could be attacked. Neither condition existed in Tal Afar in 2005 or in Ramadi in 2006.
The approach to seizing Ramadi determined by the 1BCT was described as “clear, build, and hold.” This later became the central concept of the US surge offensive throughout Iraq in 2007–08. The first step was for US forces to clear a particular discrete subsection of the city. This was accomplished by establishing a combat outpost in the midst of that section of the city. The US forces, supported by the Iraqi army, would then hold that section of the city against counterattacks or infiltration by AQI. As the US forces cleared and held their assigned part of the city, they and their Iraqi partners would simultaneously build institutions and infrastructure in that subsection to win the loyalty of that portion of the city’s population. In this manner, sections of the city would gradually and systematically be brought under US control and then turned over to the government of Iraq and the Iraqi army. This operational technique was time consuming, but it allowed the attacking force to ensure dominant combat power at the point of attack and thereby minimize friendly casualties. The 1BCT determined to conduct one major operation a week to keep the initiative and maintain the momentum of the attack. The pace of the operation was also designed to keep AQI reacting to events, off-balance, and surprised. The goal of the clear, hold, and build strategy was to systematically eliminate AQI and nationalist insurgency dominance of the city and replace their presence with the dominance of Iraqi army and police forces.
A Slow but Systematic Battle
The first step in the 1BCT plan was to isolate the city from external support. The concept was not to stop traffic from entering the city, but rather to control traffic coming into the city. This was done by establishing outposts on the major avenues into the city central from the north, west, and east. The SURCs interdicted any waterborne traffic. These operations were to prevent the free flow of supplies and reinforcements into the city and thus prevent large-scale reinforcement of the approximately 5,000 combatants operating in the city. To this end TF 1/35 Armor was assigned the mission of controlling access from the west into the city; TF 1/6 Infantry was given the mission of controlling access to the city from the north; and 1/506 Infantry was assigned to control entry from the east. The 3/8 Marines, inside Ramadi, would continue the mission of securing the government center.
Controlling access into the city was a difficult mission just because of the size of the city and its suburbs and the huge volume of people and goods moving in and out. An example of the size of this task was the area of TF 1/35 Armor, covering the western approaches to the city. The battalion had a total of four combined arms teams (companies) to accomplish its mission. With these small units, it was tasked with securing the suburb of Tameen on the west bank of the Habbaniyah Canal and its population of 40,000, as well as the 20,000 people living north of Camp Ramadi in the Zangora district. To accomplish this mission the TF used a team consisting of a tank platoon, scout platoon, and mortar platoon to operate static vehicle observation posts securing routes Mobile and Michigan in their sector as well as the rural Zangora region north of Camp Ramadi. Two teams – one of mechanized infantry and one tank team – operated in central Tameen. These two units conducted a combination of mounted and dismounted patrols and static mounted observation posts to control the area. They were subject to daily sniping, IED attacks, VBEID attacks, and small-arms fire. Over a six-month period (TF 1/35 redeployed in October 2006), the infantry team took 25 percent casualties during operations in Tameen. However, the teams greatly restricted the ability of AQI to transit and influence their area of operations. Because of the size of the area, the fact that it was a supporting effort to the main operations in the central city, and the low density of troops available, a permanent COP in Tameen was not established until October 2006. Tameen was not completely pacified before the TF redeployed.
On June 7, 2006, a coalition airstrike near Baghdad killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of AQI. The 1BCT determined to take advantage of the degradation of the AQI leadership to accelerate the start of operations into the center of Ramadi. On June 14, the BCT ordered TF 1/37 Armor to move across the Habbaniyah Canal and establish COP Falcon in the southwest section of the central city. The was the beginning of the systematic clearing of Ramadi. The operation began with the night infiltration of a US Navy SEAL team into preselected buildings that would be the center of the COP. Seven buildings in total were occupied. Each family was paid $2,500 a month by the US military for the use of the building. The SEALs entered the building, evicted the Iraqis living there, and secured it. As the SEALs secured the building, a route clearance team moved rapidly from Camp Ramadi down the route to the COP, clearing IEDs as it moved. It was closely followed by a tank team. The tank team then linked up with the SEALs and relieved them of responsibility for the COP. The SEAL team then moved out several hundred yards from the COP and set up sniping positions along likely avenues that AQI would use to counterattack against the COP. Meanwhile combat engineers, escorted by mechanized infantry and tanks, moved to the COP with flatbed trucks carrying concrete barriers, generators, building material, sandbags and concertina wire. Power was established, antennae put up, and towers and heavy weapons installed. Within hours the COP was s
ecure, and over the subsequent days the engineers continued to improve the position with more barriers, wire, and other defensive support. Two weeks later the COP was complete with over a hundred sections of concrete wall and 50,000 sandbags. It was invulnerable to machine-gun fire.
An entire US company made COP Falcon its permanent home. In addition, an IA company moved into the COP with the Americans. Eventually the SEALs set up a forward base at the COP. The COP was the base for CF operations in southwestern Ramadi, the purposes of which were to protect the civil population from AQI and its supporters, and to establish control of the area by the government. The COP also became the base for patrolling and intelligence gathering. Both conventional and special operations snipers also operated out from the COP. From the COP the BCT could exert effective control several hundred yards in all directions in the city. In normal operations a span of control of a few hundred yards is not tactically decisive, however, in urban warfare, and in particular in a densely populated city like Ramadi, controlling several hundred yards of terrain brought thousands of civilians and dozens of businesses under the shadow of the BCT’s security. It also subjected all traffic transiting the COP’s area of influence to COP stop and search capability. Thus, the COP Falcon became the first crack in AQI’s control of the Ramadi population.
Over the course of the next nine months the BCT would establish 18 new COPs in Ramadi and through them extend its influence and control, and that of the government of Iraq, into every neighborhood in the city. COP construction became a standard operating procedure (SOP) for the BCT and they became adapt at attacking, seizing, occupying, and reinforcing a COP position in 24 hours. Tens of thousands of sandbags were needed to reinforce the COPs when established. On Camp Ramadi no-one was allowed to eat in the dining facility until they had filled two sandbags and placed them on a pallet before each meal. This policy produced thousands of sandbags a day and when a new COP was established, trucks arrived with pallets carrying tens of thousands of sandbags ready to fortify the position.
