by White, Mark
Again, Thor does not care about Cap’s dedication to duty or principle, but how well that leads him to live up to virtues that Thor regards as worthy of a hero, a warrior, and a friend.
Of course, it is not merely others whom Thor holds up to the standards of virtue, but first and foremost himself. He is unwavering in his fairness, as when he approached a demonic, rampaging Asgardian with an open hand before engaging and defeating him in battle, and then accepted exile from Asgard once it was revealed that his vanquished foe was none other than Bor, his grandfather and previous king.24 He is unflinching in his courage, such as when he swears during the Siege of Asgard, after being beaten down by Norman Osborn and his Dark Avengers, “I will not run from you, Osborn, not your minions. I will not hide. I will defend my home and the home of my father . . . with my very last breath.”25 He has a profound sense of honor and justice, refusing to kill Bob Reynolds (the Sentry) at the end of the Siege—even when Reynolds begs him to—until Reynolds forces his hand by attacking the Avengers (after which Thor takes his burnt body, wrapped in his cape, and buries it in the sun).26 And he is fiercely loyal, going so far as to revive his adopted brother Loki following his death during the destruction of Asgard (for which Loki was ultimately responsible but later repented).27
Of course, many heroes exemplify these traits, including Iron Man and Captain America, but Thor acts this way for the sake of these virtues, rather than out of the expectation of good consequences or respect for duty or principle. Thor strives to be a good person, a virtuous person. For instance, at the end of Avengers Prime, Thor reclaims the Twilight Sword with which Hela (the goddess of death) had reshaped the nine realms, but he refuses to use it himself. He could have restored Asgard to its former glory, before it was destroyed in the last Ragnarok, then restored over Broxton, Oklahoma, and later destroyed again in the Siege.28 But he tells Amora (the Enchantress), “To use this unholy power for my own ends would make me the same demon she is.”29 And that “same demon”—someone who uses infinite power for his own ends, or even for what he predicts would be the best for everybody—isn’t who Thor strives to be.
Ethicists Assemble!
Can we conclude, therefore, that virtue ethics has nothing in common with utilitarianism and deontology? Absolutely not—all three ethical approaches can be seen as ways to determine the right thing to do or the right way to live, whether approached through action or character. And they often reach the same conclusions when it comes to very general topics such as murder and lying, though they may have different things to say on specific cases. For instance, utilitarianism might be more permissive of some well-meaning lies than deontology or virtue ethics.
Still, no matter which ethical framework you choose to adopt, you need to exercise judgment to apply it to specific circumstances. You also need conviction to stand by your decision in the face of criticism from others or doubts from within. As much as our Avengers Prime may differ in terms of their basic moral philosophy, they share the same capacity for sound judgment and unshakable conviction. Ultimately they serve as examples to those of us who aspire to be heroes in our own lives—but can’t afford the tuition at Avengers Academy!
NOTES
1. See, for example, Avengers Academy #10 (May 2011), reprinted in Avengers Academy: When Will We Use This in the Real World? (2011), and discussed here: http://www.comicsprofessor.com/2011/03/superhuman-ethics-class-is-in-session-in-avengers-academy-10.html.
2. Avengers Prime #1–5 (August 2010–March 2011), reprinted in Avengers Prime (2011).
3. See . . . well, most all Marvel comics since 2006, but especially Civil War (2007), World War Hulk (2008), Secret Invasion (2009), and Siege (2010), plus dozens (if not hundreds) of tie-in comics. (Go ahead, read them, I’ll wait.)
4. See Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1781), available at http://www.utilitarianism.com/jeremy-bentham/index.html.
5. Utilitarianism is a specific form of consequentialism, which judges the morality of actions by some aspect of their consequences, such as goodness (as in utilitarianism) or equality (as in egalitarianism). For a thorough discussion, see Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Consequentialism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism.
6. Iron Man, vol. 4, #7 (June 2006), reprinted in Iron Man: Execute Program (2007). At the end of the story line (#12, November 2006), to avoid being forced to kill Cap by mental control, Tony stops his own heart, trusting that he would be revived as he did for the Dynamo.
7. See Larry Alexander and Michael Moore, “Deontological Ethics,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological.
8. Civil War #6 (December 2006). On the other hand, he allowed Wolverine into the Avengers despite telling Tony, “He’s a murderer” (New Avengers, vol. 1, #6, June 2005, reprinted in New Avengers: Breakout, 2006). I would like to think that a soldier like Cap knows the difference between someone who kills in the heat of battle and someone who does the same for personal gain (like the Thunderbolts) or vengeance (like the Punisher); for more on this theme, see the chapter “The Avengers and S.H.I.E.L.D.: The Problem with Proactive Superheroics” by Arno Bogaerts in this volume.
9. Iron Man/Captain America: Casualties of War (February 2007), reprinted in Civil War: Iron Man (2007); Captain America, vol. 5, #22 (November 2006), reprinted in Civil War: Captain America (2007).
10. See Amazing Spider-Man #529–531 (April–June 2006), reprinted in Civil War: The Road to Civil War (2007).
11. Amazing Spider-Man #532, reprinted in Civil War: Amazing Spider-Man (2007).
12. Civil War #7 (January 2007).
13. Civil War: The Confession (May 2007), reprinted in Civil War: Iron Man (2007).
14. World War Hulk #4 (November 2007).
15. Civil War: The Confession.
16. Amazing Spider-Man #537 (December 2006), reprinted in Civil War: Amazing Spider-Man.
17. Captain America to Iron Man, from Iron Man/Captain America: Casualties of War.
18. Captain America, vol. 5, #22.
19. Deirdre McCloskey, The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 263.
20. See Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Ethics,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue.
21. Thor, vol. 3, #3 (November 2007), reprinted in Thor by J. Michael Straczynski Vol. 1 (2008).
22. For more on virtue and imperfection, see the chapter titled “Cap’s Kooky Quartet: Is Rehabilitation Possible?” by Andrew Terjesen in this volume.
23. Thor, vol. 3, #11 (November 2008), reprinted in Thor by J. Michael Straczynski Vol. 2 (2009). For more on the ancient Greek meaning of friendship, see the chapter titled “Gods, Beasts, and Political Animals: Why the Avengers Assemble” by Tony Spanakos in this volume.
24. Thor, vol. 3, #600 (April 2009), reprinted in Thor by J. Michael Straczynski Vol. 2. (After issue #12, the series was renumbered at #600 to commemorate the anniversary of the title.)
25. Siege #2 (April 2010).
26. Siege #4 (June 2010).
27. Thor, vol. 3, #617 (January 2011), reprinted in Thor: The World Eaters (2011).
28. He could have also erased the Twilight books and movies from existence. You know, for the irony.
29. Avengers Prime #5 (March 2011).
Chapter 2
SHINING THE LIGHT ON THE DARK AVENGERS
Sarah Donovan and Nick Richardson
Formed in the aftermath of the Secret Invasion, the team of Avengers assembled by Norman Osborn—and known to comic book readers as the Dark Avengers—appear to work for the public good. Shedding his alter ego, the Green Goblin, Osborn became the head of H.A.M.M.E.R. (the successor to S.H.I.E.L.D.) by promoting his role in the defeat of the Skrull invasion—as well as pointing out that Tony Stark, Nick Fury, S.H.I.E.L.D., and the (old) Avengers had failed to prevent it in the first place. Since the Amer
ican public believes that they are “real” Avengers, the Dark Avengers can piggyback on their predecessors’ squeaky-clean reputation and get away with all sorts of wicked deeds. Made up of villains posing as classic Avengers like Hawkeye and Ms. Marvel, the Dark Avengers do protect the public good after the Atlanteans attack Melrose, but they also engage in behavior unbecoming of true Avengers. For instance, Osborn forms an alliance with the evil Cabal; in retaliation for the attack on Melrose, the Sentry (who was a “real” Avenger as well) kills all of the Atlantean terrorists; and the “new” Hawkeye murders the Sentry’s wife on Osborn’s orders.1
In public, the Dark Avengers appear to be good, but in reality they are not. For philosophers, this raises questions. Is it necessary to be good, or is it enough to appear to be good? If you could get away with being bad while appearing to be good, would you do it? And what do we think of people who do get away with it?
Plato and the Ancient Greek Avengers
In the Republic, Plato (429–347 BCE) creates a character out of his teacher Socrates (469–399 BCE), who argues that when people are just, it is because they are guided by something divine and perfect.2 Steve Rogers, also known as Captain America, embodies this belief; his actions seem to be guided and motivated by a profound sense of justice. He has exceptional strength, endurance, and discipline, which he could use to take what he wants by force, yet he chooses to be a soldier, a superhero, and an Avenger, serving the public good instead of his own. Cap’s deep patriotism is an example of his dedication to norms that he regards as greater than himself.
Another of Plato’s characters in the Republic, Thrasymachus, argues instead that we are only good when we think we will benefit from it. Nothing greater than us determines our actions except our own advantage, especially avoiding getting caught doing the wrong thing. Norman Osborn exemplifies this view when he becomes the head of H.A.M.M.E.R. and puts together his team of Avengers to serve his own nefarious purposes. Though the Dark Avengers do some good, it is merely a cover for Osborn’s greater plans. Osborn does not believe in any sense of “justice” beyond his own advantage.
But what does it mean to believe in concepts of goodness or justice that are above or beyond us? To answer this, we move into the realm of metaphysics, the study of that which is beyond the physical, things that can’t be touched, such as gods or the soul. Plato’s theory of the Forms is a classic example of a metaphysical theory. Plato believed that the Forms are immaterial, perfect entities that are the blueprints for all things that exist on earth. Physical objects, by contrast, are copies (with differing degrees of imperfections) of the Forms.
According to Plato’s metaphysics, reality is not what we think. The world of the Forms is the true reality, whereas our world is an inferior realm of change. In his famous allegory of the cave, Plato likens our knowledge of the world around us to that of prisoners in a cave, staring at shadows on the wall.3 The prisoners mistakenly think the shadows are the highest reality, unaware of that which makes the shadows themselves. Likewise, if we are ignorant of the Forms, we will mistakenly think the material world is the highest reality.
Plato urges us to “leave the cave” and gain knowledge of the Forms. After all, we can only be good and just by understanding the Form of the Good and the Form of the Just. Once again, Steve Rogers exemplifies what it means to believe in universal, eternal values such as the Forms. At the end of the Civil War, Rogers, the leader of the anti-registration movement, stands down and is taken into custody. When Tony Stark visits him at the Raft, the maximum-security installation at Ryker’s Island, Rogers lambasts Stark for beginning a bloody war that was born out of Stark’s ego, rather than any higher ideals, like freedom. We see that Rogers is guided by principles outside of himself when he says to Stark, “Who made you the moral compass of us?”4 Rogers implies here that there is a general code of ethics that stands apart from humans (and therefore is not created by us) but to which we must conform. This same kind of thinking underlies any belief in ideals and principles. Again we see this when Rogers says to Stark, “We maintained the principles we swore to defend and protect. You sold your principles. You lost this before it started.”5 In short, Rogers can say that he has taken the moral high ground because there really is a metaphysical “high ground” to take.
Does Might Make Right?
While Captain America would presumably agree with some metaphysical theory about goodness and justice (though not necessarily Plato’s), Norman Osborn clearly would not. For example, when he gives an elaborate TV interview to defend his public image, Osborn acts only for his own good and for the purpose of appearing good to the American people.6 Osborn is a modern-day Thrasymachus. In the Republic, after Socrates argues that justice can only be understood by reference to a metaphysical Form, Thrasymachus counters by saying that “justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger.”7 For Thrasymachus (and Osborn), there are no metaphysical Forms against which to measure or judge our actions. Instead, justice is simply about winning at all costs.
Let’s set Norman Osborn aside for the moment in order to focus on the members of his Avengers team, who appear to be actual, well-known Avengers. In fact, though, the general public would be horrified to learn their true identities and criminal backgrounds. For instance, the identity of Ms. Marvel is taken by Moonstone (Karla Sofen), who, among other evil deeds, killed her own mother, joined the Masters of Evil, and fought against the Avengers. Daken, Wolverine’s twisted son, assumes his father’s identity though he’s been killing people since he was a child (more indiscriminately than his father has). Hawkeye is really Bullseye, one of Daredevil’s prominent and most psychotic enemies, and Spider-Man is Venom (remember Spidey’s black costume?).
All of these “heroes” pose as other people who are widely regarded as good, and thus they are seen by the public as the defenders of goodness and justice. We know, of course, that these Dark Avengers are unjust in a strong sense of the word—the question is, should we care? Is Thrasymachus right that justice is merely the advantage of the stronger?
Are the Dark Avengers Evil or Simply Bold?
Another of Plato’s characters in the Republic, Glaucon, illustrates Thrasymachus’s view with a story about the ring of Gyges.8 In this story, a shepherd comes across a chasm in the middle of a field in which he finds a hollow bronze horse that entombs a dead man wearing a gold ring. The shepherd takes the ring and discovers that it makes him invisible (think Tolkien, but before the common era). He uses the power of the ring to kill the king and take over the kingdom. Through the ring he has gained a superpower, which he could use for just or wicked actions—exactly like the Dark Avengers can (as well as the real ones).
What would happen if there were two such rings, and you gave one to a just person and the other to an unjust person? Glaucon suggests that “no one, it seems, would be so incorruptible that he would stay on the path of justice or stay away from other people’s property.”9 In other words, both the just and the unjust person would do bad things; it would simply take the just person a bit longer.
Glaucon goes further, saying that most people would look down upon the person unwilling to commit injustice. If a person was given the opportunity to be invisible, and did not take the opportunity, then that person would “be thought wretched and stupid by everyone aware of the situation, though, of course, they’d praise him in public, deceiving each other for fear of suffering injustice.”10 Glaucon suggests that while we would never admit it publicly, we think that people are fools if they are good when no one else is watching. So in fact he would claim that on some level we admire people like the Dark Avengers.
Glaucon concludes that most people believe the life of an unjust and wicked person is actually better (in nonmoral terms) than that of a just person. So not only do we admire the Dark Avengers, but we believe our life would be better if we were one of them. To demonstrate this, Glaucon sets up a thought experiment with two scenarios. First, imagine a perfectly unjust person who is granted a rep
utation for being just and, no matter what he does, is able to explain his actions from within his narrative of being a just person. Second, imagine a perfectly just person who never does anything unjust, but who is given a reputation for profound injustice. He will always act justly, but will always be thought to be unjust.
Glaucon’s experiment pushes us to ask ourselves whether “being” just is important enough to us that we would accept the second scenario. In other words, if you only had the two options of being just and appearing unjust, or being unjust and appearing just, which would you choose? Do you care enough about being just that you would accept being shunned by your family, friends, and society (in which case you accept Socrates’s view)? Or do you care more about power and the praise you get from those around you (in which case you accept Thrasymachus’s view)?
The Dark Avengers all have “magic rings,” so to speak. They all appear to be good because they are dressed up like Avengers, but they do bad things that the general public does not know about. The short run of Dark Avengers abounds with examples of hidden violent actions that the average person would consider morally despicable. For instance, Norman Osborn gives Bullseye, posing as Hawkeye, the order to murder the Sentry’s wife, Lindy. Bullseye is more than happy to throw Lindy out of a helicopter and then claim that she committed suicide.11 We can see what the Dark Avengers, and especially Osborn, do when they have the power of invisibility, hiding behind the identities of legitimate Avengers, but the truly scary thought is how readily they were accepted as such.