A bridge between the military and social militarism was established between the army and public associations. One such association was the League of Front-Soldiers, known as the Steel Helmets (Stahlhelm), founded by veterans of the Great War, in December 1918. Their initial intention was to keep alive the spirit of comradeship, born in the trenches, in common with a host of similar organizations around the world. The greeting of its members, “hail the front” (frontheil), symbolized the merger of trench culture and paramilitarism. While the Stahlhelm conducted obvious military activities, including weapons training and full-scale exercises, it also waged a hostile political campaign for a return to the pre-1914 order. The Stahlhelm administered a welfare campaign of social help for the poorer communities and charitable activities that included winter-help schemes. They were reasonably successful in proving an acceptable face to militarism under Weimar.32 There was a flood of political party protection squads. They were essential for protecting officials and ensuring the party message was delivered without interference. The Nazis raised two guard formations: the SA (Sturmabteilung) and the Protection Squad (Schutzstaffel–SS). The SS was initially formed as small elite to protect Hitler.33 Their growth in power and influence was because of Hitler. In Mein Kampf, Hitler thought the SA would become the highly trained champions of national socialism, the devoted soldiers of the Nazi Weltanschauung. However, the unruly behavior of the SA, especially toward elements within the party, including himself, led Hitler to abandon the SS as a personal bodyguard.
In 1929, Hitler promoted Heinrich Himmler to Reichsführer-SS with the mandate to increase the post’s political authority and influence. Himmler arranged the central office of the SS and, in 1931, opened two branches that addressed questions of security and race. The Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst–SD), under Reinhard Heydrich, was an internal security bureau that monitored society and the party. The other was the SS Race and Settlement Office (Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt, RuSHA), which, under Richard Darré, codified Blut und Boden ideas into SS dogma. 34 In the early years, the SS leadership embedded its harsh discipline and blind obedience to Hitler that remained until May 1945.35 The end of freebooting paramilitarism coincided with the destruction of Ernst Röhm and the emasculation of the SA. The culling of Nazi comrades by the SS in June 1934, during the “night of the long knives,” was inevitable. The end of paramilitarism was confirmed in July 1934 when Hitler declared, “I elevate [the SS] to the status of an independent organisation within the NSDAP subordinate to the supreme SS leader. The Chief of Staff and the Reichsführer-SS are both invested with the Party rank of Reichsleiter.”36
In 1935, Kurt Daluege, later the chief of the Order Police (Chef der Ordnungspolizei), mimicked Carl Severing when he asked the question, “What are the police for?” He believed that if the police were to meet the National Socialist mission then they should aspire to become soldiers of the community (Gemeindesoldat).37 Erich Ludendorff also made an encore appearance at this time. In the chaos after 1918, he had brought together a disparate group of individuals that subsequently became the backbone of the Nazi Party. Epp, Hitler, Röhm, Hess, and Ludendorff shared a vision of the pure Germanic (Aryan) society, a militarized community, regimented, racist, rich in territories and raw materials, led by a man of vision.38 The Nazi mindset believed in Ludendorff for his near victory in 1918, the “stab-in-the-back” slogan, and his support for Hitler during the failed Munich putsch (1923). His book Der totale Krieg (1935) was published in the same year Hitler introduced the Nuremberg race laws and conscription, the key foundations of the racist militarized society.39 In Wilhelm Deist’s opinion, Ludendorff had drafted the blueprint for the Nazi concept of warfare. A vision of power lay at the heart of Ludendorff’s total war. This was a vision of conflict and struggle as the permanent way of life. Interpretations of Ludendorff’s “total war” have played down the experiences that underpinned his theories. The “Ober Ost” and his supreme command had scaled the heights of the purely militarized society, alien to civilian social norms.40 Ludendorff’s model for the militarized national community founded the Nazi concept of a national community (Volksgemeinschaft) and met Daluege’s ideas of a community soldier. He recommended the application of sweeping preventative measures to suppress “disgruntled” groups in times of war and their classification as enemies of the state.41 Ludendorff answered Daluege’s question by encapsulating the role of a militarized police within the dogma of race and space.
In June 1936, Heinrich Himmler became chief of the SS (Reichsführer-SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei), marking the next stage in the radicalization of security. The merger of the SS and police signaled the rise of a national police force following the road of national security. Himmler’s experience of political soldiering, policing, and Nazi administrative politics was not the only reason Hitler chose him to become the supreme police officer. The exponent of guardianship policing, Himmler propagandized this mission as “inner security, the inner protection of the National Socialist people.” As he argued, “From the traditional concept of Police has arisen the new concept of a protective Corps of the German people. And just as the old idea was typically personified in the bailiff, the new idea also demands a new man.” Thus, he wrote, “The police again was carried into the midst of the people as an important member for the protection and defense of the community.”42 Himmler’s legendary administrative skills, education and career, classical upbringing, degree in agricultural economics, and even his grasp of the principles of modern business, especially the concepts of profit and loss and the cost-benefit method of German bureaucracy, served as the guidelines for the SS corporation. From a bureaucratic standpoint, the merger of the SS and police simplified the regulation of doctrines. The administration of the Nuremberg race laws became a state code. In the codified nation, police officers and civilians alike could practice unrestricted institutional racism without telegraphing as publicly or overtly racist.
The elevation of his two lieutenants—Reinhard Heydrich as chief of the Security Police and Daluege as chief of the Order Police—amplified Hitler’s faith in Himmler as his highly motivated protégé.43 This triumvirate reinforced the competence of SS-Police leadership and proved highly productive.44 There were practicalities to this arrangement. Before his death, Röhm proposed creating a Nazi army by absorbing the Reichswehr into the SA and creating an armed state protection corps (Staatsschutzkorps) responsible for internal and external security. Hermann Göring proposed the transformation of the federated police forces into a centralized police army. Himmler’s plan involved centralizing all internal security assets into a single corporation led by the SS. Himmler’s triumph was the catalyst to all the ideas and the radical compromise for Nazi security.
This “new man” was mentally energetic and craved to follow in the footsteps of men such as Hitler and Ludendorff. He came from a family dominated by the father, a senior school official who taught the classics. Alfred Andersch did not write of Himmler’s father in glowing terms. He described him as a member of the Bavarian People’s Party, a conservative to the core (Schwarz bis in die Knochen), who was known for being a “rear-area stallion” (Etappen-hengst) and a fervent Catholic, but most notably a non-racist. Andersch portrayed the youthful Himmler as a fine young man, denied the chance of becoming a soldier, who moved in the correct circles of Hitler’s followers and the “Ludendorff people.”45 Fascinated by Germanic myths and mythology, Himmler grasped Hitler’s one-thousand-year Reich and, through Nazi symbiotic cultism, was able to flaunt his interests. His SS uniform collar patches combined the oak leaves of Germanic culture with the Roman laurel-leaf crown symbolizing the fusion of German mythology with ancient Rome. In climbing the greasy pole of Nazi politics, Himmler had self-styled his SS as Hitler’s Wagnerian Praetorian Guard.46 As Hitler’s most trusted soldier, Himmler was bent on imposing the lessons from the past as the benefactors to the Nazi future. “We are not wiser than the men of two thousand years ago,” he said. “Persians, Greeks, Ro
mans and Prussians all had their guards. The guards of the new Germany will be the SS.”47
Political Prominence
Erich Julius Eberhard von Zelewski was born in March 1899 in Lauenberg, a small Pomeranian town in West Prussia. His rise to prominence was rapid and unsurprising. Although the son of a Junker family, he grew up poverty stricken. His father, Otto Johannes von Zelewski, was born in 1859. He undertook a range of jobs, including in civil service and agriculture, and died on April 17, 1911, in Dortmund while working as an insurance clerk. His mother, Eveline Schimanski, was born in Thorn in April 1862 or 1864. His parents married in Lauenberg in June 1890. The family reputation was also blighted: his father’s brother was the ill-fated Emil von Zelewski who brought disgrace to the nation. Young Erich lived to restore the family honor. He spent his formative years under the guidance of his uncle, Oskar von Zelewski, who became his stepfather and was killed in action on the Eastern Front in 1915. Oskar was twenty-five years old and Erich just sixteen. Like his stepfather, Erich joined the army and, in November 1914, had the status of the youngest recruit of the war.48 His first posting was to the 3rd West Prussian Infantry-Regiment Nr.129 (Neustettin). While serving with this regiment, he was awarded the Iron Cross (Second Class), and he received his first wound in 1915 and then earned a battlefield commission in 1916. The psychological effects of his wounding and extreme pain haunted him for the rest of his life. As Leutnant von Zelewski, he was posted to the Grenadier Regiment König Friederich Wilhelm (1st Silesian) Nr.10 based in Schweidnitz. This elite regiment had served in China during the Boxer Rebellion and fostered a close relationship with both Trotha and Lettow-Vorbeck. The regiment prided itself on a reputation for passing on its military skills and expertise from one generation of officers to the next. Leutnant von Zelewski found a home freely mingling with other Junker vons, including Manteuffel, Lüttwitz, Blankensee, Kleist, Bonin, and Bülow. 49 In July 1918, he was awarded the Cross of Honor (Ehrenkreuz) for his war service and then the Iron Cross (First Class). Leutnant von Zelewski ended the war as a young, battle-scared hero.
In November 1918, following the kaiser’s abdication, Germany descended into revolution. During the ensuing chaos, Leutnant von Zelewski took his first political steps. His 1944 SS curriculum vitae (Lebenslauf) notes that in 1919 he joined the monarchist and right-wing German National People’s Party (DNVP). His military career appeared safe in July 1919, although the regiment lost its monarchical status and became the 11th Infantry Regiment. It became part of Reichswehr Brigade 6 (formerly the 11th Infantry Division), within military district (Wehrkreis) III, and retained its home depot in Schweidnitz. From 1919 to 1924, the regiment was committed to German–Polish border duties. Leutnant von Zelewski made a memorable impression on Kurt von Bülow, his battalion commander, as a trustworthy (Vertrauensmann) officer revealing qualities of leadership and bravery. He led an aggressive reconnaissance, was wounded in the arm, and, in another incident, led a squad in the arrest of a doctor and his daughter working for the Polish authorities.50 The young Leutnant received a new batch of medals for bravery, including the “Silesian Eagle” (Schlesischer Adler I and II), the “Protection of Silesia Medal,” and the courage award (Tapferkeitsabzeichen). It was significant that the awards came from fighting against Polish nationalism. His SS files also list service with the former 4th Foot Guards, which was later renumbered to “29.” In 1947, he alleged that, at the time of the Kapp putsch (1920), he was serving as the ordnance officer for the 29th Infantry Regiment of the Reichswehr based in Berlin-Moabit.51 Both regiments came under Wehrkreis III, and for a war-commissioned officer without a specific base, his postings were common. The reasons for his departure from the army remain obscure. Under interrogation in 1946, he blamed his sisters for marrying Jews and destroying his reputation. He also suggested he became a battalion commander in the Black Reichswehr under Buchrucker. Given his proximity to the events, he was probably granted a battalion posting to soften the impact of his eventual demobilization and was released after the putsch.52 In the mid-1930s, he briefly returned to the army, reactivating his reserve status with the 8th Infantry Regiment (Schweidnitz), and was promoted to Hauptmann. On October 23, 1925, the young Zelewski changed his name by legal decree from the justice ministry to include “von dem Bach.”53 Years later, he wrote to Himmler referring to Bülow’s book. He failed to explain why the author referred to Leutnant von Zelewski in the narrative but listed “von dem Bach-Zelewski” in the index.54 His military career had closed at the age of twenty-five; yet he had taken on a new identity and delved into politics.
Bach-Zelewski married Ruth Apfeld in September 1921, and together they had six children. Ruth’s family came from Ratibor, which in 1921 lay close to the Polish and Czechoslovakian borders. Bach-Zelewski showed in his diary their devotion to one another: he called her Mutti (as in mother), and she referred to him as Vati (father). They owned a farm near Dühringshof near Frankfurt on the Oder, and later he set up home in Breslau.55 Between 1924 and 1930, he became involved in local farming association politics, building a reputation for soldiering and farming that would place him at the forefront of Himmler’s Blut und Boden warriors. In 1930, he joined the Allgemeine-SS and came under Daluege’s command in the Frankfurt/Oder area. Daluege thought very highly of him, probably because they had both been youthful volunteers in the Great War. The SS records indicate that Daluege assessed Bach-Zelewski as “true and honest, starkly impulsive, in many cases unrestrained, uncontrolled recklessness (hemmungslos). Promotion is recommended if he controls his impulsiveness.”56 Bach-Zelewski’s transfer of loyalty to Daluege proved immediately valuable in the attempted internal coup by the Berlin SA in April 1931. Walter Stennes and Bruno Buchrucker had become members of the SA. True to form, they attempted to inspire a revolt in Berlin against Hitler. Intervention by Daluege, assisted by Bach-Zelewski, tipped off Hitler, and the coup was crushed. Afterward, Hitler wrote to Daluege a letter of thanks that included the words “my honor is loyalty” (Meine Ehre heist Treue), which Himmler had etched into the blade of all SS ceremonial daggers.
In the 1930s, senior SS officers were required to prove their racial ancestry. Bach-Zelewski wrote to the SS Race and Resettlement Office in December 1935 explaining that he had not been able to retrieve the appropriate documentation from Poland. He alleged that proof of his wife’s Aryan ancestry was in her brother’s possession, the police chief of Neisse-Schlesien (Poland). Bach-Zelewski promised to make every effort to retrieve the documents. On January 11, 1937, however, the SS Race and Resettlement Officer of Breslau declared that the Poles had frustrated their efforts. The SS, in the 1930s, also institutionalized proselytism as religion and paganism existed in a permanent state of flux. Bach-Zelewski changed religion from Catholic to Evangelist in 1933 and then to “believer in a higher form of life” (gottgläubig) in 1938, further evidence of his immersion into SS orthodoxy.57 In 1935, Himmler accepted one of Bach-Zelewski’s children as a godson (Patenkind), in his evergrowing list of politicized godchildren.58 The bond between Himmler and Bach-Zelewski thrived during the war.
Bach-Zelewski began his SS career of political killing in 1930 with the murder of three communists. On July 2, 1934, he ordered his subordinates, SS driver Paul Zummach and SS-Hauptsturmführer Reinhardt, to kill Anton Freiherr von Hohberg und Buchwald in Eylau in East Prussia. In 1935, he was chief of SS and security police in Königsberg. He very quickly came to blows with Gauleiter Koch over a series of matters, including, most significantly, who controlled Königsberg.59 In August, Hjalmar Schacht, in his role as president of the Reichsbank and economics minister, attended the Königsberg eastern conference (Ostmesse) to present the keynote speech on the consequences of Nazi economic policies. Schacht was critical of the growing attacks on Jews. He said they were detrimental to the performance of the economy and weakened Germany’s currency trade balances with foreign countries. Bach-Zelewski was incensed. He shouted at Schacht, calling him a traitor to the German people, while declaring that the
Jews would pay for their crimes. He ordered the SS and police to leave the conference in a deliberate show of blatant anti-Semitism.60 Koch took exception to Bach-Zelewski’s behavior and reported him to Goebbels and Himmler. Attending the conference were representatives from the army and the navy who witnessed the incident and reported it to their respective commanding officers. Both officers condoned Bach-Zelewski’s behavior, placing on the record that he was a fine comrade and correct, endorsing the professionalism of his actions against Schacht.61
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