7th Hussars, it will be recalled, were already operating around Meiktila, and on 25th April Captain Ray Nickel’s troop, patrolling south on the Toungoo road, bumped a column of enemy lorries head on. Nickel’s guns opened up at once, and he travelled the length of the column twice, lashing it from end to end with machine-gun fire. Not surprisingly, the tank crews enjoyed giving the Japanese a taste of the medicine they had themselves handed out so often to British transport columns, and the engagement ended with a large number of the enemy sprawled dead and wounded in and around their wrecked and blazing vehicles.
On the same day Major Bonham-Carter had set off for Pyawbwe with two scout cars to liaise with the Chinese, who reported that they were under pressure. Rounding a bend about a mile north of the town he suddenly found himself staring down the muzzles of three Japanese tanks, only seventy-five yards away. Both cars at once swung round to make good their escape, and whilst they were turning the tanks opened fire. Incredibly, they all missed, and Bonham-Carter did not give them a second chance.
By now, the strategic situation in Burma was extremely grave. Whilst Burma Corps and the Chinese were conducting a fighting withdrawal up the river valleys, a third Japanese force was proceeding unopposed northwards through the hills of eastern Burma, and had captured Lashio, effectively severing the vital link with China, the Burma Road. This force was now swinging westwards, and the implications were that very shortly all Allied forces to the south of Mandalay would be surrounded and forced to surrender. For obvious military and political reasons, Alexander could not allow another debacle like Singapore, and the decision was made that the Army should cross the Irrawaddy and retire westwards towards the Indian frontier.
It was, in any case, time to go. For two months the Army had been living and fighting on stores back-loaded from Rangoon, and now these were beginning to run out. Replenishment from India was out of the question, since the physical means of delivery did not exist.
In this light, the events of 25th April, whilst small in themselves, were symptomatic. The reappearance of the Japanese armour, and the presence so far forward of a motorized column, indicated not merely another local offensive, but the beginnings of a major effort to finish the business once and for all.
During 26th April, the Hussars’ A Squadron, patrolling south from Meiktila, encountered the enemy in considerable numbers near a village called Kandang. Troops from B and C Squadrons were sent down to assist, together with D Troop Essex Yeomanry and a company of West Yorkshires. In spite of heavy losses, the Japanese held onto the village throughout the day, and fought back hard, knocking out two of the Stuarts. At last light, the tanks withdrew into leaguer north of Wundwin, close to 2 RTR, 7th Armoured Brigade being concentrated for the first time for several weeks.
After the checks imposed on the enemy by 7th Hussars during the past two days, Brigadier Anstice did not feel that the Japanese would press their advance the next day, and his orders were that 2 RTR were to patrol southwards in an attempt to contact the enemy, but not to get heavily involved.
B Squadron thus found themselves advancing southwards through Ngathet next morning, and the point troop had actually passed through the village, when two tanks in the next troop were knocked out in quick succession by anti-tank fire. The leading troop returned to the squadron across country, and the tanks remained in a position of observation whilst the Essex Yeomanry shelled the village.
The enemy replied from Ngathet with four guns but his fire was inaccurate, and it was felt that he was not in position to observe his shooting. Observation of any kind was, in fact, extremely difficult, as the country was covered with tall thick scrub.
At about 1030, Captain Chaplin, the Essex Yeomanry FOO, observed through his binoculars four enemy tanks moving north out of Ngathet. B Squadron at once engaged and a short but sharp exchange of fire took place, in which at least one Japanese vehicle was hit without either casualties or damage being sustained by the Stuarts. The remaining enemy tanks retired.
The Japanese now changed their tactics, and were clearly under pressure to get on. Throughout the morning they had been stealthily pushing their guns forward, manhandling them through the thick scrub. The only indication of this movement was that after a few rounds of gunfire there would be a period of silence, and then the guns would open up again, a little nearer the tanks. Back at RHQ it sounded as though the guns were actually firing from B Squadron’s position. Occasionally, infantry could be seen, but never for very long, whilst away to the west dust and blue smoke were visible, accompanied by engine noises.
It seemed, therefore, that the Japanese armour was, for once, trying to work round the flank whilst B Squadron’s attention was held by the artillery. Lt-Colonel Yule appreciated that the squadron was too far forward, and deployed A Squadron on a wide front south of Wundwin, in a lay-back position. In the meantime, B Squadron 7th Hussars was covering the eastern flank, whilst the same regiment’s C Squadron patrolled the main road north of Wundwin to prevent the formation of the sort of road blocks which had given so much trouble in the past.
At 1430 B Squadron began to withdraw. As the tanks approached the village of Shawbin, enemy guns, which must have been manhandled through or round the squadron’s position, opened up, firing on the main British position at Wundwin to the north. Simultaneously, the Japanese tanks put in an appearance to the west of the road, which they began to shoot up with a mixture of AP and HE, and their infantry and mortar teams also engaged the Stuarts.
In spite of this unexpected reception, Captain Dumas, commanding B Squadron whilst Major Bonham-Carter was recovering from a severe snake bite, fought his way through, and the squadron took up a position of observation north of the village. One tank, attempting to skirt the village on the blind side, had overturned in a nullah, and the crew, evacuating under small, arms fire, later found their way back.
The Essex Yeomanry at once engaged Shawbin, but the steady infiltration continued, and Colonel Yule advised Brigade HQ that the position, as far as 2 RTR were concerned, would become untenable very shortly. Brigadier Anstice sent up another company of West Yorkshires to plug the gaps between the tanks, but told Yule that he must stay where he was and cover 63 Brigade’s position at Wundwin until they withdrew during the evening.
Whilst Anstice arranged for 7th Hussars and the Tanks’ newly returned C Squadron to lift 63 Brigade out of the position, there now being very little wheeled transport left to Burma Corps, A and B Squadrons, the Yeomanry and the West Yorkshires held on. By 1800 the enemy had closed up on the position, and an assault seemed a distinct possibility. The situation was further complicated by damaging shellfire from the north, which caused casualties amongst the infantry, and B Squadron was despatched to the rear to deal with this problem. To their disgust they found that the guns belonged to 17th Indian Division, and were firing very much at random, without an OP.
At 1900 Brigade HQ reported that the majority of 63 Brigade was safely away, and instructed B Squadron and the Essex Yeomanry to bring out the remainder on their tanks and gun limbers. No sooner had this move started than A Squadron reported that the enemy had started his attack, and that it was being led by tanks.
Captain Dumas at once returned to the position with four B Squadron tanks, and joined in A Squadron’s battle in the fading light. Hits were obtained on the enemy vehicles,* without loss or damage to either squadron, and the Japanese broke contact.
Throughout the night 2 RTR continued to ferry the infantry northwards, passing through 7th Hussars’ position at Kyaukse, and going into leaguer at 0600.
The morning of 28th April found the Hussars’ C Squadron patrolling south from Kyaukse. SSM Ainley’s troop encountered another enemy transport column, destroying several vehicles before the rest turned tail. The Japanese then brought up their guns, forcing C Squadron to withdraw slightly, and their dive-bombers, one of which destroyed a tank in Lt Allen’s troop with a direct hit.
During the night 7th Hussars’ leaguer was shelled, and
the following morning the enemy mounted several heavy attacks on 48 Brigade’s position at Kyaukse. Everyone in 7th Armoured Brigade had a tremendous admiration for these Gurkhas, who were holding an excellent position on a big hill west of the town, fronted by a belt of sharpened bamboo stakes, each capable of disembowelling a man.
The Japanese came on through the artillery’s shell bursts and the Gurkhas steady fire until they were shot flat, and then they tried again. B Squadron added their weight of fire to the defence, and as each Stuart mounted three Browning machine guns, one in the hull, one co-axially and one in an AA mounting on the turret roof, the resulting fire-storm was more than flesh and blood could stand. The Japanese turned and ran, and after them went the Gurkhas, kukris swinging as they tore down the hill in a savage counter attack. When it was over, a quick body count showed approximately 300 enemy dead carpeting the ground. The Gurkhas had lost one man.
48 Brigade pulled out during the evening, covered by Lt Patteson’s troop. As the infantry were moving off, Patteson observed that the Japanese were beginning to deploy out of some woodland, and waited until they were nicely arranged before laying into them with his troop’s 12 Brownings. As they went down in heaps, Patteson felt a justifiable pleasure in balancing the account opened with his treatment at the Shwedaung road block.
Lt Palmer, meanwhile, had been sent back to Kyaukse to prevent the enemy following up the Gurkhas’ withdrawal.
‘The place was a ghastly sight. It was a wooden town and was on fire from end to end. There were dead all over the place, and the stench was appalling.’
During the day, C Squadron had been patrolling the road to the north to keep it open. However, the check imposed on the enemy was so severe that he was in no position to interfere with the withdrawal to the Ava bridge, which the rearguard, including 7th Armoured Brigade, crossed that night. As the tanks motored through the grey dawn light, a thunderous explosion announced the destruction of the bridge, which was so badly damaged that it was beyond the capacity of the Japanese to repair.
Once beyond the Irrawaddy, it might have been felt that Burma Corps was safe from immediate contact with the enemy, but this was not so. The Japanese had pushed an amphibious force up the Chindwin, the Irrawaddy’s major tributary, and during 30th April this had all but captured Corps HQ at Monywa, and now had 63 Brigade cornered.
C Squadron 7th Hussars was despatched at once, followed by the rest of the regiment. The approach march was a long one, something like 140 miles, but C Squadron was in action almost as soon as it arrived.
By the morning of 2nd May, the regiment was six miles north of Monywa, but was in contact with neither C Squadron nor 63 Brigade. Lt Palmer’s troop was therefore given the difficult task of getting through to them.
I was told to establish contact with them and give verbal orders for them to withdraw immediately. We knew nothing whatsoever of the enemy’s movements. I decided to make a wide sweep out to the south-east and followed little-used tracks, few of which were marked. The country was close and I moved with considerable caution.
More by luck than judgement, as I had soon got rather lost, and also due to a bit of incorrect map reading, I hit the road running south-east from Monywa and met some Indian refugees who told me that there were tanks further up the road. I concluded these belonged to C Squadron and pushed on.
I soon met Pat Howard-Dobson’s troop, who directed me to Sqn HQ. John Congreve was very pleased to see us as he was under the impression they were completely cut off. I was taken to the Brigade Commander. I briefed him on my orders and explained that I had worked my way round without seeing any Japanese. He was very worried about getting his wounded away, and I called up the regiment and they organized a bullock-cart convoy which was brought down to us under escort by Basil Young.
At 1700 the Brigade started to pull out. C Squadron, who only had a few tanks, left Shorty White to stay with me. Our two troops then carried out a series of leap-frogs to cover the withdrawal and we had only slight trouble from some mortaring and a few rounds of anti-tank fire.
We rejoined the squadron at Yeu and soon snipers started up from the river area. It looked as if the enemy were following up quickly. We moved up the Yeu road about ten miles where we leaguered. During the night, Ray Nickel, whose troop had been missing, came in. He had been wounded and his troop sergeant killed. Basil Young, who had covered our withdrawal, had had a bad time and had destroyed one of his tanks which had broken down.
7th Hussars were now operating in a particularly nasty neck of the woods, which swarmed with dacoits. During the day, three members of an A Squadron tank crew were stabbed to death by villagers who were pretending to barter. Unfortunately for them, the vehicle commander shot his way out with his pistol, and soon returned with the entire squadron and a company of West Yorkshires. The infantry attack flushed the dacoits out of their village and under the tanks’ guns; too late it was realized that the running mob contained women and children, and innocent people died before the firing could be stopped. This unhappy incident upset 7th Hussars more than anything else during the long retreat.
Next day, B Squadron, patrolling the Monywa-Yeu road, had a further brush with dacoits.
‘The roads were a horrible sight,’ recalls Palmer. ‘They were crowded with civilian refugees, many of whom had been killed by dacoits. The Burmese had been quick to take their revenge on Indian shopkeepers and moneylenders. On one occasion I was told of a dacoit gang and followed them. We found them fleeing. They numbered about 50/60 and we had a real holiday, killing and wounding a very large proportion of them. We also put in a certain amount of work destroying Burma Division’s MT which had been abandoned. We even found a 3.7-inch AA gun apparently in working order, and put this out of action.’
Meanwhile, 2 RTR, whose squadrons had been dispersed on various tasks over a fifty-mile triangle, had concentrated and moved into a lay-back position at Budalin on 2nd May. A Squadron was sent down to Alon to cover the river, and a little later C Squadron arrived to protect their left flank. Some Japanese barges were engaged on the river, but at this stage of the war the Stuarts’ 37-mm gun did not fire HE ammunition, and the small, neat hole made by the AP shot did not do a great deal of damage.
By now, the troops trapped in Monywa had made their way out, and 2 RTR’s role was to cover their withdrawal to the north and act as rearguard. By approximately 1830 the infantry were clear, and A Squadron began to pull back from the river bank to the road. As they did so, small arms fire was opened on the tanks from very short range, showing that the enemy had been moving up through the close country undetected throughout the day.
When A Squadron was clear, C Squadron returned to the road from their position to the east, and during this move one tank shed a track in the heavy going. The situation was now beginning to deteriorate rapidly, and the enemy was now adding artillery fire to the constant sniping. Leaving one tank as escort for the cripple, whilst the crew effected repairs, Major Rudkin ordered the crews of both vehicles to rejoin the squadron when the job was finished, instructing them to move parallel to the road.
At this point a Japanese armoured car engaged the squadron from a position 300 yards down the road, but scurried away into the scrub when the tanks returned the fire.
The regiment then withdrew at very slow speed up the road for the next four hours [wrote Major Rudkin]. The speed was governed by the marching infantry in front, who had animal transport with them. At about 0200 C Squadron were ordered to take up a position just south of Budalin with a mixed battalion of infantry while the remainder of the regiment leaguered about three miles to the north. Two guard tanks of C Squadron were placed on either side of the road and the remainder of the squadron formed a very close leaguer about fifty yards further back.
Here we settled for the remainder of the night feeling fairly secure with infantry screens about two hundred yards out all round us. At this stage I had lost contact with the two tanks who were trying to make their way back by travelling paral
lel to the road and east of it. The last wireless message, at about midnight, reported that they were making good progress. I warned the infantry that there were still two tanks out which might be expected to come in during the night.
At 0400 the sentries heard tanks moving towards the leaguer up the road from the south. The NCO commanding one of the guard tanks, assuming they were the two missing tanks, stood in the middle of the road, and when the first tank was about thirty yards away, waved it to slow down and prepared to guide it in. To his horror, he heard excited Japanese voices coming from inside the tank, but before he could do anything about it, the tank opened fire, knocking out one of our guard tanks with the first shot. The second guard tank opened up on the enemy within a few seconds, but was unable to see very much owing to the darkness.
On the first shot from the guard tank, the Japanese tanks turned round and vanished into the dark, leaving one of our tanks blazing. The crew inside this tank had no chance and were all so badly burned that they died soon afterwards. The whole episode took but a minute, but in that time the remainder of the squadron had mounted and started up their tanks. When it got light, we found parts of a Stuart on the road where the Japanese had been, so we knew that the shots fired by the second guard tank had at least winged the Japanese, who were obviously using tanks captured from us earlier in the campaign.
Between 0500 and 0800 all infantry in the area came in and withdrew northwards. At 0800 the noise of a tank engine was heard, but nothing could be seen owing to the thick scrub. C Squadron was disposed on the road ready to meet any threat from the east, but eventually one of the tanks which had been missing from the day before emerged from the scrub, and was lucky not to be fired at by the remainder of the squadron. The second missing tank had overturned in a nullah during the night, and was burnt after its petrol had been siphoned into the fit tank, which was running short. SSM Philpotts, the tank commander, stated that he had been forced by very bad going to take a very wide detour to get back. For most of the night a friendly Burmese had ridden on his tank and guided him, dodging enemy patrols after first light. The crew of the abandoned tank were carried back by the fit tank.
Tank Tracks to Rangoon Page 8
