A Squadron, working with 33 Brigade, carried out a most destructive shoot on Ngakyedauk village, suspected of being a major Japanese supply centre and assembly area for Jif units. The squadron, now at full strength since its remaining seven tanks had joined it from the Admin Box, fired non-stop for twenty minutes, utterly destroying the village, the site of which was then occupied.
For the Japanese, Ha-Go was beginning to turn out very badly, however desperate the situation might appear to the defenders of the Admin Box. The British had not been panicked into fighting their way out; they were staying put, and they were being supplied by air regularly, whilst the ramshackle Japanese supply system was showing signs of breaking down where it had not stopped completely. 55th Division was taking casualties at a quite disproportionate rate, but had very little to show for it. On the other hand, 5th Indian Division which should by now be conducting a disorderly withdrawal, was actually menacing the western end of the Ngakyedauk Pass, whilst General Christison had committed a fresh division, 26th Indian, which was now advancing southwards to sever the communications of Kubo and Tanahashi.
The gallant defence of the Admin Box was causing Tanahashi to lose face with his superiors. His excuse to Hanaya was that he had not expected to find tanks east of the Mayu range, and that they were present in large numbers. At a meeting of his unit commanders he called for greater sacrifice to put an end to what he called the ‘hysterical’ defence; coming from a Japanese officer, this was really rich. The men on the spot knew that unless they could dispose of the tanks they were not going to get anywhere, and although several had been hit and set on fire, they were not being destroyed fast enough. A suicide attack was rashly mounted on the Dragoons’ harbour, but was destroyed in the open paddy. Phosphorous shells were fired in an attempt to set fire to the grass around the tanks, without success.
Meanwhile, several additional infantry companies had been able to work their way into the box, taking some of the strain off the exhausted West Yorkshires. Nonetheless, conditions inside the perimeter were anything but pleasant, shelling, mortaring and sniping being constant. During the night, the Japanese kept the mens’ nerves on edge with their jitter parties when they were not actually attacking. The whole area now reeked of death and cordite, and was covered with the skeletons of countless smashed and burned out vehicles. By 16th February the new dressing-station contained almost 500 casualties.
During the night of 15th February firing had been heard from the direction of the old divisional headquarters. As this had nothing to do with the Admin Box’s immediate defence, nor could have involved troops from 7th Division’s equally embattled brigades, a patrol from C Squadron under Captain Alexander was sent out the following morning to investigate. By 1000 hours Alexander was in contact with 1st Lincolnshire Regiment, the leading unit of 26th Indian Division. The Lincoin’s adjutant, brought into the box, was able to tell General Messervy that an attack on Point 315, covering the eastern approach, had been halted by determined Japanese resistance, and that his battalion was to pull back a little. In covering the Lincoln’s withdrawal, one of C Squadron’s tanks was hit by mortar fire and burned out, and a second ditched so badly as to be irrecoverable for the present.
B Squadron also had a derelict tank, and they used this to test the effectiveness of some captured Japanese magnetic mines. It was found that when applied to the sides of a Lee, the explosion merely bulged the plating inwards; however, when placed on top of the tank, above the operator’s seat, the mine blew a hole clean through the roof, the floor below, and ten inches into the ground. It was immediately recommended that wire frames should be fitted above the vulnerable top plates to prevent an effective contact being made.
Meanwhile, 5th Indian Division, supported by a squadron made up from the 25 th Dragoons’ spare tanks and crews, was making good progress through the Pass. Commanding the squadron was Major James Allason, a Carabinier officer who had been sent up by GHQ on a fact-finding tour, and now found himself playing a leading role in the relief operations.
On reaching the summit of the Pass, the leading brigade found itself held up by the grandfather of all bunker complexes. From the main position, which was exceptionally well constructed, subsidiary bunkers radiated, spitting fire, and for once the Lees were unable to subdue the opposition.
Allason consulted the divisional CRA, and between them they drew up a plan. A 5.5-inch howitzer was brought up, and two tanks manoeuvred into position to provide protection for the gun and its crew. The Japanese fired everything they had at the little party, but it was too late. Methodically, the gun slammed its heavy shells into one fire slit after another, and after about twenty rounds all that was left of the complex was smoking craters. The advance continued.
On the 22nd C Squadron and two companies of KOSB left the Admin Box to try and make contact. A road block delayed progress for most of the day, and when this was cleared, a further block was discovered a little beyond.
The next day the operation continued, and contact was established between the KOSB and two Punjabi battalions from 5th Division. To all intents and purposes, the siege was over, although the Japanese remained in the area in some strength for some days, and one anti-tank gun, located near Tattenham Corner, made a nuisance of itself until finally disposed of on the 25th. This gun opened up on any tank within range, and had disabled Colonel Frink’s tank with a hit on the side.
Tanahashi’s men withdrew as best they could, defeated, starving, and doubting themselves and their leaders for the first time. Hanaya’s once proud 55th Division had taken over 5,000 casualties, and had almost been crushed by the embrace of three British divisions; in return, beyond the infliction of some 3,000 casualties on 15 Corps, it had accomplished precisely nothing.
As the morale of the Japanese fell, that of the British and Indian troops rose in proportion. They had met and beaten the enemy at his own game, and things would never be quite the same again, since the Japanese had not only been out-fought, but out-generalled as well.
The part played by 25th Dragoons, both inside and outside the Admin Box, had been critical, and the presence of their tanks had clearly upset Tanahashi’s plans, since he had no effective way of dealing with them. The regiment’s War Diary for the period is, at first glance, a most modest and matter-of-fact summary of events, but the daily entries, taken together, show a constant involvement in an aggressive defence, supporting attacks at one point, beating them off at another, defensive shoots, patrols, and recovery of tanks and air-dropped supplies under fire.
‘25th Dragoons were a continual source of anxiety to the Japanese, who time and again made suicidal efforts to reach and destroy their tanks. One effort was reminiscent of the Charge of the Light Brigade, when a large party put in a bayonet charge in broad daylight across open paddy fields in a desperate attempt to destroy the tanks with hand placed explosives. Every man of the attackers was killed by the fire of the tanks and the motorized company of 3/4 Bombay Grenadiers long before they reached their objective.’
Such is the tribute paid by 7th Indian Division in their history, Golden Arrow; the historian of 5th Indian Division was even more specific.
‘The debt owed to these tanks and their crews cannot be over emphasized. It was their accurate, high velocity, close range blasting which put our infantry back whenever the Japanese penetrated our defences or captured any vital position.’*
Had the relief of the Admin Box been the end of organized fighting in the Arakan, no doubt the film maker could have shown the Dragoons’ Lees roaring off into an improbable sunset. Unhappily, life is seldom so accommodating, and the regiment was committed to a further two months gruelling fighting.
First, they got on with the task that they had originally crossed the Mayu range to perform, the capture of Buthidaung, during which they supported first 7th and later 26th Division in operations which lasted throughout March. The closer the British and Indian troops pressed to the town, the more frenzied the Japanese resistance became. They had b
een ordered to hold to the last man, and with no thought other than literal obedience, that was exactly what they did; when the infantry overran one position, killing 120 of them, they found that both of their officers had committed hara kiri rather than see the shame of their failure.
During these operations, the tanks constantly employed the bunker-busting technique that had been perfected in the Admin Box, which not only saved the infantry heavy casualties, but also saw them onto their objectives whilst the enemy still had their heads below ground.
At the end of this period, Colonel Frink left the regiment to command a brigade in the Middle East, and was replaced by Lt-Colonel R. Hearder, RTR. The regiment crossed the Kalapanzin River, and was engaged almost continuously in prising the Japanese from their remaining positions around Kyaukyit. Here were encountered bunkers that were not only well concealed, but which also had no less than six feet of earth for head-cover; these were proof against anything less than medium artillery and the direct fire of the tanks, although in one instance it took ten minutes of close concentrated pounding from eight Lees before the bunker succumbed. In addition, Japanese held villages were set on fire, and the tanks brought up ammunition and water for the infantry, and engaged enemy sampan traffic on the river. On one occasion, a tank commander, ordered to deal with a sniper, found that his guns would not bear, so he dismounted and stalked his opponent, killing him with his tommy gun.
The Japanese were now desperately rushing reinforcements into the area. Their Arakan strategy had backfired so badly that General Christison was able to release 5th and 7th Indian Divisions, for use on the Central Front, whilst they, on the other hand, were having to commit reserves which might have had a critical effect on the success of their main offensive. The arrival of the enemy’s reinforcements was made clear by the replacement of the ragged scarecrows 15 Corps had been fighting with fit men ‘wearing good new clothes who had large packs and a lot of rice’.
Early in May the newly arrived Japanese went over to the offensive, attacking with great vigour and recovering ground. In one action A Squadron was in action for nine hours covering the withdrawal of the infantry into their boxes and bringing off their wounded. However, the enemy had left his counter attacks too late, for the monsoon was beginning to break, and of course in the Arakan this was particularly severe.
Gradually fighting in the area spluttered to a halt as movement became more and more difficult. Many of the Dragoons’ tanks became bogged down whilst in close and violent contact with the enemy, making recovery a difficult and dangerous task. When the front stabilized to await the arrival of better weather, the regiment was withdrawn from the line, and returned to India.
Only A Squadron was to see action again, during the mopping up operations of May and June 1945. 25th Dragoons were disbanded in 1947, having had an active life of only six years, but they will always be remembered by anyone who fought in the Arakan as having been a major factor in smashing the myth of Japanese invincibility. For the Japanese, pockets stuffed with Indian money for their ‘March on Delhi’, it was the first of many painful and humiliating lessons they would learn from British and Indian armoured regiments. From now on, the contest would be influenced by 14th Army’s highly professional use of its armour, and by the almost total failure of the Japanese to grasp its potential.
* The History of the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment.
* ‘In the Autumn of 1943, my brother, who was commanding 4 Corps at Imphal, arranged for me to visit him. He asked me to recce his two main axes, the road to Tamu and the Tiddim road. I later told him that I was quite sure that tanks could operate on both axes, though on strictly limited frontages. He said he would ask for my Brigade to be sent up to Imphal. I returned to my Brigade in India, to be met by my second-in-command, Claud Pert, who said that in my absence the DMT from GHQ had visited the Brigade, and told the officers that if they wished to see anything of the war, they should take steps to transfer to the infantry, as tanks would never be used in Burma. Assuming that my job as a Brigade Commander was about to end, and that I had nothing to lose, I took the next aeroplane to Delhi. Here I had interviews with the Auk and Alan Hartley, the Deputy Commander, and with the DMO and DMT, whose names I cannot remember. I pointed out as strongly as I could that the tanks could be used in Burma, and would eventually have to be used, and that GHQ would be caught short. The DMT asked me how long I had been in India, and I told him six months. He replied, “We have been here many years and we know India,” to which I replied, “Well at least I have walked the course on my own feet, which I suspect is more than anyone in this HQ has done!” After which I swept out.
‘The unfortunate action at Donbaik had grave repercussions, as it resulted in few infantry battalions of brigades ever being trained with tanks or knowing their capabilities, all of which had then to be learned on the battlefield. The net result was that we commenced operations in 1944 with only one brigade of tanks employed. This allowed no reserve and with the constant demand for tank support, meant that both tanks and crews were pretty heavily flogged’.—Extract from letter written by Major-General Sir Reginald Scoones to the author.
*This was not Messervy’s first experience of narrow escapes. At the start of the Gazala battle in North Africa his HQ had been overrun and he had been captured, although he had escaped shortly afterwards. When taunted with German superiority and skill at arms, he is said to have tartly suggested to the officer concerned that if he would care to examine himself carefully before turning in for the night, he would be surprised to discover that he was made just like anyone else.
* No study of the use of armour during the campaign in Burma would be complete without due tribute being paid to this outstanding Regiment, who referred to another Grenadier regiment whose headquarters is in Birdcage Walk as ‘our London branch’.
When tanks are operating in close country where the enemy has every opportunity of lurking amongst the dense foliage, they must have the immediate protection of infantry; the need for this had been appreciated very early by 7th Armoured Brigade. However, it is better if the infantry are specialists, and the Bombay Grenadier battalions had been chosen to train for this very exacting and dangerous work. One has only to read the words of the historian of 150 Regiment RAC, which have been echoed, and in some cases quoted, by every armoured regiment which had the good fortune to work with the Grenadiers, to see how well they performed their role.
‘They relieved (the Regiment) of all its worries as to the safety of its tanks, acted as its eyes in spotting targets, came with it where other infantry hesitated to follow, and accepted casualties in safeguarding their charges which perhaps a less loyal and literal interpretation of their duties might have avoided.
‘Despite the almost complete inability of the men of 150th Regiment and these brave Jats to understand a word of each other’s language, they established between them that odd lingo by means of which British and Indian troops have conversed for so long. With this lingo was also created an unbreakable confidence in each other’s abilities and friendship which eased the hardest tasks.’
At the personal level, Colonel Critchley of 19th Lancers, who exercised command from well forward, has told the author that on numerous occasions he owed his life to a Grenadier whose presence he did not even suspect.
* Indian soldiers fighting for the Japanese.
† The feeling is faithfully mirrored in 14th Army’s newspaper, SEAC. Reporting on the fighting at Kohima, it printed several paragraphs describing how a Japanese soldier had had his eyes gouged out in hand to hand fighting with a British infantryman. The general opinion was that this was a good thing, and so it must have seemed at the time.
* Ball of Fire.
Note
The recapture of the Tunnels Road was completed by the Major-General Francis Festing’s 36th Division, supported by the Shermans of C Squadron 149 Regiment RAC. One tunnel was used by the Japanese as an ammunition dump; on 27 March this erupted in a series of thundrous explosions w
hen a Sherman fired a round into the tunnel mouth, enabling the attacking infantry to take possession.
5
U-Go: Overture and Beginners
The best way for the British to reconquer Burma would have been by means of an amphibious operation which secured Rangoon, followed by an advance northwards. The Japanese armies, deprived of their major source of supply, would wither on the vine and die for want of succour.
However, in 1944 landing craft of all descriptions were at a premium, being required for the landings in Normandy and the south of France and for countless operations against enemy held islands in the Pacific. Therefore, Burma would have to be conquered from the north by conventional means.
Since the end of the 1942 fighting, the Central Front had rested on the Une of the Chindwin, whilst in the north Stilwell and his Chinese divisions occupied the upper reaches of the Hukawng Valley. In his original plan, General Slim envisaged Stilwell advancing down the Hukawng to effect the capture of Myitkina and Mogaung, aided by Wingate’s Chindits who would be landed right on top of the Japanese line of communication, whilst the British 4 Corps, commanded by Lt-General G. A. P. Scoones, advanced to the Chindwin and effected a crossing.
However, Slim’s opponent, General Kawabe, the commander of the Burma Area Army, was already mounting an offensive of his own. He had been told that as the war was not going well elsewhere, the last thing the people of Japan wanted to hear was bad news from Burma.
Kawabe’s problem was simple. He was confident that he could contain Stilwell’s Chinese without difficulty, but he felt that the long line of the Chindwin was too vulnerable to be guarded adequately, and that he must therefore find an alternative line which would be impregnable. Such a line existed along the crest of the Naga Hills, beyond the Chindwin and across the Imphal Plain, and he felt that once he had secured that objective the British would never be able to break out of India proper to resume operations in Burma, since routes through the towering hills were few and could be easily guarded. Kawabe called his offensive U-Go, although the advance publicity to the troops referred to it grandiloquently as the March on Delhi.
Tank Tracks to Rangoon Page 11
